






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# Southern Historical Society Papers.

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VOLUME IV.

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JULY TO DECEMBER.

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RICHMOND, VA.:  
Rev. J. WM. JONES, D. D.,  
SECRETARY SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY.  
1877.

KRAUS REPRINT CO.  
Millwood, New York  
1977

E 483.7 .S76 1777 V.4

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Printed in U.S.A.

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# SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

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**Vol. IV.      Richmond, Va., July, 1877.      No. 1.**

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**Battle of Kelleysville, March 17th, 1863—Reports of Generals J. E. B. Stuart and Fitz. Lee.**

[The following reports were published in 1863, but are so rare as to be accessible to but few. We are confident, therefore, that many of our readers will be glad to have us print them from the original MSS. in our possession.]

HD. QRS. CAVALRY DIVISION,  
ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,  
*March 25, 1863.*

GEN'L R. H. CHILTON, *A. A. G.:*

GENERAL: I have the honor to enclose herewith the very graphic report of Brig.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee of the battle of Kelleysville, (March 17th), between his brigade and a division of the enemy's cavalry. There is little to be said in addition. The dispositions made for meeting this anticipated raid were sufficient to have prevented or very much retarded the crossing of the Rappahannock at Kelleysville. The report shows wherein these dispositions failed of their object.

The brigade, however, under its noble chief, so redeemed the day by an exhibition of the most extraordinary heroism that we are half disposed to lose sight of the picket failure in the outset.

Being charged by the Commanding-General specially with "preparations to meet Stoneman," I was present on this occasion because of the responsibility which would necessarily attach to me for what was done; but having approved of Brig.-

Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's plans, I determined not to interfere with his command of the brigade as long as it was commanded so entirely to my satisfaction, and I took special pride in witnessing its gallant conduct under its accomplished leader.

The defeat was decided, and the enemy, broken and demoralized, retired, under cover of darkness, to his place of refuge—the main army having abandoned in defeat an expedition undertaken with boasting and vain-glorious demonstration.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of congratulatory orders from division and brigade headquarters, and an order announcing to the division the death of the lamented and noble Pelham.

I was especially indebted to him for his usual gallant services, and to Capt. Harry Gilmer, Twelfth Virginia cavalry, who accompanied me as volunteer staff. Major Lewis F. Terrell, the court martial to which he belonged having taken recess, buckled on his sword with commendable zeal, and came to the field, where he acquitted himself with credit both as an artillery and staff officer.

I cordially concur with Brigadier-General commanding in the high praise he bestows on Col. T. L. Rosser, Fifth Virginia cavalry, who, though severely wounded at 2 P. M., remained in command, at the head of his regiment, till the day was won, and night put an end to further operations; on Col. Jas. H. Drake, First Virginia cavalry, who led his regiment in a brilliant charge upon the enemy's flank, routing and pursuing him to his stronghold; on the lamented Puller and his comrades fallen; on Lieut. Hill Carter, Third Virginia cavalry, and Adj. Peter Fontaine, Fourth Virginia cavalry, whose individual prowess attracted my personal attention, and remark, the latter receiving a severe wound; and on the very efficient staff of General Lee, enumerated in his report, and the many others to whom the 17th of March will ever be the proudest of days.

Brig.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee exhibited in the operations, antecedent to and consequent upon the enemy's crossing, the



sagacity of a successful general, and, under the blessing of Divine Providence, we are indebted to his prompt and vigorous action, and the determined bravery of his men for this signal victory, which, when the odds are considered, was one of the most brilliant achievements of the war, Gen. Lee's command in action being less than 800.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. E. B. STUART,  
*Maj.-Gen. Commanding.*

---

HD. QRS. LEE'S CAVALRY BRIGADE,

*March 23d, 1863.*

GEN'L R. H. CHILTON,

*A. A. & I. Gen'l A. N. Va.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of an encounter on the 17th instant between my brigade and a division of the enemy's cavalry, certainly not less than 3,000 mounted men with a battery of artillery. My first intimation of their approach was a telegram received at 11 A. M. on 16th from headquarters, A. N. V. At 6 P. M., scouts reported them at Morissville, a little place 6 miles from Kelley's Ford. At 1 A. M., another report informed me that enemy had encamped at that place, coming from three different directions.

I that night reinforced my picket of 20 sharpshooters by 40 more. I regret to say that only about 11 or 12 of them got into the rifle pits in time for the attack of the enemy (owing to an unnecessary delay in carrying their horses to the rear), which commenced about 5 A. M. The force *in the pits*, under Captain Jas. Breckenridge of the Second, behaved very gallantly, holding in check a large force of the enemy, mounted and dismounted, for an hour and a half—killing and wounding 30 or 40 of them. I also ordered the remaining sharpshooters of the brigade, under that very efficient officer Major Morgan, First Virginia, to move from their camps by day-break to a

point on the railroad, where road turns to Kelley's,  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile from railroad bridge, and  $3\frac{1}{2}$  from Kelley's, and the rest of the command was ordered to be in readiness to move at the shortest notice. At that time a force was reported to be at Bealeton, supposed to be their advance guard; and it was uncertain whether they would attempt to cross at Kelley's, railroad bridge, or move on towards Warrenton.

The report that enemy's attack was made at Kelley's never reached me; and the first intimation I received from that point was at 7:30 A. M., to the effect that they had succeeded in crossing, capturing 25 of my sharpshooters who were unable to reach their horses. I moved my command at once down the railroad, taking up a position to await their approach, ordering my baggage-wagons and disabled horses to the rear towards Rapidan station. Some time elapsing and they not advancing, I determined to move upon them, and marched immediately for Kelley's. First met the enemy half a mile this side of ford, and at once charged them. Their position was a very strong one, sheltered by woods and a long, high stone fence running perpendicular to my advance. My men, unable to cross the fence and ditch in their front, wheeled about, delivering their fire almost in the faces of the enemy, and reformed again, facing about under a heavy fire from their artillery and small arms. The Third, in this charge, was in front, and First Lieutenant Hill Carter was very conspicuous in his behavior. From that time it was a succession of gallant charges by the various regiments, and once by the whole brigade in line, whenever the enemy would show his mounted men; they invariably falling back upon his artillery and sheltered dismounted skirmishers. Their total advance was 2 miles from the ford. At that time my artillery arrived, and they were driven back, recrossing the river about 7:30 P. M., with us in close pursuit.

My whole command acted nobly. Sabres were frequently crossed, and fences charged up to, the leading men dismounting and pulling them down, under a heavy fire of canister, grape, and carbine balls.

Had I my command in the order it arrived in this enervating section of country, and not weakened by the absence of four squadrons on picket guarding a line stretching from Grifinsburg, on the Sperryville turnpike, to Richards' ford, and by the large numbers of horses unfit for duty by exposure to the severe winter with a very limited supply of forage, I feel confident that the defeat of the enemy would have been changed into a disorderly rout, and the whole brigade be supplied with horses, saddles, and bridles.

Commanding officers of the detachments from the various regiments engaged mention in their reports as deserving especial attention:

In the Fifth, Private Wm. J. Haynes, Company F. (badly wounded); Private A. R. Harwood, Company E., Private Henry Wooding, Company C., (especially commended, seized the colors when the horse of the color-bearer was shot, and carried them bravely through the fight); Sergeants Morecocke and Ratliffe, and Private George James, Company H.

In the Fourth, Captains Newton and Old, Lieutenant Hobson and Adjutant Fontaine (seriously wounded). Sergeant Kimbrough, of Company G, deserves particular notice; wounded early in the day, he refused to leave the field. In the last charge he was the first to spring to the ground to open the fence. Then, dashing on at the head of the column, he was twice sabred over the head, his arm shattered by a bullet, captured and carried over the river, when he escaped and walked back 12 miles to his camp. Lieutenant-Colonel Payne, commanding, also mentions Privates Jos. Gilman, J. R. Gilman, Poindexter, Redd, Sydnor, Terry, and N. Priddy.

In the Third, Captain Collins, Company H; Lieutenants Hill Carter and Jno. Lamb, of Company D; Lieutenant Stamper of Company F; Lieutenant R. T. Hubbard, Company G; and First Lieutenant Hall, of Company C, (was twice wounded before he desisted from the charge, and, when retiring, received a third and still more severe wound, and was unable to leave the field). Adjutant H. B. McClellan is also particu-



larly commended for his bravery; Acting Sergeant-Major E. N. Price, Company K; Private Keech, Company I; and Bugler Drilling. Sergeant Betts, of Company C; Privates Young, Company B; Fowler, Company G, and Wilkins, of Company C, died as became brave men, in the front of the charge at the head of the column.

In the Second, the commanding officer reports, "where so many behaved themselves with so much gallantry he does not like to discriminate."

In the First, Captain Jordan, Company C, and Lieutenant Cecil, Company K, (specially commended for reckless daring without a parallel).

As coming under my own observation, I particularly noticed Colonel T. L. Rosser, of the Fifth, with his habitual coolness and daring, charging at the head of his regiment.

Colonel James Drake, of the First, always ready at the right time and place. Colonel T. H. Owen, of Third, begging to be allowed to charge, again and again. Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Payne, of the Fourth, unmindful of his former dreadful wound, using his sabre with effect in hand-to-hand conflict, and the imperturable, self-possessed Major Breckenridge, of the Second, whose boldness led him so far that he was captured, his horse being shot. Colonel T. L. Munford of the Second, I regret to say, was President of a Court-Martial in Culpeper Courthouse, and did not know of the action in time to join his command until the fight was nearly over. I also commend for their behavior, Captain Tebbs, of the Second, and Captain Litchfield and Lieutenant Dorsey, of the First; also Major W. A. Morgan, of the First.

My personal staff, Major Mason, Captains Ferguson and Bowling, Dr. J. B. Fontaine, and Lieutenants Lee, Ryals, and Minnegerode rendered great service by their accurate and quick transmission of orders, and by their conduct under fire. Surgeon Fontaine's horse was killed under him, and my own was also shot; but through the generosity of Private Jno. H. Owings, Company K, First Virginia cavalry, attached to my headquarters, was quickly replaced by his.

The conduct of Couriers Owings, Lee, Nightengale, and Henry Shackelford, deserves the highest praise.

The enemy's loss was heavy. Besides leaving a number of his dead and wounded on the field, he carried off a large number on horses and in ambulances.

We captured 29 prisoners—a captain, 2 lieutenants, and 26 privates. My own loss was 11 killed, 88 wounded, 34 taken prisoners, making aggregate of 133.

In horses, 71 killed, 87 wounded, 12 captured, making aggregate loss of horses, 170.

Among the killed, I deeply regret to report Major Puller, of the Fifth, and Lieutenant Harris, of the Fourth, both gallant and highly efficient officers—a heavy loss to their regiments and country.

In conclusion, I desire *especially* to state that *Major-General J. E. B. Stuart* joined me before the fight commenced; was on the field the whole day, assisted immensely by his *sagacious counsels, large experience*, and by his *usual daring and conspicuous example*, in turning the fortunes of the day in our favor. We share with him the anguish and deep grief felt at the loss of the noble Pelham of his staff—an officer of the brightest promise for the future.

Major Terrill of General Stuart's staff, besides being active on the field, assisted the gallant Brethed in the management of the artillery. Captain Gilmer, Twelfth Virginia cavalry, a volunteer for the occasion on the Major-General's staff, I also commend for his marked bravery and cool courage.

I append a recapitulation of my loss.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

FITZ. LEE,  
*Brig.-Gen'l Comd'g.*

## RECAPITULATION

*Of the loss of Brig.-Gen. Fitz. Lee's Cavalry Brigade, in the engagement near  
"KELLEYSVILLE" March 17th, 1863.*

	Killed.		Wounded.		Taken Prisoners.		Aggregate loss.	Horses.			
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.		Killed.	Wounded.	Taken by enemy.	Aggregate loss.
Field and staff.....	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	1	1	.....	2
1st Regt. Va. cav.....	.....	1	.....	7	.....	.....	8	7	13	1	21
2d " " " .....	.....	1	2	16	1	14	34	6	20	.....	26
3d " " " .....	.....	4	6	31	.....	3	44	26	24	1	51
4th " " " .....	1	1	1	16	.....	16	35	15	16	10	41
5th " " " .....	1	1	2	7	.....	.....	11	16	13	.....	29
Total.....	3	8	11	77	1	33	133	71	87	12	170



**Battle of Chancellorsville—Report of Major-General Stuart.**

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,  
ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

*May 6th, 1863.*

Brig. Gen. R. H. CHILTON, *A. A. & I. G.*,

*Hd. Qrs. A. N. V.:*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit, in advance of a detailed report, the following narrative of events connected with the battle of the Wilderness, May second, and of Chancellorsville, May third, and events following:

This corps, under its immortal leader, Lieut.-Gen. Jackson, attacked the enemy on his right, turning his right flank by the turnpike road, at Melzie Chancellor's, two miles above Chancellorsville, making the attack late in the evening, after an arduous and necessarily circuitous march from the plank road, two miles below Chancellorsville. The enemy had a fine position, and if time had been given him to recover from his first surprise and mass troops on that front, it would have been a difficult task to dislodge them; but Jackson's entire corps, both when marching and when in position, had been purposely screened from view by the cavalry of Fitz. Lee's brigade—an important duty, which he performed with great skill and address. The attack was thus, in a measure, a surprise. The enemy's line of entrenchments was carried, and his legions driven in confusion from the field. It was already dark when I sought Gen. Jackson, and proposed, as there appeared nothing else for me to do, to take some cavalry and infantry over and hold the Ely's ford. He approved the proposition, and I had already gained the heights overlooking the ford, where was a large number of camp fires, when Capt. Adams, of Gen. A. P. Hill's staff, reached me post haste, and informed me of the sad calamities which for the time deprived the troops of the leadership of both Jackson and Hill, and the urgent demand for me to come and take command as quickly

as possible. I rode with rapidity back five miles, determined to press the pursuit already so gloriously begun. Gen. Jackson had gone to the rear, but Gen. A. P. Hill was still on the ground, and formally turned over the command to me. I sent also a staff officer to Gen. Jackson to inform him that I would cheerfully carry out any instructions he would give, and proceeded immediately to the front, which I reached at 10 P. M. I found, upon reaching it, A. P. Hill's division in front, under Heth, with Lane's, McGowan's, Archer's and Heth's brigades on the right of the road, within half a mile of Chancellorsville, near the apex of the ridge, and Pender's and Thomas' on the left. I found that the enemy had made an attack on our right flank, but were repulsed. The fact, however, that the attack was made, and at night, made me apprehensive of a repetition of it, and necessitated throwing back the right wing so as to meet it. I was also informed that there was much confusion on the right, owing to the fact that some troops mistook friends for the enemy, and fired upon them. Knowing that an advance under such circumstances would be extremely hazardous, much against my inclination I felt bound to wait for daylight. Gen. Jackson had also sent me word to use my own discretion. The Commanding-General was with the right wing of the army, with which I had no communication, except by a very circuitous and uncertain route. I nevertheless sent a dispatch to inform him of the state of affairs, and rode around the lines, restoring order, imposing silence and making arrangements for the attack early next day. I sent Col. E. P. Alexander, senior officer of artillery, to select and occupy with artillery, positions along the line bearing upon the enemy's position, with which duty he was engaged all night. At early dawn Trimble's division composed the second line and Rodes' division the third. The latter had his rations on the spot, and as his men were entirely without food, was extremely anxious to issue. I was disposed to wait a short time for this purpose; but when, as preliminary to an attack, I ordered the right of the first line to swing around and come per-

pendicular to the road, the order was misunderstood for an order to attack, and that part of the line became engaged. I ordered the whole line to advance and the second and third lines to follow. As the sun lifted the mist that shrouded the field, it was discovered that the ridge on the extreme right was a fine position for concentrating artillery. I immediately ordered thirty pieces to that point, and under the happy effects of the battalion system, it was done quickly. The effect of this fire upon the enemy's batteries was superb. In the mean time the enemy was pressing our left with infantry, and all the reinforcements I could obtain were sent there. Colquitt's brigade, of Trimble's division, ordered first to the right, was directed to the left to support Pender. Iverson's brigade, of the second line, was also engaged there, and the three lines were more or less merged into one line of battle, and reported hard pressed. Urgent requests were sent for reinforcements, and notices that the troops were out of ammunition, &c. I ordered that the ground must be held at all hazards; if necessary, with the bayonet. About this time, also, our right connected with Anderson's left, relieving all anxiety on that subject. I was now anxious to mass infantry on the left, to push the enemy there, and sent every available regiment to that point. About 8 o'clock A. M., the works of the enemy directly in front of our right were stormed; but the enemy's forces retiring from the line facing Anderson, which our batteries enfiladed, caused our troops to abandon these works, the enemy coming in their rear. It was stormed a second time, when I discovered the enemy making a flank movement to the left of the road for the purpose of dislodging our forces, and hastened to change the front of a portion of our line to meet this attack; but the shortness of the time and the deafening roar of artillery prevented the execution of this movement, and our line again retired. The third time it was taken I made disposition of a portion of Ramseur's brigade to protect the left flank. Artillery was pushed forward to the crest, sharpshooters were posted in a house in advance, and in a few

moments Chancellorsville was ours, (10 o'clock, A. M.) The enemy retired towards Ely's ford, the road to United States' ford branching one half mile west of Chancellorsville.

In this hotly contested battle the enemy had strong works on each side of the road, those on the commanding ridge being heavily defended by artillery. The night, also, had given him time to mass his troops to meet this attack; but the desperate valor of Jackson's corps overcame every obstacle, and drove the enemy to his new line of defence, which his engineers had constructed in his rear, ready for occupation, at the intersection of the Ely's ford and United States ford roads. Gen. Anderson's division, of the right wing, arrived upon the field comparatively fresh. I set about reforming my command, with a view to a renewal of the attack, when the Commanding-General received intelligence that the enemy had crossed at Fredericksburg, and taken Marye's hill. An aide-de-camp of Gen. Sedgwick, captured by Col. Wickham's regiment on the right near Banks' ford, reported two corps under command of Sedgwick. The Commanding-General decided to hold Hooker, beaten as he was, in his works, with Jackson's corps, and detach enough of other forces to turn on Sedgwick. The success of this strategy enabled him again to concentrate to force Hooker's position; and arrangements were made for attack with this corps on the morning of the 6th (Wednesday); but before it was begun our skirmishers found the enemy's works abandoned, and, pressing forward to the river, captured many prisoners. The enemy had another work, two miles in rear of the other, which was also abandoned. This region of country is known as "The Wilderness." Rapid pursuit in such a country is an impossibility, where the enemy takes care to leave his trains beyond the Rappahannock, and avails himself, as he does, of the appliances of art, labor and natural obstacles, to delay his pursuers. In this battle, in which the enemy's main force was attacked in chosen positions, he was driven entirely from the field, and finally fled across the river. Our troops behaved with the greatest heroism.



I desire to call the attention of the Commanding-General to the fact that I was called to the command at 10 o'clock at night, on the battle-field, of the *corps d'armee* led so long by the immortal Jackson, in the midst of a night attack made by the enemy, without any knowledge of the ground, the position of our forces, or the plans thus far pursued, and without an officer left in the corps above the rank of Brigadier-General. Under these disadvantages the attack was renewed the next morning and prosecuted to a successful issue. Major-General A. P. Hill, who had the misfortune to be wounded soon after the command devolved upon him, remained near the field next day, notwithstanding his wound, for which I was very grateful, for circumstances might have arisen making his presence necessary.

To the generals of divisions and brigades I feel greatly indebted for the hearty co-operation, zeal and support accorded to me by all to the fullest extent of their ability. The field officers and others I hope to particularize hereafter in a detailed report, when the data is collected, as well as mention specially the various officers serving on my staff with marked distinction during the day.

I labored under great disadvantages in having none of Gen. Jackson's staff with me until after the action began, and then only Major A. S. Pendleton, who, however, behaved with great heroism and efficiency when he did join me.

Our losses were heavy; the enemy's heavier. In Sunday's battle, Brigadier-Generals Ramseur, Heth and McGowan were wounded, and Paxton killed. Heth and Ramseur, though painfully wounded, persisted in retaining command to the close of the fight. Their heroic conduct will be specially mentioned in the report proper. The casualties of the corps I have not the means of knowing, as, before the returns were completed, I relinquished the command to Major-General A. P. Hill, in pursuance to the orders of the Commanding-General; but the division and brigade commanders were ordered to submit, through me, their reports of the battle of Chancellorsville.

The cavalry was well managed by Brigadier-General Fitz. Lee, who seized Ely's ford and held the road to within two miles of Chancellorsville, driving the enemy's cavalry from the former place. His men, without rations or forage, displayed a heroism rarely met with under any circumstances; and, guarding the two flanks, accomplished an indispensable part of the great success which God vouchsafed to us.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. E. B. STUART,

*Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.*

---

#### **General S. D. Lee's Report of the Siege of Vicksburg.**

[The following important and valuable report has never been published, so far as we have been able to ascertain, and we give it from the original MS. of its accomplished author.]

HD. QRS. 2D BRIG., STEVENSON'S DIVISION,  
DEMOPOLIS, ALABAMA, *July 25th*, 1863.

SIR:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken in our operations during the siege of Vicksburg, by the troops under my command, consisting of the Twentieth Alabama regiment, Col. J. W. Jarrot; Twenty-third Alabama regiment, Col. F. K. Beck; Thirtieth Alabama regiment, Col. C. M. Shelly; Thirty-first Alabama regiment, Lt.-Col. T. M. Arrington; Forty-sixth Alabama regiment, Capt. Geo. E. Brewer; Waul's Texas legion, Col. T. N. Waul; Waddell's battery, Capt. J. F. Waddell; Drew's battery, Lieut. W. J. Duncan; the Hudson battery, Lieut. Trentham; Capt. Haynes' company, First Louisiana artillery, and a section of the Vaiden artillery, Lieut. Collins.

On the morning of the 17th of May, our works on Big Black bridge having been carried by the enemy, our army was ordered to retire to our entrenchments around Vicksburg. My

brigade was ordered to cover the retreat across the river after the works were carried, and was accordingly posted along the banks for that purpose, where it remained until relieved by Baldwin's brigade, Smith's division, which brought up the rear. By an error in the transmission of an order, the Twenty-third Alabama regiment, Col. F. K. Beck, remained at the bridge after Baldwin's brigade had been withdrawn, and gallantly engaged the enemy during the entire day, leaving its position about midnight and joining the brigade at Vicksburg. The city of Vicksburg was invested on the 18th of May—the enemy having regularly surrounded it, and commenced their parallel approaches. The position occupied by my brigade was immediately to the right of the railroad, with its left resting on that road. All the knolls in front of my line were at once seized by the enemy, and batteries erected thereon for their artillery, their sharpshooters in the meantime keeping up a continuous and annoying fire. On the 19th, 20th, and 21st of May, the enemy's forces were massed under cover of their artillery and sharpshooters' fire, in the ravines a few hundred yards in front of our lines. At about 10 A. M. on the 22d, a gallant assault was made upon our works from the right of my position to the extreme left of our line on the river. The assault upon my front was a determined one, but was handsomely repulsed, with considerable loss to the enemy. They succeeded, however, in carrying an angle of the work immediately to the right of the railroad, and in planting two colors upon the parapet, which remained there for several hours. The angle was finally assaulted and carried by a gallant band of Waul's Texas legion, under command of the intrepid Lt.-Col. E. W. Pettus, Twentieth Alabama regiment. This brave officer, assisted by Major Steele and Capt. Bradly of the legion and the heroic Texans, captured the colors of the enemy and about fifty prisoners, including a lieutenant-colonel. A more daring feat has not been performed during the war, and too much praise cannot be awarded to everyone engaged in it. All the troops under my command behaved well during the

assault, and inflicted severe loss upon the enemy. Waul's Texas legion particularly distinguished itself under its brave colonel, by its coolness and gallantry, as did also a portion of Col. Dockerie's Arkansas regiment. The Twentieth, Twenty-third, and Thirty-first Alabama regiments attracted my attention by their good conduct during the day. The above-mentioned commands are those which particularly came under my personal observation during the assault. From the 22d of May, the enemy seemed to have abandoned the idea of carrying our works by assault, and from that time commenced pushing their works gradually, but industriously, towards ours, up to the 4th of July, when the city was surrendered—at which time their trenches, at several points on my line, were within thirty feet of our works. As each of their ditches was completed it was filled with sharpshooters, who kept up a continuous fire upon our lines. The enemy had, also, from fifteen to thirty pieces of artillery in front of my line, which kept up a heavy fire both night and day. The fire from their small arms commenced generally about one-half hour before daylight, and continued until about dark in the evening. There was no relief whatever to our men, who were confined for forty-seven days in their narrow trenches, without any opportunity for moving about, as there was during the day a perfect rain of minnie balls, which prevented any one from showing the least portion of his person, while at night, in consequence of the proximity of the enemy, it was impossible for the men to leave their position for any length of time. After about the 10th day of the siege the men lived on about one-half rations, and on even less than that towards its close. During the whole time the troops under my command exhibited cheerfulness and good spirit, feeling confident that they would finally be relieved. Physically they were much weakened by their arduous duties and poor rations, and at the time of the surrender I did not consider more than one-half of my men able to undergo the fatigues of the field.



The officers who particularly attracted my attention were Col. Garrett, Twentieth Alabama, the pure patriot and gallant soldier who was killed on the 17th of June, while in the fearless discharge of his duties. Respected and loved by all who knew him, a more attentive and vigilant officer was not in our service. Col. T. N. Waul, commanding Texas legion, by his dashing gallantry and coolness inspired every one around him with confidence, and handled his legion with skill. Cols. Beck and Shelly were particularly brave and vigilant. Col. Pettus, Twentieth Alabama, won the admiration of every one by his daring on the 22d of May, and by his uniform good conduct during the remainder of the siege. Lt.-Cols. Smith, Thirtieth Alabama, Arrington, Thirty-first Alabama; Timmons and ———, of Waul's Texas legion; Maj. Mattisin, Thirty-first Alabama; Capts. Francis, Thirtieth Alabama, and Brewer, Forty-sixth Alabama; Captains Waddell and Haynes, and Lieuts. Duncan and Collins, commanding batteries and sections of artillery, were gallant and vigilant. Major Jno. J. Reeve, Assistant Adjutant-General of the division, was with me on the lines on several occasions, and particularly attracted my attention by his daring and coolness during the assault on the 22d. Capt. Conway, the engineer in charge of the work on my line, was active and energetic in the discharge of his duties, and was unceasing in his efforts during night and day to check the approach of the enemy.

Of my personal staff I would mention the uniform, cool, and gallant conduct of Capt. Wm. Elliott, Assistant Adjutant-General, who was always at the post of danger inspiring confidence by his example. Capt. W. H. Johnson and Lt. H. N. Martin, acting aides-de-camp, and Capt. Curell and Lt. Underhill, volunteer aides-de-camp, behaved with gallantry during the siege. I would also mention Mr. West, who was serving on my staff; my orderly, L. B. Murphey, Forty-sixth Alabama regiment, and my couriers, Hill and J. M. Simpson, who were always gallant and at their posts.



The report of casualties in the different regiments and companies cannot yet be furnished, as the reports have not been received from their respective commanders.

Yours respectfully,

S. D. LEE,  
*Brigadier-General.*

Official:

H. B. LEE, *First Lieutenant and A. D. C.*

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### **Defence of Batteries Gregg and Whitworth, and the Evacuation of Petersburg.**

By Maj.-Gen. C. M. WILCOX.

[We give from the pen of a gallant participant still another account of the heroic defence of Battery Gregg, together with other matters pertaining to those stirring scenes.]

The January and February numbers of the Southern Historical Society Papers contain accounts of the attack, defence and capture of Fort Gregg, April 2, 1865, called at the time Battery Gregg. The first mentioned number has the report of Brig.-Gen. James H. Lane, accompanied by several letters: one of his own addressed to myself, and one from each of the following named officers of his brigade, Lieut. Geo. H. Snow, Lieut. F. B. Craige, and Lieut. A. B. Howard, of the Thirty-third North Carolina, and one from Lieut. D. M. Rigler, Thirty-seventh North Carolina regiment; there is also a short extract from a letter of Col. R. V. Cowan, Thirty-third North Carolina, addressed to Gen. Lane, referring, as do the other mentioned letters, to this fight.

In the February number, the editor refers to what is stated in the previous number, and "that all may be heard and with the view of getting at the truth," publishes an account of this affair, from a "Soldier's Story of the late war, by Napier Bartlett." Many and conflicting statements of this Battery

Gregg fight, have at various times appeared in newspapers, periodicals and histories, all differing and more or less inaccurate, but none varying more widely from the truth than those of the two historians, Cooke and Swinton. The former, page 445 of his *Life of Gen. Lee* says: "The forts, especially Gregg, made a gallant resistance. This work was defended by 250 men of Harris' Mississippi brigade, and they fought until their numbers were reduced to 30, killing or wounding 500 of the enemy. The forts were taken at last, and the Federals advanced towards the city. In this attack fell the eminent soldier, Gen. A. P. Hill, whose record had been so illustrious, and whose good fortune it was to thus terminate his life while the Southern flag still floated." The errors of this writer are, 1st, there were not 250 men in Battery Gregg on the occasion referred to; 2d, they were not all of Harris' Mississippi brigade; 3d, Gen. Hill did not fall at it, but several hours before, and beyond Pickerell's house, on the Boydton plank road, and on west side of the road; 4th, the number of men in the battery was not reduced to thirty.

Swinton, page 603, *Army of the Potomac* says: "The attack was directed against Forts Gregg and Alexander," the last mentioned was called Battery Whitworth, "two strong enclosed works;" he then repeats Cooke's errors as to the composition of the command that held and defended Battery Gregg, but falls into one not found in Cooke; "the other, Fort Alexander," meaning Whitworth, "found no such defenders and readily fell." Battery Whitworth was held by just as true, brave, and devoted men as their comrades in Battery Gregg; it was not captured by the enemy, but evacuated by my orders when Gregg fell; the command in it, at least the infantry, were all of Harris' brigade; these and the troops outside of and near Gregg fell back to the main line around Petersburg, near a mile in rear, and were not annoyed or pursued by the enemy. Among the troops that retired at this time were Cox's North Carolina brigade, that had been thrown out from the main line, its right connecting with my left several hundred yards to the left of Gregg.

Inasmuch as I was present at the time, and gave the order to occupy both batteries, Gregg and Whitworth, and made such other disposition of the small number of men at my disposal as was believed would best answer the purpose in view, and finally, when this was accomplished, directed the withdrawal to the main line in rear, and as my official report has never been published, I will now give some of the facts connected with the defence of these two batteries. Before doing so, however, it would be well to refer briefly to our line that was exterior to the main or Petersburg line on this part of our very widely extended field, and to state in what manner they were held, going somewhat into the details of the military operations of the few days preceding April second.

Early in October, 1864, Heth's division and two brigades, Lane's and McGowan's, of my division, were placed in position with orders to entrench, the line being east of the Boydton plank road, which ran to Dinwiddie Courthouse. The left of the line was near where this road crossed Old Town creek, and some two hundred yards east of the road, and little less than a mile from the lines around Petersburg; the right rested on Hatcher's run, a mile below Burgess' mill, this being at the crossing of the run by the Dinwiddie Courthouse road. This new line guarded the road—Boydton plank road—over which we received supplies from Hieksford, on the Weldon railroad, in rear or south of the point where the Federal line crossed this road.

March 27th, General Grant withdrew all save a small force from the north side of James river, and on the 29th moved the bulk of his army towards the extreme right of our lines, then resting below Burgess' mill. General Lee shifted to his extreme right Pickett's division and part of that of Bushrod Johnson's, March 29th; then took position beyond Burgess' mill and to the right of the road and nearly parallel with the White Oak road. 10 P. M., McCrae's brigade, of Heth's division, and McGowan's brigade, of my division, were moved from the line covering the Boydton plank road to the vicinity

of Burgess' mill, halting on the north side of Hatcher's run. These brigades had moved under direction of General Heth. The march was toilsome and fatiguing, the night excessively dark, and the road muddy from heavy rain then falling in torrents. Artillery was heard in direction of Petersburg, at times intermingled with small arms. On the lines at various points the dark clouds were made visible occasionally by rockets sent up from the two lines. Early the next morning—30th—these brigades were moved across the run and placed in line to the right of the road and at right angles to it, along a line partially entrenched. Skirmishers that had covered their front, whence they had moved, remained; they were thus weakened by about 150 men each. McCrae's brigade to the left of McGowan's, and Bushrod Johnson's division, or a part of it, on his (McGowan's) right. In this new position the line of skirmishers became involved in a brisk fire as soon as posted. Scale's brigade, of my division, was moved from the right of the Petersburg lines to Burgess' mill, and occupied a line on both sides of the road. General Lee was early in the morning present on this part of the lines. These troops, save Scale's, were moved or extended farther to the right, their line being nearly parallel with the general direction of Hatcher's run. It rained very hard all day and most of the night. Late in the afternoon the Thirteenth and Thirty-eighth North Carolina regiments, of Scale's brigade, under command of Colonel Ashford, of the latter, were ordered forward to dislodge the enemy from a piece of woods close in front. This involved a sharp fight. The enemy were driven out with a loss of quite a number of prisoners. The Hon. Thomas Conley,\* member of the English Parliament, and my guest at the time, was present with General Lee.

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\* This genial and warm-hearted stranger was in our midst during the last days of the defence of Richmond and Petersburg. I had met him in Raleigh, North Carolina, a few weeks before, and on the eve of returning to the army. Gov. Vance introduced us, and requested me to look after him. He had run the blockade on the Owl, destined for Wilmington. On coming within easy range of Fort Fisher, the Confederate flag was not seen, but in its place waved



Colonel Ashford was wounded, and on his return was complimented by the Commanding-General. This spirited affair enabled us to advance our skirmish line considerably. The Fifth and Sixth corps, of the Union army, bivouaced the night of the 30th facing Hatcher's run; one of Warren's—Fifth corps—divisions on the west side of the Boydton plank road. Early the following morning—31st—Warren moved farther to his left—west—approached quite near the White Oak road, and was assailed with such spirit by Gen. McGowan, in command of his own and Gracie's brigades, of Johnson's division, soon reinforced by Hunton's brigade, of Pickett's division, that he was driven back a mile, when, being reinforced by a division of the Second corps, which attacked the Confederates

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the stars and stripes. It had been captured a few days before. The Owl made its escape, and landed Mr. Conley and two other passengers a short distance below, from which place Raleigh was reached without difficulty. On board the Owl was a full set of horse equipments, saddle, bridle, &c., for Gen. Lee and each member of his staff, presents from Mr. Conley. They were never received. We reached Richmond together. He was kindly received, and seemed much gratified at it. He made me three visits in my winter quarters near Petersburg, called to see Gen. Lee, dined with him, and secured one of his photographs. He was greatly delighted when I asked him to ride with me along my skirmish line. On much of the line the Federal skirmishers were in sight. On his last visit, he witnessed the collision between Col. Ashford, commanding two North Carolina regiments, and a small force of the enemy. This pleased him so much that he offered his services to me for the coming campaign, and said if I would permit him he would remain with me until its close. I accepted his tender of service, and told him I would make him one of my volunteer aids. He thanked me, and asked if I would let him go under fire. I replied that it would hardly be possible for him to escape being under fire. He said he would return to Richmond, get his baggage and report to me early Monday morning. He left me Saturday evening. Our lines were broken next morning, and the army retired towards Appomattox Courthouse, 8 P. M. I was in New York ten days after the surrender, on my way to Texas, a paroled prisoner; met Conley the first night. He gave an amusing account of his leaving Richmond in the night and his difficulties in reaching the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. He urged me to go to Ireland with him, and supposing I wanted money, offered me his purse freely. He was eccentric in the dress he wore on the streets and about camp. He had all the vivacity, and much of the wit and humor peculiar to his race. I was much pained when I heard of his death a few years since.



in flank, while he fought them in front, he forced them back to their original lines, the most of the day being consumed in the battle. The attack was made about 10.30 A. M. Late in the afternoon Sheridan, who had advanced to the immediate vicinity of Five Forks, was driven back by Pickett to Dinwiddie Courthouse.

During most of the day, while the fighting was severe farther to the right, there was a very heavy skirmish going on about Burgess' mill, and on Cooke's brigade, near where the line intersected Hatcher's run, below the mill, and on Lane's brigade, to the left of Cooke. It was so heavy and threatening about the mill that Gen. Heth sent to me for a brigade, I being in charge of the lines from the run back to near Petersburg; but the firing increasing on my own front, and being probably heard and properly appreciated by him, he sent me the note below:

“HEADQUARTERS, &c.,

“*March 31, 1865.*

“Gen. WILCOX, *Commanding, &c.*:

“Maj.-Gen. Heth directs me to say that you must not compromise your line. He wants the brigade sent for by Maj. Starke, but you must be the judge as to whether or not you can spare it.

“Respectfully,

“W. H. PALMER,

“*Assist. Adjutant-General.*”

This left me free to choose between two evils, each equally dangerous; we, Gen. Heth and myself, were too weak to support the one, the other, or to maintain our own line if attacked with force and spirit. The brigade was not sent. At this time I was holding a line three or four miles long, with Cooke's, Davis', and McComb's brigades of Heth's division, and Lane's and Thomas' of my division; on parts of my line the men were in one thin line ten feet apart, and no where was it held by men in double ranks. Col. Richardson, of the artillery,

was wounded seriously to-day on the line held by Davis' brigade; and near the same place and time my horse was wounded twice.\*

The effect of the spirited fighting of McGowan, that forced Warren back upon Gravelly run, and the driving of Sheridan back to Dinwiddie Courthouse by Pickett, was the cause, according to Mr. Swinton, of such anxiety at headquarters of the Army of the Potomac as to lead to the determination to withdraw the Second and Fifth corps, in order to hold, if possible, the line of the Boydton plank road and Gravelly run—Ord and Humphreys to hold the run. This was abandoned, according to Swinton, at the suggestion of Gen. Warren, who proposed to move towards Dinwiddie Courthouse and make a combined attack with Sheridan the following morning.

Sheridan having been forced back to Dinwiddie Courthouse, after dark Pickett withdrew, and retired upon Five Forks, several miles to the right of our lines, extending from Burgess' mill. The following morning, April 1st, our cavalry pickets confronting Sheridan were driven in. The Federal cavalry following towards Five Forks, was joined by Warren—Fifth corps—before 8 A. M. The cavalry delayed Sheridan a good deal, but he reached the vicinity of the Forks by 2:30

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\* This note was from a lady, a refugee, at the time living in Petersburg; her home was on the south side of James river, below City Point some distance. It was in the Federal line, and had been despoiled by the soldiers. She sought safety in Petersburg. Knowing the excitement that prevailed in Petersburg during our final operations about it, I sent couriers with short notes, giving the exact condition of affairs. This was in reply to one of such notes:

“PETERSBURG, April 1, 1865.

“Your ‘bulletin’ was more than usually interesting and acceptable. We had heard nothing reliable to-day, and every body is looking a little sad. We are very sorry to hear your horse was wounded. Don’t let them get the South-side railroad. They are too near us now. I am sure if all will do their duty the enemy can be kept off. At this time no one should know such a word as fail. Hoping for brighter intelligence, and cordial wishes for your safety and success, in which all unite,

“I am truly yours,

“M. I. W.”

P. M. About 4 P. M. a combined and simultaneous attack was made, the infantry moving against Pickett's left and rear, whilst dismounted cavalry assailed him in front. The attack succeeded. The position was carried with the loss of valuable lives, many prisoners and all of the artillery. Our extreme right was crushed. The extent of the disaster was not generally known till late the next day.

All during the night of April 1st the enemy's batteries around Petersburg kept up an almost incessant cannonade, solid shot and shell whizzing through the air and bursting in every direction, at times equal in brilliancy to a vivid meteoric display.\*

The infantry pickets were also wide awake and kept up much more than their usual firing. About day-light it was

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\* This note is from the same lady:

“APRIL 2D, 1865, 12 o'clock M.

“The greastest excitement prevails every where and with every body this morning. No one but the young people slept at all last night. The shelling was very severe from 11 P. M. till 6½ o'clock. About breakfast time they fired the warehouses and tobacco. Since then they have been shelling very horribly. The shells are whistling around us every few minutes—one has just struck nearly opposite to us. I am so sorry the enemy has gained any advantage. Every kind of rumor in circulation; people are flying in every direction; we all try and keep composed. The enemy came under the bank of the river and surprised and took a portion of two companies of the Thirteenth Virginia infantry—they were retaken with slight loss on our side this morning. General Gordon sent word about an hour ago that he can hold his lines. General Walker has sent one of his brigades to the support of General Grimes. They hold a salient of ours at or near the Wilcox house. I hear that General Harris has come over and been sent to retake it. We have just heard General Hill is quite seriously wounded. Mrs. H. is very much excited, much more than any of us. I trust Colonel Pegram has not been killed, as reported.

“The ambulance committee have reached here from Richmond. E., M., and S. unite in kindest regards for you, and say you must take good care of yourself.

“With kindest, &c., your sincere friend,

“M. I. W.

“General WILCOX.

“Please let us know if they will evacuate Petersburg to-night.”

Written in reply to one from myself reporting that our lines had been broken, and telling of the disaster at Five Forks.

heard, and of such volume as to make the impression that it was not a mere skirmish-line engagement. I started for the lines, and on reaching the vicinity of Battery Gregg met a few of my men coming to the rear. They reported that our lines had been broken. Portions of Thomas' and Lane's brigades were in and near Batteries Gregg and Whitworth. I learned that the lines had been pierced on Lane's front near Boisseau's house and at a point to his right. Most of the enemy had turned to their left, sweeping up every thing as far as Hatcher's run; part had filed to their right and had driven our thin line back; not, however, without suffering seriously. Gen. Wright, commanding the Sixth corps, informed me subsequently that he lost 1,200 men in getting over the line. The enemy had reached the plank road in small numbers. One of Lane's regiments was forced back to the Southside road. The enemy were seen along our captured lines and on the plank road. Lane's and Thomas' men were reformed—in all about 600—moved forward in good spirits, and recaptured the lines to the vicinity of Boisseau's house, together with the artillery in the different batteries along it. This was reported to Gen. Lee.

Col. Venable, aide-de-camp to Gen. Lee, soon joined me with a message that Harris' brigade would report in a few minutes; it numbers little over 500 muskets. Heavy masses of the enemy were soon seen moving forward from their entrenched lines in a direction that crossed ours near the Carnes' house. It was useless to attempt engaging them with the force I had; Harris was, therefore, ordered forward a little beyond the Bank's house, advanced skirmishers, but with orders not to become engaged with his line of battle. It was the purpose to delay the forward movement of the enemy as much as possible, in order that troops from the north side of the James river might arrive and fill the gap between the right of our main Petersburg lines and the Appomattox.\*

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\* The enemy had withdrawn from the north side of the James river all but a small force on the 27th ult., but General Longstreet had not learned of it in time to render any assistance up to this date.



The enemy moving by the flank, crossed the Boydton plank road near the Piekerell house, north of it; then continuing the march across an open field of six or eight hundred yards halted, faced to the right, and preparatory to their advance, fired a few rounds from a battery. Several pieces of artillery were placed in rear of Harris, and opened fire on the enemy over a mile distant; they moved forward unchecked, and but little annoyed by this fire.

The fragments of Thomas' and Lane's brigades were withdrawn; a portion placed in the plank road, here deeply worn, and extending to the left, connected at Old Town creek with the right of Brig-Gen. Cox's North Carolina brigade; this was partially entrenched.\* A second detachment from these brigades was posted on the lines beyond or east of the Boydton plank road, and about 200 yards from Battery Gregg, this part of the line being along the bank of Old Town creek. The enemy had placed a battery supported with infantry near a house in a field seven or eight hundred yards beyond the creek. It had been posted so as to have Gregg and Whitworth in the same line, and shots that passed over the former could and did strike the latter, four or five hundred yards beyond.

The lines of battle of the enemy, imposing from their numbers and strength, advanced. Slowly but steadily our artillery—that in rear of Harris' brigade—was withdrawn, and the brigade, after a slight skirmish, retired.

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\* The following note from General Cox will show how weak we were. I had written to him to request that he have his skirmish line connect with mine:

"BATTERY 45, HD. QRS. BRIGADE,  
"April 2d, 1865.

"GENERAL: Your note was received; I will have my skirmish line connected with yours. The enemy are massing heavily on my left. My men are now deployed at 20 feet. I will, therefore, be compelled to move to my left, and wish that you would extend your line to this battery, in order to keep up a proper connection. As you are aware, it is of vital importance that this line should be held.

"I am, respectfully,

"W. M. Cox,  
"Brigadier-General."



It was now that a little detachment was ordered to occupy Battery Gregg. It was made up of two pieces of artillery,\* and in all about 200 men, the infantry being composed of detachments from Thomas', Lane's and Harris' brigades; the number from Thomas' brigade, as now remembered, being less than that from either of the other two. The most of Harris' brigade was ordered to Battery Whitworth. In this were three pieces of artillery. Gen. Harris was in command at Whitworth. At the time the detachments were placed in Gregg I did not know who was the ranking officer; did not regard it of much consequence, as I had determined to remain either in it or near it. I was in Gregg about 10 minutes. Saw that it had as many men as could fire conveniently. Extra ammunition was supplied, and the little detachments ordered to hold these two batteries to the last. Battery Gregg was a detached *lunette*, with a ditch eight or ten feet deep, about the same width, and the parapet of corresponding height and thickness. The guns were in *barbette*; its gorge was closed with palisades, and these with loop-holes, I believe. It was the intention to have connected these two batteries with a rifle trench, and earth had been excavated for a distance of thirty yards, commencing at the right end of the palisading of Gregg. The connection was never made; but it was by means of the parapet of this short, unfinished trench, that the enemy reached the crest of Battery Gregg. As the enemy's attacking forces advanced, a few guns on the main lines at Battery 45, the two guns in Gregg, and the three in Whitworth delivered a rapid fire. The enemy's battery in the open field beyond Old Town creek was in the meantime directing a brisk and well-directed fire upon Gregg and Whitworth. The enemy's front line coming within good range, the musketry from the two little garrisons began, and with decided effect, to be easily seen. This inspired with increased courage our men, greatly diminished in numbers. The enemy drew nearer, but close in front of Whitworth were the cabins of a bri-

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\* Washington Artillery I believe; of what battery do not remember.

gade that had passed the winter there. Our men set these on fire, and the enemy attacking this part of the line, halted near by. Against Gregg, however, they continued to advance, nearer and nearer, till they were within less than sixty yards. The two guns in it ceased firing; those on the main line also. The three in Whitworth were withdrawn without any authority from myself, and the enemy's battery beyond Old Town creek was forced to desist, their own troops being between it and Gregg. The latter was now nearly surrounded. The heroism displayed by the defenders of Battery Gregg has not been exaggerated by those attempting to describe it. A mere handful of men, they beat back repeatedly the overwhelming numbers assailing them on all sides. After they were surrounded the contest continued. The enemy finally gained the parapet, and were enabled to hold it, it being reached by means of the parapet of the unfinished trench previously referred to. As they appeared at this point, they were either shot or thrust off with the bayonet. Again and again was this done. At length numbers prevailed, and the parapet of the little work was thickly covered with men, six flags being seen on it at the same time; and from this dense mass a close, and of necessity destructive fire, was poured down upon the devoted little band within. To prevent further sacrifice, and the object believed to have been accomplished, the troops in Whitworth were ordered to retire, as well as those that were near Gregg in the road, extending down Old Town creek, and Cox's brigade on their left. These were all reformed in the Petersburg lines, the men being in one thin line, with from 6 to 10 feet interval. The fight continued at Gregg fifteen or twenty minutes after the Confederates were driven from the *banquette*.

It was Gen. Gibbon's command that captured Battery Gregg; and if I remember correctly, he informed me at Appomattox Courthouse, that sixty-seven of our men were killed, and among the wounded was Lieut.-Col. Duncan, of Harris' Mississippi brigade, the senior officer. Gen. Gibbon, also, according to present recollection, told me that he lost over 800 men

before it and Whitworth; at the latter place but few. The enemy remained at Gregg; advanced no nearer to Petersburg from that direction; but a corps (6th) approached on the Ccx road; were confronted by Field's division; did not attack; artillery only was placed in position, and shelled at intervals for several hours without inflicting loss.

Much has been said and written about the Battery Gregg fight, it being witnessed by many standing on the Petersburg breastworks; among this number was Gen. Lee himself; and while all the praise that has been awarded the little Spartan band that held it against such comparatively vast odds is justly due, there was yet another collision later on the same day, not often referred to, but in which the Confederates displayed, as usual, that courage known to be common to the rank and file of the Army of Northern Virginia. This contest, and the last between any of the fragments of our little army and the enemy near Petersburg, took place at Sutherland's depot, on the Southside railroad. When the lines were broken a little after day-light, the greater portion of the attacking force turned to their left, and made a clean sweep of the lines to Hatcher's run. Those of our men that escaped being captured were either driven or retreated to Burgess' mill, crossed the run and filed to the right. From this part of the lines the troops were withdrawn, and successfully, by Gen. Heth, moving to the rear by the right flank, and then marching to the depot. There were four brigades that retired from this point: Cook's and McCrae's, of Heth's division, and McGowan's and Scale's, of my division.

While the troops were being withdrawn from Burgess' mill, Scale's brigade, commanded by Col. Hyman, Thirteenth North Carolina, held the bridge, not quitting it till the enemy were close upon his rear, left flank, and in his front. McGowan's brigade being formed in line, preparatory to moving, the enemy rushed forward and opened fire upon it, but our men were not unprepared, and returned instantly a prompt and effective fire, breaking their line at once, leaving the brigade

to follow the movement to the rear. The enemy followed closely, firing an occasional shot from a battery; this was responded to by some of our guns. The depot was reached and line of battle selected, nearly parallel to the railroad; its left being nearer to it; the right rested close to a house to the left of the road over which our troops had marched, the left near a church. It ran along an open ridge sloping to the front to a small stream six or eight hundred yards; beyond the stream was a similar ridge, save that it was covered with trees. Our men sought slight protection from piling up rails taken from neighboring fences. The enemy soon occupied the wooded ridge, the intervening space being about a half mile; they lost no time, but rushed forward in a disjointed manner, yelling furiously. Our artillery opened fire upon them, but without effect. They came up against the right still yelling. When at a convenient distance they received a cool, well-directed and destructive fire, that thinned their ranks, arrested the advance, and soon sent them to the rear in great disorder. The Confederates now gave vent to a wild and derisive yell. A second advance was soon made, and with better order and a more creditable exhibition of courage. They assailed this time our left, drove in the skirmishers, and came up at a sweeping charge cheering vociferously, but were again repulsed, driven clear off from the field, and this time followed by a line of skirmishers.

There was a respite of an hour or more, save a desultory artillery fire, during which the enemy could be seen massing in front of our left. Once more they came against the left flank, attacking us simultaneously in front, which they were enabled to do from their preponderating numbers. Our left was driven in. The front attack at the same time being vigorously pressed, our ranks were thrown into great confusion, the men nevertheless displaying their usual individual courage, though now unavailing. With ranks disorganized, many killed, wounded and captured, they were forced from the field, and with no friendly fortified line close in rear to receive them,



but the Appomattox, turbid and swollen from recent rains to such an extent as to make fording impossible. After seeking in vain for bridges, they finally reached the north bank by means of an indifferent ferry; but many threw away their arms from necessity, and crossed by swimming.

Such information as has been given of the collision at Sutherland's depot was derived from reports of two of my brigade commanders.\*

C. M. WILCOX.

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In the afternoon, about 3 o'clock P. M., General Lee, in the presence of General Longstreet, General Heth and myself, sitting on the portico of Captain McQuaine's house, to the left and near the Cox road, a half or three-fourths of a mile from Petersburg, dictated the following order to his Adjutant-General, Col. W. H. Taylor:

"HD. QRS. A. N. VA.

"*April 2d, 1865.*

"Gens. Longstreet and Hill's corps will cross the pontoon bridge at Battesea factory and take the River road, north side of Appomattox, to Bevel's bridge, to-night. Gen. Gordon's corps will cross at Pocahontas and Railroad bridges, his troops

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\* "PETERSBURG, 4 P. M.

"I am so much obliged to you for letting us hear from you. Of course we feel the greatest solicitude about our friends at this critical period, but trust all will be well for us.

"Firm trust in a merciful God and in the judgment of our great and good Lee will, I feel confident, in the end insure success. I hope you will be able to keep up, and by your presence encourage your brave men.

"E. and the young ladies unite in the kindest regards. Let us hear from you whenever you can.

"With prayers for your success and safety, believe me,

"Very sincerely,

"M. I. W."

This was in reply to a note written to inform her that Petersburg would be evacuated at 8 P. M. It shows what was the faith in the justice of our cause, and confidence in our Commanding-General that prevailed very generally up to this date.

taking Hickory road, following Gen. Longstreet to Bevel's bridge, and his wagons taking the Woodpecker road to Old Colville, endeavoring not to interfere with Mahone's troops from Chesterfield Courthouse, who will take the same road. Gen. Mahone's division will take the road to Chesterfield Courthouse, thence by Old Colville, to Goode's bridge. Mahone's wagons will precede him on the same road, or take some road to his right. Gen. Ewell's command will cross the James river at and below Richmond, taking the road to Branch church, *via* Gregory's, to Genito road, *via* Genito bridge, to Amelia Courthouse. The wagons from Richmond will take the Manchester pike and Buckingham road, *via* Meadville, to Amelia Courthouse.

"The movement of all troops will commence at 8 o'clock. The artillery moving out quietly first, infantry following, except the pickets, who will be withdrawn at 3 o'clock. The artillery not required with the troops will be moved by the roads prescribed for the wagons, or such other as may be most convenient.

"Every officer is expected to give his unremitting attention to cause the movement to be made successfully.

"By order of General Lee:

"W. H. TAYLOR,  
"Assistant Adjutant-General.

"After all the infantry and artillery have crossed, Pocahontas and Campbell's bridges will be destroyed by the engineers. The pontoon bridge at Battesea factory and the railroad bridges will be reserved for the pickets."

**Gen. Lee's Strength and Losses at Gettysburg.**

By Col. WILLIAM ALLAN.

[The following is in reply to a letter of the Secretary, enclosing a letter received from a distinguished foreign critic commenting on Col. Allan's review of Bates' Gettysburg. As the letter of our foreign correspondent was a *private* one we suppress his name, though we do not think proper to withhold Col. Allan's able and conclusive reply.]

McDONOUGH SCHOOL, *April 24th*, 1877.

MY DEAR DR.:

I regret that a press of engagements has prevented an earlier reply to your kind letter, enclosing that of \_\_\_\_\_ in regard to Bates' Gettysburg.

I hasten to express my acknowledgments to your correspondent for pointing out an error, into which I was led by the fact that Lieut.-Gen. A. P. Hill's report had not been published at the date of my strictures on Dr. Bates' book. In those strictures the Confederate loss at Gettysburg was estimated at not over 21,000 men. The loss actually was:

In Longstreet's corps (see his report in the Southern Magazine, April, 1874), including the losses at Funkstown and Williamsport on the 6th and 10th of July.....	7,659
In Ewell's corps (see Ewell's report in Southern Magazine, June, 1873), while north of the Potomac.....	6,087
In Hill's corps (see Hill's report in Southern Historical Papers, Nov., 1876), including his loss of 500 at the recrossing of the Potomac.....	8,982
Total in the three corps.....	<u>22,728</u>

This was the entire loss, except that in the cavalry. As but a small portion of the Confederate cavalry was engaged at Gettysburg, and that not severely, 100 or 200 added to the above will cover the entire Confederate loss during the battle and the subsequent retreat to the Potomac. Hence the statement should have been, that the "Confederate loss did not exceed 23,000 men." My error was in underestimating Hill's

loss, which, in the absence of his report, I supposed not greater than the average of the other corps. ——— adds to the above the losses of the Confederate cavalry in the fights of Brandy Station (June 9th), and at Aldie, &c., (June 17th to 21st,) before Lee crossed the Potomac, putting the aggregate cavalry loss during the campaign at 1,100, and thus brings up the Confederate loss to the neighborhood of 24,000 men. But with what propriety this addition should be made to the losses at Gettysburg I am at a loss to perceive. The two cavalry fights mentioned cost the Federals, according to Gen. Gregg, commanding one of the Federal cavalry divisions (see *Philadelphia Times*, March 31st, 1877), about 1,000 men, and between the dates of these combats Milroy was overthrown at Winchester, with a loss of over 4,500 men. These Federal losses are of course not included in Gen. Meade's aggregate of 23,186 lost. ——— has omitted Ewell's loss at Winchester, June 15th, from his aggregate of Confederate losses. He should have omitted Stuart's also, as otherwise his statement is confusing and inaccurate.

I have carefully re-examined Dr. Bates' statement, as well as the other data at hand, in regard to the strength of the respective armies, but do not find any reason to doubt the general correctness of the estimates, which ——— thinks erroneous. As he does not give the ground for his opinion, I do not know on what he bases it. His criticism on the number and strength of the regiments, even if correct, would give no support to Dr. Bates' conclusions. As to the number of the regiments, I distinctly adopted Dr. Bates' roster. He gives 163 (not 167 as ——— has it) as the number of Confederate infantry regiments present. His roster is incorrect in several particulars. For instance, he enumerates the First, Seventh and Fourteenth S. C. regiments twice (page 308); gives eight regiments to O'Neal's brigade, which only contained five; and omits Garnett's brigade, of Pickett's division, altogether. (I will send you a correct roster as soon as I can get at the data.) But these and some other errors do not destroy its general cor-



rectness for the purpose in view, and as my object was to show Dr. B.'s inconsistency, I of course used the roster as he gives it. I have no means of verifying the Federal roster, but assume its accuracy as a matter of course. Now if we take merely the lists of regiments, assuming them to be equally full, we have the infantry strength of the two armies as 239 : 163. If Meade had 95,000 men *on the field*, as he testifies, then deducting 15,000 or 16,000 for artillery and cavalry (Dr. Bates places the cavalry alone at 12,000), there remained about 80,000 for his infantry force at Gettysburg.

Then,  $239 : 163 :: 80,000 : 54,560$  = the Confederate infantry. If 10,000 be added to this for artillery and cavalry, the entire Confederate force would be between 64,000 and 65,000 men, and the ratio of Federals to Confederates on the field would be as about 95,000 to 65,000.

It is difficult to see how Dr. Bates could make an estimate with any regard to the facts which would place the Confederate strength nearer to the Federal than the above figures permit.

—— is, however, a soldier of far too much skill and experience not to appreciate the special advantages enjoyed by the Federal commanders for keeping up the strength of their regiments over those possessed by their antagonists. On both sides there was a disposition to maintain the regimental organization for the sake of good officers, even when their commands had worn away to skeletons; but while the Confederate government filled up these skeletons slowly and painfully from a sparse population, and derived no assistance from immigration, the Federal government drew from a population about four times as numerous, and through the employment of foreign immigrants as substitutes, availed itself largely of a source of supply entirely out of reach of the South. Hence it was, that Confederate regiments, which had seen any length of service, were not, as a usual thing, equal in strength to Federal ones; and hence it is that the above calculation of Lee's strength at Gettysburg is from 5,000 to 7,000 in excess of the

truth. But to return to return to Dr. Bates: He quotes the "return" of the Federal army on June 10th, as given by Gen. Butterfield in his testimony. On that day the infantry corps numbered 78,255, and Dr. Bates shows that the cavalry and the reinforcements received before July 1st, increased this number to 99,000. It is unnecessary to quote Butterfield's testimony at length; but it is evident from it, as given on pp. 427-8, vol. I, Rep. on Conduct of the War, 1865, that the above "return" only included effectives. He is comparing the strength of the Federal army before the battle with its strength after, and having given the estimates of the corps commanders of their force on July 4th (51,514 infantry), and cautioned the committee that this was only a rough estimate the day after the fight, he then gives the strength on the 10th of June, which was seemingly the date of the last exact "return" in his possession.

It is impossible to believe that he meant any thing but those "present for duty" in both instances. Again, Gen. Meade in his testimony about Gettysburg before the committee on the conduct of the war, replies to the question: "What was your strength upon that battle-field?" "Including all arms of the service, my strength was a little over 100,000 men—about 95,000."

In the face of both Butterfield and Meade, Dr. Bates assumes that these figures "represent the numbers borne upon the rolls, but by no means show the true numbers standing in the ranks. In this record (Butterfield's 'return'), the First corps is credited with 11,350; but we know that on the morning of the 1st of July it could muster but 8,200. If the difference in all the corps, between the number borne upon the rolls and number present to go into battle, was as great as in this, the sum total was reduced to 72,000." Now is it credible that Gen. Meade testified, under oath, that his *strength upon that battle-field* was 95,000 men, when it was only 72,000? When, too, there was no conceivable reason for an exaggeration of his numbers, but the contrary? Gen. Meade was not capable of being influenced by

any "reason" in such a matter but a desire to tell the truth; but the circumstances attending his testimony show how unfounded is Dr. Bates' statement.

Let us examine for a moment the process by which Dr. Bates arrives at his 72,000. In the "return" given by Butterfield, the First corps (Reynold's) numbered, June 10th, 11,350. On July 1st it went into battle, Dr. Bates says, with 8,200—decrease 3,150. This ratio of decrease is then applied without hesitation to all the other corps, and no explanation is attempted of the fact. The Federal army is thus shorn of one-fourth its strength, though it had not suffered meantime from any battles, hard marches, or peculiar sickness, but had received on the contrary all the accession the Federal government, under the spur of invasion, could hasten to its assistance. Had Dr. Bates been a soldier he could not have made such a statement.

The source from which Dr. Bates derives the number of the First corps on July 1st, is no doubt Doubleday's testimony. This officer commanded that corps on that day, after the fall of Reynolds, and in a statement before the committee on the conduct of war, strongly marked by bad temper and a vivid imagination, he says, among other things: "According to reports rendered to me, we entered the fight with 8,200 men in the First corps, and came out with 2,450 men." He says further: "I do not believe that our forces actually engaged belonging to the two corps (the First and Eleventh) amounted to over 14,000 men. There was a reserve of 3,000 or 4,000 of the Eleventh corps which did not join actually in the fight. It fired some shots from Cemetery hill, but the most of them fell short into our own front line. Now 14,000 men were wholly inadequate to contend against two immense corps of the enemy, amounting to 60,000 men," &c. This statement makes it appear that about 6,000 men of Howard's corps (Eleventh) were engaged July 1st. Add the 4,000 kept in reserve on Cemetery hill and we have Howard's strength July 1st, as near 10,000 men. On June 10th it numbered in the

“return” given by Gen. Butterfield, 10,177. Why did not Dr. Bates take the ratio of decrease from this corps? This would have given him a result much nearer the truth.

In the absence of the Federal official reports, it may not be proper to offer any explanation of the discrepancy between the numbers given by Butterfield and Doubleday for the strength of the First corps; but it seems evident, if Gen. Doubleday is correct, that some transfer of troops must have taken place between June 10th and July 1st; or that some part of the corps must have been elsewhere on detached duty.

—— falls into the error of Dr. Bates in assuming that the Federal reports of “strength” always included the sick and the teamsters, &c., while the Confederate did not. If Gen. Meade did not mean that his army present for duty numbered 95,000 he would have said so. I do not think there is an officer in either of the American armies who would understand his statement in the connection in which it was given in any other sense, and Dr. Bates must show some evidence to the contrary if he wishes his conclusions accepted. The specifications on the “returns” usually show what is included in the strength of armies, and generally the connection, if not direct statement, shows whether the numbers refer to the “present for duty,” or to the “whole number borne upon the rolls,” as Dr. Bates has it. In the civil war the officers on both sides had been trained in the same school, and their reports made in the same way. Frequently the Confederate reports included more than the effective fighting men. Thus Rodes’ “return” at Carlisle, a few days before Gettysburg, makes his total strength of officers and enlisted men, “8,052.” Now, Rodes had about 6,000 muskets, or less than 7,000 effectives. The remainder were the detailed men—many of them disabled soldiers, but all “enlisted” men—who filled the places of teamsters, clerks, &c. There were no employees in the Confederate army—all such places being filled by details from the ranks.



It may be well to mention, in regard to the number of Federal troops engaged the first day, that Dr. Bates gives a widely different strength to Buford's cavalry division from that assigned to it by Gen. Pleasanton, who, as Commander-in-Chief of the Federal cavalry, should, next to Buford himself, have known the truth. Dr. Bates says that the cavalry engaged the first day (Buford's) amounted to 2,200 men. Pleasanton puts Buford's strength at 4,000. (See Pleasanton's report to Hon. Ben. Wade, Oct. 15, 1865.)

In regard to the Confederate strength, Dr. Bates' conclusions are scarcely worthy of criticism. Were we at this late day seriously to attempt to determine Meade's force by giving the estimates made of it at the time of the battle, by Lee, or Longstreet, or Ewell, or by citizens, we would expose ourselves to the ridicule of ———, and of every other intelligent man. Yet this is what Dr. Bates has done in regard to Lee's force. The only scrap of respectable evidence he offers in support of his estimate as to the Confederate strength is a statement, reported as coming from Gen. Longstreet, that Lee had at Gettysburg "67,000 bayonets, or above 70,000 of all arms."

These numbers, Mr. Swinton says (see his "Army of the Potomac"), were given him by Longstreet, in an interview soon after the war. Now, Mr. Swinton may have misunderstood Gen. Longstreet, and probably did, for this officer, in a letter on the battle of Gettysburg to the New Orleans Republican, dated February 16th, 1876, says that the strength of the two divisions, of Hood's and McLaws, was but 13,000 "in all." These divisions each contained four brigades. The remaining division of Longstreet's corps (Pickett's) contained only three brigades, and these were less in strength than the average. The highest Confederate estimate of Pickett's division I have found puts it at 4,000. This would make Longstreet's corps 17,000. And averaging the other corps at the same, would give 51,000 for the entire infantry strength of Gen. Lee, or under 61,000 for every thing. Note in connection with this:

1. Gen. Lee's own statement to Gen. Early, myself and others, in which he placed his strength, when about to move northward, in June, 1863, at 60,000 effective men. (See Gen. Early's reply to Gen. Badeau, in the *London Standard*, 1870; and article on Gettysburg, *Southern Review*, April, 1868.)

2. Gen. Lee's papers were burned at the close of the war, and he requested, in 1865, from his officers, such information as they possessed, with the intention of preparing a narrative of his campaigns. I have a copy, received from him, of the statements furnished to him in regard to his strength at Gettysburg, by two members of his staff, Col. W. H. Taylor, his Assistant Adjutant-General, and Col. C. S. Venable, his Military Secretary. The former places the Confederate strength of all arms on that battle-field at 61,000; the latter at 55,000.

3. Out of the 68,352 men, which constituted the entire force for duty in the "Department of Northern Virginia," at the end of May, according to the Confederate return, published by Swinton, Gen. Lee could hardly have taken over 60,000 with him.

4. Gen. Early's careful estimate. (See his report, *Southern Magazine*, September and October, 1872.)

5. The number of regiments on each side as given by Dr. Bates himself.

All these go to show that Gen. Lee moved northward with about 60,000 men, and that instead of being weakened by train guards or by straggling to the extent of 25 per cent., between the Potomac and Gettysburg, as Dr. Bates imagines, he brought almost his entire force to the latter point.

Hoping —— will carefully examine the original sources of information in regard to the matters treated by Dr. Bates, whose book may be "conscientiously," but is certainly not carefully compiled,

I am, most truly yours,

W. ALLAN.

**The Confederate Loss at Seven Pines.—Letter from General J. E. Johnston.**

[We take pleasure in publishing the following letter from General Johnston, which explains itself, as we are always ready to make explanations or corrections of any thing that we may put into our *Papers*.]

RICHMOND, *June 22d*, 1877.

Rev. J. WM. JONES, D. D.,

*Secretary Southern Historical Society :*

DEAR SIR: Major-General Longstreet's report of the battle of Seven Pines, as published in your Society's Papers—May and June, 1877—differs materially from his *official* report made to me, the commander of the Confederate army on that occasion.

The difference is in the interpolation of a "list of killed, wounded, and missing" in the paper you published. No such list was in the official report. General Longstreet's statement of his loss is in the sentence of his report next to the last, viz: "A rough estimate of the loss on this part of the field may be put down at 3,000 killed and wounded." This "estimate" was after he had received the report of his chief surgeon, Dr. J. S. D. Cullen.—See 3d paragraph from the end of the report.

It is not to be supposed that General Longstreet would have written in the same report, and in such juxtaposition, that his loss was about 3,000, and that it was 4,851.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. JOHNSTON.

[It is due to ourselves to say, in reference to the above, that we printed General Longstreet's report from a *verbatim* copy of the one recorded in the letter book kept at his own headquarters, and that we, of course, had no reason to suspect that it was in any particular different from the original report sent to General Johnston.]

**A Slander Refuted.**

[It has been suggested that we ought to put in permanent form the follow-refutation of a slander against General Carter Stevenson and his brave men, which we felt called on to make at the time:]

OFFICE SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY,  
RICHMOND, *January 25, 1876.*

EDITORS DISPATCH:

We have in our Archives the following official document, which completely refutes Mr. Blaine's statement that Gen. Grant told him that he fought at Chattanooga Gen. Carter Stevenson's division, which had been captured at Vicksburg, and had not been exchanged:

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
RICHMOND, *September 16, 1863.*

*General Orders, No. 123.*

The following order is published for the information of all concerned:

*Exchange Notice, No. 6.*

The following Confederate officers and men, captured at Vicksburg, Miss., July 4, 1863, and subsequently paroled, have been duly exchanged, and are hereby so declared:

1. The officers and men of Gen. C. L. Stevenson's division.
2. The officers and men of Gen. Bowen's division.
3. The officers and men of Brig.-Gen. Moore's brigade.
4. The officers and men of the Second Texas regiment.
5. The officers and men of Waul's legion.

6. Also, all Confederate officers and men who have been delivered at City Point at any time previous to July 25th, 1863, have been duly exchanged, and are hereby so declared.

Ro. OULD,  
*Agent of Exchange.*

RICHMOND, *September 12, 1863.*

By order:

S. COOPER,  
*Adjutant and Inspector-General.*



And if Mr. Blaine will not receive "rebel" authority, then the following is submitted:

On page 74 of General Boynton's book ("Sherman's Historical Raid") the following telegram from Gen. Halleck, at Washington, to Burnside, in East Tennessee, is given:

"SEPTEMBER 18, —.

\* \* \* "A part at least of Longstreet's corps is going to Atlanta. It is believed that Bragg, Johnston, and Hardee, *with the exchanged prisoners from Vicksburg and Port Hudson*, are concentrating against Rosecrans. You must give him all the aid you can." [Italics ours.]

Either Mr. Blaine is mistaken, therefore, in giving General Grant as his authority for saying that these high-toned gentlemen and gallant soldiers violated their paroles, or else General Grant's memory is at variance with the facts.

J. WILLIAM JONES,  
*Secretary Southern Historical Society.*

## EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS.

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OUR FOURTH VOLUME begins with this number, and we think we can safely promise that it will surpass in interest and value either of the volumes which have preceded it. We will begin in our next number the publication of a series of papers on the battle of Gettysburg, which will be simply invaluable to all who desire to know the truth concerning that great battle; and these will be followed by able papers on other battles and campaigns. We have scarcely touched our series of *original* MS. reports, and shall, from month to month, continue to publish the more important of these. In a word, we desire to make our *Papers* indispensable to all who would know the truth concerning our great struggle for constitutional freedom.

But we earnestly beg that our friends will help us by sending papers of interest on any thing concerning the war, and by securing for us subscribers to our Monthly.

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THE BURNING OF TWENTY-SEVEN BOXES OF CONFEDERATE DOCUMENTS in North Carolina the other day, which those in charge of them had *intended* to send to our Archives, is but another sad illustration of the danger of allowing valuable material to remain in private hands.

A distinguished Confederate officer wrote us last year that a fire had just destroyed invaluable reports, &c., which he had *intended* to send us, and we fear that other such examples will be needed to convince our friends that the right thing to do with such material is to send it *at once* by express to *J. Wm. Jones, Secretary Southern Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.*

Remember, that where our friends have material which they are not willing to donate, we will be glad to receive it *as a loan*, to be carefully preserved and held subject to their order.

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MR. W. B. McEWEN, a former agent of our Society in Georgia and Alabama, would find it to his interest to communicate at once with this office, and any friend knowing his whereabouts would confer a favor by informing us without delay.

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OUR BOUND VOLUMES (3 of which are now ready), are very neatly gotten up, and we are not surprised that many subscribers prefer to take their numbers bound, rather than in pamphlet form. We would advise all such, how-

ever, to send their orders (and the money) *in advance*, as we may not be able hereafter to supply bound volumes to any save those who have so ordered them. We now have on hand a number of bound volumes for 1876, and for *January to June*, 1877, and we ask our friends to assist us in securing orders for them. We can also supply our little volume on "*A Confederate View of the Treatment of Prisoners.*" We beg our friends to interest themselves in placing these volumes on the shelves of public libraries in all parts of the country. College libraries, Y. M. C. A. libraries, and others would be glad to purchase these books if their attention were called to them.

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CONTRIBUTIONS TO OUR ARCHIVES ARE ALWAYS ACCEPTABLE, AND GRATEFULLY RECEIVED. Since our last acknowledgment we have received the following:

*From Yates Snowden, Esq., Charleston, S. C.*—Address of Hon. Thos. F. Bayard on "*Decentralization of Power.*" Address before the South Carolina Historical Society, May 19th, 1876, by William J. Rivers, Esq., of Maryland. Map of Fort Moultrie. Copy of "*The American Eagle*," published at Vera Cruz, April 6th, 1847, containing full account of the siege of Vera Cruz, &c. Memorial Sermon of Rev. Charles Wallace Howard, by Rev. C. S. Vedder, D. D.

*From Robert Clarke & Co., Cincinnati*—A Memorial Sermon, Fiftieth Anniversary of Mount Horeb Church, in Fayette county, Ky., by W. George.

*From Wisconsin Historical Society*—"Report and Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin for the years 1873-74-75 and 76."

*From Capt. Frank Potts, Petersburg, Va.*—Ten numbers of "*The Record of News, History and Literature*," published at Richmond in 1863.

*From Major R. F. Walker, Superintendent of Public Printing, Richmond*—Bound volume "*Senate Journal and Documents*," 1876-77. "*Report Board of Public Works.*" Bound volume "*House Journal and Documents*," 1876-77.

*From Hon. John Perkins, Jr., formerly member of Confederate States House Representatives from Louisiana, through Judge Lay, of Richmond*—Large box of Confederate books, documents, pamphlets, papers, &c.

We have not space to name all of these valuable documents, but they consist in part of the following: Report of Brig.-Gen. S. M. Jones of the Evacuation of Pensacola Navy Yard and Forts. Report of the Bombardment and Capture of Fort Henry. Reports of the Battle of Fort Donaldson. Reports of Operations in New Mexico. Gen. Polk's Report of the Evacuation of Columbus. Gen. Beauregard's Report and Reports of Subordinate Officers of the Battle of Shiloh. Reports of the Evacuation of Jacksonville. Report of Gen. Lovell and Subordinate Reports of Events Attendant upon the Fall of New Orleans. Report of Maj.-Gen. Huger of the Affair at South Mills. Report of Gen. Leadbeater of Operations on Tennessee River, and of the Affair at Bridgeport. Report of Brig.-Gen. Humphrey Marshall of the Affair at

Princeton. Capt. Bloeker's Report of Engagement with Enemy on Crooked River. Gen. Beauregard's Report of the Evacuation of Corinth. Report of Maj.-Gen. Pemberton and the Subordinate Reports of the Engagement on James' Island. Report of Brig.-Gen. Morgan and Subordinate Reports of the Expedition into Kentucky. Maj.-Gen. Magruder's Report and Subordinate Reports of the Operations on the Peninsula. Report of Gen. Pemberton and the Subordinate Reports in reference to the Expedition to Pinckney Island. Report of Col. J. H. Morgan of the Affair at Gallatin, Tennessee. Report of Brig.-Gen. Maxby of Operations of the Army at Bridgeport and Battle Creek. Report of Gen. E. Kirby Smith and Subordinate Reports of the Battle of Richmond, Kentucky. Answer of Col. Forrest to Interrogatories propounded by Congressional Committee, in regard to the Management of the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments, about the time of the surrender of Nashville. Official Reports of Gens. Johnston and Beauregard of the Battle of Manassas, July 21st, 1861. Also Official Reports of all the other Battles fought in 1861. Report of Gen. Bragg and Subordinate Reports of the Battle of Chieamauga. Official Reports of Battles, embracing Defence of Vicksburg by Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dorn and the Attack upon Baton Rouge by Maj.-Gen. Breckinridge, together with the Reports of Battles of Corinth and Hatchie Bridge; The Expedition to Hartsville, Tennessee; The Affair at Pocotaligo and Yemassee; The Action near Coffeeville, Mississippi; The Action and Casualties of the Brigade of Col. Simon-ton at Fort Donelson. Reports of the Attack by the Enemy's Fleet on Fort McAllister, February 1st, 1863; Engagement at Fayette Courthouse, Cotton Hill, Gauley, Charleston, and Pursuit of the Enemy to the Ohio; of the Operations of Brig.-Gen. Rodes' Brigade at Seven Pines; and of the Capture of the Gunboat J. P. Smith in Stono River. Report of Maj.-Gen. Polk of the Battle of 7th November, 1861, near Columbus, Ky. Report of Gen. Jos. E. Johnston of his Operations in the Departments of Mississippi and East Louisiana, together with Lieut.-Gen. Pemberton's Report of the Battles of Port Gibson, Baker's Creek, and the Siege of Vicksburg. Correspondence between the President and Gen. Jos. E. Johnston, together with that of the Secretary of War and the Adjutant and Inspector-General, during the months of May, June and July, 1863. Correspondence between the War Department and Gen. Lovell, relating to the Defence of New Orleans. Report of the Special Committee of the Confederate Congress on the Disasters at Forts Henry and Donelson and the Evacuation of Nashville. Provisional and Permanent Constitutions of the Confederate States, together with the Acts and Resolutions of the First Session of the Provisional Congress, 1861. Large number of Confederate States Executive and Congressional Documents, embracing Messages of the President and Reports of Heads of Departments, Bills, Acts, Joint Resolutions of Congress, Statutes at Large, Reports of Special Committees, Speeches in Congress, &c. (Many of these documents are very rare, and of great value.) Report of Evidence taken before a Joint Special Committee of both Houses of the Confederate Congress to Investigate the Affairs of the Navy Department. Report of the Roanoke Island Investigating Committee.



Confederate States Navy Register of 1862. Confederate States Navy Register to January 1st, 1863. Ordinances adopted by the Convention of Virginia in secret session in April and May, 1861. Convention between the Commonwealth of Virginia and the Confederate States of America. Message of Governor Moore, of Louisiana, to the General Assembly, November, 1861. Rules and Directions for Proceedings in the Confederate States Patent Office. Jomini's Practice of War. Richmond: West & Johnston, 1863. Proceedings of the Confederate States Congress on the announcement of the death of Col. Francis S. Bartow, of the Army of the Confederate States, and late a delegate in Congress from the State of Georgia. General Orders from the Confederate States Adjutant and Inspector-General's Office, for 1862. Twenty-four pamphlets discussing both sides of the Slavery Question. Sixty-seven miscellaneous pamphlets on various matters of general interest. Speech of Hon. J. P. Benjamin, of Louisiana, on the right of Secession, in the United States Senate, December 31st, 1860. Four Essays on The Right and Propriety of Secession, by a member of the Richmond Bar. Secession and its Causes, in a letter to Viscount Palmerston, Prime Minister of England, by Henry Wikoff. "Disunion and its Results to the South." "Recognition of the Confederate States considered, in reply to the letters of Historicus in the 'London Times,' " by "Juridicus." Commercial Enfranchisement of the Confederate States. "Cause and Contrast," by T. W. MacMahon. Address to Christians throughout the World, signed by ninety-five Clergymen of the Confederate States. "The American Union, its Effect on National Character and Policy," by James Spence. Richmond: West & Johnston, 1863. Reply of S. Teackle Wallis, Esq., to the Letter of Hon. John Sherman, published by the Officers of the First Maryland Infantry, 1863. Address on the Constitution and Laws of the Confederate States of America, by Hon. Robt. H. Smith. Confederate States' Almanac of 1862. "Senator Hammond and 'The Tribune,' " by Troup. Rev. J. H. Thornwell, D. D., of Columbia, S. C., on the State of the Country in 1861. "The North and the South," by John Forsyth, of Mobile, Ala. "Proceedings of the Congress of the Confederate States, on the announcement of the death of Hon. John Tyler, Jan'y 20th and 21st, 1862." Addresses of Hon. D. W. Voorhees, of Indiana, on the trial of John E. Cook, Nov. 8th, 1859, and before the Literary Societies of the University of Virginia, July 4th, 1860. "Life and Services of Hon. R. Barnwell Rhett, of South Carolina." "The Character and Influence of Abolitionism." A Sermon by Rev. Henry J. Van Dyke, of Brooklyn, preached Dec. 9th, 1860. Address before the Society of Alumni of the University of Virginia, by Hon. Jas. P. Holcombe. "The South, Her Peril and her Duty." A thanksgiving sermon preached Nov. 29th, 1860, by Rev. B. M. Palmer, D. D. "God, our Refuge and Strength in this War," a fast day sermon, by Rev. T. V. Moore, D. D., of Richmond. "The Oath of Allegiance to the United States," by the Rev. B. M. Palmer, D. D. A large number of Religious Tracts published in the Confederacy during the War.

This contribution by Judge Perkins is one of great value, and indicates the character of the publications we are most anxious to secure.

# SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

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**Vol. IV.      Richmond, Va., Aug., 1877.      No. 2.**

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## **Causes of the Defeat of Gen. Lee's Army at the Battle of Gettysburg— Opinions of Leading Confederate Soldiers.**

In February last the Secretary received a letter from a distinguished foreign military critic propounding a series of questions as to the causes of the failure of the Confederate army to win the battle of Gettysburg, and requesting us to obtain the opinions of leading Confederates who were participants in that great battle. We at once had twenty copies of the letter made, and sent them to representatives of every corps and division and every arm of the service of the Army of Northern Virginia. We have received a number of replies, and have the promise of several others, and we are sure that our readers will agree with us that the series of papers form the most valuable contribution to the history of that great campaign which has yet been published.

As the letter of our distinguished correspondent was not intended for publication, we suppress both the letter and the name of the writer. But we would be recreant to the cause of truth did we withhold the able, interesting and valuable papers which we have received in response to this letter.

There are, as will be seen, honest differences of opinion between the writers of these papers in reference to certain points; but we shall publish them without alteration, just as they are received from the accomplished soldiers who have prepared them.

We print the papers also in the order in which they have been received :

**Letter from Gen. J. A. Early.**

LYNCHBURG, VA., *March 12th, 1877.*

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A copy of your letter to Mr. Jones, the Secretary of the Southern Historical Society, in which you express a desire to have my opinion upon certain propositions suggested by you in regard to the Pennsylvania campaign of 1863, and the battle of Gettysburg, has been forwarded to me, and I take pleasure in giving my views on the several mooted questions.

In the first place, I must say that you are mistaken in assuming that the Army of Northern Virginia was more powerful when it undertook the invasion of Pennsylvania than it had ever been before. I believe that you receive our publications entitled "*Southern Historical Society Papers*," and if so, by referring to the July number for 1876, you will find a paper by me in regard to the relative strength of the armies of Generals Lee and Grant, in which is embodied, on page 16, a table of returns of the forces in the Department of Northern Virginia at the end of each month from February, 1862, to February, 1865, inclusive, except for the months of June and August, 1862, April and June, 1863, and May and September, 1864. This table was made out by Mr. Swinton, author of the "*History of the Army of the Potomac*," from the Confederate returns in the Archive Office at Washington, and is indisputably correct, except where, in the absence of the official returns, Mr. Swinton has substituted his own estimates or conjectures for the months of June and August, 1862, and June, 1863. You will observe that, at the close of May, 1863, the whole force for duty in the Department of Northern Virginia consisted of 68,352 men and officers. The Department of Northern Virginia embraced all that portion of eastern Virginia and the Valley north of James river, and included

all the troops within it. Of course, the movable army was less than the whole force in the department, as some troops had to be left guarding depots, &c. There were no accessions to the army after the returns showing 68,352 for duty, prior to the movement towards Pennsylvania, which begun on the 4th of June. Even some of the movable troops had to be left behind, and among them were two brigades of cavalry, Robertson's and Jones', as you will see from Gen. Lee's report in the same number of the Society Papers, pages 44-5. Those brigades arrived at Gettysburg on the 3d of July, too late to be of any service, except in guarding the trains on the retreat. The force with which Gen. Lee invaded Pennsylvania was really under 60,000 effectives, as I have stated in the address embodied in Mr. Jones' "Personal Reminiscences," a separate copy of which I now send you. Gen. Lee's force against McClellan, in June, 1862, was between 75,000 and 80,000—a fact I think I have demonstrated in a communication which you will find in the June number of the Society Papers for 1876, page 413. The table before referred to shows the force for duty in the Department of Northern Virginia, at the close of July, 1862, just before the commencement of the campaign against Pope, was 69,559, and the force for duty at the close of November, 1862, just before the battle of Fredericksburg, was 73,554. There is no return at the close of April, 1863, just before Chancellorsville, for the enemy had then begun his movement by crossing the river in our front, and the steps necessary to oppose him rendered it impracticable to make returns. The force present, however, was not as large as it was at the close of May following, for two divisions of Longstreet's corps were absent south of James river, though the army in the aggregate was larger than it was at the beginning of the movement into Pennsylvania, by reason of the loss at Chancellorsville and at Fredericksburg at the same time. No reliance whatever is to be placed in the conjectural estimate of our strength for June of that year made by Mr. Swinton, nor in the statements of any of the writers on the Federal side as to our strength at Gettysburg.



You will perceive, therefore, that our army was numerically smaller at the time of the commencement of the Pennsylvania campaign than it had been at the commencement of any of the previous campaigns; though in one sense it may be said to have been more powerful than it had previously been, for it was elated with the victory over Hooker, and bouyant with the prospect of carrying the war into the enemy's country—in fact it had come to regard itself as invincible.

From your first proposition, that "it was a mistake to invade the Northern States at all," I entirely dissent. The Trans-Mississippi Department was then practically severed from the Confederacy by the investment of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. To have confined our efforts east of the Mississippi to an entirely defensive policy would have exposed us to a certain, though slow process of exhaustion. We would have had not only to defend our northern frontier, on a line from the Chesapeake bay, up the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers, across the Upper Valley of the Shenandoah, and through Western Virginia, Middle Tennessee, and Northern Alabama and Mississippi, but also the entire coasts of Chesapeake bay and the Atlantic, on the east, from the mouth of the Rappahannock, south, and of the Gulf of Mexico on the south, with the enemy firmly in possession of a number of ports and harbors on said coasts, as well as a line in the west, parallel to and east of the Mississippi, with the enemy in possession of or besieging all of the towns on that river. This in fact would have required us to defend a line extending entirely around the States east of the Mississippi, with very inadequate resources. If we had had troops and resources in money, provisions, and munitions of war enough to defend this entire line, we might have accomplished "the pecuniary exhaustion of the North," which you think should have been our policy; but our men, our resources, and, above all, our faith would have been exhausted long before we could have accomplished the desired result.

Mr. Lincoln had announced his purpose to "keep a-pegging" until the "rebellion" was suppressed, and Gen. Grant

subsequently announced the same policy in rather different language, to-wit: "To hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until, by mere attrition, if by nothing else, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land." Under this *pegging-hammer* process, we must inevitably have succumbed, if we had remained on the defensive entirely, just as it is said the constant dropping of water will wear away the hardest stone.

Let us look at the condition of affairs at the close of May, 1863. The Federal forces held possession of Fortress Monroe, Yorktown and Norfolk in Virginia, with the control, by means of gunboats, of the Chesapeake, York river, and James river up to the mouth of the Appomattox—of the entire coast of North Carolina, except the mouth of Cape Fear river—of Port Royal and Beaufort island on the coast of South Carolina, with Charleston harbor blockaded and the city of Charleston besieged—of Fort Pulaski, at the mouth of the Savannah river, in Georgia—of the mouth of the St. John's river, Key West and Pensacola, in Florida—of the lower Mississippi, New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Memphis, with Vicksburg and Port Hudson besieged, the fall of which latter towns was all that was necessary to give complete possession of the Mississippi river—of West Tennessee, the northern portion of Middle Tennessee, all of Kentucky, northwestern Virginia, including the Valley of the Kanawha, the lower Valley of Virginia, and all of eastern Virginia north of the Rappahannock. At the same time the entire coasts of the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico were so rigidly blockaded and patrolled by war vessels, that it was a mere chance when the blockade was evaded.

The large army under Grant, besieging Vicksburg and Port Hudson, could very readily have been brought against one or the other of our armies in the field on the fall of the beleaguered towns, which was a mere question of time, as Gen. Johnston was unable to concentrate a force large enough to relieve

them. Our main Western army, under Bragg, was confronted in southern Tennessee by a much larger army under Rosecrantz, while the Army of Northern Virginia was confronted on the Rappahannock by one of nearly, if not quite double its numbers, under Hooker. In this condition of things, it was very apparent that unless we could break through the cordon that was gradually closing and tightening around us, we must infallibly be crushed as a victim in the coils of a boaconstrictor. To set down and content ourselves with a mere defensive policy, would be to await an inevitable collapse of our cause, sooner or later, by the gradual process of attrition and exhaustion. The only hope for us, then, was to strike such a blow as would alarm the North and shake its faith in the financial credit of the Federal government, and its ability to conduct the war to a successful issue.

Bragg's army was not in a condition to strike such a blow, and the issue of the Kentucky campaign of the previous year would not have warranted its employment for such a purpose, if other things had been favorable. The Army of Northern Virginia was the only one that could be relied on to undertake the difficult task, and its recent success at Chancellorsville had inspired the whole of that army with a spirit that gave promise of success.

There were but three plans that presented themselves for our adoption, if we were to take the aggressive. The first was to attack Hooker's army in position, and endeavor to destroy it; the second, to draw it out into the open field and defeat it, which could only be done by threatening Washington or the States north of the Potomac; and the third was to undertake an invasion of the latter States, pure and simple.

If we had awaited a renewal of the attacks of the Army of the Potomac, we might have repulsed it again and again; but from the nature of the ground occupied by the two armies respectively, with a wide, low plain on the south bank of the Rappahannock between the heights occupied by us and the river, while the commanding heights on the north bank were close

upon the river, and crowned with an immense armament of heavy guns, it was always practicable for the Army of the Potomac to recross to its position of safety after a repulse. The result, therefore, must have been, as we always feared it would be, that that army, heavily reinforced under some new and more sagacious commander, would have been transported, by way of the Potomac, Chesapeake, and James river, to the position Grant was finally forced to take on the south of the James, when a siege of Richmond and Petersburg would have ensued, and the fall of those cities would have been only a question of time.

As to the alternatives presented, if we took the aggressive, it was impossible for us to have attacked the Army of the Potomac in its position on the north of the Rappahannock, except at great disadvantage. If you examine the map of that part of Virginia, and take into consideration the fact that the Rappahannock, between the two armies, and below, and for some distance above, could be crossed only on pontoon bridges; that from the nature of the ground we could not have forced the passage if we had the bridges, and that if we had undertaken to cross above, at some point where bridges were not necessary, we would have had to make a wide circuit and cross two rivers, the Rapidan and Rappahannock, you can understand the difficulties we would have had to encounter in making the attack. If you knew the exact topography of the country, you would perceive the difficulties more clearly.

Unless, therefore, we had made up our minds to perish by degrees, it was necessary to adopt one of the other alternatives. Of course, Hooker would not have undertaken another forward movement until his army was sufficiently recruited to supply the loss incurred at Chancellorsville, and the diminution from the expiration of the terms of service of a portion of his troops, which was rapidly approaching, and to draw him out from his position of safety before that happened, it was necessary for us to threaten Washington or the States north of the Potomac. To have moved directly on Washington would have been idle,



for Hooker would have moved back into the defences of that city on the south, and if we could have entered them we would then have had to cross the Potomac, which would have been an impossibility.

To threaten Washington, therefore, it was necessary to pass through the lower valley and cross the Potomac into Maryland, which amounted to an invasion.

General Lee adopted a plan, which was a combination of the last two plans mentioned, as open to us, to-wit: to draw Hooker out from his position, and transfer the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac, as you will perceive from the succinct but very clear statement of his purposes contained in his report. Hooker hugged too closely the defences of Washington for us to attack him south of the Potomac, and hence we crossed that stream without fighting him.

If we could have gained a decided victory north of the Potomac, it would have done more to produce a financial crisis at the North and secure our independence than a succession of victories on the soil of Virginia. I have always been and still am firmly convinced that, if General Lee's plans and orders had been promptly and strictly carried out, we would have gained such a victory at Gettysburg. I am, therefore, of opinion that the invasion of Pennsylvania, when undertaken, was a wise and judicious movement, notwithstanding the fate that attended it. It is true that it may be looked upon as somewhat of the nature of a forlorn hope, but it was our best chance for success, and we should have taken it.

I also dissent from your second proposition, that "If the invasion was to be undertaken, only raiding parties should have been sent." My observation during the war led me to the conviction that raiding parties generally resulted in more damage to the raiders than to the opposite side. Such was undoubtedly the case with Stuart's famous raid around McClellan's army, through Maryland and Pennsylvania, in October, 1862. The Dutch farmers and housewives in Pennsylvania were probably very badly frightened, but the loss in disabled

cavalry horses, which were left behind in exchange for useless Dutch farm horses, was not compensated by any damage to the enemy. So, Morgan's celebrated raid across the Ohio proved disastrous to his command, without the possibility of any compensating damage to the enemy. Most of the raids undertaken by the Federal cavalry also proved disastrous to the commands engaged in them.

It is true that Stuart's raid around McClellan, when he was on the Chickahominy in 1862, resulted in obtaining valuable information for Gen. Lee, but it also served to convince McClellan of the necessity of a change of his base to James river, which for us was the most dangerous position for him to occupy. Some of Forrest's raids also, in the west, were attended with valuable results in the destruction of stores and the interruption of the enemy's lines of communication; but, as a general thing, the raids, unless when undertaken with a specific object, as for the purpose of obtaining information or the destruction of some depot of stores, or the cutting of a line of communication, and then with a force adequate to the purpose, were mere annoyances to the opposite side without serious damage, while the raiders came out badly worsted, at least in horse flesh; which latter was a very important consideration on our side. When undertaken merely for the purpose of harrying a particular section of country, they were too apt to degenerate into mere marauding parties, and almost always came to grief. These remarks apply equally to the partisan corps employed on our side. They annoyed without weakening the enemy, just as a spiteful insect may worry and enrage a huge bull, without doing him any serious hurt. Really they did a vast deal more damage to our own cause, by the demoralization caused in the army from a desire upon the part of many to share in the captures, which the partisan corps appropriated to their own use, which induced quite a number to desert their colors for the sake of plunder. I have been struck with the force of a remark contained in Gen. Sheridan's report of his operations in the Valley of Virginia in 1864, where,

in speaking of the partisan corps, which he calls "guerrilla bands," he says: "I had constantly refused to operate against these bands, believing them to be, substantially, a benefit to me, as they prevented straggling and kept my trains well closed up, and discharged such other duties as would have required a provost guard of at least two regiments of cavalry." He is here speaking of the principal corps of that kind that operated in Virginia. I am of opinion that mere raiding parties sent north of the Potomac would have done much to arouse and excite the population to a stronger support of the war, without any compensating damage to the enemy or benefit to us.

I must here admonish you not to confound my expedition into Maryland, and up to the fortifications of Washington, with what were merely raids. That expedition, though frequently called a raid, was not undertaken as such, but Gen. Lee's real purpose in sending me on it was to induce the withdrawal of troops from Grant's army, and eventually the abandonment of the siege of Richmond, which he saw was inevitable, and would result in the final capture of the city, unless a diversion was made. It was a forlorn hope, it is true, but I think it is unquestionable that it had a very considerable effect in prolonging the contest before Richmond by the detention in the Valley until the close of the year, not only of the troops that belonged to the Department of West Virginia, but also of two corps of infantry and two divisions of cavalry that had been sent from Grant's army.

My observation did not lead me to the conclusion, at which you seem to have arrived, that, on Northern soil, the Army of the Potomac "fought ten times better than in Virginia." I did not observe that the fighting at Gettysburg by that army was in any way superior to what I had seen it do before. You must make some allowance for the "poetic license" which writers and speakers on the Northern side have taken in describing the deeds of Meade's soldiers at Gettysburg, and in putting dramatic exclamations into their mouths. Those wri-

ters and speakers were not there to witness and hear what they have undertaken to record; and you can readily understand that, in the dreadful shock of battle, men have not the leisure or the calmness to frame pretty speeches, nor are they exactly in the condition to recollect what any of their comrades may have given utterance to. I am as incredulous about dramatic speeches and ejaculations in time of battle as about "real bayonet charges."

Our failure to carry the position at Gettysburg was not due so much to the superior fighting of Meade's army in position as to the failure to support according to General Lee's instruction the several attacks made on the 2d and 3d, and the delay in making those attacks. Meade did not select the position at Gettysburg; but that position was forced on him by the engagement which took place unexpectedly on the 1st. He had previously selected another position, behind Pipe creek, for his battle-ground, and even on the 2d, after his arrival at Gettysburg, deliberated about withdrawing to the former position, and was probably prevented from doing so by the attack on our part.—See the testimony of himself and others before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, contained in the 1st vol. (2d series) of its report.

Your third proposition, that "the way in which the fights of the 2d of July were directed does not show the same co-ordination which ensured the success of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville"—in which I understand you to mean by "co-ordination," co-operation and concert of action—has more of soundness in it. In the first place, it was intended by General Lee that the attack from his right flank on the enemy's left should commence at a very early hour on the morning of the 2d; that Hill should threaten the center with two of his divisions, and co-operate in Longstreet's attack with his right division; while Ewell was to make a demonstration upon the enemy's right, to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer—that is, should success attend the attack on the enemy's left. That attack was not made



until late in the afternoon, and, as a natural consequence, there could not be that co-operation that would have taken place had the attack been promptly made at the time expected. When Johnson, later in the day, attacked the enemy's right flank, and two of my brigades advanced to the crest of Cemetery Hill and got possession of the enemy's batteries, the divisions on my right that were to have co-operated did not move, and the enemy sent reinforcements from the part of the line against which those divisions ought to have advanced, which rendered it necessary for my brigades to retire. I have always thought that, if at the time Johnson's division and my two brigades became engaged the two divisions on my right had advanced promptly, we would have secured a lodgment on Cemetery Hill that would have ensured us the victory.

Again: On the 3d the attack from our right was to have been made at a very early hour by Pickett and the other two divisions of Longstreet's corps, while a simultaneous attack was to have been made from our left. Johnson, heavily reinforced for the purpose, begun the attack from our left at the proper time, but Longstreet again delayed until in the afternoon, and there was once more a failure of co-operation.

In regard to your fourth proposition, that General Lee, after the fight on the 2d, having found Meade's position very strong, ought to have attempted "to turn it by the south, which was its weakest place, by extending his right so as to endanger Meade's communications with Washington," I have this to say: It would have been an exceedingly hazardous movement at best, in which we would have been exposed to attack under great disadvantage, as we would have had to move by flank on, I believe, but one road in the narrow strip of country between South mountain and Meade's position; and there would have been great danger of the capture or destruction of a large part of our trains. Look at the map of the country, if you have one, and recollect that we were on the north and west of Meade's position, which was really between us and Washington. In order to get near enough to Meade's line of commu-

nications, with Washington to threaten it, we would have had to make a wide circuit, while he had the inner and shorter line. If we had undertaken to get between him and Washington, he could have retired to Westminster, from whence there was a railroad to Baltimore, or to some point on the Northern Central railroad, and have run into Washington by rail before we could have gotten half way there, if he had desired to do so. Or, taking a bolder course, he might have moved down by the way of Emmettsburg to Frederick, Md., where he would have been joined by 10,000 men under French, taken possession of the passes of South mountain, and thus been on the line of our communications. If we had moved on Washington, we would have been followed on our heels, and while we had the strong fortifications of that city in our front, we would have had Meade's army in our rear. In any event, we would have been in a most hazardous position, with no prospect of escape in case of a defeat, for we could not have gotten near enough to Meade's line of communications to endanger them without crossing the Monocacy and going at least as far as Tancytown; where we would have been out of reach of the passes of South mountain. This idea about our being able to threaten Meade's communications by extending our right on the Emmettsburg road, has grown out of an entire misapprehension of the topography of the country.

Your fifth proposition, that "The heroic but foolish attack of Pickett on the 3d, should never have been attempted," may now appear very plain in the light of what actually happened. We have in our country a homely saying of some backwoodsman, that, "If a man's foresight was as good as his hindsight he wouldn't so often go wrong," which has a vast deal of sound practical philosophy in it. You and I, with a full knowledge of the facts and circumstances attending any military movement, acquired by subsequent developments, may be able to perceive where mistakes were made; but how would it have been if we had been called on to direct that movement with only the knowledge possessed by him who did direct it?

I was at Gettysburg and participated in the first day's action—in fact, it was the arrival of my division, at an opportune moment, that made the defeat of the enemy so signal. This fight was not anticipated by General Lee, who had ordered the concentration of his army at the eastern base of the South mountain. The fight was brought on by the movement of two of A. P. Hill's divisions towards Gettysburg, for the purpose of ascertaining the strength of the enemy's force reported to be there, which was supposed to consist entirely of cavalry. Hill's divisions having become engaged, Ewell went to his assistance with his two divisions that were in reach, and the result was a brilliant success for our arms.

General Lee reached the part of the field where Hill was about the close of the action. Upon ascertaining the facts, and seeing a brilliant and decisive victory within his grasp, as all of us thought, he determined to give battle at that point. To have withdrawn without fighting would have been exceedingly dispiriting to the troops that had been engaged; and I venture to affirm that not a man of the entire force present lay down that night with any other expectation than that the next day would witness a crushing defeat of Meade's army. It was Gen. Lee's purpose to begin the battle at a very early hour next morning; but, by some untoward management on the part of the commander of the troops that were to open the attack, it did not begin until very late in the afternoon. It is very manifest to my mind, that if the attack from our right flank had been made at an early hour on the morning of the 2d, or, in fact, at any time in the forenoon of that day, we would have achieved the anticipated victory, for Meade's whole army had not then arrived, and the position on his left, which was assailed at 4 P. M., was not occupied by his troops until about 3 P. M. Nevertheless we gained advantages which produced the conviction that, by concerted action next day, we could still win the victory, and General Lee determined to make the attempt. There was good reason at the time to anticipate success from the proposed attack, if made at the time and in the manner designed.

You will observe from General Lee's report, already referred to, that the attack was to have been made by the whole of Longstreet's corps, and Ewell was to have assailed the enemy's right at the same time, for which latter purpose Johnson had been reinforced by two brigades from Rodes' division and one from mine. Johnson did become engaged about daybreak, the time, Ewell says, that had been designated for the combined attack. Had Longstreet's three divisions moved to the attack at the same time, while Hill had his three divisions ready to support that attack, I verily believe that it would have been successful; but there was again a great delay on our right, and the attack there did not begin until after 2 P. M. In the meantime, Johnson had been compelled to retire from the attack made by him, on account of the accumulation of forces against him, which ought to have been employed by the attacking force from our right. When the attack was made by Pickett's division, and the division and two brigades from Hill's corps, the victory for sometime hung in the balance, and our troops got into the enemy's lines, but were repulsed by reinforcements brought from the enemy's right, which could not have been spared if the attack had been simultaneous with that of Johnson. If this failure of co-operation had been anticipated, of course it would have been injudicious to order the attack; but there was no good reason at the time to expect any such failure. When any movement of any kind is attended with failure, it is a very easy thing to condemn it, and declare that it should never have been made; but in order to judge of the propriety of making the attacks on the 2d and 3d, we should consider the circumstances and conditions under which those attacks were ordered, and not merely their failure from other circumstances and conditions beyond the control of the Commander-in-Chief.

Gen. Longstreet's long delay on the 3d seems to have been based mainly on the idea that his right flank was in danger from a body of troops on the enemy's extreme left. By examining the testimony of Gen. Pleasanton before the Committee



on the Conduct of the War, pages 359-60, same volume of the report already referred to, you will find that the troops threatening Longstreet's right were really only two brigades of cavalry, which were posted there to prevent Meade's left from being turned. Two divisions of infantry were used to keep off that force, when one brigade ought to have been amply sufficient.

From some communications made to Mr. Swinton by Gen. Longstreet after the war, and contained in the book of the former, you will find that Gen. Longstreet was strongly opposed to the attack on the enemy's position at Gettysburg, and foreboded the worst results from it. He did not, therefore, enter into those attacks with that spirit of confidence so necessary to success.

I have discussed the causes of our failure to achieve a victory at Gettysburg at length in a controversy that arose last year between Gen. Longstreet and myself, which was produced by an article published by him. I think I have pointed out in my replies to him the real causes of our failure, and will not now repeat the arguments used, but send you copies of my two articles. I regret that I have not also copies of his articles to send you, but the quotations I give from them will fully indicate the points at issue between us. You will observe that in my articles there is some causticity of expression, which was provoked by the character of the articles I was replying to. I now sincerely regret the necessity which called for the personal strictures contained in my replies, and would be glad if they could be eliminated. The facts, however, on which I rely are historic, and the arguments based on them are legitimate. I send you also a manuscript copy of a letter from Gen. A. L. Long, who was on Gen. Lee's staff at Gettysburg, received subsequently to the controversy between Longstreet and myself. The facts stated by Gen. Long tend very strongly to sustain my positions.

I must here take occasion to declare that I have never had, and do not now have any suspicion of a want of fidelity on

the part of Gen. Longstreet to the cause of the Confederacy at Gettysburg or at any other period of the war. I am willing to accord to him great merit as a fighter, but I think his efficiency on such an occasion as that at Gettysburg was materially impaired by a constitutional inertia, mental and physical, that very often delayed his readiness to fight. When once ready, and in the fight, he always fought well, and sometimes most brilliantly.

You may ask, if I am right in my view of the causes of our failure at Gettysburg, why it was that General Lee did not speak out and place the responsibility where it properly belonged? My reply would be, that it is difficult for one who did not know him personally to understand the wonderful magnanimity of character which induced General Lee often to take the chances of incurring censure himself rather than run the risk of doing possible injustice to another. Hence it was that he preferred to let the entire responsibility for the battle of Gettysburg and its failure rest on his shoulders, rather than attempt to screen himself by casting it upon one or more subordinates, for whose soldierly qualities he had respect, notwithstanding their short-comings on that occasion.

In connection with the battle of Gettysburg, I send you, besides the address and articles before mentioned, the official reports of Generals Longstreet and Ewell, as well as my own, in regard to that battle.

In conclusion, I must say that I do not regard the campaign in Pennsylvania as having resulted in such disastrous consequences to our arms as you seem to think attended them. It is true that we failed to win a great battle on the soil of Pennsylvania, but all the enemy's plans for the campaign in Virginia for that year were thwarted, and our army retired across the Potomac self-relying and defiant. When it confronted Meade for several days, near Hagerstown, Maryland, on the retreat, he dared not attack it.

In the following autumn General Lee was able to detach one corps from the army, two divisions of which were sent to the

assistance of Bragg's army in the southwest, and contributed materially to the victory of Chickamauga.

In the ensuing spring the Army of Northern Virginia was able to meet and cope with an army under Grant, originally of nearly if not quite thrice its numbers, which was also constantly receiving heavy reinforcements during a campaign of unsurpassed length and brilliancy. It finally succumbed, solely from exhaustion, resulting from the mere process of attrition, caused by constant contact with overwhelming numbers.

But for the simultaneous disasters in the southwest, the campaign in Pennsylvania would not have materially impaired the chances for success of the Confederacy.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. A. EARLY.

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[Copy.]

CHARLOTTESVILLE, *April 5th*, 1876.

General J. A. EARLY:

DEAR SIR: General Lee and staff arrived on the field at Gettysburg near the close of the battle on the afternoon of July 1st—soon after Anderson's division arrived, but too late to participate in the action. About the same time Longstreet arrived in person, leaving his troops a few miles behind.

The only troops that were on the ground were four divisions, which had just been engaged, and Anderson's division, which, in addition to a day's march, had just made a forced march from Cashtown.

While discussing the question of renewing the battle, General Lee directed me to reconnoitre the position to which the enemy had retired.

I found Cemetery Hill occupied by a considerable force, a part strongly posted behind a stone fence near its crest, and the rest on the reverse slope.

In my opinion an attack at that time, with the troops then at hand, would have been hazardous and of very doubtful suc-

cess. After making my report no mention was made of a renewal of the attack that evening. The plan of battle was then decided upon for the ensuing day. I believe Longstreet was still on the field when I delivered my report. Two of his divisions bivouaced that night in four miles of the position he was to occupy the next day. When I sought my bivouac for the night, it was with the firm belief that the battle would be renewed early the next morning. As an evidence that General Lee anticipated an early commencement of the battle, he breakfasted and was in the saddle before it was fairly light. At that early hour, on visiting Hill's headquarters, every thing exhibited signs of preparation for action.

General Lee directed me to assist Colonel Walker in disposing of the artillery of Hill's corps, and afterward to examine and correct, if necessary, the position of the artillery on other parts of the line. I understood the plan of battle to be, that Longstreet, on the right, should commence the attack, while Hill, in the center, and Ewell, on the left, should co-operate by a vigorous support.

On reaching Hill's position, about sunrise, I discovered that there had been considerable accession to the enemy's force on Cemetery Hill during the night; but it was chiefly massed to his right, leaving much of his center and almost his entire left unoccupied.

When calling the attention of Colonel Walker to the importance of occupying a ridge springing obliquely from the right of Hill's position, and extending in a direct line towards Round Top mountain, General Pendleton offered his services to Walker; and I proceeded, to our left, more than a mile, on the opposite side of Gettysburg. As I examined the position of the artillery on the left, I momentarily expected to hear the guns on the right announce the opening of the battle. As the morning advanced, I became anxious lest the delay might lose us the opportunity of defeating the enemy in detail.

When returning to the right, I found General Lee at Ewell's headquarters, on the outskirts of Gettysburg, and accompa-



nied him through the town and along Hill's line. On arriving at the point where I left Walker a few hours before, the ridge to which his attention had been called in the morning was still unoccupied; but as this ground was to be the position of Longstreet's corps, and as the withdrawal of troops for its occupation from the corps already in position would change the order of battle, and might produce disastrous consequences by precipitating the attack before the arrival of Longstreet's troops, its occupation was therefore delayed until the occurrence of that event. It was now about ten o'clock, and the Federals had considerably increased in numbers and extended their left.

Perceiving the great value of time, General Lee's impatience became so urgent that he proceeded in person to hasten the movement of Longstreet. He was, however, met on the way with the welcome tidings that Longstreet's troops were in motion. Finding a convenient point, General Lee waited a reasonable time for Longstreet to reach his destination, and then set out to meet him, but, on arriving at the point of action, it was found that Longstreet was still absent. While waiting a Federal sergeant was captured, who was found, on examination, to belong to a division which had taken position in the peach orchard at the further end of the ridge before mentioned.

It was now apparent that the advantage of position had been lost by delay, and the enemy had been permitted to concentrate a greater part of his forces. It was now after one o'clock, and General Lee's impatience again urged him to go in quest of Longstreet. After proceeding about a mile, we discovered Hood's division at a halt; it was said, waiting for McLaws, whose division had taken a wrong direction. It was four o'clock before Longstreet was in position to attack.

I here conclude a brief and I hope impartial statement, from which you may make your own deductions.

Very respectfully, &c.,

(Signed)

A. L. LONG.

Letter from General Fitz. Lee.

RICHLAND, STAFFORD CO., VA.,

March 5th, 1877.

REV. J. WM. JONES,

*Secretary Southern Historical Society:*

MY DEAR SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter enclosing a copy of a communication from ——— in which he requests information to be used in a forthcoming work, upon certain points connected with the battle of Gettysburg.

Upon them he expresses his convictions as follows: "At present, as far as my studies of this period go, my opinion on the question is this: The mistakes which brought upon the Confederate arms the repulse at Gettysburg, with its fatal consequences, were the following:

"1st. It was a mistake to invade the Northern States at all, because it stirred up their military spirit. The best chance of the Confederacy was the pecuniary exhaustion of the North, and not the exhaustion of its resources in men. The invasion was the death blow to what has been called the Copperhead party. It called under arms thousands of men who would never have enrolled otherwise, and who became experienced soldiers in '64'; and, moreover, it diminished for one or two years the resisting powers of the Confederate army.

"2d. If the invasion was to be undertaken, only raiding parties should have been sent until the Army of the Potomac should have been defeated. It was a great mistake to bring her on the Northern soil, where she fought ten times better than in Virginia. A real invasion, viz: the establishment of the Confederate army in Pennsylvania, with its communications well secured, was an impossibility as long as the Federal army was not crushed. The proof is, that as soon as the latter began to move, Lee, who had undertaken nothing but a raid on a too large scale, found himself so much endangered, that

he was obliged to fight an offensive battle on the ground where Meade chose to wait for him. He ought to have manoeuvred in Virginia so as to bring on a battle before crossing the Potomac.

"3d. The way in which the fights of the 2d of July were directed does not show the same co-ordination which insured the success of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville.

"4th. I do not understand why Lee, having gained some success on the 2d, but found the Federal position very strong, did not attempt to turn it by the south, which was its weak place, by extending his right so as to endanger Meade's communications with Washington.

"5th. The heroic but foolish attack of Pickett on the 3d should never have been made. Longstreet seems to think that it was imposed upon him against his will by Lee. General Early says distinctly, in a paper published by the Southern Historical Society, that Longstreet deferred it so long that the Second corps could not co-operate with it as it would have done had the attack taken place early in the morning. I hesitate very much between these two opinions."

I respond seriatim, and as concisely as I can, to his questions.

To the *first* and *second*, I may say, as far as I know and believe, the invasion of the North, at the time referred to, resulted from four reasons, viz: 1st. The difficulties lying in the path of an attack upon the Federal army in its chosen position in *this* (Stafford) county after Chancellorsville. 2d. The desire to manoeuvre it to a safer distance from the Confederate capital. 3d. The knowledge that a decisive battle fought in Maryland or Pennsylvania would in all probability have given us the former State with large accessions to our ranks from a sympathizing population, while Washington, the capital of our opponents, would have necessarily fallen—a prize the moral effect of which cannot be overestimated. I believe it was General Lee's original plan to strike the Federal army at the most favorable point as soon as he heard they

had crossed the Potomac, and not so far from his base as Gettysburg; indeed he said so, but the absence of his cavalry, under Stuart, prevented its movements and the time of its crossing from being definitely known to him. In the language of the official report of the Commander of our army, we find it stated that "the movements of our army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of cavalry." And again: "It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base unless attacked, but coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal army, to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous." Finally, in the fourth place: The great relief to this country the withdrawal of the Federal army would have caused, as well as the immense relief given to the Commissary of the Confederate States, by the absence of the Army of Northern Virginia from the soil of Virginia—the question of supplies for man and beast being even at that time a troublesome one.

I fully agree with ——— in his opinion, expressed in his *third* declaration, as to a want of co-operation during the battle of the 2d July, 1863. I am decidedly of the opinion that the failure of co-operative effort, so visible upon that day, was the result of the different degrees of *promptness* with which General Lee's orders for attack were carried out by his subordinate commanders. It is difficult to conceive why, with two out of the three army corps of the Army of Northern Virginia in close contact with the enemy's position on the night of the 1st July, and two-thirds of the remaining corps in camp only four miles in rear, an attack upon the Federal force, not yet wholly concentrated on the 2d; but whose numbers were hourly growing stronger and whose position was hourly rendered more impregnable by the work of thousands of men, should have been delayed until 4 P. M.

I am satisfied that any military man, reading the sworn testimony of the leading Federal participants in that battle, before the Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the



War, would agree in the conclusion I have reached, that an attack made upon the Federal position at Gettysburg any time before 12 o'clock on the morning of July 2d, 1863, would have embraced many elements of success; and from all I have heard and believe, such an attack *was ordered*.

In noticing the fourth and fifth proposition submitted, I begin by quoting Gen. Lee's official report, in which he says: "The result of this day's (2d) operations induced the belief that with proper concert of action (rather a confession of its absence the day before) and with the increased support that position gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack."

The general plan of that attack was unchanged. Ewell, commanding on the extreme left, promptly attacked the enemy's *right* on the morning of the 3d, with Johnson's division of his corps, reinforced with two of Rodes', and one of Early's brigades, but was driven back and forced to retire to his original position about one in the afternoon; and here I quote General Lee's report: "The projected attack on the enemy's *left* not having been made, he was enabled to hold his *right* with a force largely superior to General Johnson's." General Lee adds, though, that this attack "was delayed by a force occupying the high rocky hill on the enemy's extreme *left*." When at last it was made, the attacking column consisted of Pickett's and Heth's divisions, the latter under Pettigrew, (Heth having been wounded two days before). Behind Pickett's right marched Wilcox's brigade, and Pettigrew's support consisted of Lane's and Scales', brigadiers under General Trimble. This force moved to the attack some two hours after the cessation of the attempt by Ewell upon the enemy's right, and not coexistent with it, as contemplated. It has been said by military critics that General Lee did not make this assaulting column—charging beneath the eyes, as it were, of two armies, upon which their fate and the fate of their respective nations trembled—strong enough. Without going into

that, I may say, the point in the enemy's lines to be seized was most admirably selected, and could it have been successfully held their line would undoubtedly have been forced back, General Meade, the Federal commander, admitting it was the key to his position. The prosecution of the attack on our part upon the 3d, was not in accordance, I believe, with the sound judgment of General Lee, though he admits a belief that it might have succeeded. He told the father of the writer (his brother) that he was controlled too far by the "great confidence felt in the splendid fighting qualities of his people," and who begged simply "to be turned loose," and the assurances of most of his higher officers, who believed the position in his front could be carried.

I think our trouble was in not making proper allowance for the great natural strength of the Federal position, immeasurably increased by the thousands of hands unweariedly working with but short intervals from the night of the 1st to the afternoon of the 3d, and defended by an army outnumbering ours by some 30,000 soldiers. I am inclined to the opinion that after the 2d no assault we could have made would have succeeded, however wisely the dispositions for it were executed—however gallantly performed. I do not see either, how, in such close proximity to a largely superior force—skirmish line against skirmish line—"General Lee could have extended his right so as to endanger Meade's communications with Washington," as suggested by ———. He would have exposed himself to an attack in turn which might have proved fatal—an examination of military history showing such moves can be rarely made, save when superior to your enemy in numbers and protected by favorable ground. After the night of the 2d the alternatives presented to General Lee were to await an attack by the enemy, to attack him, or withdraw from his immediate front in the direction of his own rear.

And now, having answered the questions asked, I hope you will pardon me if I go further and say that if I should be asked "to what can the failure of that campaign on our part be

properly attributed," I should answer: 1st. The absence of General Stuart's cavalry from the army. 2d. The non-occupation of the hills south of Gettysburg by General Ewell on the afternoon of the 1st July, 1863. 3d. To the delay in the attack upon the 2d.

Let me turn your mind briefly to the two first, the third having already been commented upon. It is evident that General Stuart was ordered to give information of the enemy's crossing the Potomac, or why did General Lee loiter after crossing his army and wait to hear from him? Without orders it was his duty to do so as commander of his cavalry. The advance of the Army of Northern Virginia, under Ewell, entered Pennsylvania on the 22d of June. The Federal army crossed the Potomac on the 25th and 26th.

General Lee heard of that event on the night of the 28th June through a scout. Up to that period he thought their army was still in Virginia, because he had heard nothing from Stuart. Knowing as I do Stuart's strict attention to forwarding all species of information, I am bound to believe he did not fail to send the notice of this important fact. It may have miscarried. It has been charged that Stuart disobeyed orders in crossing his command at a lower point on the Potomac than that at which the Federals crossed, and making the circuit which interposed the army of the enemy between his command and the force of General Lee. I deny that. I know that he was left to the exercise of his own discretion. Indeed, Gen. Lee says in his report, that "in the exercise of the discretion given him, when Longstreet and Hill crossed into Maryland, General Stuart determined to pass around the rear of the Federal army with three brigades and cross the Potomac between it and Washington."

Free to act, I think the move selected was not the best under the circumstances. As soon as the Federal army began to cross the river, he should have marched to the west side of the Blue Ridge, crossed also, and moving rapidly to General Lee's front, have placed himself at once in direct communi-

cation with him. His bold activity would have developed the enemy's position, which, General Lee being no longer in ignorance of, could then have made his plans accordingly. In that event the battle would not in all probability have taken place at Gettysburg.

In justice to Stuart, it may be said that he had calculated upon the brigade of Jenkins and White's battalion of cavalry, which accompanied Generals Ewell and Early, and Jones' and Robertson's brigades, which were left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, and were to rejoin General Lee as soon as the enemy crossed the river, to do all that was necessary. The brigade of General Jenkins, Stuart estimated at 3,800 troopers when leaving Virginia, and, referring to the complaint of the Commanding-General of a want of cavalry upon that occasion, says: "Properly handled such a command should have done every thing requisite." In reference to the second point I have taken, there is evidence that a staff officer of General Lee carried an order to General Ewell on the afternoon of the 1st of July, that from where he, General Lee, was, he could see the enemy flying over the heights; to push on and occupy them. But in his official report of the operations of that day, General Lee says: "General Ewell was instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army;" and that Ewell "decided to wait for Johnson's division," of his corps, to get up, which had been left behind to guard the trains, and "did not reach Gettysburg until a late hour," and "in the meantime the enemy occupied the point which General Ewell designed seizing." At the beginning of the war I occupied the position of chief of staff to General Ewell, and bear too much love for his heroic memory to say more than that I believe a little more marching, perhaps a little more fighting, would have given us the coveted position, and that in such an event the battle of Gettysburg would have had another name, and possibly another result—who knows?



It must be borne in mind, however, that at the time of these operations, I was only a general officer of cavalry, serving under Stuart. My brigade accompanied his movement, and I did not reach Gettysburg until the afternoon of the 2d July, going into line on the extreme left of our army, and fighting the enemy's cavalry in my front on the third.

My personal knowledge of these events, which I fear I have criticised too freely, is not worth much. As a soldier and a graduate of the United States Military Academy, I have, however, formed *my own opinions* upon the important battle of Gettysburg, based upon conversations with other officers, including the Commanding-General himself, and the perusal of official reports and histories of both sides.

Among the soldiers now living, and who are accessible, and who know most about that campaign on our side, are Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet, Hood, Anderson and Early, and Major-Generals McLaws, Heth, Wilcox and Trimble; General Pendleton, chief of artillery; Generals Kemper, Lane and Scales; and Colonels Taylor, Marshall and Venable, of General Lee's staff.

Were I writing history, I should like to have the opinions of these officers upon this subject, from which, with the official reports in my possession, I would of course draw and write my own conclusions.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FITZHUGH LEE.

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Letter from Colonel William Allan, of Ewell's Staff.

MCDONOUGH SCHOOL,  
OWINGS' MILL, BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD.,  
April 26th, 1877.

REV. J. W. JONES, D. D.

MY DEAR SIR: The questions asked in the letter of \_\_\_\_\_ of January 21st, 1877, in regard to Gettysburg, are more or

less fully discussed in my article on Gettysburg in the *Southern Review*, April, 1868. The views therein expressed as to the motives, policy, conduct and results of that campaign, I have reason to know agreed substantially with those of General Lee. I have procured a copy of the *Review*, corrected the errors and missprints, and sent it to ———, through the address in Philadelphia you gave me. I will add a few notes here:

1st. ——— thinks it was “a mistake to invade the Northern States at all” in 1863. There were undoubted evils in such a course as ——— clearly states, but he leaves out of view the fact that only a “choice of evils” existed for an army greatly inferior in numbers and resources in the presence of a powerful adversary—an adversary severely checked, it is true, at Chancellorsville, but with ample means of quickly repairing his losses, with absolute command of the water, and the consequent power to penetrate Virginia in half a dozen places whenever he chose to do so. It was impossible to attack Hooker at Fredericksburg, when he was only 10 or 12 miles from his base on the water. As Lee moved northward Hooker kept his forces in front of Washington, and so near it as to offer no opportunity to his antagonist. It was only after Lee had crossed the Potomac and excited apprehension in regard to one or more of the large Northern cities that he could get the Federal army far enough away from its base, or from fortified lines, to attack it. His march diverted their campaign from a movement against Richmond to the defence of Washington, and at the same time brought him within reach of ample supplies. But suppose Lee had remained at Fredericksburg on the strict defensive. This was to lose the results of the advantages gained at Chancellorsville. It was to yield a large part of the best grain producing portions of Virginia to the enemy. In a few weeks the Federal army would have been ready to move against him. His position could be easily turned because of the Federal command of the water. It was possible for the Federal army at any time to establish itself by

means of the James or York rivers within a few miles of Richmond, as Grant did subsequently, and by the operations of a siege, slowly, but surely, to compass the downfall of the Confederate capital. The Federal army had been twice beaten in attempting to advance from Fredericksburg. It was not probable that they would try that again, and Lee would probably have soon been forced to the vicinity of Richmond. The question is not whether there were serious objections to crossing the Potomac, but whether these were greater than those to remaining inactive on the Rappahannock.

2d. ——— thinks Hooker should have been defeated on the southside of the Potomac, before the Confederates crossed that river. This would have been better, of course, had it been practicable; but the Federal General was able to concentrate nearly 100,000 men at Gettysburg, while it retained 36,000 for the defence of Washington, and as many more, under Schenck, with headquarters at Baltimore. Half of these last commands might have been made available in case of necessity, and new levies were being brought in rapidly. How was General Lee, with a force of under 70,000 in his entire department, to defeat Hooker so long as the latter remained in the vicinity of Washington? To wait was to allow him to gather all the strength he wished. The movement northward was never intended as a permanent invasion. One of its objects was to so embarrass the Federal army by threatening not merely one city but several, as to obtain opportunities for partial blows.

3d. ——— says that the fights of July 2d does not show the same co-ordination which insured to the Confederates success at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville. This is entirely true. For some reason, or perhaps from a combination of reasons, the Confederate attacks at Gettysburg on the 2d and 3d days were all halting and partial. The Confederate line was a long one, and the perfect co-operation in the attack needed to prevent Meade, whose line was short, from using the same troops at more than one point, was difficult of attainment.

Two of the corps commanders (Ewell and Hill) were new in their places. Longstreet's attack on the Federal left on the 2d was delayed beyond the expected time, and was not promptly seconded by Hill and Ewell when made. Ewell's divisions were not made to act in concert—Johnson, Early, Rodes attacking in succession. It is difficult to decide where the weight of responsibility for these failures rests, and I shall not attempt it. General Lee always expressed the strongest conviction that if the Confederate corps had attacked General Meade simultaneously on either day, he would have succeeded in overthrowing the Federal army. He declared that "victory trembled in the balance" up to the final repulse of Pickett, and that a united effort, at any hour, would have secured it. He said once to me that he had used every effort to obtain the necessary concert of action, but had failed. He said that he consulted Ewell, and told him if he could not carry his part of the line, he would move his corps to the right of Longstreet and threaten the Federal communications with Baltimore, but upon the statement of Generals Ewell and Ed. Johnson that the positions in their fronts could be carried, he did not change his plan. Assured of his ability to carry the Federal lines, and having gained decided successes on both the 1st and 2d days, it is easy to see why Lee, instead of drawing off and changing his mode of attack, should devote all his energies to a supreme effort with his entire army. He urged concert of action on the 3d; but Johnson's division fought and suffered in the morning alone, and Pickett's attack in the afternoon was unsupported. There was nothing "foolish" in Pickett's attack had it been executed as designed. Pickett carried the works before him. Had Pettigrew and Wilcox moved with him, and Hill and Ewell vigorously seconded this onset, General Lee never doubted that the Federal army would have been ruined. It was this great prize, which he believed within his grasp, that induced him to fight the battle as he did, and not to adopt the more cautious plan of merely manoeuvring Meade away from his position by threatening his communica-



tions. General Lee did not consider the Federal position at Gettysburg stronger than many others that army had occupied; and the testimony of Butterfield and others shows that General Meade did not rate it highly. The notion of its great strength has grown up since the battle.

It should not be forgotten that a general battle was not in Lee's design in going into Pennsylvania. He repeatedly stated that in consequence of the absence of Stuart with the cavalry he was unaware of the near proximity of the Federal army, and when Hill reported a large force of infantry in his front on July 1st, did not believe it. It was only the fight of that afternoon that convinced him that Meade was near at hand, and he then deemed it injudicious to decline battle. The Confederates would probably have been successful:

1st. Had Ewell and Hill pushed Howard's broken troops over the top of Cemetery Hill on the first day.

2d. Had Longstreet reached the field earlier on the second day and secured and held "Round Top."

3d. Had Ewell made his attack in the afternoon of the second at same time as Longstreet, instead of later, and then not "piecemeal," so that Early was beaten back before Rodes was ready to support him.

4th. Had Longstreet and Hill attacked early on the third, as was first designed, while Ewell was engaged.

5th. Had Ewell and Hill made one prompt and determined effort in support of Pickett at the proper moment.

Very truly yours,

W. ALLAN.

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**Memorandum by Colonel Walter H. Taylor, of General Lee's Staff.**

——— shares the opinion that the Confederate cause was not a lost cause from the beginning, and seeks with great care to find out why it did not succeed.

The solution to this point, in my judgment, is summed up in the simple sentence: *Paucity of men and of resources.* Other

considerations are involved in a determination of the question, could the war have been further prolonged? but given an earnest determination on the part of a united North to prosecute the war to a successful issue; and ultimate success was certain. Consider the census of the United States, 1860. Excluding Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri, the States that entered the Confederacy had a white population of a little over 5,000,000; whereas those that sustained the United States government had 19,000,000. Then reflect that the South had no navy; its ports were blockaded, and intercourse with the outside world interdicted. Under such circumstances it is remarkable that the South maintained itself so long as it did.

——— asserts that the Army of Northern Virginia when it invaded Pennsylvania was more powerful than it had ever been before. As a question of numbers, this is an error. The field returns of the army of the 31st May, 1863, show General Lee's total effectives to have been a few hundred over sixty-eight thousand (68,000).

I have a copy of this return, which I made from the original now in the war office at Washington. He received no reinforcements, and this was the maximum of General Lee's strength in the Pennsylvania campaign.

Ewell's corps had some fighting with Milroy in the Valley; the cavalry had considerable skirmishing east of the mountains before crossing the Potomac; made the circuit of the Federal army on the other side; had more fighting and incessant hard riding until the evening of the 2d of July, second day's fight, when it joined General Lee. The infantry was reduced by the guards left on the Virginia side to protect captured property and escort prisoners, and of all arms General Lee had not at Gettysburg over 62,000 men. On his return to Virginia he had but 49,000, showing a loss of 19,000 from all causes and in the whole campaign.—See return of 20th July, 1863.

The argument of ———, that it was a mistake to invade the Northern States "because it stirred up the military spirit of the people, was a deathblow to the Copperhead party, and

diminished the resisting powers of the South," is plausible enough, since we lacked success at Gettysburg; but had we accomplished as much as was reasonably hoped for, how different it would have been! Looking to the pecuniary exhaustion of the North, spoken of by ———, a decided success for the Confederates in Pennsylvania would have exerted a powerful influence on the Federal finances. Then, again, even as matters resulted, so far from diminishing the resisting powers of the South for one or two years, it freed Virginia of the presence of the Federals for a time and threw them back one year.

General Grant found the Army of the Potomac in May, 1864, pretty much where it was in the spring of the previous year.

The design of General Lee in invading the Northern States was to free Virginia of the presence of the enemy—to transfer the theatre of war to the enemy's country, and to take the reasonable chance of defeating his adversary there—knowing full well that to obtain an advantage there over the enemy would operate more powerfully in our favor than to discomfit him in Virginia.

He sought an encounter with his opponent, but upon his own terms as to time and place. He justly felt great confidence in his army, and hoped to select a favorable position, where he could receive the attack which the enemy would be compelled to make, and from which, if successful, he could seriously threaten the Federal capital. The condition of the army at this time was excellent; never was I so impressed by its *morale* as when the two corps of Hill and Longstreet passed through Chambersburg.

Now as to the battle itself. The first great disadvantage experienced by General Lee was the unexpected absence of his cavalry. Certain discretionary power had to be left with General Stuart as to where he would cross the Potomac. It was arranged that the movements of the enemy and his own judgment should determine this, but he was to connect at once with General Lee, keep on his flank, and advise him of the

enemy's movements. After crossing the river General Stuart consumed some time in pursuing and capturing a train of wagons, and when he turned to join the main column of the army, he found that General Hooker had interposed between him and General Lee, and so was compelled to make the circuit of the Federal Army. He did not join General Lee until the evening of the second of July. On approaching Gettysburg, where General Lee had directed a concentration of his army, a force of the enemy was encountered near that town by the advance of Hill's corps on the 1st of July. This was the first intimation that General Lee received of the proximity of the enemy's infantry. The first encounter was unexpected. Hill's troops became engaged; Ewell, whose orders were to concentrate at Cashtown or Gettysburg, heard the firing and turned towards Gettysburg. His advanced divisions—Rodes' and Early's—became engaged. The engagement now involved two of Hill's divisions and two of Ewell's—all of both corps then up. The result was a success of no small proportions to the Confederates. On the side of the enemy two corps were engaged besides Buford's cavalry. The forces were about balanced in strength as to infantry—22,000 to 24,000 each. The maximum average of Lee's divisions was 6,000 each—24,000—but at this date the four divisions had not over 22,000 present. \*General Butterfield testified that the First and Eleventh Federal corps had 24,000 on 10th of June.—Page 428, vol. I, *Conduct of the War*.

General Lee directed close pursuit. We should have occupied the heights that evening. I took the order to General Ewell to press the enemy and secure the heights if possible.

Later, General Lee rode over to General Ewell's front and conferred as to the future movements. He wanted to follow up the success gained; thought that with Johnson's division, then up, that General Ewell could go forward at dawn next day. Ewell, Early and Rodes thought it best to await Longstreet's arrival, and make the main attack on the enemy's left.

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\*Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac.



This was determined on. Longstreet was then about four miles off, with two of his divisions. He was expected early on the morning of the 2d. Orders were sent him to move up to gain the Emmettsburg road. He did not reach the field early, and his dispositions were not completed for attack until four o'clock in the afternoon. In his report, General Longstreet says he received orders to move with the portion of his command that was then up, to gain the Emmettsburg road on the enemy's left, but fearing that he was too weak to attack, he delayed until one of his brigades (Laws') joined its division, and that he begun the movement as soon after its arrival as his preparations could be made. It seemed impossible to get the co-operation of the commanders along the line. When Longstreet did attack, he did it in handsome style—drove the enemy and captured prisoners, artillery and other trophies.

So far we had succeeded in every encounter with the enemy. It was thought that a continuance of the attack as made by Longstreet offered promise of success. He was ordered to renew the fight early on the 3d; Ewell was to co-operate. Ewell ordered Johnson to attack at an early hour, anticipating that Longstreet would do the same. Longstreet delayed. He found that a force of the enemy, occupying high ground on their left, would take his troops in reverse as they advanced.

Longstreet was then visited by General Lee, and they conferred as to the mode of attack. It was determined to adhere to the plan of attack by Longstreet; and to strengthen him for the movement, he was to be reinforced by Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's, of Hill's corps. These, with his three divisions, were to attack. Longstreet made his dispositions and General Lee went to our centre to observe movements. The attack was not made as designed. Pickett's division, Heth's division, and two brigades of Pender's division advanced. Hood and McLaws were not moved forward. There were nine divisions in the army; seven were quiet, while two assailed the fortified line of the enemy. A. P. Hill had orders to be prepared to assist Longstreet further if neces-

sary. Anderson, who commanded one of Hill's divisions, was in readiness to respond to Longstreet's call, made his dispositions to advance, but General Longstreet told him it was of no use—the attack had failed.

Had Hood and McLaws followed or supported Pickett, and Pettigrew and Anderson have been advanced, the design of the Commanding-General would have been carried out—the world would not be so at a loss to understand *what was designed* by throwing forward, unsupported, against the enemy's stronghold, so small a portion of our army. Had General Lee known what was to happen, doubtless he would have manoeuvred to force General Meade away from his strong position by threatening his communications with the east, as suggested by —; but he felt strong enough to carry the enemy's lines, and I believe success would have crowned his plan had it been faithfully carried out.

As previously stated, I obtained access to the Archives of the War Department, U. S. A., and have taken copies of the original returns of our army. On the 31st May our effective strength as 68,352; but one brigade, Pettigrew's, joined the army after this, and to offset Pettigrew, Corse's brigade, of Pickett's division, with one regiment of North Carolina troops (of Pettigrew's brigade), remained at Hanover Junction.

Pickett had but three of his brigades at Gettysburg. I am sure that the causes already mentioned reduced General Lee's effective strength at Gettysburg, including Stuart's cavalry, to sixty-two thousand (62,000) men. Perhaps I had better go more into detail. The return alluded to is the nearest to the invasion—indeed made but a few days before the army advanced. The strength of the several arms was as follows: Infantry, 54,356; cavalry, 9,536; artillery, 4,460; of all arms, 68,352.

At the time of that return the army was divided into but two corps or wings—one under Longstreet, and the other—Jackson's old corps—under A. P. Hill. The former embraced four divisions—McLaws', Anderson's, Pickett's and Hood's; and the latter the same number, viz: A. P. Hill's, Early's, Rodes' and Johnson's.

Just before we advanced the army was reorganized into three corps—the First, under Longstreet; Second, under Ewell; and Third, under A. P. Hill. The First corps embraced the divisions of McLaws, Pickett and Hood; the Second those of Early, Rodes and Johnson; and the Third those of Anderson, Heth and Pender.

The last two divisions of Hill's corps were formed by adding Pettigrew's brigade, which had just then joined the army, and Davis' Mississippi brigade (formed for him by bringing together Mississippi regiments from mixed brigades), to the six which constituted A. P. Hill's old division, and dividing the eight into two divisions of four brigades each. The army remained the same as to brigades, except Pettigrew's, as before mentioned, and received no additional reinforcements from any source. On the 20th July, 1863, after our return, the army numbered 41,388 effective, *exclusive* of the cavalry, of which no report is made in the return last mentioned. Allowing 7,612 a fair estimate for the cavalry, and the effective total of the army on the 20th July, 1863, was 49,000—showing a loss of 19,000 *in the campaign*.

Concerning the strength of the Federal army, General Meade testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War that he had a little under 100,000 men in action. He also said that when he assumed command of the army, from returns showed him, he ascertained its strength to be 105,000, including the 10,000 under General French at Harper's Ferry. General Hooker, who was relieved but a few days before the battle, on the 27th of June telegraphed to General Halleck: "My whole force of enlisted men for duty will not exceed 105,000." This would make his effective total (officers and men) fully 112,000. This communication was sent to General Halleck by wire, and received at 9 o'clock A. M. Later in the day he telegraphed from Sandy Hook concerning the troops at Harper's Ferry: "I find 10,000 men here in condition to take the field," &c. This dispatch was received by General Halleck at 2:55 P. M. It is evident that General Meade was

in error in supposing that the returns showing the 105,000 enlisted men of the Army of the Potomac included the 10,000 at Harper's Ferry. Including the latter, General Meade had 115,000 to 122,000 men under his command. He ordered General French to Frederick with 7,000 men from Harper's Ferry to protect his communications, and thus made available a like number of the Army of the Potomac who would otherwise have been detached for this service. I put the Army of Northern Virginia at \*62,000, and the Army of the Potomac at 105,000, effective, at Gettysburg, and believe these figures nearly correct.

WALTER H. TAYLOR,

*Late Adj't-Gen'l of the Army of Northern Va., C. S. A.*

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We shall follow the above papers with letters from General E. P. Alexander, chief of artillery of Longstreet's corps; General A. L. Long, chief of artillery of Ewell's corps; General Wilcox, of Hill's corps; General Heth, of Hill's corps; and others who were in position to know, and who give their personal observations and opinions of the great battle.

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\* Infantry, 50,000; Cavalry, 8,000; Artillery, 4,000—62,000.



**Major Scheibert's Book.**

[We are glad to be able to give our readers the following notice of Major Scheibert's book, by so competent a critic as Colonel C. S. Venable.]

LA  
GUERRE, CIVILE  
AUX ETATS-UNIS D'AMÉRIQUE:  
Considérée au point de vue Militaire pour les Officiers de l'Armée  
Allemande,  
PAR  
I. SCHEIBERT,  
Major au Corps Royal des Ingénieurs Prussiens,  
Traduit de l'allemande par J. Bonneceque, Capitaine du 3<sup>me</sup> regi-  
ment du génie.

Such is the title of the French translation of Major Scheibert's excellent work, a copy of which has been presented to the Southern Historical Society by the author. Major Scheibert is well known to many of the officers of the Army of Northern Virginia, who met him during the campaigns of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg at General Lee's headquarters. He is a thoroughly trained officer of engineers, who was sent by the Prussian government to make a study of the late war through a close observation of the operations of the Confederate army, offensive and defensive. A man of splendid military education, genial, brave and warm-hearted, Major Scheibert won the good-will and golden opinion of all with whom he came in contact during his brief sojourn with the Army of Northern Virginia. He was received by General Lee with the utmost confidence and cordiality as guest at his headquarters at Chancellorsville and during the Gettysburg campaign, and thus had opportunity for close observation of the operations of the army, and also for sharing its dangers. The writer of this well remembers the pleasure which beamed from the genial face of the tall Pomeranian at Chancellorsville when General Lee, picking up a bullet which cut the sod in front of

him and fell harmless at his feet, presented it playfully to his guest, who the previous day had ridden with Jackson in his last great flank attack.

Major Scheibert remained six months in the Confederacy, gathering information by observation and otherwise of the operations of all the arms of our service. On his return home in 1863, we have heard that he delivered a lecture on the military operations of the Confederate army with especial reference to the Army of Northern Virginia, before 800 Prussian officers—among them the Prince of Prussia and other generals of high rank—and that at the close of the lecture the assembled officers rose to their feet and gave three cheers for General Lee. To fit himself for the preparation of his admirable work, Major Scheibert has added to his personal observations while in the Confederate States a profound study of the best Northern sources of information on the war. The motto of the author is *sine ira et studio*.

That he should have fallen into some errors is natural, especially from the paucity of Southern documents accessible to him on the campaign of 1864 of the Army of Northern Virginia—the greatest of all of Lee's campaigns—and of the Army of the West, under General Johnston. But his love of truth and spirit of fairness is manifest throughout the book.

The work is divided into eight chapters. In the first chapter we have a brief sketch of the war. The next six chapters treat, respectively, of the infantry, the cavalry, artillery and engineer corps, strategy, naval operations and the sanitary corps. Chapter VIII is devoted to some final considerations and brief sketches of Generals Stuart, Stonewall Jackson, Sherman, Grant and of General Lee.

Our author's sketch of Lee is a splendid piece of military criticism. In the closing paragraph of the book he thus compares him to Von Moltke, his own loved commander: "Thus died this rare man, whom a clear intellect and naturalness and simplicity of character, joined to an unswerving fidelity to duty, and reposing on firm confidence in God, made one of

the first Generals of his century. There is but one man to whom I can compare him—a venerable General who, like Lee, is by his devotion to duty, the first soldier of his country.”

We cannot in this brief critique enter into any special view of the different chapters of Major Scheibert's book. We are glad to learn that it will be translated into English by an accomplished lady—the widow of a distinguished General of Engineers in the Army of Northern Virginia. It is a most readable book, and at the same time it will make an admirable text-book of war for West Point or the Virginia Military Institute. Distinguished Northern generals have expressed their opinion that it could be adopted with advantage at West Point if some parts, which, from their point of view, do not do full justice to the North, might be corrected by notes.

We would respectfully suggest to the translator that notes from some of our distinguished officers, as General Early and others, would be very valuable. And we might venture to make a particular suggestion—a full note on the torpedo service of the Confederate States in Charleston harbor and elsewhere would be of permanent value.

Major Scheibert's book appeared in Germany at a most opportune time. It was just after the issue of the work of the Comte de Paris from the press, with its one-sided view of the war and its tissue of singularly incorrect statements with regard to many of the most signal operations of the war. Major Scheibert's book, with its simple, clear statements of an honest, true and brave soldier, who writes without prejudice, and knows whereof he writes, was a complete refutation to the magnificent corps of Prussian officers of the Comte's slipshod misrepresentations. And now that Captain Bonnekque, of the French Engineers, has paid Major Scheibert the distinguished compliment of forgetting his national hatred of the Germans for the time being, and translating his excellent book into French, it may serve to show Frenchmen that the distinguished Orleanist is a partisan, or at least, that he has not sought accuracy with that devotion to truth with which

the true soldier-author should be inspired in the presence of great events.

It will give pleasure to those who remember Major Scheibert so pleasantly in the Army of Northern Virginia in 1863, to know that he is alive and well, having served unharmed in the campaign against Austria, which ended in the battle of Sadowa. He was badly wounded in the late war against France in the battle of Worth. He remembers warmly his comrades of the Army of Northern Virginia, and holds frequent happy reunions with Von Boreke, the big and big-hearted cavalryman who rode with Stuart, when there is much talk of their old comrades—of those still here as well as of those who have “gone beyond.”

C. S. VENABLE.

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#### **The Capture of Mr. Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States.**

We regret to see that in an article in the *Philadelphia Times* General Wilson revives the stale slander that President Davis was captured in a woman's disguise.

We hope to present before long a full statement of the facts; but in the meantime we give, without alteration, the following statement of a Federal soldier who was present, and which fully offsets the statement of General Wilson, who was *not* present at the capture:

JEFF. DAVIS' ALLEGED DISGUISE.—Portland (Maine) *Argus*. I am no admirer of Jeff. Davis. I am a Yankee, born between Saccarappa and Gorham Corner; am full of Yankee prejudices; but I think it wicked to lie even about him, or, for the matter, about the devil.

I was with the party that captured Jeff. Davis; saw the whole transaction from its beginning. I now say—and hope you will publish it—that Jeff. Davis did not have on at the time he was taken any such garment as is worn by women. He did have over his shoulders a water-proof article of clothing—something like a “Havelock.” It was not in the least concealed. He wore a hat, and did not carry a pail of water on his head, nor carry pail, bucket or kettle in any way.



To the best of my recollection, he carried nothing whatever in his hands. His wife did not tell any person that her husband might hurt some body if he got exasperated. She behaved like a lady, and he as a gentleman, though manifestly he was chagrined at being taken into custody. Our soldiers behaved like gentlemen, as they were, and our officers like honorable, brave men; and the foolish stories that went the newspaper rounds of the day, telling how wolfishly he deported himself, were all false. I know what I am writing about. I saw Jefferson Davis many times while he was staying in Portland several years ago; and I think I was the first one who recognized him at the time of his arrest.

When it was known that he was certainly taken, some newspaper correspondent—I knew his name at the time—fabricated the story about his disguise in an old woman's dress. I heard the whole matter talked over as a good joke; and the officers, who knew better, never took the trouble to deny it. Perhaps they thought the Confederate President deserved all the contempt that could be put upon him. I think so, too; only I would never perpetrate a falsehood that by any means would become history. And, further, I would never slander a woman who has shown so much devotion as Mrs. Davis has to her husband, no matter how wicked he is or may have been.

I defy any person to find a single officer or soldier who was present at the capture of Jefferson Davis who will say, upon honor, that he was disguised in woman's clothes, or that his wife acted in any way unladylike or undignified on that occasion. I go for trying him for his crimes, and, if he is found guilty, punishing him. But I would not lie about him, when the truth will certainly make it bad enough.

JAMES H. PARKER.

*Elburnville, Pa.*

**The Exchange Question.—Another Letter from Judge Ould.**

[ We propose to continue, from time to time, to ventilate this question, and to *pile up* the evidence which acquits the Confederacy of all blame and convicts the authorities at Washington of the entire responsibility in this matter. The following letter of our Agent of Exchange is worth preserving :]

RICHMOND, *July 18, 1867.*

MY DEAR SIR :

I have read the remarkable discussion in the House. Mr. Eldridge is substantially right in what he said. I offered early in August to deliver all the sick and wounded prisoners we had without requiring equivalents for them. I would have made the offer earlier but for the fact that some considerable time before I had made an offer of exchange, man for man, to which I could get no response. I waited for a response until early in August, and failing to receive one, I then made the offer above named, at the same time urging haste on the part of the United States government, as the mortality amongst the Federal prisoners was very great.

During the fall I again and again urged haste, giving the same reason. I informed the Federal authorities that if they would send transportation for fifteen thousand men to the mouth of the Savannah river I would furnish that number of sick and wounded, and that I would fill up any deficiency with well prisoners. I did not require a corresponding delivery of our prisoners, though I expressed a desire that they might be sent. From early in August we were not only ready, but anxious to make this delivery. It was our purpose, as well as our offer, to continue the delivery of the sick and wounded at all the depots of prisoners, and upon the terms mentioned—that is, without requiring equivalents. Transportation was not sent until December. The United States authorities brought in that month some three thousand prisoners to the mouth of the Savannah river, and received over thirteen thousand in return, many of whom were well men. The three thousand delivered presented as melancholy a spectacle as Andersonville ever disclosed. Most, if not all of them, had been brought from Elmira. Some died between Elmira and Baltimore—many between Baltimore and Savannah. I do not believe ten per cent. of the number are alive now.

All these facts are known to Federal officers. Rebels may lie, but yet the fact is fully established by other evidence that

the Federal authorities sent three thousand and received thirteen thousand. They would have received more if there had been accommodation. Why was transportation sent to Savannah for the prisoners unless I had agreed to deliver them? Why were thirteen thousand delivered and only three thousand received if I insisted on receiving equivalents?

There is nothing in the published correspondence referred to by General Butler which in any manner contests any one of the facts I have mentioned.

General Mulford will sustain every thing I have herein written. He is a man of honor and courage, and I do not think will hesitate to tell the truth. I think it would be well for you to make the appeal to him, as it has become a question of veracity.

General Butler says the proposition was made in the fall, and that seven thousand prisoners were delivered. It was in August, and over thirteen thousand were delivered.

You can make public any portion of this letter. I defy contradiction as to any statement I have made, and challenge scrutiny. I will prove every word by Federal testimony. Who, then, is responsible for the suffering of Andersonville during the period of its most deadly mortality, from August to January?

Yours truly,

ROBERT OULD.

## EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS.

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THE SAFETY OF OUR ARCHIVES—which are of such great value—has naturally excited a good deal of interest among our friends. We are very fortunate in having, by the action of the Legislature and the kindly courtesy of Governor Kemper, an excellent office on the Library floor of the State Capitol of Virginia. The building is isolated, and under constant guard, and our Archives are as safe as those of the Commonwealth. It would, of course, be better if we had a *fire-proof* building—plans of building one in connection with the Virginia Historical Society are being discussed—and we are hoping that the day is not very far distant which shall witness the consummation of our hopes in this regard. But in the meantime, we desire to repeat, our Archives are a much safer place of deposit than a private house. We will as rapidly as possible print rare documents in order to preserve them; and the very best way to preserve the material for our history is to send it *at once* to our office.

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THE FINANCES OF THE SOCIETY have from our organization been in such condition as to require the exercise of the most rigid economy in the administration of our affairs. We have had no means of buying books or documents, and have been compelled to omit many other things which would greatly promote our usefulness and success.

Just now we especially need an increase of revenue, and it would be very acceptable if some of our Annual Members would become LIFE Members—if some whose subscriptions have expired would renew—and if our friends generally would exert themselves to replenish our treasury, and enable us to push forward more vigorously our work.

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### WE ACKNOWLEDGE THE FOLLOWING CONTRIBUTIONS:

*From Gov. J. D. Porter, of Tennessee*—An autograph letter from General Albert Sidney Johnston, dated Dec'r 25th, 1861, to Gov. Harris, giving his plans, resources, and general views of the approaching campaign.

*From Rev. P. B. Price, of Virginia*—Memoir of Capt. Thos. E. King, by Rev. Dr. Jos. C. Stiles. [We are anxious to secure all similar publications made during the war.]

*From A. Barron Holmes, Charleston*—"South Carolina in the Revolution." "A Memorial of the Special Services held May, 1875, at St. Philip's Church, Charleston, in commemoration of the planting of the Church of England in the Province of S. C."



## Book Notice.

THE GREAT REVIVAL IN THE SOUTHERN ARMIES, BY WM. W. BENNETT, D. D. PHILADELPHIA: CLAXTON, REMSEN & HAFFELFINGER.—We are indebted to the publishers for a copy of this admirable book, which we have read with deep interest, and which we cordially recommend as worthy of a place in every library.

No history of the late war would be complete without an account of that wonderful work of grace, which made the camps and hospitals of the Confederacy vocal with the Saviour's praises—which brought thousands of our brave men to simple-hearted trust in Christ, and which made the *morale* of the Southern armies superior to that of any which the world has ever seen.

As Superintendent of the "*Soldiers' Tract Association*," and Chaplain in the Confederate army, Dr. Bennett had some peculiar facilities for knowing of this great work. He has used good judgment in culling from the ample material at his disposal, and he has produced a book of great interest and value.

In his first chapter he speaks of "Religion among soldiers" in the past, and brings out brief sketches of eminent soldiers in all ages who have been active servants of the Living God. He then treats, in successive chapters, of "Subjects of the Revival," "Hindrances to the Revival," and "Helps to the Revival," and proceeds with his narrative in the order of the events of the war.

The narrative is adorned and illustrated with accounts of their work by Chaplains, Army Missionaries, Colporteurs and others, and by most touching examples of the power of faith in Christ to fit men for the camp, the march, the battle-field, the hospital, or the last struggle with the grim monster—Death.

The book is gotten up in the admirable style which we always expect from these well known publishers. It is sold at the low price of \$1.50, and we predict for it an extensive sale and wide usefulness.

We notice an inaccuracy in the statement that the Chaplains met in Petersburg in the winter of 1864–5 to form a Chaplains' Association. This organization was perfected at Old Round Oak Church, in Caroline county, in the spring of 1863, and the meeting in Petersburg was only a regular meeting of the Association, which had been in active existence ever since. We may add that the subject, though well treated, is by no means exhausted, and there is still room for a book on "*Jesus in the Camp, or Religion in Lee's Army*," which a friend of ours has been preparing.

# SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

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Vol. IV.      Richmond, Va., Sept., 1877.      No. 3.

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## Causes of the Confederate Defeat at Gettysburg.

[CONTINUED FROM AUGUST NO.]

We present our readers this month several other papers of our Gettysburg series, and feel quite sure that their deep interest and great historic value will be appreciated by all seekers after the truth. We hope to give soon other papers on this campaign which have been promised us, and that yet others of our ablest soldiers will be induced to tell what they know of the great battle.

Letter from General E. P. Alexander, late Chief of Artillery First Corps, A. N. V.

MONTGOMERY, ALA., *March 17th*, 1877.

*Rev. J. WM. JONES, Sec'y:*

DEAR SIR: I have your favor of the 27th ult., enclosing copy of letter from ———, giving an outline of his views of the campaign and battle of Gettysburg, and inviting my comments thereon. I take great pleasure in giving them in the same frank spirit in which they are asked, and asking no one to accept them to whom they do not commend themselves, and not pretending to know *every thing* about it.

My rank and position during that campaign was colonel of artillery, commanding a battalion of six batteries attached as reserve to Longstreet's corps; and on the field of Gettysburg I was placed by General Longstreet in command of all of his artillery on the field as chief of artillery for the action. As I had belonged to the United States Engineer Corps before the war, and as General Longstreet at that time had no engineer officers on his staff, I was frequently called on, also, during the campaign, as an

engineer officer. I mention these facts only that you may form an idea of my personal opportunities of observation and information.

And now as to the questions of ——— in their order :

First. Was the invasion a mistake? The proof of the pudding is the eating, and that test has certainly condemned it. I must also say frankly that my recollection is, that while the whole army went across the Potomac in the highest spirits, they were due more to confidence in General Lee than to an entire accordance of all of the prominent officers in the wisdom of the invasion. I remember conversations on the matter while on the march with one of the most gallant major-generals of the army—General Hood—in which he suggested all of the very grave considerations against it which are so forcibly put by ———. General Longstreet has also stated to me since (although during the campaign I do not remember a word or sign from him indicating any doubt in its success) that he urged similar considerations, very earnestly, upon General Lee, when the campaign was being discussed, and was only persuaded out of them by the understanding that we were not to deliver an *offensive* battle, but to so manoeuvre that Meade would be forced to attack us. Remember, in this connection, one of Stonewall Jackson's last speeches: "Our men *sometimes* fail to drive the enemy out of their positions, but they *always* fail to drive us." Such a confidence on General Lee's part would probably not have been misplaced, for he carried the best and largest army into Pennsylvania that he ever had in hand. The morale and spirit of the men was simply superb, as shown by the fight they made and the orderly and successful retreat after the battle. General Lee, in his report, has given the reasons which led him to plan the invasion. Whether he then fully appreciated all of the objections to it which can now be pointed out I do not know, but, even if he did, I can imagine his confidence in defeating the enemy in a decisive battle, by *forcing them to attack us*, as so great, and as based on such reasonable grounds, as to fully justify the movement. For it must be remembered that there were great objections to be found to his standing still and allowing the enemy to take the initiative.

Second question. I fully agree as to the necessity to General Lee of defeating the Federal army, and *perhaps* that army would fight better on its own soil than in Virginia, and would, therefore, be

easier to defeat in Virginia; but bear in mind that the *great* condition to *assure* its defeat was to force it to attack General Lee. Moreover, he did manoeuvre in Virginia inviting an attack, but in vain—at least he gave Hooker opportunities which were not availed of, and no disposition shown to act on them during the few days they remained open. It is also very certain that General Lee could never have established his army in Pennsylvania with his communications open so as to get supplies, even of ammunition; but yet I think he could easily have so manoeuvred as to force Meade to attack him. A position covering Fairfield would have given him the Valley to support himself himself on, and would have been so threatening to Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia and Harrisburg that *public clamor would have forced Meade to try and dislodge him*. We had ammunition enough for one good fight, and in a victory would capture enough for the next. If Lee was to cross the Potomac at all, I don't think the crossing should necessarily have been dependent on a previous victory. A subsequent one would have answered all purposes, and in all human probabilities it was nearly as certain.

They could have been forced to attack us, and they never had driven us from a field since the war began. Excellent positions also were to be found every where in that section, which was a lime-stone country, well cleared and abounding in long parallel ridges like the Seminary ridge or Cemetery ridge at Gettysburg. So much for the general plan of the campaign; and before proceeding to the next questions of ———, relating more to the incidents of the battle itself, it is in order to inquire why the original plan was changed and an offensive battle delivered. And, on this subject, I know little or nothing that is not contained in General Lee's report. My general recollection is that we considered the enemy very slow in moving upon us, and took our time every where to give him opportunities to attack, if he desired, and that the concentration which was ordered at Gettysburg was intended as an offer of battle to him. In making this concentration Hill's corps unexpectedly came in collision with Reynolds' corps, and the thing began. Reynolds' corps was not expected there, and our information of the enemy's movements was incomplete on account of the absence of all of the cavalry, or nearly all, with General Stuart, who, instead of being between us and the enemy, was on



a raid around him. In this way the action began, and the first day's success stimulated the second day's effort. This effort should have been successful, and would have been, but for delays and faults of detail in its execution. These have been the subject of much crimination and recrimination among survivors as to the greater or less responsibility for them, but, to history, of course the general commanding is the responsible party. I will write frankly all that I know about them personally further on. It is sufficient to say here that, as I have already implied, the battle was lost by them, and, in fact, under the conditions existing when the actual conflict was joined, success was *almost impossible*.

Even after the second day's battle, in my humble judgment, it was possible to have withdrawn from the offensive and taken the defensive, and forced Meade to assault us, and to have given him a crushing defeat. I may be mistaken, and I do not by any means set up as a military critic in general, but, as we did offer battle on the 4th, and again for several days near Hagerstown, on the retreat (while waiting to construct a bridge over the Potomac), and as Meade did at last feel bound to attack us, but just a day too late to do it, I think a similar course might have been successfully pursued after the action of the second. Whether it was discussed I do not know, but I do know that Longstreet was very averse to the assault by Pickett's division on the third. He only expressed his opinion about it, so far as I know, after the division was launched, but the circumstances which I will detail presently led me to infer that he had discussed the matter fully with General Lee. And now I will give what details of the battle itself fell under my personal observation, which may assist in an understanding of the whole matter, and I will be very careful to give nothing unqualifiedly of which I am not personally certain.

My command, with the greater portion of Longstreet's corps, was in camp at Chambersburg from Saturday, June 27th, to Tuesday, June 30th, and on the latter date we moved in direction of Gettysburg, about 10 miles, and about 2 P. M. encamped at a small village called Greenwood. General Lee was in camp very near us during the same afternoon. On Wednesday, July 1st, we (the reserve artillery) remained in camp all day, and heard nothing of the battle which was begun at Gettysburg until about dark, when orders were received to march at 2 A. M. on the 2d for Get-

tysburg. Pickett's division of infantry had been left behind at Chambersburg, Hood's and McLaws' divisions had marched before us, and when we took the road at 2 A. M. (my batallion, 26 guns, and the Washington Artillery, 10 guns, I think, forming the artillery reserve,) we had a clear road and bright moonlight, and saw nothing of the infantry. About 8 or 9 A. M. we reached the vicinity of the field, and the guns were halted in a wood, and I reported in person to Generals Lee and Longstreet, who were together on a hill in rear of our lines. I was told that we were to attack the enemy's left flank, and was directed to take command of my own batallion—Cabell's batallion (with McLaws' division), 18 guns; Henry's batallion (with Hood's), 18 guns—leaving the Washington Artillery in reserve, and to reconnoitre the ground and co-operate with the infantry in the attack. I was especially cautioned in moving up the guns to avoid exposing them to the view of a signal station of the enemy's on Round Top mountain. I do not remember seeing or hearing any thing at this time of Longstreet's infantry, nor did I get the impression that General Lee thought there was any unnecessary delay going on. I had just arrived, and knew nothing of the situation, and my instructions were to reconnoitre the flank to be attacked, and choose my own positions and means of reaching them. This duty occupied me, according to the best of my recollection, one or two hours, when I rode back, and in person conducted my own batallion to the school-house on Willoughby run. At one point the direct road leading to this place came in sight of the enemy's signal station, but I turned out of the road before reaching the exposed part, and passing through some meadows a few hundred yards, regained the road without coming in sight. I then went about hunting up the other batallions which were attached to the infantry in order to give them all their positions for opening the attack. While thus engaged I came upon the head of an infantry column, which I think was Hood's division, standing halted in the road where it was in sight of Round Top. They had been instructed to avoid being seen, and finding that the road on which they had been sent came at this point in full view of the signal station, they had halted, in finding themselves already exposed, and sent back to General Lee or Longstreet for orders. For some reason, which I cannot now recall, they would not turn back and follow the tracks of my

guns, and I remember a long and tiresome waiting; and at length there came an order to turn back and take another road around by "Black Horse Tavern," and I have never forgotten that name since. My general recollection is that nearly three hours were lost in that delay and countermarch, and that it was about 4 P. M. when Hood became engaged heavily on our extreme right flank, with Henry's battalion aiding him, while, with 18 guns of my own battalion and Cabell's 18, I attacked Hooker's corps at the Peach Orchard. McLaws' division was, during this, in the woods in our rear, our batteries firing from the edge next the Peach Orchard—my own probably 500 yards and Cabell's 700 yards distant. We were so engaged probably for an hour, when McLaws charged and carried the Peach Orchard, my batteries following him closely and going into action in and around the Orchard, and the firing was kept up thence till after dark.

*Note.*—I have just found copy of a brief diary kept by Colonel G. Moxley Sorrel, Adjutant-General of Longstreet's corps, from which I copy the following entries, showing movements of the infantry divisions more accurately:

"JUNE 30TH.—Moved (from Chambersburg) for Greenwood, where we camped at night, Pickett being left back at Chambersburg.

"JULY 1ST.—Moved out from Greenwood on the Gettysburg road, passing through Cashtown and New Salem; arrive within two miles of Gettysburg; during the day A. P. Hill's corps is sharply engaged; also Ewell on the left. The enemy is driven steadily back, and the lines occupied by Rodes' division. McLaws, Hood, and the artillery are now moving up and Pickett is ordered from Chambersburg.

"JULY 2D AND 3D.—See Battle Reports of General Longstreet.

"JULY 4TH.—After the disasters of yesterday the morning opens very quietly, our troops occupying their original positions. There is not even the usual light skirmishing. Both armies appear thoroughly exhausted. Preparations are apparant for a backward movement by the right. The wagons are sent to Cashtown. The movement begins at dark, A. P. Hill leading and our corps following him in the order—1st. Reserve artillery; 2d. Pickett; 3d. McLaws; 4th. Hood. The troops move all night and the next day (5), when they camp in the afternoon near Monterey Springs. The retirement of our forces is not molested by the enemy. They evidently believed in building a golden bridge for a flying enemy."

Before daylight on the morning of the 3d I received orders to post the artillery for an assault upon the enemy's position, and



later I learned that it was to be led by Pickett's division and directed on Cemetery Hill. Some of the batteries had gone back for ammunition and forage, but they were all brought up immediately, and by daylight all then on the field were posted. Dearing's battalion (with Pickett's division) reported sometime during the morning. The enemy fired on our movements and positions occasionally, doing no great damage, and we scarcely returned a shot. The morning was consumed in waiting for Pickett's division, and possibly other movements of infantry. While forming for the attack, I borrowed from General Pendleton, General Lee's chief of artillery, seven 12 pounder howitzers, belonging to the Third corps, under Major Richardson, which I put in reserve in a selected spot, intending them to accompany Pickett's infantry in the charge to have the advantage of fresh horses and men and full chests of ammunition for the critical moment, in case the batteries engaged in the preliminary cannonade should be so cut up and exhausted as to be slow in getting up. About 11 A. M. the skirmishers in A. P. Hill's front got to fighting for a barn in between the lines, and the artillery on both sides gradually took part until the whole of Hill's artillery in position, which I think was 63 guns, were heavily engaged with about an equal number of the enemy's guns for over a half hour, but not one of the 75 guns which I then had in line was allowed to fire a shot, as we had at best but a short supply of ammunition for the work laid out. In this connection note that the number of rounds which is carried with each piece in its limber and caisson is, including canister, about 130 to 150—about enough for one hour and a half of rapid firing. I am *very sure* that our ordnance trains did not carry into Pennsylvania a reserve supply of more than 100 rounds per gun additional, and I don't believe they had over 60 rounds to a gun. I have never seen the figures, but I was myself chief of ordnance of the army from August, 1861, to November, 1862, and was very familiar with the extent and capacity of the ordnance trains. When nearer Richmond we seldom had a reserve of over 50 rounds per gun, the difficulty of transportation always limiting us to the utmost economy in its use, and in the trains devoted to its carriage. Gradually the cannonade just referred to died out as it began, and the field became nearly silent, but writers have frequently referred to "the cannonade preceding the assault" as



having begun at 11 o'clock and lasted for some hours, being misled by this affair. About 12 M. General Longstreet told me that when Pickett was ready, he would himself give the signal for all our guns to open (which was to be two guns from the Washington Artillery, near the center of our line), and meanwhile he desired me to select a suitable position for observation, and to take with me one of General Pickett's staff, and exercise my judgment in selecting the moment for Pickett's advance to begin. Complying, I selected the advanced salient angle of the wood in which Pickett's line was now formed, just on the left flank of my line of 75 guns. While occupying this position and in conversation with General A. R. Wright, commanding a Georgia brigade in A. P. Hill's corps, who had come out there for an observation of the position, I received a note from General Longstreet, which I copy from the original still in my possession, as follows:

"HD. QRS., *July 3rd*, 1863.

"COLONEL:

"If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off the enemy or greatly demoralize him so as to make our efforts pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise General Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal on your good judgment to determine the matter, and shall expect you to let General Pickett know when the moment offers.

"Respectfully,

"J. LONGSTREET, *Lieut.-General*.

"To Colonel E. P. ALEXANDER, *Artillery*."

This note at once suggested that there was some alternative to the attack, and placed me on the responsibility of deciding the question. I endeavored to avoid it by giving my views in a note, of which I kept no copy, but of which I have always retained a vivid recollection, having discussed its points with General A. R. Wright as I wrote it. It was expressed very nearly as follows:

"GENERAL:

"I will only be able to judge of the effect of our fire on the enemy by his return fire, for his infantry is but little exposed to view and the smoke will obscure the whole field. If, as I infer from your note, there is any alternative to this attack, it

should be carefully considered before opening our fire, for it will take all the artillery ammunition we have left to test this one thoroughly, and, if the result is unfavorable, we will have none left for another effort. And even if this is entirely successful it can only be so at a very bloody cost.

"Very respectfully, &c.,

"E. P. ALEXANDER, *Colonel Artillery.*"

To this note I soon received the following reply—the original still in my possession:

"HD. QRS., *July 3rd, 1863.*

"COLONEL:

"The intention is to advance the infantry if the artillery has the desired effect of driving the enemy's off, or having other effect such as to warrant us in making the attack. When that moment arrives advise General P., and of course advance such artillery as you can use in aiding the attack.

"Respectfully,

"J. LONGSTREET, *Lieut.-General, Commanding.*

"*To Colonel ALEXANDER.*"

This letter again placed the responsibility upon me, and I felt it very deeply, for the day was rapidly advancing (it was about 12 M., or a little later), and whatever was to be done was to be done soon. Meanwhile I had been anxiously discussing the attack with General A. R. Wright, who said that the difficulty was not so much in *reaching* Cemetery Hill, or taking it—that his brigade had carried it the afternoon before—but that the trouble was to hold it, for the whole Federal army was massed in a sort of horse-shoe shape and could rapidly reinforce the point to any extent, while our long, enveloping line could not give prompt enough support. This somewhat reassured me, as I had heard it said that morning that General Lee had ordered "every brigade in the army to charge Cemetery Hill," and it was at least certain that the question of supports had had his careful attention. Before answering, however, I rode back to converse with General Pickett, whose line was now formed or forming in the wood, and without telling him of the question I had to decide, I found out that he was entirely sanguine of success in the charge, and was only congratulating himself on the opportunity. I was convinced that to make

any half-way effort would insure a failure of the campaign, and that if our artillery fire was once opened, after all the time consumed in preparation for the attack, the only hope of success was to follow it up promptly with one supreme effort, concentrating every energy we possessed into it, and my mind was fully made up that *if the artillery opened Pickett must charge*. After the second note from General Longstreet, therefore, and the interview with Pickett, I did not feel justified in making any delay, but to acquaint General Longstreet with my determination. I wrote him a note, which I think I quote verbatim, as follows: "General: When our artillery fire is doing its best I shall advise General Pickett to advance." It was my intention, as he had a long distance to traverse, that he should start not later than fifteen minutes after our fire opened. About this time, too, to be sure that Richardson with his seven 12-pounder howitzers should be promptly on hand, I sent for him to come up through the woods and be ready to move ahead of Pickett's division in the advance. To my great disappointment I learned just as we opened fire, and too late to replace him, that General Pendleton had sent four of his guns, without my knowledge, to some other part of the field, and the other three had also moved off and could not be found. Probably, however, the presence of guns in the head of this column would only have resulted in their loss, but it would have been a brilliant opportunity for them, and I always feel like apologizing for their absence.

It was 1 P. M. by my watch when the signal guns were fired, the field at that time being entirely silent, but for light picket firing between the lines, and as suddenly as an organ strikes up in a church, the grand roar followed from all the guns of both armies. The enemy's fire was heavy and severe, and their accounts represent ours as having been equally so, though our rifle guns were comparatively few and had only very defective ammunition. As an illustration, I remember that the casualties in my own battalion (26 guns) were about 147 men and 116 horses in the two days' actions, and about 80 per cent. of the wounds were from artillery fire. General A. S. Webb, U. S. A., who commanded a brigade on Cemetery Hill, told me, after the war, that a Federal battery, coming into action on the Hill, lost from our artillery fire 27 out of 36 horses in about ten minutes. Average distances I should suppose were about 1,400 yards. We had some casualties

from canister. I had fully intended giving Pickett the order to advance as soon as I saw that our guns had gotten their ranges, say, in ten or fifteen minutes, but the enemy's fire was so severe that when that time had elapsed I could not make up my mind to order the infantry out into a fire which I did not believe they could face, for so long a charge, in such a hot sun, tired as they already were by the march from Chambersburg. I accordingly waited in hopes that our fire would produce some visible effect, or something turn up to make the situation more hopeful; but fifteen minutes more passed without any change in the situation, the fire on neither side slackening for a moment. Even then I could not bring myself to give a peremptory order to Pickett to advance, but feeling that the critical moment would soon pass, I wrote him a note to this effect: "If you are coming at all you must come immediately or I cannot give you proper support; but the enemy's fire has not slackened materially, and at least 18 guns are still firing from the Cemetery itself."

This note (which, though given from memory, I can vouch for as very nearly verbatim) I sent off at 1:30 P. M., consulting my watch. I afterwards heard what followed its receipt from members of the staff of both Generals Pickett and Longstreet, as follows: Pickett on receiving it galloped over to General Longstreet, who was not far off, and showed it to General L. The latter read it and made no reply. (General Longstreet himself, speaking of it afterwards, said that he knew the charge had to be made, but could not bring himself to give the order.) General Pickett then said: "General, shall I advance?" Longstreet turned around in his saddle and would not answer. Pickett immediately saluted, and said: "I am going to lead my division forward, sir," and galloped off to put it in motion; on which General L. left his staff and rode out alone to my position. Meanwhile, five minutes after I sent the above note to Pickett, the enemy's fire suddenly slackened materially, and the batteries in the Cemetery were limbered up and were withdrawn. As the enemy had such abundance of ammunition and so much better guns than ours that they were not compelled to reserve their artillery for critical moments (as we almost always had to do), I knew that they must have felt the punishment a good deal, and I was a good deal elated by the sight. But to make sure that it was a withdrawal for good, and not a



mere change of position or relieving of the batteries by fresh ones, I waited for five minutes more, closely examining the ground with a large glass. At that time I sent my courier to Pickett with a note: "For God's sake come quick; the 18 guns are gone"; and, going to the nearest guns, I sent a lieutenant and a sergeant, one after the other, with other messages to same effect. A few minutes after this, Pickett still not appearing, General Longstreet rode up alone, having seen Pickett and left his staff as above. I showed him the situation, and said I only feared I could not give Pickett the help I wanted to, my ammunition being very low, and the seven guns under Richardson having been taken off. General Longstreet spoke up promptly: "Go and stop Pickett right where he is, and replenish your ammunition." I answered, that the ordnance wagons had been nearly emptied, replacing expenditures of the day before, and that not over 20 rounds to the gun were left—too little to accomplish much—and that while this was being done the enemy would recover from the effect of the fire we were now giving him. His reply was: "I don't want to make this charge; I don't believe it can succeed. I would stop Pickett now, but that General Lee has ordered it and expects it," and other remarks, showing that he would have been easily induced, even then, to order Pickett to halt. It was just at this moment that Pickett's line appeared sweeping out of the wood, Garnett's brigade passing over us. I then left General Longstreet and rode a short distance with General Garnett, an old friend, who had been sick, but, buttoned up in an old blue overcoat, in spite of the heat of the day, was riding in front of his line. I then galloped along my line of guns, ordering those that had over 20 rounds left to limber up and follow Pickett, and those that had less to maintain their fire from where they were. I had advanced several batteries or parts of batteries in this way, when Pickett's division appeared on the slope of Cemetery Hill, and a considerable force of the enemy were thrown out, attacking his unprotected right flank. Meanwhile, too, several batteries which had been withdrawn were run out again and were firing on him very heavily. We opened on these troops and batteries with the best we had in the shop, and appeared to do them considerable damage, but meanwhile Pickett's division just seemed to melt away in the blue musketry smoke which now covered the hill. Nothing but stragglers came

back. As soon as it was clear that Pickett was "gone up," I ceased firing, saving what little ammunition was left for fear of an advance by the enemy. About this time General Lee came up to our guns alone and remained there a half hour or more, speaking to Pickett's men as they came straggling back, and encouraging them to form again in the first cover they could find. While he was here Colonel Fremantle, of the Coldstream Guards, rode up, who afterwards wrote a very graphic account of the battle and of incidents occurring here, which was published in Blackwood's Magazine. A little before this, Heth's division, under Pettigrew, had been advanced also, but I cannot recall the moment or the place where I saw them, but only the impression on my mind, as the men passed us, that the charge must surely be some misapprehension of orders, as the circumstances at the moment made it utterly impossible that it could accomplish any thing, and I thought what a pity it was that so many of them were about being sacrificed in vain. It was intended, I believe, that Pettigrew should support Pickett's right flank, but the distance that had to be traversed in the charge got such an interval between the two that Pickett's force was spent and his division disintegrated before Pettigrew's got under close fire. I have always believed that the enemy here lost the greatest opportunity they ever had of routing General Lee's army by a prompt offensive. They occupied a line shaped somewhat like a horse shoe. I suppose that the greatest diameter of the horse shoe was not more than one mile, and the ground within was entirely sheltered from our observation and fire, with communications by signals all over it, and they could concentrate their whole force at any point in a very short while and without our knowledge. Our line was an enveloping semi-circle, over four miles in development, and communication from flank to flank even by courier was difficult, the country being well cleared and exposed to the enemy's view and fire, the roads all running at right angles to our lines, and some of them at least broad turnpikes which the enemy's guns could rake for two miles. Is it necessary now to add any statement as to the superiority of the Federal force or the exhausted and shattered condition of the Confederates for a space of at least a mile in their very center, to show that a great opportunity was thrown away? I think that General Lee himself was quite apprehensive that the enemy would

"ri poote," and that it was that apprehension which brought him alone out to my guns where he could observe all the indications.

*Note.*—In Fremantle's account he tells of General Lee's reproofing an artillery officer for spurring his horse severely when it shied at the bursting of a shell. The officer was my ordnance officer and acting adjutant, Lieutenant F. M. Colston, now of Baltimore, and the shying was not at the bursting of a shell, but, just at that time there was a loud cheering in the enemy's line, a little on our right, and General Lee requested Colston to ride towards it and discover if it indicated an advance, Colston's horse cut up because it did not want to leave my horse, the two being together a great deal on the march and in the camp. General Lee then spoke to him, as Fremantle narrates; and the cheering turned out to be given to some general officer riding along the Federal line.

In the above narrative I have given all the light I can throw on the subjects of enquiry in the 4th and 5th questions of ——'s letter, the 1st and 2d having been previously discussed. The 3d question relates to the lack of co-ordination between the attacks of the 2d July; and a similar lack of co-ordination is equally patent in the attacks on the 3d. I attribute it partially to the fact that our staff organizations were never sufficiently extensive and perfect to enable the Commanding-General to be practically present every where and to thoroughly handle a large force on an extended field, but principally it was due to the exceedingly difficult shape in which our line was formed, the enemy occupying a center and we a semi-circumference, with poor and exposed communications along it. I believe it was simply *impossible* to have made different attacks from the flanks and center of the line we occupied and over the different distances which would have to be traversed and which should be so simultaneous that the *squeeze* would fall on the enemy at all points at the same time. And in this connection, I think that the very position which we took and every feature of the three days' conflict shows the absurdity of a story told by Swinton, who is generally very fair and above giving anecdotes suitable only for the marines. He says that some of our brigades were encouraged to the charge by being told that they were to meet only Pennsylvania militia, but on getting very near the enemy's line they "recognized the bronzed features of the veterans of the Army of the Potomac," (I quote from mem-

ory) and were at once panic-struck. Such stories are not only absurd, but, in a history, are in bad taste, having a tendency to provoke retorts. The above has been written in piece-meal in leisure moments during the past month, and with scarcely the opportunity to read it over, which must be my apology for its deficiencies; but as a narrative of what fell under my personal knowledge, it may assist ——— in understanding some of the points of his enquiries, and is at your service for that or any other purpose.

Very respectfully, yours,

E. P. ALEXANDER.

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Letter from General C. M. Wilcox.

BALTIMORE, MD., *March 26th*, 1877.

—————:

DEAR SIR: The Rev. J. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Southern Historical Society, has favored me with a copy of your letter of January 21st, 1877, and at his request I give you such facts as I have personal knowledge of connected with the battle of Gettysburg, together with those derived from official reports of the same. I beg to assure you that it is with much pleasure that I contribute in a small way to aid in your commendable efforts to get at the truth, believing, as I do, that few of the historians of our late war, or of the writers of biographies of officers, more or less distinguished on either side, have written with that laborious painstaking care indicative of intelligent or conscientious historians.

To begin, you err in stating that the Army of Northern Virginia in its invasion of Pennsylvania was "more powerful than it had ever been before." In numbers it was at its maximum in 1862, when contending with the Army of the Potomac, then commanded by your old chief and my friend, General McClellan, having at that time between 80,000 and 90,000 of all arms, while at Gettysburg it did not exceed 60,000.

I may add that our invasion of the North in 1863 could scarcely be characterized as "disastrous." It certainly was unfortunate in that we did not remain longer on Northern soil and detain the Army of the Potomac there, thus relieving Virginia of a great



and too grievous burden. It was a question of *the commissariat*, to a very great extent, that carried the Army of Northern Virginia across the Potomac. This was so palpably the case that many believe it to have been the main or sole object of the expedition. There was no loss of morale on the Confederate side, for every one knew that in two of the three days' collisions it had the advantage, and while our losses were serious and such that we could ill afford, the Federals were so weakened that we were permitted to retrace our steps with little or no annoyance, and military operations in Virginia were so feeble that General Lee, although closely confronting Meade's army, detached Longstreet and sent him to Georgia, where he aided in winning the brilliant victory of Chickamauga, and did not return to Virginia till March, 1864.

It is known to those who are well informed that accident rather than design brought the two armies in contact at Gettysburg. General Stuart, in command of the cavalry, remained on the east side of the Blue Ridge, holding the passes, while the main army marched down the Valley on the west side to the Potomac. He was instructed to place his command on the right of our army as soon as the Federals should cross the river and move north, and ordered to lose no time in doing so, and he was expected to give notice as soon as Hooker crossed the Potomac. As no report had been made it was believed that Hooker was still in Virginia, and, under this impression, orders were issued to move on Harrisburg. Ewell, with two of his divisions, Johnson's and Rodes', had reached Carlisle June 27th. The other division, Early's, was moving towards York. On the same day Longstreet and Hill had marched through Chambersburg and halted at Fayetteville, six miles east of it, on the Gettysburg pike.

During the night of the 28th a scout reported that Hooker had crossed the Potomac and was moving north and towards South mountain. Without his cavalry, General Lee could not divine the purpose of the enemy, but he determined, with the view of guarding his communications with Virginia and to check the advance west, to concentrate his forces east of the mountains.

Heth's division, of Hill's corps, was moved over the mountain to Cashtown, eight miles west of Gettysburg, on the 29th. The next day Pender's division, of the same corps, followed, and one

of Heth's brigades, ordered to Gettysburg to get supplies, finding the enemy there and not knowing his strength, returned. Report of this was made by General Hill to both Generals Lee and Ewell. Anderson's division, of Hill's corps, and Longstreet, with Hood's and McLaws' divisions, moved July 1st towards Gettysburg. The Union cavalry, under General Buford, reached Gettysburg the forenoon of the 30th, passed through, crossed Seminary Ridge and threw out pickets on roads leading to Gettysburg from the southwest, west and northwest, to the west as far as Marsh creek, three miles of the town.

The night of the 30th Hill, with two of his divisions, lay at Cashtown, eight miles west of Gettysburg, Buford's cavalry between his command and the town. At Emmettsburg, ten miles southeast of Gettysburg, bivouacked the First and Eleventh corps of Hooker's army; and an infantry division of the Federal army camped at Fairfield, twelve miles southwest of Gettysburg. At 5 A. M., July 1st, Hill advanced towards Gettysburg, and at 8 A. M. the two Federal corps moved forward from Emmettsburg towards the same point—these hostile forces being ignorant of the designs and proximity of each other. Had the cavalry been with the army Hill would have known the condition of affairs in his front and would have pushed Buford back and reached Gettysburg before the First and Eleventh corps moved from their camp at Emmettsburg. As Hill moved forward he met Buford's cavalry, drove them back to within less than two miles of the town, when infantry came to their support, and a fierce battle ensued.

Rodes left Heidlersburg and Early left Berlin, three miles further east, under orders for Cashtown; but Ewell, on getting Hill's report of the enemy being at Gettysburg, changed their destination for that place. Rodes came upon the field at 2:30 P. M. and attacked the enemy, now greatly reinforced. He was soon reinforced by Early, and after severe fighting the Union troops were driven back at 4 P. M., with serious losses in killed and wounded, and in much disorder, through the town, losing over 5,000 prisoners. The losses in the four Confederate divisions were heavy. Such was the first day's battle.

Anderson's division, of Hill's corps, reached the field after the fighting ceased, and halted on the ground held by Pender when the battle began. One brigade of this division, Wilcox's, and a

battery were placed on picket one and a quarter miles below or south of the Chambersburg pike, at a mill on Marsh creek, reaching this point before sundown. Johnson's division, of Ewell's corps, came up a little before dark; McLaws' and Hood's, of Longstreet's corps, after dark, and bivouacked east of Marsh creek. These four divisions had not been engaged. All of General Lee's infantry was now at hand, except Pickett's division, of three brigades. One corps of the Union army arrived at 7 A. M. on the 2d and another late in the afternoon, at the end or near the close of the battle of the next day. Our troops, from their success, were in fine spirits. The reverse of this, it was reasonable to suppose, was the condition of the enemy.

It was the natural order of things that the attack should be renewed the next morning, and the earlier the better. There can be but little doubt, if the first collision had been made with a full or a more perfect knowledge of the enemy, the victory would have been more complete, and it is probable there would not have been a second collision, certainly not at the same place.

It has been asserted that General Longstreet was ordered to attack at daylight or early the next morning. Of this I have no knowledge personally, but am inclined to believe that he was so ordered. The attack could have been made easily by 9 or 10 A. M., as will appear. Wilcox's brigade was recalled from picket duty, leaving its post after sunrise, moved back to the Chambersburg pike, then on it towards Gettysburg for about a mile, bore off then to the right, passed through troops whose arms were stacked, was informed they were McLaws' and Hood's divisions; continuing the march over undulating fields and wooded crests nearly in a straight line, till at length, from an elevated point, its commander was ordered to let its right rest against a piece of woods three-fourths of a mile in front and to the right, the left connecting with other brigades of the division. In this wood were two Union regiments on picket. A regiment sent to explore the woods came upon them suddenly, and it was a sharp fight to drive them out. This was about 9 A. M., and at 4 P. M. McLaws formed in these same woods, and moved forward to the attack about 6 P. M.

General Longstreet in his report refers to his orders on this occasion, but is not definite as to time.

"Law's brigade was ordered forward to his division during the day, and joined it about noon on the 2d. Previous to his joining I received instructions from the Commanding-General to move, with the portion of my command that was up, around to gain the Emmettsburg road on the enemy's left. Fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an attack, I delayed until General Law's brigade joined its division." The order, it is seen, was given for him to move with the portion of his command that was up. He does not give the time the move was to begin, but when the order was given it was known to General Lee that his whole corps was not present. "As soon after Law's arrival as we could make our preparations the movement was begun. Engineers sent out by the Commanding-General and myself guided us by a road which would have completely disclosed the move, and some delay ensued in seeking a more concealed route. McLaws' division got into position, opposite the enemy's left, about 4 P. M. Hood's division was moved further to our right, and got into position partially enveloping the enemy's left."

Wilcox's brigade reached the woods in which McLaws subsequently formed without being seen, but the collision that took place made the presence of Confederates in it known to the enemy, and it may have been this knowledge that caused Sickles to advance his line so as to rest its right along the Emmettsburg pike. McLaws was opposite Sickles' right; the left of his corps rested at Round Top, a mile or more to our right, and near the left of the Union army, its right being to the east and north of Culps' Hill. McLaws advanced about 6 P. M., and while engaged in a close musketry fight with Sickles, two brigades of Anderson's division, Wilcox's and Perry's, assailed him in flank and rear, breaking his line at once, and forcing it back with loss and in confusion. Further to the right he fared no better, and his entire corps was driven back to the Ridge in rear. He had been in the meantime heavily reinforced, but all were driven back. The Sixth corps came upon the field at the close of the battle; but one of its brigades became engaged. Longstreet's attack, as all must admit, was made too late in the day. Had it taken place at any time before 12 M. it would probably have been a success, and there would have been no battle on the 3d.



In the battle of the 3d there was a want of concert of action on the part of the Confederates, as the following extract from General Lee's report will show: "General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected, but before notice could be sent to Ewell, Johnson had already become engaged, and it was too late to recall him. After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy was forced to abandon a part of his entrenchments, General Johnson found himself unable to carry the strongly fortified crest of the hill. The projected attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he was enabled to hold his right with a force largely superior to that of General Johnson, and finally to threaten his flank and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his original position about 1 P. M." It was near this hour that Longstreet's attack commenced, with a heavy cannonade of nearly an hour, to be speedily and thoroughly repulsed. In his report he says: "Orders were given to Major-General Pickett to form his line under the best cover he could get from the enemy's batteries, and so that the center of the assaulting column could arrive at the salient of the enemy's position, General Pickett's line to be the guide, and to attack the line of the enemy's defences, and General Pettigrew, in command of Heth's division, moving on the same line as Pickett, was to assault the salient at the time. Pickett's division was arranged two brigades in the front line, supported by his third brigade, and Wilcox's brigade was ordered to move in rear of his right to protect it from any force that the enemy might attempt to move against it." Wilcox's brigade had lost seriously in the engagement the evening before—little over 500 out of 1,600—but was ordered at daylight to move to the front to support artillery, then being placed in position on and near the Emmettsburg pike, on ground won from the enemy. This brigade lay in line parallel with the pike and 150 yards in rear of it. About 10 A. M. Pickett's division arrived and formed in line nearly parallel with the pike, his center brigade directly in rear of Wilcox's brigade.

These four brigades lay in position during the cannonading that preceded the attack. Pickett's right brigade—Kemper's—lost near 200, the other brigades much less. From these four brigades the enemy's line directly in front was some 700 or 800 yards. Beyond the Emmettsburg pike it converged upon the pike towards

the town and touched it near the Cemetery, or came within a very short distance of it. The Cemetery was near a mile from Pickett's left. As Pickett's left was to be the center of the column of attack, the difficulty, if not impossibility, of executing his orders is obvious, the salient being the Cemetery.

When the order to advance was given Pickett's center brigade marched over Wilcox's men, who lay down for that purpose. They then changed direction to the left by a wheel. This threw one brigade in rear. The enemy's artillery opened fire on them before they had gone 100 yards. They had moved forward several hundred yards when Wilcox was ordered to advance, and on Pickett's right. He moved at a double-quick step so as to be uncovered by Pickett's men as speedily as possible, so as to draw upon his own command a portion of the very heavy and destructive fire then directed solely on the former. The changed direction to the left, made by Pickett's brigades, exposed them, after they had gone some distance, to a fire somewhat in flank. Wilcox had got within 100 yards of the enemy's line, when Pickett and the troops on his left were repulsed. His brigade then fell back to its original position, having lost about 200 men. These details are given to show that, in addition to the attack being made too late, the position from which Pickett advanced was not well selected.

I believe I have brought to your notice the causes of our want of complete success at Gettysburg: 1st. Absence of the cavalry, and failure to report promptly when the Federal army had crossed the Potomac, and the line of direction of their march; 2d. Longstreet's late attack in the afternoon of the 2d; and 3d. Want of concert the last day. We might have, even on this day, by making a united and well directed and prompt effort, won the field.

Few army commanders have been more fortunate than General Lee in the matter of chief of cavalry. General Stuart was ever faithful, untiring, vigilant, energetic, brave, quick to conceive, clear in his judgment, and in the execution, either of his own previously determined plans, or the orders of a superior, to whom he was devotedly attached, rarely equalled.

Very respectfully and truly,

C. M. WILCOX.

**Letter from General A. L. Long, Military Secretary to General R. E. Lee.**CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA., *April*, 1877.*Rev. J. WM. JONES, D. D.,**Secretary Southern Historical Society:*

The questions of ———, in relation to the invasion of Pennsylvania and the battle of Gettysburg, I will notice in the order in which they are propounded:

1st. "It was a mistake to invade the Northern States at all, because it stirred up their military spirit. The best chance of the Confederacy was the pecuniary exhaustion of the North, and not the exhaustion of its resources in men. The invasion of the North was the deathblow to what has been called the 'Copperhead' party. It called under arms thousands of men who would never have enrolled otherwise, and who became experienced soldiers in 1864; and, moreover, it diminished for one or two years the resisting powers of the Confederate army."

Since there was never a deficiency of men in the Northern army, it may be justly inferred that the stimulant of our invasion was not needed to arouse the military spirit of the North.

In regard to the Copperhead influence in the prosecution of the war, ——— seems to adhere to the same fallacy that was entertained by many prominent Confederates at the commencement of hostilities, but which was speedily dissipated by subsequent events. The fruit of the first battle of Manassas was lost partly on account of the opinion that the capture of Washington and the invasion of Maryland would unite the political parties of the North and obliterate the hope of a speedy termination of the war; for it was soon demonstrated that the mortifying defeat of the Federal army at Manassas, July, 1861, as firmly united the political parties of the North as an invasion would have done.

Again, ——— seems oblivious of the fact that while there was a pecuniary diminution of one per cent. in the North there were ten in the South. ——— is mistaken in his opinion that the resisting power of the South was materially impaired by the invasion of Pennsylvania. This is clearly shown by the subsequent movements of the Army of Northern Virginia, for it will be remembered that on the retreat from Gettysburg the Federal army

was held in check at Williamsport until the passage of the Potomac could be safely effected, without any greater diminution of strength than the loss of ten or twelve thousand men—the result of the battle of Gettysburg. These losses were soon replaced, and it was again in a position to assert its strength with effect against the Federal army on the Orange and Alexandria railroad and in the Wilderness of Spotsylvania. Therefore, on the above grounds, ——'s opinions in regard to the invasion of Pennsylvania are erroneous. Many of the Northern writers on the War between the States seem to have taken but little pains to extend their search for information much beyond the Federal lines.

Before deciding upon the merits of a military movement it is necessary to understand the motives which dictated it.

2d. "If the invasion was to be undertaken, only raiding parties should have been sent until the Army of the Potomac should have been defeated. It was a great mistake to bring her on the Northern soil, where she fought ten times better than in Virginia. A real invasion, viz: the establishment of the Confederate army in Pennsylvania, with its communications well secured, was an impossibility as long as the Federal army was not crushed. The proof of this is, that as soon as the latter began to move, Lee, who had undertaken nothing but a raid on too large a scale, found himself so much endangered that he was obliged to fight an offensive battle on the ground and where Meade chose to wait for him. He ought to have manœuvred in Virginia so as to bring on a battle before crossing the Potomac."

The answer to these questions requires a brief reference to the circumstances which dictated the movement into Pennsylvania.

Shortly after the battle of Chancellorsville the Army of Northern Virginia had, by the return of absentees and the divisions of Longstreet, been increased to sixty-five thousand men, and its recent victories, with the care bestowed on its reorganization, equipment and discipline, made its spirit and efficiency unsurpassed by any army of modern times. This result was chiefly due to the unaided exertions of General Lee.

While the army was in admirable condition, the country at large was beginning to sink into despondency from the want of a reliable financial system, and the rapid diminution of its military resources.



As no relief was afforded by judicious legislation, bold and successful military operations were necessary to rouse the drooping spirits of the Confederacy.

Since the battle of Chancellorsville the Army of the Potomac, though dispirited, maintained a threatening attitude; its ranks had been filled to its original numbers, and Richmond was still its objective point.

The relative condition of the opposing armies early in June suggested to General Lee the advantage of a departure from a strictly defensive system, and of casting the defence of Richmond on a bold offensive campaign.

Immediately on this decision the Army of Northern Virginia was put in motion for the invasion of the North.

After this brief explanation I will return to the enquiries of ———. Small raiding parties always infested the line of the Potomac when not occupied in force by the Federal army. The raiding corps, under Colonels Mosby and White, were conspicuously known for their bold raids and dashing onslaughts upon trains and unsuspecting parties on both sides of the Potomac. Raiding parties of a more formidable character, under Stuart and others; were also projected across the lines, creating in the body politic of the North as little sensation as sticking pins in the hide of the rhinoceros. In continuation of the answer to the 2d question, I will repeat in substance the remarks of General Lee, when the invasion of the North was under consideration: "Should we defeat General Hooker in a general engagement south of the Potomac any where in the vicinity of Washington, his shattered army would find refuge within the defences of that city, as two Federal armies have previously done, and the fruits of victory would again be lost. But should we draw him far away from the defences of his capital, and defeat him on a field of our own choosing, his army would be irretrievably lost, and the victory would be attended with results of the utmost importance." Gettysburg and York were designated as points suitable for such a battle. With such prospects in the range of possibility, any commander might be willing to risk for a time his communications, especially when the theatre of operations abounds in supplies and the invading army is accompanied by a powerful cavalry. Such were the prospects of General Lee when he crossed the Potomac on his

advance into Pennsylvania. He was sure of being able to supply his army should his communications be interrupted, and did not doubt his ability to open them whenever circumstances should require him to need them, as he subsequently did, without difficulty.

The chance of increasing the fighting qualities of the enemy by drawing him on his own soil was not considered by General Lee when he was forming his plan of invasion. Neither from history nor experience have I been able to learn that the fighting of a *regular* army is influenced by locality or country. I have been taught to believe that quality to be derived from its commander. It was not discovered that Federal troops fought better at Boonesboro', Sharpsburg and Gettysburg than they did at Gaines' Mill, Malvern Hill and Fredericksburg. Could the French troops have fought better in France than they did at the Pyramids, Marengo or Austerlitz? or did the English display less valor in Spain or in the Crimea than they would have done in England under their favorite leaders?

3d. "The way in which the fights of the second of July were directed does not show the same co-ordination which ensured the success of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville."

4th. "I do not understand why Lee, having gained some success on the second, but found the Federal position very strong, did not attempt to turn it by the south, which was its weak place, by extending his right so as to endanger Meade's communications with Washington."

5th. "The heroic but foolish attack of Pickett on the third should never have been attempted. Longstreet seems to think that it was imposed upon him against his will by Lee. General Early says distinctly, in a paper published by the Southern Historical Society, that Longstreet deferred it so long that the Second corps could not co-operate with it as it would have done if the attack had taken place early in the morning."

Since the battle of Gettysburg has been the theme of so much discussion, and is still the subject of enquiry, I will narrate some of the circumstances relative to that event, believing that the information sought by the above questions can be best imparted in that way.

While preparing for his campaign in Pennsylvania General Lee carefully considered every contingency that could mar success, except the possibility of tactical blunders of those who had always maintained his confidence by a prompt and intelligent execution of instructions. When, however, he had crossed the Potomac, the absence of his cavalry, caused by the fatal blunder of Stuart, which separated it from the army at the most critical time, obliged him to grope his way in the dark, and precipitated him, by the want of timely notice, into a premature engagement with the enemy. While waiting for information at Chambersburg, the first intelligence received of the movements of the enemy was his arrival at Emmettsburg. As had been previously concerted, General Lee ordered a rapid concentration of his forces at Gettysburg. Early in the forenoon of the first of July two Federal corps arrived at that place, and almost simultaneously the head of the Confederate columns arrived, and an engagement immediately ensued, which continued with great spirit until about four o'clock in the afternoon, when the Federal corps were signally defeated, and almost annihilated. General Lee arrived on the field near the close of the action. Perceiving the utter prostration of two Federal corps, and being aware that General Meade could not bring up all his forces before the afternoon of the next day, he determined to cast the fate of the campaign on the chance of an immediate battle.

By the close of the day all of Hill's and Ewell's corps had come up, and Longstreet's was only a few miles in rear.

Having formed his plan of attack, Hill and Ewell were put at once in position, while Longstreet bivouacked about four miles from the field of battle. The order was that Longstreet, on the right, should begin the attack as early as practicable on the second, and Ewell and Hill were to afford him vigorous co-operation. On the morning of the second Meade's position on Cemetery Ridge was not fully occupied, and, as had been expected, a large portion of his forces was still on the march.

If a vigorous attack had then been made, by all the chances of war, victory would have crowned the Confederate arms. But another blunder intervened, and the attack was delayed until four o'clock in the afternoon, when, after desperate fighting, a position was gained, which a few hours before could have been occupied

without a blow. The blunder of a lieutenant who had never before failed him, being unexpected, could not be averted in time to prevent the evil consequences that followed. I think enough has been said to explain the causes of the failure of the Confederates on the second at Gettysburg.

From the nature of the country, the absence of cavalry and the proximity of an uncrippled enemy, the flank movement referred to was simply an absurdity. The attack of Pickett's division on the third has been more criticised, and is still less understood, than any other act of the Gettysburg drama. General Longstreet did not enter into the spirit of it, and consequently did not support it with his wonted vigor. It has been characterised as rash and objectless, on the order of "The Charge of the Light Brigade"; nevertheless it was not ordered without mature consideration, and on grounds that presented fair prospects of success. By extending his left wing west of the Emmettsburg road General Meade weakened his position by presenting a weak center, which, being penetrated, his wings would be isolated and paralyzed, so far as regarded supporting each other. A glance at a correct sketch of the Federal position on the third will sufficiently corroborate this remark, and had Pickett's division been promptly supported when it burst through Meade's center, a more positive proof would have been given than the features of the country, for his right wing would have been overwhelmed before the left could have disengaged itself from the woods and mountains and come to its relief.

Very respectfully,

A. L. LONG,

*Military Secretary to General R. E. Lee.*



**Second Paper by Colonel Walter H. Taylor, of General Lee's Staff.**

[The following paper by Colonel Taylor has just appeared in the *Philadelphia Times* and, although it repeats the points made in his "Memorandum" published in our August number, yet, as it enters more fully into details which came under the observation of this accomplished officer, whose close relations to General Lee make his statements of such great value, we deem it best to give it a place in our Gettysburg series.]

From the very necessity of the case, the general theory upon which the war was conducted on the part of the South was one of defence. The great superiority of the North in men and material made it indispensable for the South to husband its resources as much as possible, inasmuch as the hope of ultimate success which the latter entertained, rested rather upon the dissatisfaction and pecuniary distress which a prolonged war would entail upon the former—making the people weary of the struggle—than upon any expectation of conquering a peace by actually subduing so powerful an adversary. Nevertheless, in the judgment of General Lee, it was a part of a true defensive policy to take the aggressive when good opportunity offered; and by delivering an effective blow to the enemy, not only to inflict upon him serious loss, but at the same time to thwart his designs of invasion, derange the plan of campaign contemplated by him, and thus prolong the conflict. The Federal army, under General Hooker, had reoccupied the heights opposite Fredericksburg, where it could not be attacked except at a disadvantage. Instead of quietly awaiting the pleasure of the Federal commander in designing and putting into execution some new plan of campaign, General Lee determined to manoeuvre to draw him from his impregnable position and if possible to remove the scene of hostilities beyond the Potomac. His design was to free the State of Virginia, for a time at least, from the presence of the enemy, to transfer the theatre of war to Northern soil, and, by selecting a favorable time and place in which to receive the attack which his adversary would be compelled to make on him, to take the reasonable chances of defeating him in a pitched battle; knowing full well that to obtain such an advantage there would place him in position to attain far more decisive results than could be hoped for from a like advantage

gained in Virginia. But even if unable to attain the valuable results which might be expected to follow a decided advantage gained over the enemy in Maryland or Pennsylvania, it was thought that the movement would at least so far disturb the Federal plan for the summer campaign as to prevent its execution during the season for active operations.

In pursuance of this design, early in the month of June, General Lee moved his army northward by way of Culpeper, and thence to and down the Valley of Virginia to Winchester. The army had been reorganized into three army corps, designated the First, Second and Third corps, and commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet, Ewell and A. P. Hill. The Second corps was in advance, and crossed the branches of the Shenandoah, near Front Royal, on the 12th of June. Brushing aside the force of the enemy, under General Milroy, that occupied the lower Valley—most of which was captured and the remnant of which sought refuge in the fortifications at Harper's Ferry—General Ewell crossed the Potomac river with his three divisions in the latter part of June, and, in pursuance of the orders of General Lee, traversed Maryland and advanced into Pennsylvania. General A. P. Hill, whose corps was the last to leave the line of the Rappahannock, followed with his three divisions in Ewell's rear. General Longstreet covered these movements with his corps; then moved by Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps into the Valley and likewise crossed the Potomac river, leaving to General Stuart the task of holding the gaps of the Blue Ridge mountains with his corps of cavalry. The Federal commander had meanwhile moved his army so as to cover Washington city; and, as soon as he was thoroughly informed, by Ewell's rapid advance, of the real intention of his adversary, he too crossed into Maryland. On the 27th of June General Lee was near Chambersburg with the First and Third corps, the Second being still in advance, but within supporting distance. With the exception of the cavalry, the army was well in hand. The absence of that indispensable arm of the service was most seriously felt by General Lee. He had directed General Stuart to use his discretion as to where and when to cross the river—that is, he was to cross east of the mountains, or retire through the mountain passes into the Valley and cross in the immediate rear of the infantry, as the movements of the enemy and

his own judgment should determine—but he was expected to maintain communication with the main column, and especially directed to keep the Commanding-General informed of the movements of the Federal army.

The army continued to advance. On the 1st of July General Lee reached Cashtown and stopped to confer with General A. P. Hill, whose corps was concentrating at that point, and who reported that the advance of Heth's division had encountered the cavalry of the enemy near Gettysburg. Instructions had been sent to General Heth to ascertain what force was at Gettysburg, and, if he found infantry opposed to him, to report the fact immediately, without forcing an engagement. No tidings whatever had been received from or of our cavalry under General Stuart since crossing the river; and General Lee was consequently without accurate information of the movements or position of the main Federal army. An army without cavalry in a strange and hostile country is as a man deprived of his eyesight and beset by enemies; he may be ever so brave and strong, but he cannot intelligently administer a single effective blow. The sound of artillery was soon heard in the direction of Gettysburg. General Hill hastened to the front. General Lee followed. On arriving at the scene of battle, General Lee ascertained that the enemy's infantry and artillery were present in considerable force. Heth's division was already hotly engaged, and it was soon evident that a serious engagement could not be avoided. Orders had previously been sent to General Ewell to recall his advanced divisions, and to concentrate about Cashtown. While *en route* for that point, on the morning of the 1st of July, General Ewell learned that Hill's corps was moving toward Gettysburg, and, on arriving at Middletown, he turned the head of his column in that direction. When within a few miles of the town, General Rodes, whose division was in advance, was made aware, by the sharp cannonading, of the presence of the enemy in force at Gettysburg, and caused immediate preparations for battle to be made.

On reaching the scene of conflict, General Rodes made his dispositions to assail the force with which Hill's troops were engaged, but no sooner were his lines formed than he perceived fresh troops of the enemy extending their right flank, and deploying in his immediate front. With this force he was soon actively engaged.

The contest now became sharp and earnest. Neither side sought or expected a general engagement; and yet, brought thus unexpectedly in the presence of each other, found a conflict unavoidable. The battle continued, with varying success, until perhaps 3 P. M., when General Early, of Ewell's corps, reached the field with his division, moved in on Rodes' left, and attacked the enemy with his accustomed vigor and impetuosity. This decided the contest. The enemy's right gave way under Early's assault. Pender's division, of Hill's corps, had meanwhile been advanced to relieve that of Heth; and Rodes, observing the effect of Early's attack, ordered his line forward. There resulted a general and irresistible advance of our entire line; the enemy gave way at all points, and were driven in disorder through and beyond the town of Gettysburg, leaving over five thousand prisoners in our hands. In this action the force engaged on the Confederate side, as already stated, consisted of the divisions of Heth and Pender, of Hill's corps, and those of Early and Rodes, of Ewell's corps. On the side of the Federals there was the First corps, embracing the divisions of Wadsworth, Doubleday and Robinson; the Eleventh corps, embracing the divisions of Schurz, Barlow and Steinwehr; and the cavalry force under General Buford. The infantry force on each side was about the same, and the preponderance in numbers was with the Federals, to the extent of General Buford's cavalry command.

General Lee witnessed the flight of the Federals through Gettysburg and up the hills beyond. He then directed me to go to General Ewell and to say to him that, from the position which he occupied, he could see the enemy retreating over those hills, without organization and in great confusion; that it was only necessary to press "those people" in order to secure possession of the heights, and that, if possible, he wished him to do this. In obedience to these instructions, I proceeded immediately to General Ewell and delivered the order of General Lee; and, after receiving from him some message for the Commanding-General in regard to the prisoners captured, returned to the latter and reported that his order had been delivered. General Ewell did not express any objection, or indicate the existence of any impediment, to the execution of the order conveyed to him, but left the impression upon my mind that it would be executed. In the exercise of that dis-



cretion, however, which General Lee was accustomed to accord to his lieutenants, and probably because of an undue regard for his admonition, given early in the day, not to precipitate a general engagement, General Ewell deemed it unwise to make the pursuit. The troops were not moved forward, and the enemy proceeded to occupy and fortify the position which it was designed that General Ewell should seize. Major-General Edward Johnson, whose division reached the field after the engagement, and formed on the left of Early, in a conversation had with me, since the war, about this circumstance, in which I sought an explanation of our inaction at that time, assured me that there was no hindrance to his moving forward; but that, after getting his command in line of battle, and before it became seriously engaged or had advanced any great distance, for some unexplained reason, he had received orders to halt. This was after General Lee's message was delivered to General Ewell.

Such was the condition of affairs when darkness veiled the scene on the evening of the first day. The prevailing idea with General Lee was, to press forward without delay; to follow up promptly and vigorously the advantage already gained. Having failed to reap the full fruit of the victory before night, his mind was evidently occupied with the idea of renewing the assault upon the enemy's right with the dawn of day on the second. The divisions of Major-Generals Early and Rodes, of Ewell's corps, had been actively engaged, and had sustained some loss, but were still in excellent condition, and in the full enjoyment of the prestige of success and a consequent elation of spirit, in having so gallantly swept the enemy from their front, through the town of Gettysburg, and compelled him to seek refuge behind the heights beyond. The division of Major-General Edward Johnson, of the same corps, was perfectly fresh, not having been engaged. Anderson's division, of Hill's corps, was also now up. With this force General Lee thought that the enemy's position could be assailed with every prospect of success; but, after a conference with the corps and division commanders on our left, who represented that, in their judgment, it would be hazardous to attempt to storm the strong position occupied by the enemy, with troops somewhat fagged by the marching and fighting of the first day; that the ground in their immediate front furnished greater obstacles to a successful

assault than existed at other points of the line, and that it could be reasonably concluded, since they had so severely handled the enemy in their front, that he would concentrate and fortify with special reference to resisting a further advance just there, he determined to make the main attack well on the enemy's left, indulging the hope that Longstreet's corps would be up in time to begin the movement at an early hour on the second. He instructed General Ewell to be prepared to co-operate by a simultaneous advance by his corps. General Longstreet was unexpectedly detained, however, as will best appear from the following extract from his report of the Gettysburg campaign. In speaking of his movements on the first day of July, he says:

"Our march on this day was greatly delayed by Johnson's division, of the Second corps, which came into the road from Shippenburg, and the long wagon trains that followed him. McLaws' division, however, reached Marsh creek, four miles from Gettysburg, a little after dark, and Hood's division got within nearly the same distance of the town about 12 o'clock at night. Law's brigade was ordered forward to its division during the day, and joined it about noon on the second. Previous to his joining I received instructions from the Commanding-General to move with the portion of my command that was up around to gain the Emmettsburg road on the enemy's left. The enemy, having been driven back by the corps of Lieutenant-Generals Ewell and A. P. Hill the day previous, had taken a strong position, extending from the hill at the Cemetery along the Emmettsburg road. Fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an attack, I delayed until General Law's brigade joined its division. As soon after his arrival as we could make our preparations, the movement was begun. Engineers, sent out by the Commanding-General and myself, guided us by a road which would have completely disclosed the move. Some delay ensued in seeking a more concealed route. McLaws' division got into position opposite the enemy's left about 4 P. M. Hood's division was moved on farther to our right, and got into position, partially enveloping the enemy's left."

General Longstreet here explains the cause of the delay in bringing up his troops on the *first day*; but, notwithstanding this, the divisions of Hood and McLaws (with the exception of Law's brigade) encamped within four miles of Gettysburg at midnight

of the 1st of July. He then received instructions to move *with the portion of his command that was then up*, to gain the Emmettsburg road on the enemy's left; but fearing that his force was too weak to venture to make an attack, he delayed until Law's brigade joined its division—about noon on the second. In this, General Longstreet clearly admits that he assumed the responsibility of postponing the execution of the orders of the Commanding-General. Owing to the causes assigned, the troops were not in position to attack until 4 P. M. One can imagine what was going on in the Federal lines meanwhile. Round Top, the key to their position, which was not occupied in the morning, they now held in force, and another corps (Sedgwick's) had reached the field. Late as it was, the original plan was adhered to. The two divisions of Longstreet's corps gallantly advanced, forced the enemy back a considerable distance, and captured some trophies and prisoners. Ewell's divisions were ordered forward, and likewise gained additional ground and trophies. On Cemetery Hill the attack by Early's leading brigades was made with vigor. They drove the enemy back into the works on the crest, into which they forced their way, and seized several pieces of artillery; but they were compelled to relinquish what they had gained, from want of expected support on their right, and retired to their original position, bringing with them some prisoners and four stands of colors. In explanation of this lack of expected support, General Rodes, who was on General Early's right, states in his report that after he had conferred with General Early on his left, and General Lane on his right, and arranged to attack in concert, he proceeded at once to make the necessary preparations; but as he had to draw his troops out of the town by the flank, change the direction of the line of battle, and then traverse a distance of twelve or fourteen hundred yards, while General Early had to move only half that distance, without change of front, it resulted that, before he drove in the enemy's skirmishers, General Early had attacked, and been compelled to withdraw.

The whole affair was disjointed. There was an utter absence of accord in the movements of the several commands, and no decisive result attended the operations of the second day. It is generally conceded that General Longstreet, on this occasion, was fairly chargeable with tardiness, and I have always thought that his

conduct, in this particular, was due to a lack of appreciation on his part of the circumstances which created an urgent and peculiar need for the presence of his troops at the front. As soon as the necessity for the concentration of the army was precipitated by the unexpected encounter on the first of July with a large force of the enemy near Gettysburg, General Longstreet was urged to hasten his march, and this, perhaps, should have sufficed to cause him to push his divisions on toward Gettysburg, from which point he was distant but four miles, early on the second; but I cannot say that he was notified, on the night of the first, of the attack proposed to be made on the morning of the second, and the part his corps was to take therein. Neither do I think it just to charge that he was alone responsible for the delay in attacking that ensued *after* his arrival on the field. I well remember how General Lee was chafed by the non-appearance of the troops, until he finally became restless, and rode back to meet General Longstreet, and urge him forward; but, then, there was considerable delay in putting the troops to work after they reached the field and much time was spent in discussing what was to be done, which, perhaps, could not be avoided. At any rate, it would be unreasonable to hold General Longstreet alone accountable for this. Indeed, great injustice has been done him in the charge that he had orders from the Commanding-General to attack the enemy at sunrise on the second of July, and that he disobeyed these orders. This would imply that he was in position to attack, whereas General Lee but anticipated his early arrival on the second, and based his calculations upon it. I have shown how he was disappointed, and I need hardly add that the delay was fatal.

General Lee determined to renew the attack upon the enemy's position on the third day of July. In his report of the campaign, in speaking of the operations of the second day, he says:

"The result of this day's operations induced the belief that, with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed; and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field during the afternoon of the second, was ordered to attack the next morning; and Gen-



eral Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time."

General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected; it appears that he was delayed by apprehensions that his troops would be taken in reverse as they advanced. General Ewell, who had orders to co-operate with General Longstreet, and who was, of course, not aware of any impediment to the main attack arranged to be made on the enemy's left, having reinforced General Johnson, whose division was upon our extreme left during the night of the second, ordered him forward early the next morning. In obedience to these instructions General Johnson became hotly engaged before General Ewell could be informed of the halt which had been called on our right. After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy was forced to abandon part of his entrenchments, General Johnson found himself unable to carry the strongly-fortified crest of the hill. The projected attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he was enabled to hold his right with a force largely superior to that of General Johnson, and finally to threaten his flank and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his original position about 1 P. M. General Lee then had a conference with General Longstreet, and the mode of attack and the troops to make it were thoroughly debated. I was present, and understood the arrangements to be that General Longstreet should endeavor to force the enemy's lines in his front. That front was held by the divisions of Hood and McLaws. To strengthen him for the undertaking, it was decided to reinforce him by such troops as could be drawn from the center.

Pickett's division, of Longstreet's corps, was then up, fresh and available. Heth's division, of Hill's corps, was also mentioned as available, having in great measure recuperated since its active engagement of the first day; so, also, were the brigades of Lane and Scales, of Pender's division, Hill's corps; and as our extreme right was comparatively safe, being well posted, and not at all threatened, one of the divisions of Hood and McLaws, and the greater portion of the other, could be moved out of the lines and be made to take part in the attack. Indeed, it was designed originally that the two divisions last named, reinforced by Pickett, should make the attack; and it was only because of the apprehensions of General Longstreet that his corps was not strong enough for the

movement, that General Hill was called on to reinforce him. Orders were sent to General Hill to place Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's at General Longstreet's disposal, and to be prepared to give him further assistance if requested. The assault was to have been made with a column of not less than two divisions, and the remaining divisions were to have been moved forward in support of those in advance. This was the result of the conference alluded to as understood by me. Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill appears to have had the same impression, for he says in his report of the operations of his corps at this time:

"I was directed to hold my line with Anderson's division and the half of Pender's, now commanded by General Lane, and to order Heth's division, commanded by Pettigrew, and Lane's and Seales' brigades, of Pender's division, to report to Lieutenant-General Longstreet as a support to his corps, in the assault on the enemy's lines."

General Longstreet proceeded at once to make the dispositions for attack, and General Lee rode along the portion of the line held by A. P. Hill's corps, and finally took position about the Confederate center, on an elevated point, from which he could survey the field and watch the result of the movement. After a heavy artillery fire along the entire line, and at a given signal, the movement began, but the plan agreed on was not carried out. The only troops that participated in the attack were the divisions of Pickett (First corps) and Heth (Third corps)—the latter, since the wounding of General Heth, commanded by General Pettigrew—and the brigades of Lane, Seales and Wilcox. The two divisions were formed in advance—the three brigades as their support. The divisions of Hood and McLaws (First corps) were passive spectators of the movement. To one who observed the charge, it appeared that Pettigrew's line was not a continuation of that of Pickett, but that it advanced in *echelon*. It would seem that there was some confusion in forming the troops, for Captain Louis G. Young, of General Pettigrew's staff, says:

"On the morning of the third of July, General Pettigrew, commanding Heth's division, was instructed to report to General Longstreet, who directed him to form *in the rear* of Pickett's division, and support his advance upon Cemetery Hill, which would be commenced as soon as the fire from our artillery should have driven

the enemy from his guns and prepared the way for attack. And I presume that it was in consequence of this having been the first plan settled on, that the erroneous report was circulated that Heth's division was assigned the duty of supporting that of Pickett. But the order referred to was countermanded almost as soon as given, and General Pettigrew was instructed to advance *upon the same line* with Pickett, a portion of Pender's division acting as supports."

Wilcox's brigade was ordered to support Pickett's right flank, and the brigades of Lane and Scales acted as supports to Heth's division. General Lane, in his report, says:

"General Longstreet ordered me to form in rear of the *right* of Heth's division, commanded by General Pettigrew. Soon after I had executed this order, putting Lowrance on the right, I was relieved of the command of the division by Major-General Trimble, who acted under the same orders that I had received. Heth's division was much longer than Lowrance's brigade and my own, which constituted its only support, and there was, consequently, *no second line in rear of its left.*"

The assaulting column really consisted of Pickett's division—two brigades in front, and one in the second line as a support—with the brigade of Wilcox in the rear of its right to protect that flank; while Heth's division moved forward on Pickett's left in *echelon*, or with the alignment so imperfect and so drooping on the left as to appear in *echelon*, with Lane's and Scales' brigades in rear of its right, and its left without reserve or support, and entirely exposed. Thus the column moved forward. It is needless to say a word here of the heroic conduct of Pickett's division; that charge has already passed into history as "one of the world's great deeds of arms." While, doubtless, many brave men of other commands reached the crest of the height, this was the only organized body that entered the works of the enemy. Much can be said in excuse for the failure of the other commands to fulfill the task assigned them. As a general rule, the peculiarly rough and wooded character of the country in which our army was accustomed to operate, and which in some respects was unfavorable for the manoeuvres of large armies, was of decided advantage to us; for, in moving upon the enemy through bodies of woods, or in a broken, rolling country, not only was the enemy at a loss how

to estimate our strength, but our own men were not impressed with that sense of insecurity which must have resulted from a thorough knowledge of their own weakness.

It was different here. The charge was made down a gentle slope, and then up to the enemy's lines, a distance of over half a mile, denuded of forests, and in full sight of the enemy, and perfect range of their artillery. These combined causes produced their natural effect upon Pettigrew's division and the brigades supporting it—caused them to falter, and finally retire. Then Pickett's division continuing the charge without supports, and in the sight of the enemy, was not half so formidable or effective as it would have been had trees or hills prevented the enemy from so correctly estimating the strength of the attacking column, and our own troops from experiencing that sense of weakness which the known absence of support necessarily produced. In spite of all this, it steadily and gallantly advanced to its allotted task. As the three brigades, under Garnett, Armistead and Kemper, approach the enemy's lines, a most terrific fire of artillery and small-arms is concentrated upon them; but they swerve not—there is no faltering; steadily moving forward, they rapidly reduce the intervening space, and close with their adversaries; leaping the breastworks, they drive back the enemy and plant their standards on the captured guns, amid shouts of victory—dearly won and short-lived victory.

No more could be exacted, or expected, of those men of brave hearts and nerves of steel; but where are the supports to reap the benefit of their heroic efforts, and gather the fruits of a victory so nobly won? Was that but a forlorn hope, on whose success, not only in penetrating the enemy's lines, but in maintaining its hold against their combined and united efforts to dislodge it, an entire army was to wait in quiet observation? Was it designed to throw these few brigades—originally, at most, but two divisions—upon the fortified stronghold of the enemy, while, full half a mile away, seven-ninths of the army in breathless suspense, in ardent admiration and fearful anxiety, watched, but moved not? I maintain that such was not the design of the Commanding-General. Had the veteran divisions of Hood and McLaws been moved forward, as was planned, in support of those of Pickett and Pettigrew, not only would the latter division, in all probability, have gained the



enemy's works, as did that of Pickett, but these two would have been enabled, with the aid of Hood and McLaws, to resist all efforts of the enemy to dislodge them. The enemy, closing in on Pickett's brigades, concentrating upon that small band of heroes the fire of every gun that could be brought to bear upon them, soon disintegrated and overpowered them. Such as were not killed, disabled and made captive, fell back to our lines.

It appears that General Longstreet deemed it necessary to defend his right flank and rear with the divisions of McLaws and Hood. These divisions, as before stated, constituted all of the Confederate line held by Longstreet's troops, and it is not apparent how they were necessary to defend his flank and rear. The nearest infantry force of the enemy to our right occupied the hills—Round Top and Little Round Top—and the only force that could be said to have threatened our flank and rear consisted of two brigades of cavalry, so posted as to protect the enemy's left. It is not my purpose here to undertake to establish the wisdom of an attack on the enemy's position on the third day, which General Longstreet contends was opposed by his judgment, and of which he says he would have stayed the execution, had he felt that he had the privilege so to do; nor do I propose to discuss the necessities of his position, which he represents to have been such as to forbid the employment of McLaws' and Hood's divisions in the attack; neither do I seek any other than a just explanation of the causes of our failure at that time; but well recalling my surprise and disappointment when it was ascertained that only Pickett's division and the troops from Hill's corps had taken part in the movement, and with positively distinct impressions as to the occurrences just related, I deem it proper to record them for confirmation or refutation as the undisputed facts of the case, and the testimony of others may determine.

After the assault on the enemy's works on the third of July, there was no serious fighting at Gettysburg. The fourth passed in comparative quiet. Neither army evinced any disposition to assail the other. Notwithstanding the brilliant achievements of Ewell and Hill on the first day, and the decided advantage gained by Longstreet on the second, the failure of the operations of the third day, involving, as they did, but two divisions of the army, deprived us of the prestige of our previous successes, and gave a

shadow of right to our adversary's claim of having gained a victory. Their exultation, however, should be tempered with moderation, when we consider that, after one day of absolute quiet, the Confederates withdrew from their front without serious molestation, and with bridges swept away, and an impassable river in rear, stood in an attitude of defiance until their line of retreat could be rendered practicable, after which they safely recrossed into Virginia. Then, again, so serious was the loss visited upon the Federals in the engagements of the first and second days, and so near success was the effort to storm their position on the third day, that they were themselves undecided as to whether they should stand or retreat. In discussing several councils or conferences held by General Meade with his corps commanders, General Sickles testified, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, that the reason the Confederates were not followed up was on account of differences of opinion whether or not the Federals should themselves retreat, as "it was by no means clear, in the judgment of the corps commanders, or of the General in command, whether they had won or not."

It appears from the official returns on file in the War Department, that on the 31st of May, 1863, the Army of Northern Virginia numbered: infantry, fifty-four thousand three hundred and fifty-six; cavalry, nine thousand five hundred and thirty-six; artillery, four thousand four hundred and sixty; of all arms, sixty-eight thousand three hundred and fifty-two effective. This was immediately before the invasion of Pennsylvania, and may be regarded as representing the maximum of General Lee's army in the Gettysburg campaign. On the 20th of July, 1863, after the return of General Lee to Virginia, his army numbered forty-one thousand three hundred and eighty-eight effective, exclusive of the cavalry corps, of which no report is made in the return of the date last mentioned; allowing seven thousand six hundred and twelve, a fair estimate for the cavalry, the effective total of the army on the 20th of July was forty-nine thousand. It appears, therefore, that General Lee's loss in the Pennsylvania campaign was about nineteen thousand.

Concerning the strength of the Federal army, General Meade testified as follows before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (second series, vol. I., p. 337): "Including all arms of the ser-

vice, my strength was a little under one hundred thousand men—about ninety-five thousand. I think General Lee had about ninety thousand infantry, four thousand to five thousand artillery, and about ten thousand cavalry.” Again he testifies: “I think the returns showed me, when I took command of the army, amounted to about one hundred and five thousand men; included in these were the eleven thousand of General French.” In this latter matter the evidence is against General Meade. General Hooker, on the 27th of June, 1863, telegraphed to General Halleck, from Poolesville: “My whole force of *enlisted men* for duty will not exceed one hundred and five thousand (105,000).” This would make his total effective force (officers and men) full one hundred and twelve thousand. This dispatch was received by General Halleck at nine A. M. On reaching Sandy Hook, subsequently, on the same day, General Hooker telegraphed as follows concerning the garrison at Harper’s Ferry, under General French: “I find ten thousand men here in condition to take the field. Here they are of no earthly account. They cannot defend a ford of the river; and, as far as Harper’s Ferry is concerned, there is nothing of it. As for the fortifications, the work of the troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy will ever take possession of them for them. This is my opinion. All the public property could have been secured to-night, and the troops marched to where they could have been of some service.” This dispatch was received by General Halleck at 2:55 P. M. It is evident that the garrison at Harper’s Ferry was not embraced in the returns alluded to by General Hooker in his first dispatch. Although General Halleck refused these troops to General Hooker, they were immediately awarded to General Meade on his assuming command when General Hooker was relieved.

Without more accurate returns of the two armies at Gettysburg, we are left to form our conclusions as to their strength from the data given above. I put the Army of the Potomac at one hundred and five thousand, and the Army of Northern Virginia at sixty-two thousand of all arms—fifty thousand infantry, eight thousand cavalry, and four thousand artillery—and believe these figures very nearly correct. In this estimate, I adopt the strength of the Federal army as given by its Commander on the 27th of June, but four days before the first encounter at Gettysburg, exclu-

ding all consideration of the troops at Harper's Ferry, although General Meade, on assuming command, at once ordered General French to move to Frederick with seven thousand men, to protect his communications, and thus made available a like number of men of the Army of the Potomac, who would otherwise have been detached for this service.

On the side of the Confederates, the entire cavalry corps is included. That portion which General Stuart accompanied made a complete circuit of the Federal army, and only joined General Lee on the evening of the second day; and the brigades under Generals Jones and Robertson, which had been left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, did not rejoin the army until the third of July.



**Report of Brigadier-General R. L. Gibson of Operations in Vicinity of Nashville.**

[From the original MS. signed in General Gibson's autograph.]

HD. QRS. GIBSON'S BRIGADE,  
NEAR TUPELO, MISS., *January 11th, 1865.*

*Capt. J. M. MACON, A. A. G.:*

CAPTAIN: I have the honor, in compliance with orders from Division Headquarters, to submit the following report of operations before Nashville and along the line of our march to Columbia:

About two o'clock on the 15th December I was directed by Lieutenant-General Lee to move my brigade to the extreme left of his corps, and to deploy it in one rank so as to cover as much space as possible. A little while before sunset the troops in line at right angles to the line in which I was posted—a line extending along the left flank of the army—gave way, and soon those immediately upon my left fell back, the whole moving rapidly in some confusion to the rear. The enemy advanced and, seeing that my left flank was exposed and likely to be involved, I withdrew my brigade from the trenches and formed a line of battle at right angles to them, my right resting upon them. I also threw forward a strong line of skirmishers, under Lieutenant A. T. Martin, who at once attacked the enemy, but he showed no disposition to advance. By this time it was twilight, and in a few moments night closed operations.

The next day, the line having been retired about two and a half miles, my skirmishers were attacked early in the morning, but not ordered in until near one o'clock, when it was discovered that preparations were being made to charge us in force. The enemy assaulted my brigade either with one large or two small brigades, and, after several attempts, only came up to within seventy-five yards, and, remaining there a few moments, broke and fled. We killed and wounded a great many for the time they were under fire and the force engaged. I estimate his loss at two hundred killed and from seven hundred to nine hundred wounded.

Observing, just before sundown, troops and ambulances passing into the Franklin turnpike from the left, and double-quicking towards the rear, I at once dispatched my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Cartwright Eustis, to say to Brigadier-General Pettus that I would co-operate with him in any plan to arrest the progress of the enemy, who had evidently broken the lines somewhere to his left.

Scarcely had my aide reached me and informed me of the intentions of General Pettus, when the enemy was observed already upon our rear, and our troops upon all sides breaking and striving to reach the line of retreat, which was nearly covered. I had ordered Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. Lindsay, commanding Sixteenth Louisiana Volunteers, to get ready to deploy his regiment as skirmishers along the trenches, while I withdrew the brigade and attempted to arrest the enemy; but at this time confusion prevailed over every thing. Arriving at the woods, in front of Colonel Overton's, I formed a line as again directed by Lieutenant-General Lee, and, moving back a half mile further, Major-General Clayton reformed his division, and we continued the retreat until we reached Hollowtree Gap, where we bivouacked. Early the next morning I was sent as a reserve near the Hotel, six hundred yards in rear of the Gap. While there, in accordance with an order from Division Headquarters, I sent Colonel S. E. Hunter with the greater part of the Fourth and Thirtieth Louisiana Volunteers and my inspector-general, to report to Major-General Clayton. He was placed on picket in a gap in rear of the division by order of Lieutenant-General Lee, and while being posted there I moved the balance of my brigade to attack the enemy, who was approaching the road between us and Franklin.

I drove him back very easily, and was moving to the road again, when I was informed by a staff officer of Lieutenant-General Lee, Lieutenant Farish, that Colonel Hunter and his detachment had been captured.

I was again placed in position in an earthwork a thousand yards from Harpeth river, and, before any instructions reached me, our cavalry stampeded. The enemy, five thousand strong, charged in three columns with squadrons covering the intervening ground and connecting them—one in front, one in rear upon the left flank, and one in rear upon the right flank. I found a section of artil-

lery upon the road and a part of a regiment of infantry, under Colonel Hundly. I had the section to open upon the enemy, but it had no effect, except to increase the speed of his flanking columns, and made no impression upon that one advancing directly upon our front. After firing ten rounds with no better effect, I ordered the officer (I do not know his name) to move his pieces to the rear. I also directed Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, commanding Sixteenth Louisiana Volunteers, upon my extreme right, to deploy his regiment as skirmishers in retreat, and Colonel Campbell and Major Flournoy, with the First, Thirteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth, in all about two hundred and fifty muskets, to move to the rear, and to fight as they went. I also directed Colonel Hundly to deploy his men as skirmishers. The cavalry of the enemy charged all around us. Colonel Campbell broke up by a well-delivered fire the column charging down the road, and thus gave time to the section of artillery to cross the river. The enemy came up within less than one hundred yards of the section and fired his revolvers at those about it. My command fought its way to the river, entirely surrounded, with a loss of ten killed, twenty-five wounded and five captured. We continued to make dispositions against this cavalry, under orders of Major-General Clayton, without being engaged, until near sunset, when he again charged, coming from the left, and wheeled into and down the road just where my left flank rested upon it. I immediately changed front upon the left regiment, and ordered Colonel Henderson, Forty-Second Georgia, temporarily in charge of Stovall's brigade, upon my right, to face by the rear rank and wheel to the right so as to cover the road. A few well-directed volleys cut the charging column, and part of two regiments continued down the road while the rest fell back into the woods. Major-General Clayton coming from the front, where he had gone to superintend the advance of Holtzelaw's brigade, then came up, and made dispositions which resulted in the defeat of this body of cavalry, the killing of many, and the capture of colors and prisoners.

My command was not again engaged. I trust my officers and men behaved themselves, under all circumstances, in a way to entitle them to the confidence of my superior officers. Colonel Hunter, Fourth Louisiana Volunteers; Major Picolet, commanding Thirtieth; Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, Colonel Campbell and

Major Flournoy all gave every assistance and conducted their parts with skill and courage. I would particularly commend Lieutenant A. T. Martin, commanding battalion of Sharpshooters, for his conspicuous gallantry and skill, and regret to say he was wounded and captured when quitting the trenches. Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, while temporarily in command of my brigade, discovered fine qualities as an officer, and Colonel Henderson was conspicuous for his efficiency and bravery while, for a short time, in command of Stovall's brigade, under trying circumstances. I would again commend Captain A. L. Stuart, A. I. G., for his courage, judgment and promptness. I regret to state that he was severely wounded. Captain H. H. Bain, A. A. G., and Captain G. Norton, A. A. A. G., were always prompt, efficient and gallant; and especially so was Lieutenant C. Eustis, my aide-de-camp. Captain J. Hodges, A. Q. M., and Major W. V. Crouch, C. S., have discharged their duties throughout with fidelity and intelligence. I have to announce and to deplore the death of Captain C. W. Cushman, Thirtieth Louisiana Volunteers, who was killed at the trenches. He was a brave, intelligent and efficient officer. Nor less zealous and worthy were Lieutenant J. J. Cawthorn, Nineteenth Louisiana Volunteers, and Lieutenant C. Miller, Twentieth Louisiana Volunteers, who likewise fell in the discharge of their duties.

Yours very respectfully,

R. L. GIBSON, *Brigadier-General.*



## EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS.

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THE PRESENT FINANCIAL CONDITION OF OUR SOCIETY demands a plain statement from us, and the kind consideration of our friends.

Although we begun our publishing enterprise without capital we have been enabled to conduct it with such success that we could have readily made it meet *all* of the expenses of the Society, but for several mistakes which we have made based upon a too sanguine hope of increased circulation.

1. We gave each month a larger number of pages than our subscription price (\$3) per annum would justify, and, in order to be able to supply *back* numbers, we have been publishing each month a much larger number of copies than our subscription list demands.

2. For nearly all of last year we went to heavy expense in stereotyping each number.

3. We went to other expenses in the confident hope that our increasing circulation would enable us to meet them without difficulty, which would have been the case but for the failure of a large number of our subscribers (over 1,000 since the first of January last) to send us their renewal fees.

These causes are now giving us serious trouble, but we can and will work through them with a little help on the part of our friends. We have reduced our expenses to a basis upon which we can easily meet every demand upon us if we can maintain *even our present circulation*. But we are exceedingly anxious to relieve ourselves of a debt which we have been obliged to contract, and to be in condition to extend the sphere of our usefulness. We, therefore, earnestly appeal to our friends to help us in several ways:

1. Let all who have not renewed their subscriptions *promptly do so*. And it would be a great favor if even those whose subscriptions are not yet due would make us a remittance in anticipation.

2. Let our friends help to extend our circulation, and dispose of our three bound volumes of *Back Numbers*.

3. Those of our *Annual* Members who have promised to become *LIFE* Members would very materially help us by acting in the matter *now*.

4. Look at the inducements we offer, and send us *advertisements* for our advertising sheet.

5. Secure us suitable Agents.

We have assurances from every quarter that the work in which we are engaged is of the very highest value and importance, and we shall be greatly disappointed if our friends do not show their appreciation of it by *practical and prompt help*.

# SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

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**Vol. IV.      Richmond, Va., Oct., 1877.      No. 4.**

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## **Leading Confederates on the Battle of Gettysburg.**

[CONTINUED FROM OUR SEPTEMBER NO.]

The papers which we have been publishing on the battle of Gettysburg have attracted great attention and excited wide interest. We hope to add a number of others from distinguished soldiers who were in position to know what occurred, and who have promised to send us their views on the questions propounded by our distinguished foreign critic.

In response to our request for a paper from General John B. Hood he sends us a copy of the following letter to General Longstreet. In a note to the Secretary accompanying this letter General Hood says: "It does not cover all the points upon which you desire information, but may prove of interest." We feel sure that our readers will be glad to have the statement of this gallant and accomplished soldier.

### **Letter from General John B. Hood.**

NEW ORLEANS, LA., *June 28th, 1875.*

Gen. JAMES LONGSTREET:

GENERAL: I have not responded earlier to your letter of April 5th, by reason of pressure of business, which rendered it difficult for me to give due attention to the subject in regard to which you have desired information.

You are correct in your assumption, that I failed to make a report of the operations of my division around Suffolk, Va., and of its action in the battle of Gettysburg, in consequence of a

wound which I received in this engagement. In justice to the brave troops under my command at this period, I should here mention another cause for this apparent neglect of duty on my part. Before I had recovered from the severe wound received at Gettysburg, your corps (excepting Pickett's division) was ordered to join General Bragg, in the west, for battle against Rosecrans; my old troops—with whom I had served so long—were thus to be sent forth to another army—quasi, I may say, among strangers—to take part in a great struggle; and upon an appeal from a number of the brigade and regimental officers of my division, I consented to accompany them, although I had the use of but one arm. This movement to the west soon resulted in the battle of Chickamauga, where I was again so seriously wounded as to cause the loss of a limb. These severe wounds in close succession, in addition to the all-absorbing duties and anxieties attending the last year of the war, prevented me from submitting, subsequently, a report, as likewise one after the battle of Chickamauga, in which engagement—whilst you led the left wing—I had the honor of commanding your corps, together with the three divisions of the Army of Tennessee, respectively under A. P. Stewart, Bushrod Johnson, and Hindman. Thus, the gallantry of these troops, as well as the admirable conduct of my division at Gettysburg, I have left unrecorded.

With this apology for seeming neglect, I will proceed to give a brief sketch from memory of the events forming the subject of your letter:

My recollection of the circumstances connected with the attempt, whilst we were lying in front of Suffolk, to reach General Lee in time to participate in the battle of Chancellorsville is very clear. The order directing your corps to move to the support of General Lee was received about the time General Hooker crossed the Rapahannock. Unfortunately, we had been compelled by the scarcity of forage to send off our wagons into North Carolina to gather a supply from that state. A short delay necessarily ensued, as couriers had to be dispatched for the requisite transportation before the troops could move. Every effort, however, was made to get to Lee at the earliest moment. If my memory betrays me not, you repaired in advance of your corps to Petersburg or Richmond, having issued orders for us to march with all possible speed to

Lee on the Rappahannock. I was most anxious to get to the support of my old chief, and made strenuous efforts to do so; but, whilst on a forced march to accomplish this object, I received intelligence of our victory at Chancellorsville, and of Jackson's mortal wound. We, nevertheless, continued our march, and eventually went into bivouac upon the Rapidan, near Gordonsville.

After the battle of Chancellorsville, preparations were made for an offensive campaign.

Accordingly, my troops moved out of camp, crossed the Rapidan about the 5th of June, 1863, and joined in the general move in the direction of the Potomac. We crossed the river about the middle of the same month, and marched into Pennsylvania. Hill's and Ewell's corps were in advance, and were reported to be in the vicinity of Carlisle. Whilst lying in camp, not far distant from Chambersburg, information was received that Ewell and Hill were about to come in contact with the enemy near Gettysburg. My troops, together with McLaws' division, were put in motion upon the most direct road to that point, which, after a hard march, we reached before or at sunrise on the 2d of July. So imperative had been the orders to hasten forward with all possible speed, that on the march my troops were allowed to halt and rest only about two hours, during the night from the 1st to the 2d of July.

I arrived with my staff in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak, as I have already stated, on the morning of the 2d of July. My division soon commenced filing into an open field near me, where the troops were allowed to stack arms and rest until further orders. A short distance in advance of this point, and during the early part of that same morning, we were both engaged, in company with Generals Lee and A. P. Hill, in observing the position of the Federals. General Lee—with coat buttoned to the throat, sabre-belt buckled around the waist, and field-glasses pending at his side—walked up and down in the shade of large trees near us, halting now and then to observe the enemy. He seemed full of hope, yet at times, buried in deep thought.

Col. Fremantle, of England, was ensconced in the forks of a tree not far off, with glass in constant use, examining the lofty position of the Federal army.



General Lee was seemingly anxious you should attack that morning. He remarked to me: "The enemy is here, and if we do not whip him he will whip us." You thought it better to await the arrival of Pickett's division—at that time still in the rear—in order to make the attack; and you said to me, subsequently, whilst we were seated together near the trunk of a tree: "The General is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot off."

Thus passed the forenoon of that eventful day, when, in the afternoon—about three o'clock—it was decided to no longer await Pickett's division, but to proceed to our extreme right, and attack up the Emmettsburg road. McLaws moved off, and I followed with my division. In a short time I was ordered to quicken the march of my troops, and pass to the front of McLaws.

This movement was accomplished by throwing out an advanced force to tear down fences and clear the way. The instructions I received were to place my division across the Emmettsburg road, form line of battle, and attack. Before reaching this road, however, I had sent forward some of my picked Texas scouts to ascertain the position of the enemy's extreme left flank. They soon reported to me that it rested upon Round Top mountain; that the country was open and that I could march through an open woodland pasture around Round Top and assault the enemy in flank and rear; that their wagon trains were parked in rear of their line, and were badly exposed to our attack in that direction. As soon as I arrived upon the Emmettsburg road I placed one or two batteries in position and opened fire. A reply from the enemy's guns soon developed his lines. His left rested on or near Round Top, with line bending back and again forward, forming, as it were, a concave line as approached by the Emmettsburg road. A considerable body of troops was posted in front of their main line, between the Emmettsburg road and Round Top mountain. This force was in line of battle upon an eminence near a peach orchard.

I found, that in making the attack according to orders, viz: up the Emmettsburg road, I should have first to encounter and drive off this advanced line of battle; secondly, at the base and along the slope of the mountain, to confront immense boulders of stone, so massed together as to form narrow openings, which would

break our ranks and cause the men to scatter whilst climbing up the rocky precipice. I found, moreover, that my division would be exposed to a heavy fire from the main line of the enemy, in position on the crest of the high range, of which Round Top was the extreme left, and, by reason of the concavity of the enemy's main line, that we would be subject to a destructive fire in flank and rear, as well as in front; and deemed it almost an impossibility to clamber along the boulders up this steep and rugged mountain, and, under this number of cross-fires, put the enemy to flight. I knew that if the feat was accomplished it must be at a most fearful sacrifice of as brave and gallant soldiers as ever engaged in battle.

The reconnoissance by my Texas scouts and the development of the Federal lines were effected in a very short space of time; in truth, shorter than I have taken to recall and jot down these facts, although the scenes and events of that day are as clear to my mind as if the great battle had been fought yesterday. I was in possession of these important facts so shortly after reaching the Emmettsburg road, that I considered it my duty to report to you at once my opinion, that it was unwise to attack up the Emmettsburg road, as ordered, and to urge that you allow me to turn Round Top and attack the enemy in flank and rear. Accordingly, I dispatched a staff officer bearing to you my request to be allowed to make the proposed movement on account of the above-stated reasons. Your reply was quickly received: "Gen'l Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmettsburg road." I sent another officer to say that I feared nothing could be accomplished by such an attack, and renewed my request to turn Round Top. Again your answer was: "Gen'l Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmettsburg road." During this interim I had continued the use of the batteries upon the enemy, and had become more and more convinced that the Federal line extended to Round Top, and that I could not reasonably hope to accomplish much by the attack as ordered. In fact, it seemed to me the enemy occupied a position by nature so strong—I may say impregnable—that, independently of their flank-fire, they could easily repel our attack by merely throwing and rolling stones down the mountain side as we approached.

A third time I dispatched one of my staff to explain fully in regard to the situation, and to suggest that you had better come

and look for yourself. I selected, in this instance, my adjutant-general, Colonel Harry Sellers, whom you know to be not only an officer of great courage, but also of marked ability. Colonel Sellers returned with the same message: "Gen'l Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmettsburg road." Almost simultaneously, Col. Fairfax, of your staff, rode up and repeated the above orders.

After this urgent protest against entering into battle at Gettysburg according to instructions—which protest is the first and only one I ever made during my entire military career—I ordered my line to advance and make the assault.

As my troops were moving forward, you rode up in person; a brief conversation passed between us, during which I again expressed the fears above mentioned, and regret at not being allowed to attack in flank around Round Top. You answered to this effect: "We must obey the orders of General Lee." I then rode forward with my line under a heavy fire. In about twenty minutes after reaching the Peach Orchard I was severely wounded in the arm, and borne from the field.

With this wound terminated my participation in this great battle. As I was borne off on a litter to the rear, I could but experience deep distress of mind and heart at the thought of the inevitable fate of my brave fellow-soldiers, who formed one of the grandest divisions of that world-renowned army; and I shall ever believe that had I been permitted to turn Round Top mountain, we would not only have gained that position, but have been able finally to rout the enemy.

Trusting this sketch, however incomplete, may answer its purpose,

I am, respectfully yours,

J. B. HOOD.

Witnesses:

H. B. DEAS,

R. J. DEAS.

**Letter from Major-General Henry Heth, of A. P. Hill's Corps, A. N. V.**

[The following letter from General Heth was originally addressed to the Secretary of our Society, and was duly forwarded to our distinguished foreign correspondent, whose letter of enquiry to us called it forth.

It has been recently published in the *Philadelphia Times*, but will be none the less acceptable to our readers as one of our Gettysburg series.]

RICHMOND, VA., *June, 1877.*

Rev. J. WM. JONES, D. D.,

*Secretary Southern Historical Society:*

MY DEAR SIR: ———, referring to the invasion of Pennsylvania in 1863, says: "The Army of Northern Virginia, when it invaded the Northern States, was more powerful than it had ever been before." If ———, in using the term "more powerful," means that the numerical strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, on this occasion, was greater than ever before, he is wrong, as the subjoined statement of the strength of that army, taken from the official returns now on file in Washington, will show:

	<i>Confederate.</i>	<i>Federal.</i>
Seven days' fight, 1862.....	80,000	115,000
Fredericksburg, 1862.....	78,000	110,000
Chancellorsville, 1863.....	57,000	132,000
Gettysburg, 1863.....	*62,000	†112,000
Wilderness, 1864.....	63,981	141,160

It has been said that the *morale* of an army is to numbers as three to one. If this be correct the Army of Northern Virginia was never stronger than on entering Pennsylvania; and I am perfectly satisfied in my own mind, that this *fact* entered very largely in determining General Lee to make the attack on the 3d of July, at Gettysburg; for there was not an officer or soldier in the Army of Northern Virginia, from General Lee to the drummer boy, who did not believe, when we invaded Pennsylvania in 1863, that it

\* Field return, Army of Northern Virginia, May 31, 1863: Infantry, 54,356; artillery, 4,460; cavalry, 9,563. Total, 68,352. From this total must be deducted Ewell's loss at Winchester, the details left on the south side of the Potomac to guard persons and property captured at Winchester, and also the loss in the cavalry. It must be borne in mind that the cavalry did not join General Lee at Gettysburg until late in the evening of July 2.

† Hooker telegraphs to Staunton, June 27, 1863: Strength of rank and file, 105,000; adding commissioned officers not included in above, 7,000. Total, 112,000.



was able to drive the Federal army into the Atlantic Ocean. Not that the fighting capacity of its great adversary was under-estimated, but possibly the Army of Northern Virginia had an overweening opinion of its own prowess.

Just here let us take a retrospective view, and consider what the Army of Northern Virginia had in one year accomplished. In 1862, eighty thousand strong, it attacked the Federal army, one hundred thousand strong, and after seven days' fighting drove that army to shelter under its gunboats. Following up this success, after a series of engagements, Pope was driven across the Potomac. Then followed the battle of Sharpsburg (Antietam), when possibly the fighting capacity of the Army of Northern Virginia never shone brighter. Its numbers reduced by fighting, fatigue, and hard marching to less than forty thousand strong, it gained a drawn battle against its adversary, who numbered nearly, if not quite one hundred thousand men. Then came Fredericksburg, where, with its ranks recuperated to seventy-eight thousand, it hurled across the Rappahannock river an adversary who had crossed with one hundred and ten thousand men. Then follows that most daring and wonderful battle, Chancellorsville, where it again triumphed, fifty thousand strong, against its adversary, numbering one hundred and thirty-two thousand, compelling him again to seek shelter behind the Rappahannock. After such a series of successes, with such disparity of numbers, is it wonderful that the Army of Northern Virginia and its great leader should have believed it capable of accomplishing any thing in the power of an army to accomplish?

——— says "it was a mistake to invade the Northern States at all," and then gives very clearly and concisely his reasons for entertaining this opinion. Some of the reasons substantiating this view I shall answer hereafter. I think from ——'s standpoint, and especially looking at the sequel of the invasion of Pennsylvania in 1863, he is correct, and I have no doubt that by far the greater number of historians who may follow him will entertain like opinions. It is, possibly, very natural for myself and other officers who served in the Army of Northern Virginia to permit our judgments to be biased by the opinions of one whom we loved, admired and trusted in, as much as we did, in any opinion entertained by our great Commander. I will state General Lee's views in

regard to the invasion of Pennsylvania, as given by him to me and to another. A short time before General Grant crossed the Rapidan, in the spring of 1864, General Lee said to me: "If I could do so—unfortunately I cannot—I would again cross the Potomac and invade Pennsylvania. I believe it to be our true policy, notwithstanding the failure of last year. An invasion of the enemy's country breaks up all of his preconceived plans, relieves our country of his presence, and we subsist while there on his resources. The question of *food for this army* gives me more trouble and uneasiness *than every thing else combined*; the absence of the army from Virginia gives our people an opportunity to collect supplies ahead. The legitimate fruits of a victory, if gained in Pennsylvania, could be more readily reaped than on our own soil. We would have been in a few days' march of Philadelphia, and the occupation of that city would have given us peace." It is very difficult for any one not connected with the Army of Northern Virginia to realize how straitened we were for supplies of all kinds, especially food. The ration of a general officer was double that of a private, and so meagre was that double supply that frequently to appease my hunger I robbed my horse of a handful of corn, which, parched in the fire, served to allay the cravings of nature. What must have been the condition of the private?

After the battle of Gettysburg the President of the Confederate States, desiring to communicate with General Lee, sent Major Seddon, a brother of the Secretary of War, to General Lee's headquarters, when the following conversation took place: General Lee said, "Major Seddon, from what you have observed, are the people as much depressed at the battle of Gettysburg as the newspapers appear to indicate?" Upon Major Seddon's reply that he thought they were, General Lee continued: "To show you how little value is to be attached to popular sentiment in such matters, I beg to call your attention to the popular feeling after the battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. At Fredericksburg we gained a battle, inflicting very severe loss on the enemy in men and material; our people were greatly elated—I was much depressed. We had really accomplished nothing; we had not gained a foot of ground, and I knew the enemy could easily replace the men he had lost, and the loss of material was, if any thing, rather beneficial to him, as it gave an opportunity to contractors to make

money. At Chancellorsville we gained another victory; our people were wild with delight—I, on the contrary, was more depressed than after Fredericksburg; our loss was severe, and again we had gained not an inch of ground and the enemy could not be pursued. After the battle of Chancellorsville matters stood thus: Hooker in my front, with an army more than a hundred thousand strong; Foster preparing to advance into North Carolina; Dix preparing to advance on Richmond from Fortress Monroe; Tyler in the Kanawha Valley preparing to unite with Milroy, who was in the Valley of Virginia, collecting men and material for an advance on Staunton. To oppose these movements I had sixty thousand men. It would have been folly to have divided my army; the armies of the enemy were too far apart for me to attempt to fall upon them in detail. I considered the problem in every possible phase, and to my mind it resolved itself into the choice of one of two things—either to retire on Richmond and stand a siege, which must ultimately have ended in surrender, or to invade Pennsylvania. I chose the latter. Milroy was in my route; I crushed him, and as soon as the First corps of my army crossed the Potomac, orders were issued countermanding the advance of Foster and Dix. As soon as my Second corps crossed Hooker loosened his hold, and Old Virginia was freer of Federal troops than she had ever been since the commencement of the war. Had my cavalry been in place my plans would have been very different, and I think the result very different.”

In speaking of the fight of the 3d of July at Gettysburg, General Lee said: “I shall ever believe if General Pender had remained on his horse half an hour longer we would have carried the enemy’s position. After Pender fell the command of his division devolved on an officer\* unknown to the division; hence the failure of Pickett’s receiving the support of this division. Our loss was heavy at Gettysburg; but in my opinion no greater than it would have been from the series of battles I would have been compelled to fight had I remained in Virginia.” “General Lee,” says Major Seddon, “then rose from his seat, and with an emphatic

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\* I am perfectly satisfied that General Lee did not intend by his remark to cast the slightest censure upon the officer referred to. He simply stated a fact which all military men will understand and appreciate. General Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia had full confidence in this officer’s skill. His courage was known to the entire army.

gesture said, 'and sir, we did whip them at Gettysburg, and it will be seen for the next six months that *that army* will be as quiet as a sucking dove.'" The Army of the Potomac made no aggressive movement, saving the *fiasco* known as Mine Run, from the 3d of July, 1863, until General Grant crossed the Rapidan in May, 1864, precisely ten months afterward.

Whatever opinions may be entertained in regard to the details of the Battle of Gettysburg, whether if Stonewall Jackson had been in command of Hill's corps on the first day—July 1st—a different result would have been obtained; whether Longstreet unnecessarily delayed his attack on the second day; whether, as ——— expresses it, "the way in which the fights of the second day were directed does not show the same co-ordination which insured the success of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville;" whether the fight on the second of July should have been at all; whether the attack on the third, known as "Pickett's charge," should have been made, or, whether the failure of this attack was due to the fact that General Lee's orders were shamefully disobeyed, in its not being supported, thereby causing him to lose the battle—or, whether General Lee, seeing the great strength of the enemy's position should have turned it, are opinions upon which men will differ; but they sink into insignificance, in my judgment, when compared with the *great cause* which brought about the failure of the Pennsylvania campaign of 1863.

The failure to crush the Federal army in Pennsylvania in 1863, in the opinion of almost all the officers of the Army of Northern Virginia, can be expressed in five words—*the absence of our cavalry*.

Train a giant for an encounter and he can be whipped by a pigmy—if you put out his eyes. The eyes of an army are its cavalry. Before Ewell crossed the Potomac General Lee wrote to General Stuart, commanding the cavalry, in substance, as follows: "Ewell will cross the Potomac on a certain day, at a certain point. Hill will follow Ewell, crossing on a given day at a given point; Longstreet will hold the gaps in the mountains and protect the crossing of these two corps; after Hill has crossed Longstreet will vacate the gaps, and follow Hill; on Longstreet vacating the gaps in the mountains, you will seize them and protect Longstreet's crossing; then follow Longstreet, throw yourself on the right flank of the army, watch the enemy, give me all the



information you can gather of his movements, and collect supplies." General Stuart, probably thinking he could carry out General Lee's orders, and at the same time make a brilliant dash toward and threatening Washington, worked by his right flank, separating himself from Longstreet, crossing the Potomac between the enemy and Washington city—making a swoop toward Washington, then turning west to join the Army of Northern Virginia, when he found the enemy had crossed the Potomac and were between him and that army. This necessitated his riding entirely around the Federal army, and brought him, whether from necessity or not, I cannot say, to Carlisle, Pa. From this point he struck south and joined the Army of Northern Virginia, *being late in the evening of July second*. It is thus evident that so far as deriving any assistance from his cavalry from the — of June to the evening of July 2, it might as well have had no existence. Every officer who conversed with General Lee for several days previous to the Battle of Gettysburg, well remembers having heard such expressions as these: "Can you tell me where General Stuart is?" "Where on earth is my cavalry?" "Have you any news of the enemy's movements?" "What is the enemy going to do?" "If the enemy does not find us, we must try and find him, in the absence of our cavalry, as best we can!" The eyes of the giant were out; he knew not where to strike; a movement in any direction might prove a disastrous blunder.

I have stated above that General Lee's purpose in invading Pennsylvania was to break up the enemy's combinations, to draw him from our own territory, and to subsist his army on that of the enemy's. While this is true, his intention was to strike his enemy the very first available opportunity that offered—believing he could, when such an opportunity offered, crush him. And I here beg leave to differ from ———, when referring to the invasion of Pennsylvania, he says: "The proof is that as soon as the latter (Meade) began to move, Lee, who had undertaken nothing but a raid on too large a scale, found himself so much endangered that he was obliged to fight an offensive battle on the ground where Meade chose to await him." This determination to strike his enemy was not, from the position he found himself, consequent upon invasion, but from a leading characteristic of the man. General Lee, not excepting Jackson, was the most aggressive man in

his army. This cannot and will not be contradicted, I am satisfied. General Lee, had he seen fit, could have assumed a defensive position, and popular opinion in the Northern States would have forced the commander of the Federal army to attack.

And further, to corroborate the fact that General Lee was not compelled to attack Meade "where Meade chose to wait for him," I will show, I am confident, that the "Battle of Gettysburg" was the result purely of *an accident*, for which I am probably, more than any one else, accountable. Napoleon is said to have remarked that "a dog fight might determine the result of a great battle." Almost as trivial a circumstance determined the Battle of Gettysburg being fought at Gettysburg. It is well known that General Meade had chosen another point as his battle-field. On the 29th of June, 1863, General Lee's army was disposed as follows: Longstreet's corps, at or near Chambersburg; Ewell's corps, which had been pushed east as far as York, had received orders to counter-march and concentrate on Hill's corps, which lay on and at the base of South Mountain; the leading division (Heth's) occupying Cashtown, at the base of the mountain; the cavalry not heard from, probably at or near Carlisle. Hearing that a supply of shoes was to be obtained in Gettysburg, eight miles distant from Cashtown, and greatly needing shoes for my men, I directed General Pettigrew to go to Gettysburg and get these supplies.

On the 30th of June General Pettigrew, with his brigade, went near Gettysburg, but did not enter the town, returning the same evening to Cashtown, reporting that he had not carried out my orders, as Gettysburg was occupied by the enemy's cavalry, and that some of his officers reported hearing drums beating on the farther side of the town; that under these circumstances he did not deem it advisable to enter Gettysburg. About this time Gen. Hill rode up, and this information was given him. He remarked, "the only force at Gettysburg is cavalry, probably a detachment of observation. I am just from General Lee, and the information he has from his scouts corroborates that I have received from mine—that is, the enemy are still at Middleburg, and have not yet struck their tents." I then said, if there is no objection, I will take my division to-morrow and go to Gettysburg and get those shoes! Hill replied, "None in the world."

On July 1st I moved my division from Cashtown in the direction of Gettysburg, reaching the heights, a mile (more or less) from the town, about 9 o'clock A. M. No opposition had been made and no enemy discovered. While the division was coming up I placed several batteries in position and shelled the woods to the right and left of the town. No reply was made. Two brigades were then deployed to the right and left of the railroad leading into Gettysburg, and, with the railroad as a point of direction, were ordered to advance and occupy Gettysburg. These brigades, on moving forward, soon struck the enemy, which proved to be Reynolds' corps of the Federal army, and were driven back with some loss. This was the first intimation that General Lee had that the enemy had moved from the point he supposed him to occupy, possibly thirty miles distant.

My division was then formed in a wooded ravine to the right of the railroad, the ground rising in front and in rear. The enemy was evidently in force in my front. General Rodes, commanding a division of Ewell's corps en route to Cashtown, was following a road running north of Gettysburg. Rodes hearing the firing at Gettysburg, faced by the left flank and approached the town. He soon became heavily engaged, and seeing this, I sought for and found General Lee. Saying to the General: "Rodes is very heavily engaged, had I not better attack?" General Lee replied: "No; I am not prepared to bring on a general engagement to-day—Longstreet is not up." Returning to my division, I soon discovered that the enemy were moving troops from my front and pushing them against Rodes. I reported this fact to General Lee and again requested to be permitted to attack. Permission was given. My division numbered some seven thousand muskets. I found in my front a heavy skirmish line and two lines of battle. My division swept over these without halting. My loss was severe. In twenty-five minutes I lost twenty-seven hundred men, killed and wounded. The last I saw or remember of this day's fight was seeing the enemy in my front completely and utterly routed, and my division in hot pursuit. I was then shot and rendered insensible for some hours. I mention this attack, made by my division on the first of July, and its results, to show, as far as my observation and opinion goes, that —— is wrong in supposing that the Federal troops at Gettysburg fought "ten times better than in Virginia." The Fed-

eral troops fought quite as well when we attacked them on the second day at Chancellorsville, and better on the 5th of May in the Wilderness, and again at Spotsylvania Courthouse. I speak, of course, of my individual experience and observation in those several engagements.\*

The fight at Gettysburg on July 1 was without order or system, the several divisions attacking the enemy in their front as they arrived on the field—nor do I see how there could have been a systematic plan of battle formed, as I have, I think, clearly shown that we accidentally *stumbled* into this fight.

Longstreet's attack on July 2 was, in my judgment, made entirely too late in the day. If it could not have been made earlier, it should not have been made at all. I was by General Lee's side when this attack was made, and the thought occurred to me then that if Longstreet was successful night would rob him of the legitimate fruits of a victory. The attack on July 3, known as "Pickett's charge," made by Pickett's division, numbering some forty-five hundred strong, and my own shattered division, under General Pettigrew, numbering about forty-three hundred muskets, unsupported, was, as was said of the famous charge of the six hundred at Baliklava, "*ties grande, mais c'est ne pas la guerre.*"

In justice to General Lee it must be here stated that orders were given by him for other troops to attack at the same time, which orders were not obeyed. Who should shoulder this responsibility I know not. I think the fight of the 3d of July was a mistake; that General Lee should have so manoeuvred as to have drawn Meade from his stronghold; and such I believe to have been General Lee's views after the fight, as he remarked to me, at Orange Courthouse, during the winter of 1863-64, when, animadverting upon the criticisms made upon the Gettysburg fight, espe-

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\* The sentimental idea desired to be conveyed by —, in saying that "the Federal troops fought ten times better at Gettysburg than in Virginia," is based upon the supposition that troops are much more willing to die when fighting on their own soil and in its defence. Attacking a sentiment is not popular, I know. I am not singular, I am satisfied, in expressing the opinion that not one man in a thousand engaged in battle ever thinks what soil he is fighting on, but would rather be on any other soil than just that soil at that time. Far different emotions fill the breasts of men at such times. I confess I am matter-of-fact enough to believe that Leonidas and his celebrated three hundred would not have all died at Thermopylæ but for the fact that they were surrounded and could not get away. Human nature was pretty much the same two thousand three hundred and fifty-seven years ago as it is to-day. The part that the uninitiated would have sentiment to play in warfare is very sure to be eradicated by actual participation in such a war as raged in this country from 1860 to 1864.



cially referring to the fight of July 3, "after it is all over, as stupid a fellow as I am can see the mistakes that were made"; adding, "I notice, however, my mistakes are never told me until it is too late, and you, and all my officers know that I am always ready and anxious to have their suggestions." The fact is, General Lee believed the Army of Northern Virginia, as it then existed, could accomplish anything.

Had our cavalry been in position, General Lee would have known of Reynolds' approach in the direction of Gettysburg twenty-four hours before this corps reached Gettysburg. General Lee could and probably would, had he known the enemy were in motion, have occupied Gettysburg on the 29th or 30th of June, and rendered his position impregnable.

Had our cavalry been in position, General Lee, if he saw proper, could have permitted Reynolds' corps to have occupied Gettysburg as it did—but instead of this corps being unmasked by two brigades of my division, it would have been attacked by Longstreet, Ewell and Hill's corps. In that case the fate of this corps no one can doubt; and had the enemy thrown forward reinforcements as he did, they would have been crushed in detail.

Had our cavalry been in position, the chances are that the battle never would have been fought at Gettysburg; but whether there or elsewhere, the battle would have been planned and digested with that consummate skill and boldness which characterized the plans of the greatest of American soldiers in his seven days' fights around Richmond, his discomfiture of Pope, his Chancellorsville fight, and his series of battles in 1864, from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor.

Yours truly,

HENRY HETH.

**Official Reports of the Battle of Gettysburg.**

We will continue to add to our series of Reports on Gettysburg already published any others which we may be able to procure, and we beg our friends to aid us by sending on at once any which may not have been published. The following will be read with the interest which attaches to every thing connected with the great battle:

**Report of Brigadier-General Robertson.**

HEADQUARTERS TEXAS BRIGADE,  
NEAR BUNKER'S HILL, VA., *July 17th, 1863.*

*Major W. H. SELLERS,*

*A. A. Gen. Hood's Division:*

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit through you my report of the action of my brigade in the Battle of Gettysburg, on the 2d and 3d of July. I have been too much occupied with the duties imposed by the marches and manoeuvres we have gone through to allow me to make this report at an earlier time.

The division arrived on the ground in front of the position of the enemy that we were to attack but a few minutes before we were ordered to advance. I, therefore, got but a glance at the field on which we had to operate before we entered upon it. I was ordered to keep my right well closed on Brigadier-General Law's left, and to let my left rest on the Emmettsburg pike. I had advanced but a short distance when I discovered that my brigade would not fill the space between General Law's left and the pike named, and that I must leave the pike or disconnect myself from General Law on my right. Understanding before the action commenced that the attack on our part was to be general, and that the force of General McLaws was to advance simultaneously with us on my immediate left, and seeing at once that a mountain held by the enemy in heavy force with artillery, to the right of General Law's centre, was the key to the enemy's left, I abandoned the pike and closed on General Law's left. This caused some separation of my regiments, which was remedied as promptly as the numerous stone and rail fences that intersected the field through which we were advancing would allow. As we advanced through this field for half a mile, we were exposed to a heavy and

destructive fire of cannister, grape, and shell from six pieces of their artillery on the mountain alluded to, and the same number on a commanding hill but a short distance to the left of the mountain, and from the enemy's sharp-shooters from behind the numerous rocks, fences, and houses in the field. As we approached the base of the mountain General Law moved to the right, and I was moving obliquely to the right to close on him, when my whole line encountered the fire of the enemy's main line posted behind rocks and a stone fence. The Fourth and Fifth Texas regiments, under the direction of their gallant commanders, Colonels Powell and Key, while returning the fire and driving the enemy before them, continued to close on General Law to their right. At the same time the First Texas and Third Arkansas, under their gallant commanders, Lieutenant-Colonel Work and Colonel Manning, were hotly engaged with a greatly superior force, while at the same time a heavy force appeared and opened fire on Colonel Manning's left, seriously threatening his left flank; to meet which, he threw two or three companies, with their front to his left flank, and protected his left. On discovering this heavy force on my left flank, and seeing that no attack was being made by any of our forces on my left, I at once sent a courier to Major-General Hood stating that I was hard pressed on my left, that General McLaw's forces were not engaging the enemy to my left, which enabled him to move fresh troops from that part of his line down on me, and that I must have reinforcements. Lieutenant-Colonel Work, with the First Texas regiment, having pressed forward to the crest of the hill and driven the enemy from his battery, I ordered him to the left to the relief and support of Colonel Manning, directing Major Bass, with two companies, to hold the hill, while Colonel Work, with the rest of the regiment, went to Colonel Manning's relief. With this assistance, Colonel Manning drove the enemy back and entered the woods after him, when the enemy reoccupied the hill and his batteries in Colonel Work's front, from which Colonel Work again drove him. For an hour and upwards, these two regiments maintained one of the hottest contests against five or six times their number that I have witnessed. The moving of Colonel Work to the left to relieve Colonel Manning, while the Fourth and Fifth Texas were closing to the right on General Law's brigade, separated these two regiments from the others.

They were steadily moving to the right and front, driving the enemy before them, when they passed the woods or ravine to my right. After finding that I could not move the First and Third to the right to join them, I sent to recall them, ordering them to move to the left until the left of the Fourth should rest on the right of the First, but my messenger found two of General Law's regiments on the left of my two, the Fourth and Fifth Texas, and did not find these regiments at all. About this time my aid, Lieutenant Scott, reported my two regiments, the Fourth and Fifth Texas, in the centre of General Law's brigade, and that they could not be moved without greatly injuring his line. I sent a request to General Law to look to them. At this point my A. A. and I. Gen. reported from the Fourth and Fifth, that they were hotly engaged and wanted reinforcements. My courier sent to General Hood returned and reported him wounded and carried from the field. I sent a messenger to Lieutenant-General Longstreet for reinforcements, and at the same time sent to Generals Anderson and Benning, urging them to hurry up to my support. They came up, joined us, and fought gallantly, but as fast as we would break one line of the enemy another fresh one would present itself, the enemy reinforcing his lines in our front from his reserves at the base of the mountain to our right and front, and from his lines to our left, who, having no attack from us in his front, threw his forces from there on us. Before the arrival of Generals Anderson and Benning, Colonel J. C. G. Key, who gallantly led the Fourth Texas regiment in, up to the time of receiving a severe wound, passed me, being led to the rear. I, about the same time, learned of the fall and dangerous wounding of Colonel R. M. Powell, of the Fifth, who fell while gallantly leading his regiment in one of the impetuous charges of the Fourth and Fifth Texas on the strongly fortified mountain. Just after the arrival of General Anderson on my left, I learned that the gallant Colonel Van H. Manning, of the Third Arkansas, had been wounded and carried from the field, and about the same time I received intelligence of the wounding and being carried from the field of those two able and efficient officers, Lieutenant-Colonels K. Bryan, of the Fifth, and B. T. Carter, of the Fourth, both of whom were wounded while bravely discharging their duty. Captain Woodward, acting major of the First Texas, was wounded near me,



while gallantly discharging his duty. The Fourth and Fifth Texas, under the command of Majors Bane and Rogers, continued to hold the ground of their original line, leaving the space over which they had made their successive charges strewn with their wounded and dead comrades, many of whom could not be removed and were left upon the field. The First Texas, under Lieutenant-Colonel Work, with a portion of Benning's brigade, held the field and the batteries taken by the First Texas. Three of the guns were brought off the field and secured; the other three, from the nature of the ground and their proximity to the enemy, were left. The Third Arkansas, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, ably assisted by Major Ready, after Colonel Manning was borne from the field, sustained well the high character she made in the earlier part of the action. When night closed the conflict, late in the evening, I was struck above the knee, which deprived me of the use of my leg, and prevented me from getting about the field. I retired some two hundred yards to the rear, leaving the immediate command with Lieutenant-Colonel Work, the senior officer present, under whose supervision our wounded were brought out and guns secured, and our dead on that part of the field were buried the next day. About 2 o'clock that night the First Texas and Third Arkansas were moved by the right to the position occupied by the Fourth and Fifth, and formed on their left, where the brigade remained during the day of the third, keeping up a continuous skirmishing with the enemy's sharp-shooters, in which we had a number of our men severely wounded. I sent my A. A. Gen., Captain F. L. Price, at daybreak to examine the position of the brigade and report to me as soon as he could, and while in the discharge of that duty, was either killed or fell into the hands of the enemy, as he has not been seen or heard of since. About dark on the evening of the 3d the brigade, with the division, fell back to the hill and formed in line, where it remained during the 4th. Lieutenant Lockridge, commanding Company I, Fourth Texas, who commanded the skirmishers in front of the Fourth, and who was left when that regiment moved to the right, joined the First Texas and did gallant service during the engagement.

In this, the hardest fought battle of the war in which I have been engaged, all, both officers and men, as far as my observation extended, fully sustained the high character they have heretofore

made. Where all behaved so nobly, individual distinction cannot, with propriety, be made.

I cannot close this report without expressing my thanks to my personal staff for the able and satisfactory manner in which they discharged their duties. The wounding of so many commanding officers, among them the division commander, rendered their duties peculiarly arduous. They were discharged with zeal and promptness. Captain F. L. Price, my A. A. Gen., whose loss on the morning of the 3d I have to deplore, was an active, efficient officer, and did his duty nobly. My aid-de-camp, Lieutenant John G. Scott; my A. A. and I. Gen., Lieutenant John W. Kerr; and Lieutenant John Grace, volunteer aid, discharged their duties with a promptness and ability that merits special notice.

A list of the casualties in the several regiments, together with the reports from each of the regimental commanders, is herewith submitted.

J. B. ROBERTSON,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.*

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#### **Report of Colonel White, Commanding Anderson's Brigade.**

HD. QRS. ANDERSON'S BRIGADE, *August 8th, 1863.*

*Maj. W. H. SELLERS, A. A. Gen.:*

SIR: I have the honor to report the part borne by this brigade in the engagement near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on the 2d and 3d ult. As I was not present myself (my regiment—7th Georgia—having been detached and ordered to the right and flank of the line to watch the movements of the enemy's cavalry), I have consolidated the reports of the regimental commanders. The scene of action was reached by a march of several miles under a broiling sun, and, a portion of the way, a terrific fire of the enemy's batteries. The position of the brigade was on the extreme left of Hood's division, and when ordered to advance on the enemy's position was to the rear and supporting the Texas brigade. Soon after the Texas brigade became engaged, this brigade moved forward on a line with it, when a vigorous charge was made, which dislodged the enemy from a stone fence running diagonally with the

line of battle. The supports not coming up in time, and the enemy coming up on our left flank, General Anderson changed the front of the left wing of the 9th Georgia regiment (which occupied the extreme left of the brigade), but soon found they could not hold the enemy in check. He then ordered the brigade to retire to the crest of the hill in the edge of the timber, where the charge commenced. But a short time elapsed before McLaws' division came up on our left, when General Anderson ordered another advance, which was executed with spirit and loss to the enemy. In this charge General Anderson was wounded, in consequence of which some confusion ensued, and the command fell back a short distance the second time. The third advance was made, and resulted, after a severe conflict in the ravine of half an hour, in the rout of the enemy, which was vigorously pressed to the foot of the mountain. The loss of the enemy was here very great. Owing to the exhausted condition of the men, together with the fact that the enemy were pouring in large reinforcements on the right, it was deemed impracticable to follow him further. In this charge large numbers of prisoners were taken and sent to the rear without guard; consequently the number is not known. The brigade retired in good order across the ravine and went into bivouac for the night, the skirmishers of the brigade being well in front. The rout of the enemy was manifest from the fact that no attempt was made to follow our retreat, and scarcely any effort made to annoy us in retiring. The loss of the brigade was heavy—12 officers killed and 58 wounded; 93 men killed, 457 wounded, and 51 missing.

On the morning of the 3d my regiment (7th Georgia) was ordered to join the brigade where it was still in line of battle. Soon after reaching the point an order was received from General Law to send him one regiment. The 9th Georgia was ordered to this duty, and conducted by a courier. But a short time elapsed before another order was received from General Law for two more regiments. The 7th and 8th Georgia were detached and sent. In the course of an hour the remaining regiments—the 11th and 59th—were relieved by Semmes' brigade and ordered to the right and flank, under command of Major Henry D. McDaniel, 11th Georgia. They were engaged with the enemy's dismounted cavalry, and drove them from the field. A report of the action has already been forwarded by Major McDaniel.

Several squadrons of the enemy's cavalry charged through the pickets of a Texas regiment and were galloping up to one of our batteries with the evident purpose of spiking the guns, when they were met by a charge of the 9th Georgia regiment, killing and wounding a number. This was the first check this column met with. On their retreat they encountered several other regiments coming up from different points, and suffered greatly from their fire.

Early next morning the brigade was moved back to the main line, and threw up breastworks.

The reports of regimental commanders, together with the complete list of the killed and wounded, have already been forwarded. It would be invidious to speak of individual gallantry where all behaved so well.

I am, Major, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

W. W. WHITE,

*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

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#### Report of General H. L. Benning.

HEADQUARTERS BENNING'S BRIGADE, 3rd August, 1863.

MAJOR:

In obedience to an order from the headquarters of this division, I have the honor to submit to you the following report of the operations of this brigade since it left Culpeper Courthouse for the other side of the Potomac:

About 2 or 3 o'clock P. M., on the 2nd of July ultimo, I was informed by Major-General Hood that his division, as the right of Lieutenant-General Longstreet's corps, were about to attack the left of the enemy's line, and that in the attack my brigade would follow Law's brigade at the distance of about four hundred yards. In order to get to the place they assigned me, in the rear of General Law, it was necessary to move the brigade five or six hundred yards further to the right. Having done this, I advanced in line of battle. A wood intervened between us and the enemy, which, though it did not prevent their shells from reaching us and pro-



ducing some casualties, yet completely hid them from our view. On emerging from the woods their position became visible.

Before us, at the distance of six or eight hundred yards, was an oblong mountain peak or spur, presenting to us a steep face much roughened by rocks. To the right, four or five hundred yards from the peak, was the main mountain itself, with a side that looked almost perpendicular. Its summit overlooked the peak just sufficiently to command it well. On the summit of the peak were three pieces of artillery, and a little in advance of them, on a sort of uneven, irregular shelf, were three others. To the right and left of the battery, as well as immediately in its rear, were lines of infantry, as we afterwards ascertained. This formed the enemy's first line of battle. On the top of the mountain itself, and a little to the right of the peak, were five other guns. These commanded our approaches to the peak for nearly the whole way. To the right and left of these guns extended the enemy's second line of infantry. Where that line crossed the gorge running between the peak and the mountain, a point five or six hundred yards in the rear of the peak, were two other guns. This we ascertained when the right of the brigade reached the gorge by the terrible fire from them which swept down the gorge. Thus what we had to encounter were thirteen guns and two, if not more, lines of infantry posted on mountain heights. The intervening spur, over which we had to march to reach the first line was nearly all open.

Our own first line also became visible advancing about four hundred yards in our front. The part of it in our front I took to be Law's brigade, and so I followed it. In truth it was Robertson's, Law's being farther to the right. This I did not discover until late in the fight, a wood on the right concealing from me most of Law's brigade.

My line continued to follow the first line, halting once or twice to preserve its interval. At length I saw that the first line would not be able alone to carry the peak. So I advanced without halting again. When my line reached the foot of the peak, I found there a part of the First Texas struggling to make the ascent—the rest of the brigade having gone to the right and left—the Fourth and Fifth Texas to the right and the Third Arkansas to the left. The part of the First Texas referred to falling in with

my brigade, the whole line commenced ascending the rugged steep and (on the right) crossing the gorge. The ground was difficult—rocks in many places, presenting by their preeipitous sides, insurmountable obstacles, whilst the fire of the enemy was very heavy and very deadly. The progress was, therefore, not very rapid, but it was regular and uninterrupted. After awhile the enemy were driven from their three front guns. The advance continued, and at length they were driven completely from the peak, but they earried with them the three rear guns on its summit, its sudden deseent on the other side favoring the operation; so that we captured only the three front guns. These were ten-pounder Parrots. A number of prisoners also were taken, more I suppose than one hundred.

The peak being thus taken and the enemy's first line driven behind his second, I made my dispositions to hold the ground gained, which was all that I could do, as I was then much in advance of every other part of our line of battle, and the second line of the enemy on the mountain itself was in a position which seemed to me almost impregnable to any merely front attack, even with fresh men. Indeed, to hold the ground we had appeared a difficult task. The shells of the enemy from the adjacent mountain were incessantly bursting along the summit of the peak, and every head that showed itself was the target for a Minnie ball.

Several attempts by flank movements were made to dislodge us, but by the gallantry of the regiments on the right and left they all failed. We held the position until late next day, when we were ordered back to the crest of the wooded hill from which we first saw the enemy on the day before.

Our loss was heavy, not less than four hundred in killed, wounded, and missing. Of this number, an unusually large proportion were killed and badly wounded. Among the killed were Colonel John A. Jones, of the Twentieth Georgia, and Lieutenant-Colonel William T. Harris, commanding the Second Georgia.

Colonel Jones was killed late in the action, not far from the captured guns. After the enemy's forces were driven from the position and they had themselves opened upon it with shell from their other batteries, a fragment of one of which, glancing from a rock, passed through his brain. He had behaved with great coolness and gallantry. He fell just as success came in sight. Colonel

Harris was further to the right, where he and his regiment were exposed to the terrible fire of the two pieces, which swept the gorge, as well as to the infantry fire of the enemy's left. A ball passed through the heart, killing him instantly.<sup>4</sup> His gallantry had been most conspicuous.

I had no means of ascertaining the precise loss of the enemy. In killed and wounded it must have been large. Dead and wounded lay scattered over the ground of the conflict and of the retreat. From the latter they were removed by the enemy during the night.

We took about three hundred prisoners in all.

The conduct of both officers and men was generally, as far as I could observe it, excellent.

Under a fire from so many cannon, and towards the last from so much musketry, they advanced steadily over ground for the most part open, mounted a difficult height, drove back from it the enemy, occupied his line, took three guns, captured a number of prisoners, and, against his utmost efforts, held all they had gained.

The captured guns were taken by the Twentieth Georgia (Colonel Jones, and after his death, Lieutenant-Colonel Waddell), the part of the First Texas above referred to (Colonel Work), and the Seventeenth Georgia (Colonel Hodges), but the honor of the capture was not exclusively theirs. They could not have taken, certainly could not have held the guns, if Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, and after his death, Major Shepherd, on the left with the Second Georgia, and Colonel DuBose, with the Fifteenth Georgia, on the right, had not by the hardest kind of fighting and at great loss protected their flanks. Colonel DuBose not only drove back the enemy's line, but repulsed repeated attacks made to recover it, taking over one hundred prisoners. The same may be said of the Second, except that it did not take so many prisoners.

To my staff, Captain Seaborn J. Benning, adjutant; Lieutenant John R. Mott, aid; and Lieutenant Herman H. Perry, brigade inspector, voluntarily acting as aid, I was much indebted. They performed well duties that kept them in almost constant danger. The former having been disabled by a wound the whole weight of staff duty towards the end of the fight fell upon the two latter.

At the close of the day the fighting ceased, and I employed the night in arranging my line, establishing pickets, and removing the

wounded. The last was a work of great labor, as owing to some fault or mistake in the surgeon having charge of the brigade ambulances, but two of them made their appearance, so that the labor to the litter-bearers became very heavy.

The enemy employed the whole night in throwing up two lines of breastworks, one above the other, on the mountain side. These works were formed from the loose stones which abounded on the surface of the mountain. The sound of the stones dropping into place could be distinctly heard from our line during the whole night. The morning light revealed the two long lines completed. The upper line was sufficiently above the lower for its fire to pass over the lower. The crest was still frowning with its old line greatly strengthened since the day before. From this line the fire of both artillery and infantry would pass over both of the lines below.

Until late in the afternoon nothing occurred more important than picket firing. About 5 o'clock, two or three pickets of McLaws' division came to me and told me that the troops of General McLaws had for some hours been withdrawn from my left, leaving my flank entirely exposed. This was the first notice I had of that movement, so important to my brigade. I immediately ordered the strongest picket force I could spare to the abandoned post of General McLaws' line. Shortly afterwards a courier from General Law came to me and told me that General Law wished me to move to the crest of the hill. I asked him what crest—what hill. He said all he knew was that General Law waved his hand thus (making a wave of his hand). I was much at a loss to know what the wave meant. It seemed to me, however, to be in the direction of a ridge that ran through the woods towards the ground from which McLaws' troops had been withdrawn, and I concluded that the object of the order was to cause me to occupy that ground. Consequently, I immediately gave Colonel DuBose orders to take his regiment along the crest to that ground, his regiment being most convenient at the beginning of the crest. He moved off at once. In a few minutes afterwards I received what was the same order from General Law, but this time clearly and in a very different sense. It was to move back immediately to the crest of the hill from which we had advanced the day before. I gave the necessary orders and the three regiments remaining in



position commenced moving out. A little afterwards I heard a heavy infantry fire on the left, in the direction in which Colonel DuBose had gone. Subsequently, I learned from him that after following the ridge for five or six hundred yards, he suddenly found himself in the immediate presence of two long lines of the enemy, one almost at right angles to the other, with his own line between the two, the head of it being not far from the angle they made with each other. They opened fire on him, which he returned so as to check their advance a little. He then fell back, and availing himself of a stone fence, fought his way out, not however, without a heavy loss in prisoners, and some loss in killed and wounded. He was fortunate to escape at all. His escape is high evidence both of his skill and courage. I did not go to his assistance because when I heard the fire it seemed to be, and was indeed, so far on my left, that I thought some of General McLaws' men had been sent forward to check an advance of the enemy, and that it came from a collision between them and the enemy.

The other three regiments got out with slight loss.

The whole loss of the brigade in the movement to the rear was about one hundred, of which about eighty or ninety belonged to the Fifteenth Georgia.

A report of the killed, wounded, and missing for the two days has been sent up. The total was five hundred and nine. The loss on the first day was about four hundred.

The next day (the 4th) the division was formed in line of battle facing down the Emmettsburg road, and ordered to erect breastworks, which it did. My brigade was on the left, its left resting on that road. About 12 o'clock at night the division commenced moving back towards Hagerstown by Fairfield, my brigade bringing up the rear.

Nothing more of much interest happened to the brigade until the division had crossed the Shenandoah. It crossed that river at Berry's Ford by wading, and found the water deep and swift.

At dawn the next day, the division took the road from Front Royal to Linden by Manassas Gap. It found the Gap occupied by the enemy's cavalry and artillery, with pickets some distance in their front, and some regiments of cavalry between these and the Gap. My brigade was stretched across the road (relieving a portion of General Corse's brigade), on a ridge parallel with the Gap,

and such dispositions were made by General Law on my flanks with the other brigades, that the enemy's pickets soon fell back a mile or more, and his reserve regiments quite to the Gap.

Towards night General Law informed me that he would soon move the other three brigades of the division over to the Chester Gap road and stay there during the night, and at the same time ordered me to remain with my brigade and the Fourth Alabama regiment until relieved by Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill, and then to follow the division and overtake it as soon as possible. He stated that General Hill was to relieve me during the night, or, at farthest, by daybreak. So I remained, but it was 9 o'clock A. M. before I was relieved.

I then started to overtake the division. When I reached the Chester Gap road I found it filled with the rear of General Hill's long wagon train, the rest of that train and all of his troops having already passed. To get by these wagons and the artillery in the mountain road was a work of no small difficulty. It was near night before I could do it. I succeeded, however, in passing them, and the corps which had bivouacked near Flint Hill, and, with my brigade, bivouacked two miles this side of Flint Hill.

At daylight next day the march was resumed. I halted for an hour or more at Gaines' Crossroads (which is two miles this side of my camp of the night before) to wait for the 15th Alabama regiment (Colonel Oates), which was holding the Mountain road until General Hill's corps should come up and relieve it. That regiment having joined me, the march was resumed—General Hill's corps being close behind me.

When near Newby's Crossroads, two men of the cavalry, coming from the one of those roads which leads to Amissville, dashed up to me and told me that as they were going over towards Amissville to get their horses shod they had met a squad of Yankee cavalry coming from the opposite direction.

Colonel Oates immediately proposed to take his regiment, which was in front, and go forward and make a reconnoissance. I accepted his services, and he advanced beyond the crossing of the roads. Very soon his skirmishers were engaged with those of the enemy. After some time, as I heard and saw nothing but skirmishing, I concluded to move on, General Hill sending me word that he would relieve Colonel Oates and let him follow me. After

moving on less than half a mile a shell, much to my surprise, passed over my line, and then others in rapid succession. They had been fired by the enemy at our skirmishers. My line was concealed from the enemy by an intervening hill and the cut of the road, so I continued to move on unharmed. When I had almost reached the ford of Hazel river I received a request from General Hill to wait for his artillery and let it follow me. I accordingly halted. After waiting for some time there came to me, instead of artillery, another message from General Hill to the effect that it was necessary to drive the enemy back from their position in the mountain, and that he wished me to move my command on their flank and rear to the road by which they had come, and thus cut off their retreat, and to do this by a route which the bearer of the message, Lieutenant Stannard, would show me.

The request seemed reasonable. The enemy had evidently got artillery into a mountain position, difficult to be carried by a front attack, from which position they commanded the road at several points, including, I think, the ford, and thus, unless dislodged, could greatly annoy troops and trains passing by, if not stop their progress. My command was the one most conveniently situated to execute the suggested movement. I thought it right, therefore, to accede to General Hill's request.

Signifying this to Lieutenant Stannard, he went forward as guide, and I followed him with the brigade and the 4th Alabama regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Scruggs. The route was so well chosen that we passed through the enemy's picket line and got near enough to the road in their rear to command it before they discovered us. Before fire was opened, Captain Newell, Second Georgia, commanding the skirmishers, reported to me a battery considerably on my right, just across the road in a field. I moved to the right in the woods to get near it and seize it before it could run back. The wood was thick. I got the right of the brigade opposite the battery, and then ordered an advance in line of battle. When the line emerged from the wood the battery was gone. It had run back the way it came, having found out our presence by the fire which had opened between their skirmishers and ours. Our line fired upon such of the enemy as were in sight. Those of the latter who were not disabled fled in confusion to the opposite wood, where, on the left, was another battery, as I had

just learned by its fire. The road I found, when the line reached it, a good place for protection against this battery, and also for assailing the cavalry on their expected retreat. I therefore halted in it. I now thought we had their cannon and cavalry secured. I had been assured by Lieutenant Stannard, as well as by citizens, that there was no practicable way to Amissville, except this road occupied by the brigade, all others being excluded by the mountain and its spurs. They were mistaken. The enemy found another road nearer to the mountain, and by it escaped with their artillery and most of their cavalry. We took a few of them prisoners, and killed and wounded more.

As soon as it was clear that the enemy had retreated, at the suggestion of General Hill, I returned to the ford and resumed the march, the command having spent four hours, marched at least four miles over very difficult ground and fought a brisk fight with cavalry and artillery in the detour.

Such was the part contributed by the brigade and the Fourth and Fiftcenth Alabama to the defeat of a well-laid plan of the enemy, organized on rather a large scale, to impede the march and cut off the trains of a large part of our army. They must have had two, if not three brigades of cavalry, and two or three batteries of artillery.

This, Major, is a much longer report than I would have had it to be, but, under the order requiring it, I do not see how it could have been shorter. Indeed, I have omitted some things, showing the arduousness of the long march, which are perhaps called for by the order. I must, in closing, ask leave to pay a tribute to the merit of the brigade in that respect. There was no straggling to speak of, either on the advance or the return. The rolls when we arrived at Gettysburg showed almost the same number which they showed when we left Culpeper Courthouse. So they showed on our return to Culpeper Courthouse almost the same number which they showed when we left Gettysburg.

I am, Major, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

HENRY L. BENNING, *Brigadier General.*

*Major W. H. SELLERS, A. A. G.*



**Notes by General Benning on Battle of Gettysburg.**

At Gettysburg the behavior of the brigade was magnificent. By *deliberate* and *protracted* fighting it ascended the mountain, took the enemy's line, about three hundred prisoners, and three of his six guns in position there, and held its ground until next afternoon late, when it was ordered to fall back by General Law, commanding the division. I was told that this was the only part of the enemy's line carried and *held*, and these the only guns captured. Indeed, the brigade believes and boasts that these were the only guns ever taken by any part of our army north of the Potomac.

On the next evening I mistook an order, thinking it was an order to advance when it was one to retreat. In consequence, I sent Colonel DuBose with the Fifteenth to my left and front to occupy a line which had been occupied by some of General McLaws' division. DuBose after moving five or six hundred yards found himself between two advancing lines of the enemy, with none of our troops in sight. (They had been withdrawn for two or three hours.) He had to retreat, and in doing so lost about one hundred men, mostly prisoners.

I must mention a thing that I forgot to put in my report. When my mistake as to the meaning of General Law's order was corrected, and I found it to be an order to retreat, a good deal of time had been lost, the troops on the right and left had been withdrawn, and the enemy were advancing on both flanks, and had nearly got to our rear. I dispatched couriers in a run to regimental commanders to send me their colors immediately, and retreat in all haste and without any regard to order, and to form again where they should see their colors planted. The color-bearers were directed to run about three or four hundred yards to a position somewhat sheltered and plant their colors in line at regimental distance as nearly as they could judge. They did so. The brigade followed after as fast as men and officers could run, a confused mass; but when the colors were planted every man and every officer rushed to his own place in the line, and the line was formed in, I think, one minute. Then the brigade marched back in perfect order to the place assigned to it. The loss in the ope-

ration was about twenty men, and most of these were pickets, to whom the order to retreat had not been communicated.

The brigade at Gettysburg had 1,280 men and 140 officers, according to my recollection.

On the last day's fight, about 2 P. M., we heard from the mountain we had taken the day before a great shouting in our rear down the Emmettsburg road. We soon distinguished it to be the enemy's cheer. Very soon the head of a line of his cavalry in that road emerged from the wood, galloping, hurrahing and waving their swords as if frantie. Our artillery, which had been thrown forward across the road, opened on them. They rode on. An infantry fire from a wood on their left opened on them. They then turned to their right to escape, taking down a lane. Some men of ours (cooking details) threw themselves behind the stone fence on the side of the lane and opened on them as they came down the lane. They then turned again to the right and entered the field and directed themselves back towards the point where they had first appeared to us. In doing so they had to pass a wood on their left. From this an infantry fire opened on them, and their direction was again changed to the right. The result was that they galloped round and round in the large field, finding a fire at every outlet, until most of them were killed or captured. Every thing passed before our eyes on the mountain side as if in an amphitheatre.

Some of the men engaged (Cook's) told me that the prisoners said it was General Farnsworth's brigade, and that they were all drunk. The same men told me that in going over the field for spoils they approached a fallen horse with his rider by his side, but not dead. They ordered him to surrender. He replied wait a little, or something to that effect, and put his hand to his pistol, drew it, and blew his brains out. This was General Farnsworth.

Brigadier-General E. M. Law, who commanded the division, General Hood having been wounded the day before, made the disposition to receive this cavalry. At very short notice he put the artillery across the road, the Seventh Georgia beside the road in a wood a little beyond the artillery, and the Ninth Georgia in a wood at some distance on the other side of the road and of the enclosed field. These two regiments were very small, having suffered heavily the day before. They were all that could be

spared from the line of battle, and to spare them was a risk. Lee's baggage and rear were saved. There was nothing else to protect them. This was an exploit that excited my admiration. Never was any thing better managed.

H. L. BENNING.

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**Report of General Kershaw.**

HEADQUARTERS KERSHAW'S BRIGADE,  
NEAR CHATTANOOGA, *October 1st, 1863.*

MAJOR:

I have the honor to report the operations of my command from the commencement of the march from Culpeper Courthouse until the return of the army to that place.

Tuesday, June 16th, the brigade marched to Sperryville; 17th, to Mud run, in Fauquier county. These two days were excessively hot, and on the 17th many cases of sun-stroke occurred.

At Gaines' Cross-roads the wagons were sent by the way of Front Royal; Rice's battalion was detached as a guard to the division train; 18th, marched to Piedmont; 19th, to Ashby's Gap, where Rice's battalion rejoined the command; 20th, crossed the Shenandoah river at Berry's Ford; 21st, recrossed and took position in line of battle near Paris to resist a threatened attack of the enemy; 22d, returned to camp on western side of the river; 23d, obtained 503 new arms from Winchester; 24th, marched to Summit Point; 25th, to Martinsburg; 26th, crossed Potomac river, camped near Williamsport; 27th, marched by the way of Hagerstown, Middleburg and Greencastle and camped five miles from Chambersburg; 28th, marched through Chambersburg and camped one mile beyond; remained in camp until the 30th, when we marched to Fayetteville; 1st July, Anderson's and Johnson's divisions and General Ewell's wagon train occupied the road until 4 o'clock P. M., when we marched to a point on the Gettysburg road some two miles from that place, going into camp at 12 P. M. The command was ordered to move at 4 A. M. on the morning of the 2d, but did not leave camp until about sunrise. We reached the hill overlooking Gettysburg with only a slight detention from trains in the way, and moved to the right of the Third corps, and

were halted until about noon. We were then directed to move under cover of the hills towards the right with a view to flanking the enemy in that direction if cover could be found to conceal the movement. Arriving at the hill beyond the hotel at the Stone Bridge on the Fairfield road, the column was halted while Generals Longstreet and McLaws reconnoitered the route. After some little delay the Major-General commanding returned and directed a counter-march, and the command was marched to the left beyond the point at which we had before halted, and thence, under cover of the woods, to the right of our line of battle. Arriving at the School House, on the road leading across the Emmettsburg road by the Peach Orchard, then in possession of the enemy, the Lieutenant-General commanding directed me to advance my brigade and attack the enemy at that point, turn his flank, and extend along the cross-road with my left resting towards the Emmettsburg road. At the same time a battery of artillery was moved along the road parallel with my line of march. About 3 o'clock P. M. the head of my column came into the open field in front of a stone wall and in view of the enemy. I immediately filed to the right, along and in front of the wall, and formed line of battle under cover of my skirmishers, then engaged with those of the enemy, these extending along the Emmettsburg road. In the meantime, examining the position of the enemy, I found him to be in superior force in the orchard, supported by artillery, with a main line of battle entrenched in the rear and extending to and upon the rocky mountain to his left far beyond the point at which his flank had supposed to rest. To carry out my instructions would have been, if successful in driving him from the orchard, to present my own right and rear to a large portion of his line of battle. I, therefore, communicated the position of things to the Major-General commanding, and placed my line in position under cover of the stone wall. Along this wall the division was then formed, Semmes in reserve to me and Barksdale on my left, supported by Wofford in reserve. Artillery was also placed along the wall to my right, and Colonel DeSausseure's 15th South Carolina regiment was thrown beyond it to protect it. Hood's division was then moving in our rear towards our right to gain the enemy's left flank, and I was directed to commence the attack so soon as General Hood became engaged, swinging round towards



Peach Orchard and at the same time establishing connection with Hood on my right and co-operating with him. It was understood he was to sweep down the enemy's line in a direction perpendicular to our then line of battle. I was told that Barksdale would move with me and conform to my movement. These directions I received in various messages from the Lieutenant-General and the Major-General commanding, and in part by personal communication with them. In my center-front was a stone house, and to the left of it a stone barn, both about 500 yards from our line and on a line with the crest of the Orchard Hill. Along the front of the orchard and on the face looking towards the stone house the enemy's infantry was posted. Two batteries of artillery were in position, the one in rear of the orchard near the crest of the hill, and the other some two hundred yards further back in the direction of the rocky mountain. Behind the stone house, on the left, was a morass—on the right a stone wall, running parallel with our line of battle. Beyond the morass, some two hundred yards, was a stony hill, covered with heavy timber and thick undergrowth, extending some distance towards the enemy's main line and inclining to our left and in rear of the orchard and the batteries described. Beyond the stone wall and in a line with the stony hill, was a heavy forest, extending far to our right. From the morass a small stream ran through this wood along the base of the mountain towards the right. Between the stony hill and this forest was an interval of about 100 yards, which was only sparsely covered with scrubby undergrowth, through which a small road ran in the direction of the mountain. Looking down this road from the stone house a large wheat field was seen. In rear of the wheat field and between that and the mountain was the enemy's main line of battle, posted behind a stone wall. Under my instructions I determined to move upon the stony hill so as to strike it with my center, and thus attack the orchard on its left rear.

Accordingly, about 4 o'clock, when I received orders to advance, I moved at once in this direction, gradually changing front to the left. The numerous fences in the way, the stone building and barn, and the morass and a raking fire of grape and cannister, rendered it difficult to retain the line in good order; but, notwithstanding these obstacles, I brought my center to the point intended. In order to restore the line of the directing battalion, the

Seventh South Carolina, as soon as we reached the cover of the hill I moved it a few paces by the right flank. Unfortunately this order, given only to Colonel Aiken, was extended along the left of the line, and checked their advance. Before reaching this point I had extended an order to Colonel Kennedy, commanding Second South Carolina regiment, then moving in magnificent style (my left-center regiment), to charge the battery in their front, being the second battery mentioned above, and which most annoyed us, leaving Barksdale to deal with that at the orchard.

Meanwhile, to aid this attack, I changed the direction of the Seventh regiment, Colonel Aiken, and the Third, Major Maffett, to the left, so as to occupy the rocky hill and wood, and opened fire on the battery. Barksdale had not yet appeared, but came up soon after and cleared the orchard with the assistance of the fire of my Eighth South Carolina, Colonel Henegan, on my left, and James' battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Rice, the next in order of battle. This brigade then moved so far to the left as no longer to afford me any assistance. In a few minutes after my line halted the enemy advanced across the wheat field in two lines of battle, with a very small interval between the lines, in such a manner as to take the Seventh South Carolina in flank. I changed the direction of the right wing of the regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Bland, to meet the attack, and hurried back to General Semmes, then some 150 yards in my right-rear, to bring him up to meet the attack on my right, and also to bring forward my right regiment, Fifteenth South Carolina, Colonel DeSaussure, which, separated from the command by the artillery at the time of the advance, was now cut off by Semmes' brigade. Its gallant and accomplished commander had just fallen when I reached it, and it was under the command of Major Gist.

General Semmes promptly responded to my call and put his brigade in motion towards the right, preparatory to moving to the front. I hastened back to the Seventh regiment, and reached it just as the enemy, having arrived at a point about two hundred yards from us, poured in a volley and advanced to the charge. The Seventh received him handsomely and long kept him in check in their front. One regiment of Semmes' brigade came at a double-quick as far as the ravine in our rear, and for a time checked him in their front. There was still an interval of one hundred

yards between this regiment and the right of the Seventh, and into this the enemy was forcing his way, causing the Seventh to swing back more and more, still fighting, at a distance not exceeding 30 paces, until the two wings were doubled on each other, or nearly so.

Finding that the battery on my left had been silenced, I sent for the Second South Carolina regiment to come to the right; but by this time the enemy had swung around and lapped my whole line at close quarters, and the fighting was general and desperate. At length the Seventh South Carolina gave way, and I directed Colonel Aiken to reform them at the stone wall some two hundred yards in my right rear. I fell back to the Third regiment, then hotly engaged on the crest of the stony hill, and gradually swung around its right as the enemy made progress around our flank. Semmes' advanced regiment had given way. One of his regiments mingled with the Third, and among the rocks and trees, within a few feet of each other, a desperate conflict ensued. The enemy could make no progress in front, but slowly extended around my right. Separated from view of my left wing by the hill and wood, all of my staff being with that wing, the position of the Fifteenth regiment being unknown, and the Seventh being in the rear, I feared the brave men around me would be surrounded by the large force pressing around them, and ordered the Third regiment and the Georgia regiment with them to fall back to the stone house, whither I followed them. On emerging from the wood I saw Wofford coming in in splendid style. My left wing had held the enemy in check along their front and lost no ground. The enemy gave way at Wofford's advance, and with him the whole of my left wing advanced to the charge, sweeping the enemy before them, without a moment's stand, across the stone wall beyond the wheat field, up to the foot of the mountain. At the same time, my Fifteenth regiment and part of Semmes' brigade pressed forward on the right to the same point. Going back to the stone wall near my rear, I found Colonel Aiken in position, and at the stone building found the Third South Carolina and the regiment of Semmes' brigade. I moved them up to the stone wall, and finding that Wofford's men were coming out, I retained them at that point to check any attempt of the enemy to advance. It was now near nightfall, and the operations of the day were over. Gathering all

my regiments with Semmes' brigade behind the wall, and placing pickets well to the front, I commenced the melancholy task of looking up my numerous dead and wounded. It was a sad list. First among the dead was the brave and able officer, Colonel W. D. DeSaussure, the senior colonel of the brigade, whom I had been pleased to regard as my successor in command should any casualty create a vacancy. His loss to his regiment is irreparable; to his State and the country, not to be estimated. Major McLeod, of the Eighth South Carolina regiment, a gallant and estimable officer, was mortally wounded. Colonel John D. Kennedy, of the Second South Carolina regiment, was severely wounded while gallantly leading his command to the charge. Lieutenant-Colonel Gaillard conducted the regiment through its subsequent operations. Lieutenant-Colonel Bland, of the Seventh South Carolina regiment, while commanding the right wing of the regiment with his usual courage and ability, was severely wounded; as was also Major D. B. Miller, same battalion. A long list of brave and efficient officers sealed their devotion to the glorious cause with their blood, each of whom merits special mention did the proper limits of this report admit it. All the officers and men of the command behaved most admirably, and are entitled to the gratitude of the country. I am especially indebted to the members of my staff, Captain Holmes, A. A. G.; Lieutenant Doby, A. D. C., and Lieutenant Dwight, A. A. I. G., for most efficient services on the field under the most difficult circumstances.

About dark I was ordered to move my brigade to the left to the Peach Orchard, where I remained until noon of the next day, when I was ordered to return to the stone wall. An hour later I was directed to return to the wall where I had first formed line of battle. Hood's division, then commanded by General Law, was engaged with the enemy's cavalry in his front, his line being formed across our right flank. Lieutenant-General Longstreet directed me to move to the right so as to connect with Hood's left, retaining my then front. This I did, and remained in that position until the night of the 4th, when, about midnight, I moved with the army *via* Franklin to Monterey. On the 6th, marched through Hagerstown *via* Waterloo, and camped near Funkstown. On the 10th I was directed to proceed with my own and Semmes' brigades and a section of Frazier's battery to the bridge across



the Antietam, near Macauley's, and defend that position, the enemy having appeared in force on the other side. Some unimportant skirmishing occurred here, and next morning I rejoined the division near the St. James College. We remained in line of battle, with the enemy in front, until the night of the 13th, when we marched to Falling Waters, and recrossed the Potomac on the 14th. March was continued next day to Bunker Hill, where we rested until the 18th, when we resumed the march for Culpeper Courthouse *via* Millwood, Front Royal, Chester Gap and Gaines' Cross-roads, arriving at 10 o'clock A. M. on the 24th.

I cannot close this report without expressing my thanks to Major W. D. Peck, A. Q. M., and Major Joseph Kennedy, A. C. S. of the brigade staff, and all the regimental officers of their departments for their assiduous and efficient exertions during this important campaign.

The reports of regimental commanders accompany this. The casualties have already been reported.

I am, Major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. KERSHAW,  
*Brigadier-General Commanding.*

*Major J. M. GOGGIN, A. A. General.*

**Correspondence between General A. S. Johnston and Governor Isham G. Harris.**

[We are indebted to His Excellency Governor Porter, of Tennessee, for the following original correspondence, which will be found to be of interest and value.]

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
BOWLING GREEN, KY, *December 25th, 1861.*

*To His Excellency* ISHAM G. HARRIS,  
*Governor of Tennessee:*

SIR: The present situation of affairs is such that I deem it necessary to call the attention of your Excellency to it in connexion with the movements which the enemy meditate towards Tennessee.

My information continues to convince me that a heavy concentration of force on this line has been made to invade Tennessee on the route to Nashville. The troops of Western Virginia and Eastern Kentucky have been withdrawn and ordered upon the line in my front. These regiments, with large reinforcements from Ohio, Indiana and other Northwestern States, have been assembled, and the estimates from the most reliable sources show that General Buell has about 75,000 men, probably more, at his disposition, while the effective force here at my command does not exceed 17,000 men. In order to render these equal to the duty of preserving our frontier and protecting Nashville, I have used every precaution, and feel sanguine that by the dispositions of the last few months, they can be made to hold in check double their number. Bowling Green, naturally strong, has been well entrenched; Columbus Fort, with its garrison and troops on that front guarding the Mississippi, renders the Lower Valley comparatively secure; and General Zollicoffer, on the Cumberland, protects East Tennessee from invasion and possible revolt, which would destroy our communications between the Mississippi and Atlantic States and inflict great injury.

These dispositions will foil the designs of the enemy on East Tennessee and defeat or retard his design to descend the Mississippi this winter. The vulnerable point is by the line from Louisville towards Nashville, and the Northern Generals are evidently

aware of it. In order to obtain additional strength, I ordered Major Gilmer, my Chief Engineer, to go to Nashville and arrange defensive works for its protection, and have provided a sufficient armament. I will endeavor to render them unnecessary by defending Nashville here, but a proper forecast should induce all to join in their immediate construction, and I, therefore, ask you to have them completed, or take effective measures to furnish the necessary labor for their execution as soon as possible. The country between this place and Nashville offers no good defensible line, and the works I have ordered should not be neglected.

Such being the situation of affairs, the enemy will be compelled to move against Tennessee by this route or submit to the humiliation of closing a campaign without result or impression upon us in this quarter.

The news from Europe, as well as the dissatisfaction in the North, force them to advance now, or admit that the independence of the Confederacy is virtually established.

The disparity of my force is very great, and exposes our cause to a hazard that it is most unwise to continue to incur. Ten or fifteen thousand additional troops would make me feel assured of victory. With this additional force I could avail myself of every fault of their movements. Without them, I must be a spectator without power to seize the opportunities.

Foreseeing all this, for the last four months I have endeavored to obtain additional forces from Tennessee and other States, but, notwithstanding the efforts of your Excellency and other Governors, the response has been feeble and the forces inadequate to the momentous interests involved. If the people could be properly impressed with the vast exigency all would be safe, the designs of the enemy thwarted, and the Northern mind become dispirited and anxious for peace.

A company now is worth to the South a regiment next year.

Under these circumstances, I once more invoke your Excellency to impress upon your people these views, and solicit you to forward to me here every man at your disposition. If well reinforced now, Tennessee, the Valley of the Mississippi, and the Confederacy is safe.

Returning to your Excellency my sincere thanks for the energetic and efficient co-operation which I have received from you

and Tennessee since I assumed command, I have the honor to subscribe myself with great respect,

Your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON, *General C. S. A.*

Five thousand men, Bowen's division, will leave Columbus for this place to-day.

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ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, *December 31st, 1861.*

*General A. S. JOHNSTON:*

DEAR SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of letter of 25th instant. Upon its receipt I immediately appointed energetic agents to collect laborers in this and adjoining counties to construct the fortifications near Nashville, but I must say that the response to my appeal for laborers has not thus far been as flattering as I had wanted and expected. I shall have within a very few days some 200 negro men at this work, and hope soon to increase this number to 500 or 600. Telegraphed you the same day your letter came to hand, asking how many laborers you thought necessary, about what length of time they would be employed, and what engineer would supervise and control the work. Answers to which would have aided me in securing the laborers, but have as yet received no reply. I fully appreciate the exigencies by which you are surrounded, and, as I have heretofore, I shall continue to use every effort within my power, and all resources at my command to strengthen your position and to secure the country from invasion. In order, however, that the present resources of the State may not be overestimated, it is proper that I give you at least an approximate idea of them and some of the difficulties which I encounter at every step. Tennessee has now organized and in the field, in addition to some independent companies, 52 infantry regiments and one battalion, nine battalions of cavalry, and two regiments of artillery; volunteer companies are now in camp, under orders to move to rendezvous, sufficient to form six additional infantry regiments and two battalions of cavalry, making the whole force about sixty-six regiments. This force, large as it is, is drawn almost entirely from two divisions of the State, the unfortunate political dissensions in East Tennessee, with near



one-third of the voting population of the State, having almost paralyzed that section, but I am pleased to state that these divisions and dissensions are rapidly disappearing, and I hope soon to see a united people in Tennessee, when we may reasonably expect reinforcements from that section; but, with the immense tax upon the population of Middle and West Tennessee to make up the force already referred to, I do not hope for any considerable number of volunteers from either of these divisions, unless it be upon pressing emergency, when I feel assured that a patriotic response will be made by almost our whole people to meet such emergency.

But the difficulty is not, nor has it been, in obtaining men. The inadequate supply of arms has been and is the chief obstacle which I encounter in promptly furnishing to you any reasonable number of reinforcements. With the greatest possible energy it takes time to collect and repair the private arms of the country, and this is the only means I have of arming the force now called to the field. I have spared neither effort, pains or expense in expediting the work, and yet it has been, and is, impossible to proceed with it rapidly. In furnishing arms to the large force above referred to, the State has heretofore drawn from the hands of her citizens their most effective private arms. Almost every gun that we get at this time must necessarily pass through the hands of the smiths before it is fit for service; and in this connection it is well to remark that Tennessee, less fortunate than some of her sister States, had no United States arsenal or depository of arms within her limits from which her troops might have been supplied; that but comparatively a small number of her force have been armed independent of the State, and that upon assuming connexion with the Confederate States all of her contracts for the manufacture of arms and other materials of war were assigned and transferred to the Confederate Government. I am sure, General, you will appreciate and make due allowance for the difficulties that lie in my way in the work of arming the forces of Tennessee under these circumstances.

I trust I shall be able with the inferior arms of the country to arm the volunteers now in, and that many will hereafter come into camp.

Very respectfully,

ISHAM G. HARRIS.

**Field Telegrams from Headquarters A. N. V.**

[CONTINUED FROM OUR JUNE NO.]

*Clay's House, 3:30 P. M., 17th June, 1864.*

Major-General *W. H. F. Lee,*

Malvern Hill *via* Meadow Station:

Push after the enemy and endeavor to ascertain what has become of Grant's army. Inform General Hill. R. E. LEE.

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Lieutenant-General *A. P. Hill,*

Riddel's Shop *via* Meadow Station, Y. R. R. R'd:

As soon as you can ascertain that Grant has crossed James river move up to Chaffin's Bluff, and be prepared to cross.

R. E. LEE.

Official: W. H. Taylor, A. A. G.

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*Clay's House, 4:30 P. M., 17th June, 1864.*

General *G. T. Beauregard,*

Petersburg, Va.:

Have no information of Grant's crossing James river, but upon your report have ordered troops up to Chaffin's Bluff.

R. E. Lee, General.

Official: W. H. Taylor, A. A. G.

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*Clay's House, 4:30 P. M., 17th June, 1864.*

Lieutenant-General *A. P. Hill,*

Riddel's Shop *via* Meadow Station:

General Beauregard reports large number of Grant's troops crossed James river above Fort Powhatan yesterday. If you have nothing contradictory of this, move to Chaffin's Bluff.

R. E. LEE, General.

Official: W. H. Taylor, A. A. G.

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*Clay's House, 5 P. M., 17th June, 1864.*

His Excellency *Jeff. Davis,*

Richmond Va.:

At 4 P. M. assaulted that portion of our front line held by enemy and drove him from it. We again have the entire line from Howlett's to Dunn's Mill.

R. E. LEE, General.

Official: W. H. Taylor, A. A. G.

*Clay's House*, 5 P. M., 17th June, 1864.

General *G. T. Beauregard*,

Petersburg, Va.:

At 4 P. M. was compelled to assault center of our former line held by enemy. We now hold entire line from Howlett's to Dunn's Mill. All prisoners from Tenth corps.

R. E. LEE, General.

Official: W. H. Taylor, A. A. G.

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*Hd. Qrs. Drewry's Bluff*, 10 P. M., 17th June, 1864.

General *G. T. Beauregard*,

Petersburg, Va.:

General Kershaw's division, which will camp to-night on Red-water creek, is ordered to continue its march to-morrow to Petersburg.

R. E. LEE, General.

Official: W. H. Taylor, A. A. G.

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*Superintendent Richmond and Petersburg Railroad*,

Richmond, Va.:

Please notify me when railroad is again in running order.

R. E. LEE, General.

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*Hd. Qrs. Drewry's Bluff*, 10 P. M., 17th June, 1864.

Lieutenant-General *Hill*,

Riddle's Shop *via* Meadow Station, Y. R. R. R'd:

Move your command promptly at 3 A. M. to-morrow for Chffin's Bluff. Cross the river and move to the Petersburg turnpike. There await further orders. Send to examine about bridges.

R. E. LEE, General.

Official: W. H. Taylor, A. A. G.

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*Hd. Qrs. Army N. Va.*, June 18th, 1864.

General *Wade Hampton*,

Vernon Church *via* Hanover Junction:

If Sheridan escapes you and gets to his transports at the White House you must lose no time in moving your command to our right near Petersburg. Keep yourself thoroughly advised of his movements and intentions as far as practicable.

R. E. LEE, General.

*Drewry's Bluff, 3:30 A. M., 18th June, 1864.*

*Superintendent Richmond and Petersburg R. Rd.,*

Richmond:

Can trains run through to Petersburg? If so, send all cars available to Rice's Turnout. If they cannot run through, can any be sent from Petersburg to the point where the road is broken? It is important to get troops to Petersburg without delay.

R. E. LEE, General.

Official: W. H. Taylor, A. A. G.

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*Hd. Qrs. Army N. Va., June 18th, 1864.*

General *J. A. Early,*

Lynchburg, Va:

Grant is in front of Petersburg. Will be opposed there. Strike as quick as you can, and, if circumstances authorize, carry out the original plan, or move upon Petersburg without delay.

R. E. LEE.

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*Petersburg, June 21, 1864.*

Brigadier-General *G. W. C. Lee,*

Chaffin's Bluff:

10:34 A. M.—What is supposed strength of enemy's force reported on Kingsland road, and of what composed? Cooke's brigade is at Clay's House available, to be sent if you need assistance, and directed to be prepared to move, if ordered, either by rail or march by land. In absence of General Lee,

W. H. TAYLOR, A. A. G.

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*Dunn's Mill, 22 F., 1864.*

General *Heth:*

Inform me of the state of affairs in your front, and whether Cook's and Davis' brigades are needed on that side of the river.

R. E. LEE, General.



## EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS.

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THE ANNUAL MEETING of the Southern Historical Society will be held in the Hall of the House of Delegates, in this city, on *Wednesday evening, October the 31st.*

General John T. Morgan, of Selma, U. S. Senator from Alabama, will deliver the annual address, and a pleasant occasion is anticipated.

Members of the Society and all others interested in our work are cordially invited to attend.

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THE REUNION OF THE VIRGINIA DIVISION OF THE A. N. V. ASSOCIATION takes place in Richmond on Thursday night, November 1st.

Leigh Robinson, Esq., of Washington, a gallant "high private" in the old Richmond Howitzers, is the orator of the occasion, and has chosen as his theme, "*The Battle of the Wilderness.*"

The banquet which is to follow the public address will be an occasion of rare enjoyment, when old comrades will *share their rations* with each other and "fight their battles o'er again."

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THE FINANCIAL STATEMENT in our last issue was by no means intended to convey the idea that there is any purpose to suspend our publications. We only desired to advise our friends of our need of *prompt payment of their dues* in order to enable us to meet our obligations and carry out important plans for making our *Papers* more valuable than ever.

But we would repeat with emphasis, that those who *intend* to become *Life Members*—to raise us *clubs of new subscribers*—or to help us in any way—are not likely to find in the future a time when they can do so more acceptably to the Society.

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OUR GETTYSBURG SERIES is still exciting the deepest interest in every quarter. We have letters from our distinguished foreign correspondent expressing his very high appreciation of the interest and value of these papers.

We will be glad to have additional papers *from anybody who knows anything about the great battle worth publishing.*

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ERRATA.—On page 109, (Sept. No.), "*Heth's Division under Pettigrew,*" should read *Wilcox's Command*, and so "*Pettigrew*" should read *Wilcox*. For "*ripotee,*" page 110, read *riposte*.

# SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

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**Vol. IV.      Richmond, Va., Nov., 1877.      No. 5.**

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**Report of General Patton Anderson of Operations of his Division from  
30th of July to 31st of August, 1864, including the Battle of Jones-  
boro', Georgia.**

[From the original unpublished MS. in archives of the Southern Historical Society.]

MONTICELLO, FLORIDA, *February 9th*, 1865.

MAJOR :

In compliance with circular order from Headquarters Lee's Corps, dated January 24th, 1864—a copy of which reached me by mail on yesterday—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the division I commanded from the 30th of July to the 31st of August, inclusive:

On the 28th of July, 1864, Hindman's division, of Lee's corps, was hotly engaged with the enemy about three miles from Atlanta, on the Lickskillet road and near the poorhouse. In that engagement the division lost in killed, wounded and missing upwards of five hundred men and officers. On the 29th I was assigned to, and on the 30th assumed, the command of the division, consisting of Sharp's and Brantley's brigades of Mississippians, Deas' brigade of Alabamians, and Manigault's brigade of Alabama and South Carolina troops. Lee's corps was, at that time, holding the extreme left of our lines in front of Atlanta; my division was on the right of Lee's corps—my right resting on the Lickskillet road, my left on Utoy creek. Deas', Brantley's, Sharp's and Manigault's brigades were in position in the order named from right to left, and numbered in all about 2,800 bayonets. The position had been taken on the night of the 28th of July, after the command

had been withdrawn from the battle-field near the poorhouse. The line extended over uneven ground, through woods and open fields, across hills and over narrow valleys, and was capable of being rendered quite strong against an attack by infantry. For this purpose strong details were made, and all the entrenching tools that could be procured were put in the hands of the troops. The work of entrenching was pushed with vigor, night and day, till a feeling of security, and even defiance, pervaded the whole line. The enemy had established his main line parallel to and about eight hundred yards in front of ours. He was active in strengthening his position, and made frequent attempts upon our skirmish line, sometimes with partial success, but, in the main, gaining no substantial advantage by his sallies. Our own skirmishers were not idle, but made frequent reprisals upon the enemy, punishing him in many instances severely for his temerity. Our skirmish line was about five hundred yards distant from our main line, and, at first, consisted of shallow rifle-pits, hurriedly dug in the night, and at intervals of from twenty to fifty paces apart. A few nights' work, however, added much to their strength, and, in the course of ten days or a fortnight, the pits were gradually connected, and the whole became almost one continuous line of entrenchments, with head-logs and loop-holes to protect our sharpshooters and enable them to confine the enemy to his trenches. His line of skirmishers was, on an average, not much over a hundred yards from ours, and, in some places, the space between the two lines did not exceed sixty paces in breadth. His main line was about two hundred yards in rear of his skirmishers. At one point on the line in front of Deas' left and Brantley's right—being favored by the conformation of the ground—he established his skirmish line within sixty yards of ours, and erected on it an earthwork with embrasures for six guns. We had no guns upon my main line bearing directly upon this position, but a rifle battery on the line occupied by the troops of Loring's division (on my right), being situated favorably for the purpose, by a few well-directed shots on several occasions, put a stop to labor on the work, and, although it was eventually completed under cover of night, a wholesome dread of Featherston's Parrott guns and Deas' sharpshooters, I have no doubt, deterred the enemy from ever attempting to put more than one piece in position. With this, however, he threat-

ened to do us much damage, and, but for the courage and skill of Deas' skirmishers, backed by the indomitable energy and perseverance of the officers in charge of the line, would, doubtless, have compelled us to retire to a position nearer our main line. The embrasure from which this piece was fired was so mantled and the cannoneers so well protected that it was almost impossible for our sharpshooters to do more than confine them to their works, without preventing the free use of the piece. Day after day did they use it with damaging effect upon our rifle-pits—only sixty paces from its muzzle—frequently leveling the earth along the line for forty or fifty yards and literally covering our men in the pits with the debris. Our casualties from this source, however, were trifling. At night the men would work heroically and repair the damages of the day. After several days spent in this mode of annoying warfare, by concert of action among the sharpshooters of our line along the front, and to the right and left of the piece in question, it was completely silenced and withdrawn from position.

Similar instances of persevering skill and courage were manifested daily upon other portions of our line along Brantley's, Sharp's and Manigault's front. In one instance Brantley's men, by rolling logs ahead of them and by digging zig-zag trenches, approached so near the enemy's rifle-pits as to be able to throw hand grenades over his breastworks; and on another occasion Sharp's pickets held their position against a line of battle after those on their right and left had given way. Firing between the parties on the two picket lines was constant during the day, and, not unfrequently, continued throughout the night. Our scouts, whenever the darkness of the night favored such operations, penetrated the enemy's picket line, and kept us well advised of all his important movements.

During this time the main line was constantly being strengthened. The trenches were enlarged, the breastworks were made wider and stronger in every particular, while every available obstruction within the reach of the troops was resorted to and made use of to render the line as strong as possible. *Abattis* of the most substantial kind, *chevaux-de-frise* and palisades of approved styles bristled along our whole front, giving confidence to our troops and speaking defiance to the foe. Four weeks, in the month of August, were spent in perfecting these works of defence



and in annoying the enemy from our picket line and with the artillery as much as was consistent with an economical expenditure of ammunition. I refer to the operations of the division during this month with pleasure, as evincing a spirit and determination on the part of the troops, as well as an alacrity and skill in the performance of every duty on the part of their officers, worthy of the highest praise. To the brigade commanders (Deas, Brantley, Sharp and Manigault) I am specially indebted for their prompt obedience to every order and cheerful co-operation in every thing tending to promote the efficiency of the command and the good of the service. Their sympathy, counsel and hearty co-operation lightened my burden of responsibility and contributed to the *esprit du corps*, discipline and good feeling which, happily, pervade the division, and without which the bravest troops in the world cannot be relied on.

On the night of the 25th August our scouts reported a movement on the part of the enemy, the precise character of which was not fully understood, but which was indicated by the rumbling of artillery and wagons, &c. On the next morning it was ascertained that he had withdrawn from the front of a portion of the line occupied by Lieutenant-General Stewart's corps, which was on the right of Lee's corps. During the night of the 26th he withdrew from my front. As this movement was not unlooked for by us, preparations for it had been accordingly made. At about 9 o'clock P. M. each of our batteries delivered a few rounds for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not a reply could be elicited. With the exception of one or, perhaps, two pieces on my extreme left, there was no response along my whole front. Before daylight on the morning of the 27th our skirmishers occupied a portion of the enemy's main works without opposition. By direction of the Lieutenant-General commanding the corps, Deas' brigade, with Jackson's, of Bates' division, of Hardee's corps, Brigadier-General H. R. Jackson commanding the whole, were sent forward in pursuit on the Licksillet road. They advanced cautiously a distance of six or seven miles to within a short distance of the Chattahoochee river, and, coming upon a force of the enemy deemed too strong to be assailed by the two brigades, the command was halted, and Brigadier-General Jackson reported the facts and awaited further instructions; whereupon the two bri-

gades were directed by order of the corps commander to return to their positions in the line. They reached their places in the trenches at about — o'clock P. M., having captured a few stragglers, some sutler's stores, several wagons and mules with forage, broken-down horses, &c. On the 28th and 29th small parties were sent forward for the purpose of scouting my whole front thoroughly, and of ascertaining, if possible, the precise route taken by the enemy, and for the purpose, generally, of getting all the information possible in regard to his movements. These scouts reported the enemy as having moved the larger portion of his forces in the direction of Sandtown and Blue-pond; but one corps, at least, they reported to have crossed the Chattahoochee river, and to have moved up that stream, on or near its right bank, in the direction of the railroad bridge or Marietta.

Early in the night of the 29th I received orders from corps headquarters to hold the division in readiness to move to the left at 4 o'clock the following morning. At the appointed hour the command was withdrawn from the trenches, and, moving left in front, proceeded about two miles in the direction of East Point, when it was halted by orders from corps headquarters at the point where our line of march crossed the Campbellton road. We rested here till about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, when we were directed to proceed to East Point and relieve Cheatham's division, then in the trenches in front of that place and on the left of the railroad running to West Point. The head of the column reached this position shortly before sundown and commenced relieving Cheatham's division as soon as the necessary information in regard to the lines, pickets, details, &c., could be obtained from Brigadier-General Maury, in command. About the time that the work of relieving Gen. Maury's command had been completed, or nearly so—say at 9 o'clock P. M.—I received orders to withdraw the troops from the trenches and to follow Cheatham's division in the direction of Jonesboro'. Repairing to General Maury's quarters to ascertain when he would be ready to move, I learned from him that he had received no orders to move to Jonesboro', but, upon showing him mine, he immediately made preparations to commence the movement. It was about eleven o'clock before his rear and the head of my column got in motion. Much delay was experienced because of the want of roads and the absence of competent guides.

The column was several times halted for an hour or more, because the advance had taken the wrong road, or to remove some obstruction. Just before day on the morning of the 31st a halt occurred while I was about the center of my command, and, riding forward to ascertain the cause, I met Brigadier-General Carter, now commanding Cheatham's division, who informed me that Major-General Cleburne, of Hardee's corps, who was in advance, had sent back to inform him that the enemy had taken possession of a bridge in his (Cleburne's) front, and that the troops must be halted until he (Cleburne) could reconnoitre the position and ascertain whether or not a passage of the stream could be effected. In the meantime, the better to be prepared against an attack should the enemy feel disposed to make it, I ordered a strong line of skirmishers to be thrown out in our front and a couple of batteries of artillery to be put in eligible positions for defence. Before these dispositions, however, could be completed, the Lieutenant-General commanding the corps overtook me, and, approving my action, directed me to remain in my then position until he had ridden forward and obtained further information in regard to the exact situation. I had not remained long where he left me until a staff officer returned with orders for me to follow with the whole division. Very soon Cheatham's division began to move forward, and I followed with the commands well closed up. Before the column was all in motion, however, the sun had risen, and a clear, cloudless sky betokened fair weather, at least, for the day's operations. The march, during the night, had been toilsome in the extreme to troops who had not been out of the trenches for thirty days, and daylight revealed a wearied and jaded column with ranks considerably diminished by straggling during the night. Although the most diligent exertions were made by the officers of all grades to prevent this evil, their efforts were but partially successful. The darkness of the night, the dense woods through which we frequently marched, without roads, the want of shoes by many, and the lack of recent exercise by all, contributed to induce a degree of straggling which I do not remember to have seen exceeded in any former march of the kind. In this plight the division, well closed up on Cheatham's rear, reached the vicinity of Jonesboro' at about 11 o'clock A. M. on the 31st August, and was halted on the railroad, north of and about half a mile distant from the vil-

lage. The enemy, in apparently strong force, was plainly visible on both sides of Flint river (an inconsiderable stream at this point), in a westerly direction from where we halted, and distant from a thousand to fifteen hundred yards. The column was closed up, faced to the right, skirmishers were thrown forward, and hasty preparations made for commencing, at the proper time, *the battle of Jonesboro', Georgia.*

The troops were advanced to a position parallel with and about two hundred yards west of the railroad, and immediately began strengthening the line with logs, rails, and such other material as could be procured at hand, without tools of any kind. The skirmish line was about a hundred and fifty yards in advance of the main line, and had already begun to exchange frequent shots with the enemy, who was in easy Enfield range of their position. A hasty reconnoissance revealed the fact that the enemy was strongly posted on the crest of an irregular ridge, and that his position was rendered still stronger by a line of breastworks, which he had thrown up before our arrival, and upon which he was still at work.

Our order of battle was in two lines. The first was a continuous line, and was composed of three brigades from each division; the second was comprised of one brigade from each division, posted about two hundred yards in rear of the first—at least this was the disposition in my own command—and, shortly before going into action, I was directed by the Lieutenant-General commanding the corps to relinquish the command of my supporting line to Major-General Clayton and to devote myself exclusively to the three brigades in the first line. These were Sharp's, Deas', and Brantley's, from right to left in the order named. At the same time it was explained to me by Lieutenant-General Lee that his corps—of which my division composed the right—was not to attack until Cleburne, commanding Hardee's corps on the left, had hotly engaged the enemy at close range in his front. Preparations for the attack having been completed throughout the corps, the division commanders assembled at the side of General Lee, awaiting the report of small arms on Cleburne's line and the signal from the corps commander for the action to begin on our part.

At about 2:20 P. M., the quick and heavy rattle of musketry on Cleburne's line, mingled with the rapid discharges of artillery in



the same direction, indicated the time appointed for our advance. The order was given and the troops moved forward deliberately and with resolution. The enemy's line of skirmishers was pushed back upon his main line at the top of the ridge before alluded to, and our first line was soon under a heavy fire from his breastworks. There was but little cover for our assaulting lines, and the ascent in some places was moderately steep, but not rugged, affording the enemy great advantages in the ground, in addition to those derived from his breastworks. The troops, however, moved forward with a spirit and determination that threatened, in spite of all odds, to crown the hill and drive the enemy from his place. Slowly, but resolutely, they advanced up the ascent, to within pistol shot of the enemy's works. At this point, under a deadly fire, a few wavered and the rest laid down. The line was unbroken, and, although the position was a trying one, every inch of ground gained was resolutely maintained. A staff officer was sent to request the reserve line to be pushed forward without delay. After waiting sometime for the reserves to come up—perhaps not so long as it appeared to those exposed to this deadly fire at such close range—another staff officer was sent back with an urgent appeal for them to be brought up immediately. In the meantime, both men and officers in the front line were suffering severely. Each moment brought death and wounds into their ranks. On every part of the line officers were constantly falling, while engaged in encouraging and urging the men to remain firm until assistance should arrive, and, by their conduct, setting examples of heroism and courage seldom equalled, and still more rarely surpassed. The second line came up in rear of Deas and Brantley, but *the* ranks of the latter had been so thinned by the fire to which they had been exposed that the two lines combined were unable to make any further advance. Unwilling to abandon the attack while a reasonable hope of success remained, and believing that, with the assistance of a couple of good brigades, the enemy's left could be forced back, a staff officer was sent to General Lee to ascertain if the necessary assistance could be spared from other portions of the field. In the meantime, every effort was made to hold the ground already gained. Stragglers were pushed up to the front and the slightly wounded were encouraged to remain there. (While engaged in these efforts, a color-bearer

was discovered some short distance behind the front line, with a number of men scattered about through the pines near him. On inquiry, he reported himself as color-bearer of the Thirteenth Louisiana regiment, and stated that he had tried to get the men to follow him to the front, but could not prevail on them to do so. The officers of the regiment were then called for, but none responded. The color-bearer expressed great desire to carry the colors forward, and, upon my directing him to do so, he did advance them gallantly, calling upon his comrades to follow. I regret to say that but few responded. When the conduct of officers or troops justifies it, I deem it to be a duty no less imperative to censure than to praise; and it is under a sense of this duty that I relate this circumstance. I would not be understood as imputing reprehensible conduct to the whole regiment, whose color-bearer I have alluded to, for I know that on other fields that regiment has acquitted itself with the highest honors. But I do say, that if the men in question did belong to the Thirteenth Louisiana regiment, as represented to me, they are unworthy comrades of a gallant color-bearer, and that they reflect discredit upon a gallant regiment from as gallant a State as shines in the Southern constellation.)

Regarding the extreme right of my line as in great danger, and desiring to hold our position there until assistance might arrive, I now proceeded along the line from Brantley's right towards Sharp's position. At this time the troops of the front line were lying down within sixty yards of the enemy's breastworks, and, at many points, much nearer, keeping up a hot fire upon every thing that appeared above the defences. From these defences the enemy, too, poured an unremitting fire upon the assailants. Though at a distance from them, Sharp's gallant Mississippians could be seen pushing their way, in small parties, up to the very slope of the enemy's breastworks. Officers could be plainly observed encouraging the men to this work. One on horseback, whom I took to be General Sharp, was particularly conspicuous. After having rode along the line from Brantley's right—urging the officers and men to stand a little longer—when I had reached a point near Sharp's left I received a wound which compelled me to leave the field, and which has resulted in my absence up to the present time. This occurred about 4:30 P. M.

Not having access at present to the reports of brigade commanders, or of their subordinates, it is not in my power to state accurately the casualties in the division on this day at Jonesboro', though I am confident they will be found to exceed five hundred in killed, wounded, and missing. Some idea of the severity of the engagement may be formed by comparing this list with the number carried into action, which, I am confident, did not greatly exceed two thousand. The same want of official reports which prevents me from giving accurately the list of casualties in the division also precludes me from embracing in this report the names of the many gallant officers who fell on the occasion. For these I must refer to the reports of brigade and regimental commanders, where doubtless the names, conduct, and example of the dead are recorded in befitting terms.

A deep sense of the obligation I am personally under to the four brigade commanders above named, renders it no less my duty than a pleasure to express my thanks for their cheerful and cordial co-operation and assistance on all occasions, whether in the trenches, on the march, or upon the battle-field. To them and their subordinate commanders is due whatever of spirit, discipline, and efficiency the division can boast.

To the staff, also, without exception, my thanks are due for that constant, intelligent, and efficient discharge of their respective duties which marked their conduct throughout the whole time of our official association. In the list of those who have thus performed well their parts are the names of Captain William G. Barth, A. A. G.; Captain E. F. Travis, A. A. G. and A. I. G.; Lieutenant W. M. Davidson, Aide-de-Camp; Major Hill, Acting Division Quartermaster; Captain P. Eggleston, Chief Commissary Subsistence for the Division; Private Simon Mayer, A. A. A. G.; and D. A. Kineheloe, Chief Surgeon of the Division. To the latter, as well as to Assistant Surgeon Lundy, I am personally much indebted for attentive and skilful treatment on the field and elsewhere.

I am, Major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

PATTON ANDERSON, *Major-General.*

*Major J. W. RATCHFORD, Assistant Adjutant-General,*

*Lee's Corps, Army of Tennessee.*

**Report of Brigadier-General Perry of Battle of Chancellorsville.**

[From original MS.]

HEADQUARTERS PERRY'S BRIGADE, *May 9, 1863.*

*To Major THOMAS S. MILLS, A. A. G.:*

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my command, consisting of the Second and Eighth Florida regiments, in the recent engagements in Spotsylvania county:

On the evening of the 29th of April, in compliance with orders from division headquarters, I moved my command to the heights in front of Falmouth, and throwing my pickets out to the river bank, remained in line of battle until about 11 o'clock on the morning of the 1st of May, when, in obedience to orders from Major-General Anderson, I moved with my command up the Plank road, and into the Old Turnpike road. I advanced up this road until I came to our line of battle, held by Major-General McLaws' on the right. I then received an order from Major-General McLaws' to form my brigade on the right of Brigadier-General Wofford's brigade. This threw me some distance to the right of the Old Mine road. I at once formed my line of battle, and receiving information from Major-General McLaws that the enemy were advancing on the Old Mine road, I threw out skirmishers and so disposed my line as to enable me to command both the Old Mine road and the Dawson Mill road. Brigadier-General Wilcox soon coming up and forming his brigade on my right, I was relieved from giving further attention to the Dawson Mill road, and resumed my original line, my right regiment resting in the rifle-pits on the left of the Dawson Mill road. About 5 o'clock P. M. I received orders from Major-General McLaws to double my line of skirmishers and advance. I did so for about one and one-half miles, encountering no enemy. I halted with Brigadier-General Wofford's brigade on my left. Brigadier-General Wilcox not receiving orders to advance at the time, did not join my right. General Wofford having become disconnected from the line on his left, determined to bivouack for the night. Accordingly, I threw out a strong line of pickets and disposed my men for rest. They



were very much exhausted, owing to the nature of the country through which they had advanced. About 10 o'clock I received an order to retrace my steps and march up the Turnpike road to Major-General McLaws' position. I did so, and having arrived with my brigade near General McLaws' headquarters, received an order revoking the former order, and directing me to move my command back to the position I had just left. Having retaken that position, I remained until morning, every thing in my front continuing quiet. Brigadier-General Wofford having re-established his connection with the line on his left, the line of battle was advanced, I moving in conformity with the line on my left, keeping out a strong line of skirmishers, and sending out scouting parties to my front and right. We encountered no resistance to our advance. The enemy falling back without firing a gun. We took a few prisoners, and found some abandoned commissary stores, arms, &c. About 4 o'clock in the evening the line was closed up to the left by order from Major-General McLaws, until my left rested a few paces to the right of the Pike road. My skirmishers here became engaged with the enemy, driving back the enemy's skirmisher's and holding the ground gained against a brisk fire from both infantry and artillery. At dark I received an order from Major-General McLaws to report with my command to Major-General Anderson, on the left of Major-General McLaws' line, and in obedience to Major-General Anderson's orders, bivouacked my men in the woods for rest. Sometime before daylight of the morning of the 3d of May, I moved my command, by direction of Major-General Anderson, down the Catharpin road for the purpose of scouring the country to the left of and rear of the left of Major-General Anderson's line. I found the country clear, and moved up by the furnace, on the left of the line, and came up with the other brigades of the division, near to the enemy's works. I at once formed my line of battle and pushed forward upon the right flank of the enemy's works on the left of the line of Major-General Anderson's division. The fire was quite brisk here from a line of the enemy, thrown back at right angles to this front, to protect his flank and rear. This line soon gave way, and pushing forward, I found myself inside of his breastworks. Having no knowledge of the ground, and the woods being so thick as to entirely obstruct the view, I was at a loss for sometime as to the

direction of the enemy's next line. Their musket balls soon gave me the proper direction, and I changed front, and sending out skirmishers, soon found their line on the thickly wooded hill in the rear of their breastworks, and to their right of the field in front of Chancellor's. I ordered a charge, and the enemy, after one or two rounds, broke in the utmost confusion, throwing down arms, knapsacks, &c., great numbers of them running into our lines.

No sooner had the enemy's lines vanished, than their batteries poured a most terrific fire of grape and cannister into my lines. The men lying down, and being partially protected by a slight ridge, the fire was not as fatal as I had reason to fear. Upon going to the front, I found no infantry in my front between me and the Turnpike road, and that I could not lead my men against the enemy's battery without encountering the range of our own battery on the left of the rear of my line, which was then clearing out the enemy in double-quick time.

While making this change portions of two other brigades, which were lying down in the woods, and which a portion of my line had charged over, rushed back from the sudden and terrific fire poured into us before the enemy gave way, and the Eighth Florida regiment, which had not then passed over them, mistaking them for the left of their own brigade, allowed themselves to be swept back a short distance by them. They were not, however, at all panic-stricken, but were rallied at once, their *morale* and spirit in no manner impaired. I cannot think any blame should be attached to either the officers or the men of the regiment. I remained in that position until the rest of the division was marched up by General Anderson, and moved by the right flank with them to the turnpike road, where the division halted. Soon after I was directed by order from General Anderson to occupy the works on the right of the pike road to prevent the enemy from throwing a force into them. I remained in those works until ordered to follow the division towards U. S. Ford.

That night I halted with the division—being on its left—put out strong pickets, and rested until about two hours before daylight of May 4th, when I received orders to throw one regiment forward upon each of two roads running towards the ridge occupied by the enemy, in the rear of Chancellorsville. I sent for-

ward the Fifth Florida on the road leading by Grady's house, and the Second Florida about half a mile further to the left, throwing forward a connected line of skirmishers in front of the two regiments. These skirmishers encountered the enemy's pickets in considerable force, but they offered feeble resistance, and were pressed back a mile or a mile and a half to the enemy's entrenchments. I was then ordered by General Anderson to draw in the two regiments and line of skirmishers and follow the division towards Fredericksburg, which I did, and was next posted on the left of the line of the division, my line being to the rear of Downman's house, Brigadier-General Posey being on my right. There being an interval of three-quarters of a mile between my left and the right of General McLaws' line, I was ordered to hold the position I then occupied until further orders, unless, when the right of our line had advanced up the plank road to a point opposite me, I should see an opportunity to strike. I had thoroughly scouted the woods to my left, and from the information I had obtained, felt confident of capturing both the battery at Gregg's house and much of the infantry thrown up between that and Downman's house. That hope, however, as well as all opportunity for me, in the position in which I was, to strike a single blow to advantage, was destroyed by Brigadier-General Wright's brigade swinging across the line of battle and charging across the field in my front before our right could so engage the enemy on the plank road as to prevent the artillery and infantry from escaping by that road. Upon reporting my position to General Anderson I was directed to remain there until morning.

On the morning of May 5th, by direction of General Anderson, I moved to the vicinity of the Morgan house, on the plank road. There I remained until about four o'clock P. M., when, with the other brigades of the division, I moved up the plank road and bivouacked for the night. Early in the morning of the sixth, by order of General Anderson, I detached two regiments, posted one on the Catharpin road, and one at the fork of the plank road and the road leading to Spotsylvania Courthouse, halting the other regiment where the Furnace road crossed the plank road. About one o'clock I called in my regiments and returned to my old camp.

The conduct of both officers and men of my command, through the tiresome marches and continued watching, as well as while en-

gaging the enemy, was such as to merit high praise. The firm and steadfast courage exhibited, especially by the Fifth and Second Florida regiments, in the charge at Chancellorsville, attracted my particular attention.

I am indebted to Captain McCaslan, A. A. A. General, Lieutenant Taylor, aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Scott, volunteer aide-de-camp, and Lieutenant Riley, Acting Inspector, for the great assistance they rendered me by their attention to their duties and gallant conduct.

My command was kept supplied with rations by the persevering energy of Major Elder, Brigade Commissary. Major Hinkle, Brigade Quartermaster, for his untiring efforts to alleviate the sufferings of the wounded who were collected at the station awaiting transportation to Richmond, has merited my particular thanks. I enclose the list of casualties.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, &c.,

E. A. PERRY,  
*Brigadier-General P. A. C. S.*



**The Peace Commission.—Letter from Ex-President Davis.**

[The following letter will be read with deep interest. Any thing emanating from the patriotic statesman and gallant Soldier-President of the Confederacy will command attention, and our readers will be especially glad to get his version of the important events of which his letter treats.]

MISSISSIPPI CITY P. O., 16th August, 1877.

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY:

SIR: The article of the Hon. R. M. T. Hunter in regard to the Peace Commission of 1865, published in a Philadelphia paper a few months ago and republished in the Southern Historical Papers of April last, is of such character as seems to me to require that a correction should be sent to your readers, and filed with it in your archives.

Mr. Hunter's position as formerly a member of my Cabinet, afterwards a Confederate Senator, and one of those selected by me as a commissioner to whom the interests and the honor of our country and of its administration might be entrusted, constitute this an exceptional case which seems to call for a departure from the rule to which I have heretofore adhered; that is, to leave all attacks upon myself in connection with the Government of the Confederacy to be answered by time or by other persons.

A further and not less powerful reason for this departure from the rule of silence, is the fact that this article has been republished in the Papers of the Southern Historical Society, which is expected to be a repertory of trustworthy data for the use of the future historian who may treat of our cause and the manner in which it was maintained.

The article opens with a statement of the diminished hopes of certain persons at the period indicated, and of the effect produced by the description given by Mr. F. P. Blair to his old associates of the immense resources of the Government of the United States, and of the destructive spirit which further resistance by the Confederacy would arouse. That Mr. Hunter may be a fair exponent of the despondence he describes, and was influenced by the threatenings to which he refers, may be readily conceded; but it does not follow that in these respects he was a fair representative of the

prevalent feelings of the country, and, least of all, of its gallant army.

Be this as it may, he proceeds to ascribe to "President Davis and his friends," under the pressure of public opinion, the *beginning* of a feeling that it was expedient to exhibit some pacific inclinations. "The talk about peace" (he states), "became so earnest and frequent in the capital of the Confederacy, and the indications of a desire for it among many members of the Confederacy became so plain and obvious, that President Davis and his friends began to feel that it was expedient that the Confederate Government should show some desire for peace on fair terms. To show no sense of responsibility for the terrible conflict then waging, and no desire for peace on any terms, would injure the Confederate Government in the eyes of its own people."

Drawing perhaps, as men frequently do, upon his own consciousness as an index of the general feelings he ascribes to the "many" alarm at the talk of conscribing negroes [to the enactment of a law for which it will be remembered Mr. Hunter's opposition was a chief obstacle]; and he does injustice to the heroic mothers of the land in representing them as flinching from the prospect of having their boys of sixteen "or under" exposed to the horrors and hardships of military service. He proceeds accordingly, "the President in January, 1865, determined to appoint three commissioners, and proposed a conference between them and others to be appointed by the United States Government, on the subject of peace."

When Mr. Hunter penned these statements he must have known that the inaugural address of President Davis under the Provisional Government, delivered four years prior to the period of which he writes, expressed a strong desire for peace; that a few days after his inauguration he appointed commissioners to go to Washington with full authority to negotiate for a peaceful and equitable settlement between the two governments; that in many, if not in all, of his messages to Congress there was shown the same desire to terminate the war by any settlement that would be fair and honorable to both parties; that, hoping something from the relations of personal friendship formerly existing between President Lincoln and Vice-President Stephens, the latter was sent to seek an interview with Mr. Lincoln, in which, beginning with

the subject of suffering prisoners, it was expected that other questions might be reached in the interests of peace. And yet again, Mr. Hunter knew it was the assurance brought by Mr. Blair that a commission sent to discuss the question of establishing amicable relations would be received by the President of the United States that led to the appointment of the commission of which Mr. Hunter was a member, and which he describes as originating in a desire to allay the anxieties of our people, and as being a proposition initiated by the President of the Confederacy for a conference. It is not correct, as stated by Mr. Hunter, that the commissioners were expected to meet Messrs. Lincoln and Seward at "Old Point." It was expected that they would be passed through the lines and received in Washington.

Mr. Hunter's instructions requested him, *totidem verbis*—"To proceed to Washington city for informal conference" with Mr. Lincoln.

A true-hearted Confederate, it might have been thought reasonably, instead of seeking to put his President in the attitude of renewing efforts for conference after previous rejections without any intervening overtures from the other side indicating a more conciliatory spirit, would he rather have made prominent the fact that it was the assurance of one coming directly from President Lincoln which led to the appointment at that time of the Commission.

With regard to the instructions to the commissioners, Mr. Hunter notices that they were "to treat on the basis of two countries," thus precluding any idea of "reunion," a provision which, he says, gave rise to difficulties; and he adds: "It was rumored that Mr. Benjamin, Secretary of State, foreseeing this, had endeavored in vain to have it stricken out." If Mr. Hunter then believed all that he now asserts, why did he not frankly state his views to the President and decline to serve on the Commission? If he wished to go for the purpose of promoting "reunion"—that is to say, to surrender the Confederacy—he knew, or might easily have learned, that his views were too little in accord with those of the President for his employment in the confidential service to which he was commissioned.

The letter of Mr. Benjamin, hereunto subjoined, with the copies of his original draft of instructions to the commissioners and the

modification made by the President, gives a correct statement of the case and of the reasons for which that modification was made. It shows that there was no effort made by Mr. Benjamin to have any thing "stricken out," and that there was no difference whatever between him and the President in any except a minor question of expediency, and that even this difference disappeared on conference and comparison of views. Nay, if Mr. Hunter has been correctly reported, he himself was at that time of one mind with the President and Secretary of State in regard to this point. In a speech of stirring and patriotic tone, delivered by him in Richmond after his return from Old Point, he is represented (the quotations are from the report given in the "Annual Cyclopædia for 1865") as saying, among other expressions of fiery indignation: "And now, after three years of waste and destruction, we have been lately informed by the President of the United States that there can be no peace except upon the conditions of laying down our arms and absolute submission; to come in as rebels, &c., &c."

And again, "If anything more was wanting to stir the blood, it was furnished when we were told that the United States would not consent to entertain any proposition coming from us *as a people*; that Government which makes treaties with the meanest and weakest of nations tells us, a nation of seven millions of men, with arms in their hands, that it cannot entertain any proposition coming from rebels. Even upon the theory that we were rebels, upon what authority could they refuse to treat with us? There has been no civil war of any magnitude which has not been terminated by treating. It would seem possible that Lincoln might have offered something to a people with two hundred thousand soldiers—and such soldiers—under arms."

The truth is that the phraseology of the instructions to the commissioners constituted no embarrassment to them at all. Vice-President Stephens, who was at the head of the Commission, in his "War between the States," (Vol. II, p. 577,) referring to the charge that their hands were so tied with instructions that nothing could be accomplished, with other rumors of the same sort, says they are "utterly unworthy of notice." Yet this is the charge in substance which Mr. Hunter has revived. In his minute account of the origin, progress, and termination of the conference,



Mr. Stephens nowhere makes any reference to the letter of the instructions at all, and it is evident from his account of the conversation with Messrs. Lincoln and Seward that there was no "difficulty" whatever on this score; and finally, how did it happen that the report of the commissioners to the President of the Confederacy contained no reference to embarrassment caused by the terms of their instructions?

With palpable inconsistency it will be observed, that Mr. Hunter first presents the terms of the instructions as the impediment to negotiation, and then shows that Mr. Lincoln refused to treat with us on any terms, or accept any thing less from the Confederate States than a surrender at discretion.

What, then, could a different form of credentials have availed in the matter of negotiation; and why, if it would have availed, was the fact not communicated to the Executive at that time?

Yours respectfully,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

#### Letter from the Hon. J. P. Benjamin.

TEMPLE, 17 May 1877.

Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS:

MY DEAR FRIEND: Your letter of the 29th March arrived whilst I was temporarily absent from London, and pressure of engagements interfered with my search for old papers necessary to enable me to answer with any confidence in the accuracy of my statements.

I enclose you herewith a copy—

- 1st. Of original draft of instructions as prepared by me;
- 2d. Of instructions as sent after modification by you;
- 3d. Of the report of the commissioners (I have the *original* in my possession).

I think you will see, by comparing my draft and your amendment, the cause of Mr. Hunter's statement, which is partially but not entirely accurate.

The instructions were, if my memory does not betray me, discussed in the presence of one or more of the commissioners; but, however that may be, my idea was to make them as vague and

general as possible, so as to get at the views and sentiments of Mr. Lincoln and to test the reality of the peace intentions represented by Mr. Blair to actuate him. You feared that, under the purposely vague language which I had proposed, it might be represented that you had impliedly assented to the import of the last sentence of Mr. Lincoln's letter—"peace to the people of our one common country"—and were unwilling to subject yourself to such misconstruction, as involving an apparent betrayal of the trust reposed in you as the President of the Confederate States. I could not but yield to an objection based on such a motive, and to this extent, and no more, Mr. Hunter's statement is correct; but if the idea conveyed by his whole statement (which, unfortunately, you did not send me) is that I in any way dissented from or disapproved of a refusal to confer on the basis of our being "one country," the rumor is entirely unfounded. You thought, from regard to your personal honor, that your language ought to be such as to render impossible any malignant comment on your actions. I did not anticipate the possibility of such a perversion of your motives, and was anxious to keep out of view any topic that might defeat the object of the proposed conference, but *not* at the risk of any assault on your character or honor. As soon as the possibility of such a result was pointed out by you, I at once abandoned all dissent from the proposed amendment.

The above is, I believe, a perfectly accurate statement of what occurred; but human memory is fallible, and after a lapse of twelve years of a very busy life it is just possible that I may have *omitted*, but I certainly have not misstated any thing.

Yours, ever faithfully,

(Signed) J. P. BENJAMIN.

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**Draft of Instructions Prepared by the Secretary of State for Messrs. Stevens, Hunter and Campbell.**

[Copy.]

WASHINGTON, *January 13, 1865.*

F. P. BLAIR, *Esq.*:

SIR: You having shown me Mr. Davis' letter to you of the 12th instant, you may say to him that I have constantly been, am now,

and shall continue ready to receive any agent whom he or any other influential person now resisting the national authority may send to me with the view of securing peace to the people of our one common country.

Yours, &c.,

(Signed)

A. LINCOLN.

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RICHMOND, *January 28th*, 1865.

Hon. R. M. T. HUNTER:

SIR: In compliance with the letter of Mr. Lincoln, of which the foregoing is a copy, you are hereby requested to proceed to Washington city for conference with him upon the subject to which it relates.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

[The above draft of letter to Mr. Hunter was amended by the President, and the letter as amended and signed by him was as follows:]

In conformity with the letter of Mr. Lincoln, of which the foregoing is a copy, you are requested to proceed to Washington city for informal conference with him upon the issues involved in the existing war, and for the purpose of securing peace to the two countries.

Your obedient servant,

(Signed)

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

**Official Report of General R. L. Gibson of the Defence and Fall of the Spanish Fort.**

[From manuscript in our possession.]

MERIDIAN, MISS., April 16, 1865.

Major D. W. FLOWERREE,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, District of the Gulf:*

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the forces under my command on the eastern shore of Mobile bay:

On the 23d of March, I was ordered by Major-General Maury, commanding District of the Gulf, to report with my brigade to Brigadier-General St. John Liddell, at Blakely, and by him directed to move towards Deer Park, near Fish river, and with two regiments of Holtzelaw's brigade, Colonel Bush. Jones commanding, and Colonel P. B. Spence's cavalry, to hold the enemy in observation. The following day I disposed these troops for this purpose, and early the next morning the enemy moved in force on the Durant road, towards Sibley's Mills, about two miles to the east, beyond Spanish Fort, in the direction of Blakely. I had selected a line of battle on the north side of D'Olive Creek, intending to dispute its passage and develop him, having already thrown my small cavalry force upon his flanks with orders to harrass him. At this point the Major-General commanding District of the Gulf came up to offer battle with his whole force; but in consequence of the rapid movement of the enemy to our left and rear, as above indicated, the larger portion of the troops were ordered to Blakely under Brigadier-General Liddell, and my instructions were to assume immediate command of the defences of Spanish Fort. Set apart for this purpose were Brigadier-General Bryan M. Thomas' brigade of Alabama Reserves, about nine hundred and fifty muskets strong; Colonel I. W. Patton's artillery, three hundred and sixty effectives; and my own brigade of five hundred rifles, Colonel F. L. Campbell commanding. Batteries Huger and Tracy likewise constituted a part of this general command; and the garrisons in them, under Major Wash. Marks, Twenty-second Louisiana Artillery, formed Patton's Artillery, but are not included in the above estimate; for though they rendered valuable services,



they only furnished occasional reinforcements in defence of the field-works near the Water Battery, called Spanish Fort.

Upon examination I discovered the line of defence to be about three thousand five hundred yards long, enclosing a battery of four heavy guns in Spanish Fort, overlooking the bay, and strengthened by three redoubts so located that they commanded very well the right and center of the position.

The whole artillery consisted of six heavy guns, fourteen field-pieces, and twelve Coehorn mortars. Several additional guns were received during the operations. Of this line there were four hundred yards on the extreme right, in front of which the forest had been cut down, but no defensive works constructed; about three hundred and fifty yards in the center, across a deep ravine, in front of which was only a slight curtain partially complete; and about six hundred yards on the extreme left, with no works of any kind, and the dense forest covering that flank untouched.

The three redoubts gave no mutual support with the exception of two guns in redoubts 2 and 3, and no cross-fire could be obtained. The main line from redoubt 3 was retired without any deviation, and the left flank was thrown back and fell off into such low ground that artillery could not be used to any extent along its front, as in a regularly laid out *cremaillere*. The works from redoubt 3 were placed so far back on the retreating slope that the infantry could only command its crest, but not the ravine beyond; and, generally, from the center to the extreme left flank, the enemy's line was upon the highest ground.

Such was the extent and incomplete condition of the defences at Spanish Fort when, on assuming command, I carefully inspected them.

It was apparent that an immense work with the spade, pick, and axe was before us, and that some decisive measure must be adopted to prevent the large army already upon our front from coming upon us vigorously or by an onset. At once the main body was disposed along the rifle-pits and set hard at work, though there was quite a deficiency of tools.

Special parties were detailed to lay off a long line of battle as far in advance of the position as they could go, and to make camp-fires along its whole length; and other devices were employed to create an exaggerated impression of our numbers and to conceal

the exact locality of our positions. To gain time, and by a show of confidence and boldness, to make the enemy cautious, I resolved to attack him before daylight the next morning. Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Lyndsay, with five hundred and fifty men, in gallant style charged his lines, surprised and drove in his skirmishers, capturing a few prisoners and a large number of arms and accoutrements, and was only recalled after the enemy was revealed in a heavy and extended order of battle.

Our object seemed to be accomplished, for it was not until late in the evening that he advanced, feeling his way cautiously, and, making no assault, invested our defences.

My scouts had reported two *corps d'armee* in front of us (the Thirteenth and Sixteenth), Major-General Canby commanding. From information derived from the prisoners, and from drawings and maps captured with one of the engineers of the Sixteenth corps, I estimated the force to be not less than 20,000 muskets strong—perhaps much larger.

On his first advance he succeeded at some points in pushing his skirmishers to within two hundred yards; on the center and right he was driven back. Our artillery fire was reserved until his light batteries came well up, when it was suddenly opened, and it appeared to be with decided effect. On the left the ground was more favorable to the enemy, and to this fact and the want of works may be ascribed the nearness with which he was enabled to establish himself. On the right and center he was held at bay to the very close of the operations, nor did he at any time gain any decided advantages without severe contests and heavy losses. He sat down before us and developed rapidly a system of regular approaches by parallels. He gradually converted his advanced lines into heavy works, and after the first week displayed an exceedingly large armament of artillery. The absolute necessity of first completing our lines and the smallness of my force, prevented the attempt to meet his approaches by any system of advance. There was a great deficiency of tools. Spades, axes, and every available instrument that could be of service in any way were kept busy night and day from the commencement to the close. In the first days of the investment (the third I believe) Thomas' brigade of Alabama Reserves was relieved by Holtzclaw's and Ector's brigades, both together exceeding Thomas' by about one

hundred muskets. Large detachments from these commands did not rejoin them. While the transfer was being made, my force was greatly swollen, but the troops were for the most part out of position awaiting transportation. Sickness and constant heavy details diminished the number of muskets.

For the first ten days my artillery, aided by well trained sharpshooters, was able to cope with that of the enemy; sometimes silenced his guns and often broke up his working parties in handsome style; but after this time it was evident, from his overwhelming resources in men and guns, that it would be impossible with the means at my disposal to arrest his gradual advance. While he was steadily digging up to our front and flanks, his fleet kept up a well-directed and heavy fire in our rear, and mortars dropped over the entire surface shells of the largest size; his batteries in rear of his right flank bombarded batteries Huger and Tracy, exposing our communication and sweeping the woody flat upon the left flank, enfiladed for several hundred yards that part of the line, and took in reverse—the center and right—the batteries and rifle-pits. So his batteries in front of redoubt McDermott, No. 2, looked down upon our whole right, and took in reverse the left center and left.

Our works were shaped a good deal like a horse-shoe pressed open, and those batteries at the toe and heels could command every part of the line, and these batteries were of the weightiest metal. An expedition between us and Blakely, in Bay Minette, was daily growing more formidable, and it became necessary to guard our water flanks by picket-boats, and to dispose a considerable force to protect our rear and the telegraph lines, and the headway against his fleet and barges.

Several attempts were made by concentrated bombardment from day to day to demoralize the troops, with the intention to take advantage of any accident, and likewise repeated efforts to advance his lines without digging; but in each instance he was repulsed with a loss proportioned to the vigor of the attack.

At one time he established himself very close to redoubt 2, and it became necessary, in order to hold this battery and use it effectively, to dislodge him. It was designed to make a general attack on his part of the line to the extreme right, and Captain Clement S. Watson, my inspector general, led the sortie in front of the

battery and was completely successful. This party captured three times their own number of the enemy under cover of our artillery; and the moral effect was still more important, for it inspired our troops with a bolder spirit and the enemy with increased caution. After this the enemy guarded carefully against sudden dashes; and though frequent combats at particular points took place, and a few more sorties were contemplated, none could be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success.

I found by the 8th of April that all my artillery was about silenced; that the enemy had largely increased his; that his working parties, greatly reinforced at every point and carefully protected against sorties, were pushing forward at a rate that would bring them up to our main works; that the pressure upon my flanks, especially the left, was so heavy that it would take my whole force to resist it successfully; that his preparations of launches in the Bay of Minnetee had assumed formidable proportions; and finally, that there was unusual activity and movements in his lines.

I determined to develop the situation; to discover as accurately as possible his strength and intentions, and to measure our ability for further defence. It was apparent from his superiority in heavy guns and numbers, and the nearness of his approach at several points, that unless extraordinary reinforcements could be had, the moment had at length arrived when I could no longer hold the position without imminent risk of losing the garrison.

Not an officer or man had taken any unbroken rest, except such as they could snatch while on duty in the main works. When there was no fighting there was digging, cutting, moving ammunition, taking down and putting up heavy guns, and repairing damages and extending the main lines.

Two weeks of constant work, night and day, with the musket and spade, failed to discourage, but could not fail to fatigue and jade the troops.

Just at sunset, therefore, all the batteries were ordered to open, and the skirmishers and parts even of the main line to keep up a brisk fire, and all officers to observe the enemy closely, and to hold themselves in readiness for any contingency.

My artillery was soon disabled and silenced, and the fire from his advanced lines showed them to be filled with men—strong lines of battle.



Shortly after dark, while the firing was very heavy from all points, and especially upon the flanks, the enemy broke through the line on the extreme left, completely turned the flank of the main works and captured some of the men in them. He was enabled to do this, for the ground here was covered with water, a marshy and densely-wooded flat, and it had been impossible to get earth to throw up works or to make any covering for our men. A battery from an elevated point on the enemy's line, just in front of this flat, swept through it and rendered it almost untenable.

He was at once attacked with the force disposed in advance for this very contingency, and the moment General Holtzelaw gave the information, reinforcements were hastened to him with orders to drive back the enemy by a front and flank attack.

The general reported his force not sufficient for this purpose, and there was some confusion among the troops on the extreme left; that in the dark woods and fallen timber, the necessary disposition could not be made; and that the enemy was certainly in overwhelming strength. My staff officers and scouts brought similar intelligence. Colonel F. L. Campbell, commanding Gibson's brigade, was at once withdrawn from the right and directed to dispose a part of his command in skirmish order around the enemy, and to post the rest as a rear guard at the headway, so as to hold and secure the retreat. They at once drove back the advancing line of the enemy, and so strong and vigorous were these attacks that they soon compelled his overwhelming and constantly swelling forces to assume the defensive. He set to work to entrench. Our left might have been thrown back and re-established, but the labor for such an undertaking was altogether beyond our ability.

Moreover, he had advanced several hundred yards in rear of our works, and the probability arose almost to a certainty that as soon as he discovered where he really was, a general assault would be ordered; and he surely would ascertain this fact either during the night, or beyond all question, at daylight. His lodgment, too, when developed, would have enabled him to cut off retreat. I determined, therefore, to withdraw my troops.

My standing orders from Major-General D. H. Maury, commanding District of the Gulf, had been not to hold Spanish Fort for a moment after the garrison was in danger of capture—not to risk

in the defence of an outpost forces intended to occupy and defend the stronghold and the works around Mobile.

It was always a difficult and delicate task to decide, but I thought the moment had at length arrived contemplated by my instructions, when, however painful to the devoted defenders, the position had to be given up.

• The guns were ordered to be spiked, and time was allowed for this purpose; the few remaining stores were issued; the sick and wounded were carefully removed—the infirmary corps and several hundred negroes who arrived that evening to be employed in the defence; and finally, in good order, the whole garrison was withdrawn. The retreat was along a narrow treadway, about eighteen inches wide, which ran from a small peninsula from the left flank across the river, and over a broad marsh to a deep channel opposite Battery Huger. It was about twelve hundred yards long and was commanded throughout by the enemy's heavy batteries in front of our left flank.

It was concealed by the high grass and covered with moss, and the troops pulled off their shoes, and thus, in a noiseless manner, succeeded in retiring without attracting the attention of the enemy. The night was rather dark and the movement could not be hurried. From the end of the treadway they were conveyed in light boats to Battery Huger, and thence to Blakely in steamers, except a few under Colonel Bush. Jones, who was directed to go up the marsh to Blakely. My scouts had already moved along this route with a view of ascertaining whether it was practicable. This was necessary in order to enable all the troops to get beyond range of the enemy's batteries before daylight. From Blakely they were ordered to Mobile by the Major-General commanding District of the Gulf. I regret to report that some of the skirmishers, in spite of the precautions taken and the ample time given, and the pointed inquiries made on the occasion, and the vigilance of brigade commanders and staff officers, which I did not fail to observe, were left upon the lines. The officers in command reported all their men called in and safe. It is to be hoped and presumed that these accidents will be satisfactorily explained. I deeply deplore the capture of even a part of these brave men.

I desire to express in the strongest terms my admiration of the steady valor and cheerful endurance of the officers and members

of Ector's, Holtzclaw's, and Gibson's brigades, as well as of Patton's Artillery. I thank them for their zealous co-operation and soldierly bearing: Brigadier-General J. F. Holtzclaw, commanding the left wing; Colonel J. A. Andrews, commanding Ector's brigade; Colonel Bush. Jones, commanding Holtzclaw's brigade; Colonel F. L. Campbell, commanding Gibson's brigade; Colonel Frank Zacherie, Colonel I. W. Patton, commanding the artillery; and also Brigadier-General Bryan M. Thomas and Colonel D. E. Huger, of the Alabama Reserves.

The artillery, under command of Patton, assisted by Marks, Slocomb, Barnes, Theard, Massenburg, Wells, Phillips, Chaleson, Leverich, Garrity, Hawkins, and their associated officers, was handled with skill and courage, and rendered valuable services not only on land but against the fleet. Three vessels were believed to be sunk during the operations.

I desire to make my special acknowledgment to the Major-General commanding District of the Gulf, and to his staff officers, particularly to yourself and Colonels Lockett and Elmore, of the Engineers. I may be pardoned for commending the intelligence and efficiency of my own staff officers—Captain C. S. Watson, Inspector-General; Captain George Norton, Adjutant-General; Lieutenants Cartwright Eustis and S. L. Ware, my Aides-de-Camp; Major W. V. Crouch, Commissary; Major J. H. Henshaw, Q. M.; and Captain W. P. Richardson, Ordnance Officer, were energetic and untiring. The medical department, in charge of Surgeon J. S. Holt and J. F. Fryar, was conducted in a manner highly creditable to them and their confreres.

The Rev. Father Turgis shared our dangers and hardships, and gave the consolations of religion whenever occasion offered along the trenches and in the hospital.

I must refer you to the reports of my subordinate officers for the details of their operations. The losses reported up to the evacuation were seventy-three killed, three hundred and fifty wounded, and about half a dozen missing. I have not been able to get the exact number of casualties on the evening of the evacuation. I estimate our loss to have been about twenty killed and forty-five wounded, and two hundred and fifty captured, making a total loss of ninety-three killed, three hundred and ninety-five wounded, and two hundred and fifty missing—out of a force of less

than two thousand men, contending for two weeks against two *corps d'armee* and a large fleet, with over seventy-five cannon on land and nearly as many on water. We had no means of estimating the exact loss or strength of the enemy, but from every indication he largely exceeded twenty thousand muskets, and his loss must have reached twenty-five hundred.

Among the killed were Colonel Burnett, Chief of Artillery of the District of the Gulf, who fell while examining the enemy's lines. His loss was greatly lamented by all of us, who knew and admired him as a skilful soldier and accomplished gentleman. Lieutenant A. G. Clark, of my staff, commandant of the post, was killed while charging at the head of the garrison guard to dislodge the enemy when he had turned the left flank. Louisiana has not lost during the war a truer man or a more thorough-going soldier.

The list might be prolonged; for, with the position, we left behind, filling soldiers' graves, many of the bravest and best; and if any credit shall attach to the defence of Spanish Fort, it belongs to the heroes whose sleep shall no more be disturbed by the cannon's roar.

I have the honor to remain your obedient servant,

R. L. GIBSON,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

P. S.—I have been constantly occupied most of the time on horseback, and some of the officers have been absent. This may account for any inaccuracies.

R. L. GIBSON, *Brigadier-General.*

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Farewell Address of Brigadier-General R. L. Gibson to the Louisiana Brigade after the Terms of Surrender had been Agreed upon between Lieut.-Gen. Richard Taylor, C. S. A., and Major-Gen. E. R. S. Canby, U. S. A.

HEADQUARTERS GIBSON'S BRIGADE,  
NEAR MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI, *May 8th, 1865.*

FELLOW-SOLDIERS:

For more than four years we have shared together the fortunes of war. Throughout all the scenes of this



eventful revolution you have been fully tried, and now retire with the consciousness of having achieved a character for discipline, for valor, and for unselfish patriotism, of which you may be justly proud.

There is nothing in your career to look back upon with regret. You have always been in front of the enemy; you have never feasted in soft places at the rear, nor fought your battles at comfortable firesides. Your banners are garlanded with the emblems of every soldierly virtue; more than twenty battle-fields have seen them unfurled; they were never lowered save over the bier of a comrade.

Forget not the good and true men who have fallen. No sculptured marble may perpetuate the memory of their services; but you will wear their names ever green in your hearts, and they will be enshrined forever in the affections of the Southern people, in whose cause they fell.

Comrades! henceforth other duties will devolve upon you. Adversities can only strengthen the ties that bind you to your country, and increase the obligations you owe to her interests and her honor. As soldiers, you have been amongst the bravest and most steadfast; and as citizens, be law-abiding, peaceable, and industrious.

You have not surrendered, and will never surrender your self-respect and love of country.

You separate not as friends, but brethren, whom common hopes, mutual trials, and equal disasters have made kinsmen.

Hereafter you shall recount to your children with conscious pride the story of these rugged days, and you will always greet a comrade of the old brigade with open arms.

Having commanded a company and regiment in the brigade, I have known many of you from the very beginning of the struggle; have been with you through all its varied fortunes, and offer to each one of you a grateful and affectionate farewell.

May God bless you.

R. L. GIBSON,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

**Reminiscences of Torpedo Service in Charleston Harbor by W. T. Glassel,  
Commander Confederate States Navy.**

[The following interesting paper was sent us through the Secretary of the South Carolina Historical Society. In a note accompanying the paper the author says that while he has written from memory, and without official reports to refer to, he believes he has given the facts in the order of their occurrence.]

I had served, I believe faithfully, as a lieutenant in the United States navy, and had returned from China on the United States steamer "Hartford" to Philadelphia, sometime in 1862, after the battles of Manassas and Ball's Bluff had been fought. I was informed that I must now take a new oath of allegiance or be sent immediately to Fort Warren. I refused to take this oath, on the ground that it was inconsistent with one I had already taken to support the Constitution of the United States. I was kept in Fort Warren about eight months, and then exchanged as a prisoner of war, on the banks of the James river. Being actually placed in the ranks of the Confederate States, I should think that even Mr. President Hayes would now acknowledge that it was my *right*, if not my duty, to act the part of a belligerent.

A lieutenant's commission in the Confederate States navy was conferred on me, with orders to report for duty on the iron-clad "Chicora" at Charleston. My duties were those of a deck officer, and I had charge of the first division.

On the occasion of the attack upon the blockading squadron (making the attack at night), if I could have had any influence, we should not have fired a gun, but trusted to the effect of iron-rams at full speed. It was thought, though, by older and perhaps wiser officers, that this would have been at the risk of sinking our iron-clads together with the vessels of the enemy. I have ever believed there was no such danger to be apprehended; and if there was, we had better have encountered it, than to have made the fruitless attempt which we did, only frightening the enemy and putting them on their guard for the future.

It was my part, on that memorable morning, to aim and fire one effective shell into the "Keystone State" while running down to attack us, which (according to Captain LeRoy's report), killing

twenty-one men and severely wounding fifteen, caused him to haul down his flag in token of surrender.

The enemy now kept at a respectful distance while preparing their iron-clad vessels to sail up more closely. Our Navy Department continued slowly to construct more of these rams, all on the same general plan, fit for little else than harbor defence. The resources of the United States being such that they could build ten iron-clads to our one, and of a superior class, almost invulnerable to shot or shell, I had but little faith in the measures we were taking for defence.

Mr. Frank Lec, of the Engineers, was employed constructing torpedoes to be placed in the harbor, and called my attention to the subject. It appeared to me that this might be made an effective weapon to use offensively against the powerful vessels now being built. An old hulk was secured and Major Lee made the first experiment, as follows: A torpedo made of copper, and containing thirty or forty pounds of gunpowder, having a sensitive fuze, was attached by means of a socket to a long pine pole. To this weights were attached, and it was suspended horizontally beneath a row-boat, by cords from the bow and stern—the torpedo projecting eight or ten feet ahead of the boat, and six or seven feet below the surface. The boat was then drawn towards the hulk till the torpedo came in contact with it and exploded. The result was the immediate destruction of the old vessel and no damage to the boat.

I was now convinced that powerful engines of war could be brought into play against iron-clad ships. I believed it should be our policy to take immediate steps for the construction of a large number of small boats suitable for torpedo service, and make simultaneous attacks, if possible, before the enemy should know what we were about. The result of this experiment was represented to Commodore Ingraham. I offered all the arguments I could in favor of my pet hobby. Forty boats with small engines for this service, carrying a shield of boiler-iron to protect a man at the helm from rifle-balls, might have been constructed secretly at one-half the cost of a clumsy iron-clad. The Commodore did not believe in what he called "new-fangled notions." I retired from his presence with a feeling of grief, and almost desperation, but resolved to prove at least that I was in earnest. I got row-boats

from my friend, Mr. George A. Trenholm, and at his expense equipped them with torpedoes for a practical experiment against the blockading vessels at anchor off the bar.

Commodore Ingraham then refused to let me have the officers or men who had volunteered for the expedition, saying that my rank and age did not entitle me to command more than one boat. I was allowed, sometime after this, to go out alone with one of these boats and a crew of six men, to attack the United States ship "Powhatan" with a fifty-pound torpedo of rifle-powder attached to the end of a long pole, suspended by wires from the bow and stern, beneath the keel of the boat, and projecting eight or ten feet ahead, and seven feet below the surface.

I started out with ebb-tide in search of a victim. I approached the ship about 1 o'clock. The young moon had gone down, and every thing seemed favorable, the stars shining over head and sea smooth and calm. The bow of the ship was towards us and the ebb-tide still running out. I did not expect to reach the vessel without being discovered, but my intention was, no matter what they might say or do, not to be stopped until our torpedo came in contact with the ship. My men were instructed accordingly. I did hope the enemy would not be alarmed by the approach of such a small boat so far out at sea, and that we should be ordered to come alongside. In this I was disappointed. When they discovered us, two or three hundred yards distant from the port bow, we were hailed and immediately ordered to stop and not come nearer. To their question, "What boat is that?" and numerous others, I gave evasive and stupid answers; and notwithstanding repeated orders to stop, and threats to fire on us, I told them I was coming on board as fast as I could, and whispered to my men to pull with all their might. I trusted they would be too merciful to fire on such a stupid set of idiots as they must have taken us to be.

My men did pull splendidly, and I was aiming to strike the enemy on the port-side, just below the gangway. They continued to threaten and to order us to lay in our oars; but I had no idea of doing so, as we were now within forty feet of the intended victim. I felt confident of success, when one of my trusted men, from terror or treason, suddenly backed his oar and stopped the boat's headway. This caused the others to give up apparently in



despair. In this condition we drifted with the tide past the ship's stern, while the officer of the deck, continuing to ply me with embarrassing questions, gave order to lower a ship's boat to go for us.

The man who backed his oar had now thrown his pistol overboard, and reached to get that of the man next to him for the same purpose. A number of men, by this time, were on deck with rifles in hand. The torpedo was now an innumbrance to retard the movements of my boat.

I never was rash, or disposed to risk my life, or that of others, without large compensation from the enemy. But to surrender thus would not do. Resolving not to be taken alive till somebody at least should be hurt, I drew a revolver and whispered to the men at bow and stern to cut loose the torpedo.

This being quickly done, they were directed quietly to get the oars in position and pull away with all their strength. They did so. I expected a parting volley from the deck of the ship, and judging from the speed with which the little boat travelled, you would have thought we were trying to outrun the bullets which might follow us. No shot was fired. I am not certain whether their boat pursued us or not. We were soon out of sight and beyond their reach; and I suppose the captain and officers of the "Powhatan" never have known how near they came to having the honor of being the first ship ever blown up by a torpedo boat.

I do not think this failure was from any fault or want of proper precaution of mine. The man who backed his oar and stopped the boat at the critical moment declared afterwards that he had been terrified so that he knew not what he was doing. He seemed to be ashamed of his conduct, and wished to go with me into any danger. His name was James Murphy, and he afterwards deserted to the enemy by swimming off to a vessel at anchor in the Edisto river.

I think the enemy must have received some hint from spies, creating a suspicion of torpedoes, before I made this attempt. I got back to Charleston after daylight next morning, with only the loss of one torpedo, and convinced that steam was the only reliable motive power.

Commodore Tueker having been ordered to command the naval forces at Charleston, torpedoes were fitted to the bows of iron-clad rams for use should the monitors enter the harbor.

My esteemed friend, Mr. Theodore Stoney, of Charleston, took measures for the construction of the little cigar-boat "David" at private expense; and about this time I was ordered off to Wilmington as executive officer to attend to the equipment of the iron-clad "North Carolina." She drew so much water it would have been impossible to get her over the bar, and consequently was only fit for harbor defence.

In the meantime, the United States fleet, monitors and iron-sides, crossed the bar at Charleston and took their comfortable positions protecting the army on Morris' Island, and occasionally bombarding Fort Sumter.

The "North Carolina" being finished, was anchored near Fort Fisher. No formidable enemy was in sight, except the United States steamer "Minnesota," and she knowing that we could not get out, had taken a safe position at anchor beyond the bar to guard one entrance to the harbor. I made up my mind to destroy that ship or make a small sacrifice in the attempt. Accordingly, I set to work with all possible dispatch, preparing a little steam tug which had been placed under my control, with the intention of making an effort. I fitted a torpedo to her bow so that it could be lowered in the water or elevated at discretion.

I had selected eight or ten volunteers for this service, and would have taken with me one row-boat to save life in case of accident. My intention was to slip out after dark through the passage used by blockade-runners, and then to approach the big ship from seaward as suddenly and silently as possible on a dark night, making such answer to their hail and questions as occasion might require, and perhaps burning a blue light for their benefit, but never stopping till my torpedo came in contact and my business was made known.

I had every thing ready for the experiment, and only waited for a suitable night, when orders came requiring me to take all the men from the "North Carolina" by railroad to Charleston immediately. An attack on that city was expected. I lost no time in obeying the order, and was informed, on arriving there, that "my men were required to reinforce the crews of the gun-boats, but there was nothing in particular for me to do." In a few days, however, Mr. Theodore Stoney informed me that the little cigar boat built at his expense had been brought down by railroad, and

that if I could do anything with her he would place her at my disposal. On examination I determined to make a trial. She was yet in an unfinished state. Assistant-Engineer J. H. Toombs volunteered his services, and all the necessary machinery was soon fitted and got in working order, while Major Frank Lee gave me his zealous aid in fitting on a torpedo. James Stuart (alias Sullivan) volunteered to go as fireman, and afterwards the services of J. W. Cannon as pilot were secured. The boat was ballasted so as to float deeply in the water, and all above painted the most invisible color, (bluish.) The torpedo was made of copper, containing about one hundred pounds of rifle powder, and provided with four sensitive tubes of lead, containing explosive mixture; and this was carried by means of a hollow iron shaft projecting about fourteen feet ahead of the boat, and six or seven feet below the surface. I had also an armament on deck of four double-barrel shot guns, and as many navy revolvers; also, four cork life-preservers had been thrown on board, and made us feel safe.

Having tried the speed of my boat, and found it satisfactory, (six or seven knots an hour,) I got a necessary order from Commodore Tucker to attack the enemy at discretion, and also one from General Beauregard. And now came an order from Richmond, that I should proceed immediately back to rejoin the "North Carolina," at Wilmington. This was too much! I never obeyed that order, but left Commodore Tucker to make my excuses to the Navy Department.

The 5th of October, 1863, a little after dark, we left Charleston wharf, and proceeded with the ebb-tide down the harbor.

A light north wind was blowing, and the night was slightly hazy, but star-light, and the water was smooth. I desired to make the attack about the turn of the tide, and this ought to have been just after nine o'clock, but the north wind made it run out a little longer.

We passed Fort Sumter and beyond the line of picket-boats without being discovered. Silently steaming along just inside the bar, I had a good opportunity to reconnoitre the whole fleet of the enemy at anchor between me and the camp-fires on Morris' Island.

Perhaps I was mistaken, but it did occur to me that if we had then, instead of only one, just ten or twelve torpedoes, to make a simultaneous attack on all the iron-clads, and this quickly fol-

lowed by the egress of our rams, not only might this grand fleet have been destroyed, but the 20,000 troops on Morris' Island been left at our mercy. Quietly manouvring and observing the enemy, I was half an hour more waiting on time and tide. The music of drum and fife had just ceased, and the nine o'clock gun had been fired from the admiral's ship, as a signal for all unnecessary lights to be extinguished and for the men not on watch to retire for sleep. I thought the proper time for attack had arrived.

The admiral's ship, "New Ironsides," (the most powerful vessel in the world,) lay in the midst of the fleet, her starboard-side presented to my view. I determined to pay her the highest compliment. I had been informed, through prisoners lately captured from the fleet, that they were expecting an attack from torpedo boats, and were prepared for it. I could, therefore, hardly expect to accomplish my object without encountering some danger from riflemen, and perhaps a discharge of grape or canister from the howitzers. My guns were loaded with buck-shot. I knew that if the officer of the deck could be disabled to begin with, it would cause them some confusion and increase our chance for escape, so I determined that if the occasion offered, I would commence by firing the first shot. Accordingly, having on a full head of steam, I took charge of the helm, it being so arranged that I could sit on deck and work the wheel with my feet. Then directing the engineer and fireman to keep below and give me all the speed possible, I gave a double-barrel gun to the pilot, with instructions not to fire until I should do so, and steered directly for the monitor. I intended to strike her just under the gang-way, but the tide still running out, carried us to a point nearer the quarter. Thus we rapidly approached the enemy. When within about 300 yards of her a sentinel hailed us: Boat ahoy! boat ahoy! repeating the hail several times very rapidly. We were coming towards them with all speed, and I made no answer, but cocked both barrels of my gun. The officer of the deck next made his appearance, and loudly demanded "What boat is that?" Being now within forty yards of the ship, and plenty of headway to carry us on, I thought it about time the fight should commence, and fired my gun. The officer of the deck fell back mortally wounded (poor fellow), and I ordered the engine stopped. The next moment the torpedo struck the vessel and exploded. What amount of direct damage the



enemy received I will not attempt to say.\* My little boat plunged violently, and a large body of water which had been thrown up descended upon her deck, and down the smoke-stack and hatchway.

I immediately gave orders to reverse the engine and back off. Mr. Toombs informed me then that the fires were put out, and something had become jammed in the machinery so that it would not move. What could be done in this situation? In the mean time, the enemy recovering from the shock, beat to quarters, and general alarm spread through the fleet. I told my men I thought our only chance to escape was by swimming, and I think I told Mr. Toombs to cut the water-pipes and let the boat sink.

Then taking one of the cork floats, I got into the water and swam off as fast as I could.

The enemy, in no amiable mood, poured down upon the bubbling water a hail-storm of rifle and pistol shots from the deck of the Ironsides, and from the nearest monitor. Sometimes they struck very close to my head, but swimming for life, I soon disappeared from their sight, and found myself all alone in the water. I hoped that, with the assistance of flood-tide, I might be able to reach Fort Sumter, but a north wind was against me, and after I had been in the water more than an hour, I became numb with cold, and was nearly exhausted. Just then the boat of a transport schooner picked me up, and found, to their surprise, that they had captured a rebel.

The captain of this schooner made me as comfortable as possible that night with whiskey and blankets, for which I sincerely thanked him. I was handed over next morning to the mercy of Admiral Dahlgren. He ordered me to be transferred to the guard-ship "Ottowa," lying outside the rest of the fleet. Upon reaching the quarter-deck of this vessel, I was met and recognized by her Commander, William D. Whiting. He was an honorable gentleman and high-toned officer. I was informed that his orders were to have me put in irons, and if obstreperous, in double irons. I smiled, and told him his duty was to obey orders, and mine to adapt myself to circumstances—I could see no occasion to be obstreperous.

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\* Pilot Cannon states that the injuries were of so serious a nature that extra steam-pumps were found necessary to keep her afloat—that she was towed by tug-boats to Port Royal, where they lightened and tried to repair her, but without success; thence she was towed to Philadelphia, and finally sold for old iron. W. H. H. Davis, a northern writer, makes a statement which entirely contradicts the above.—Y. S.

I think Captain Whiting felt mortified at being obliged thus to treat an old brother officer, whom he knew could only have been actuated by a sense of patriotic duty in making the attack which caused him to fall into his power as a prisoner of war. At any rate, he proceeded immediately to see the admiral, and upon his return I was released, on giving my parole not to attempt an escape from the vessel. His kindness, and the gentlemanly courtesy with which I was treated by other officers of the old navy, I shall ever remember most gratefully. I learned that my fireman had been found hanging on to the rudder-chains of the *Ironsides* and taken on board. \*I had every reason to believe that the other two, Mr. Toombs and Mr. Cannon, had been shot or drowned, until I heard of their safe arrival in Charleston.

I was retained as a prisoner in Fort La Fayette and Fort Warren for more than a year, and learned while there that I had been promoted for what was called "gallant and meritorious service."

What all the consequences of this torpedo attack upon the enemy were is not for me to say. It certainly awakened them to a sense of the dangers to which they had been exposed, and caused them to apprehend far greater difficulties and dangers than really existed should they attempt to enter the harbor with their fleet. †It may have prevented Admiral Dahlgren from carrying out the intention he is said to have had of going in with twelve iron-clads on the arrival of his double-turreted monitor to destroy the city by a cross-fire from the two rivers. It certainly caused them to take many precautionary measures for protecting their vessels which had never before been thought of. Possibly it shook the nerve of a brave admiral and deprived him of the glory of laying low the city of Charleston. It was said by officers of the navy that the iron-clad vessels of that fleet were immediately enveloped like women in hoop-skirt petticoats of netting, to lay in idle admiration of

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\*Pilot Cannon states, that not being able to swim, when the fires were extinguished he jumped overboard and clung to the unexposed side of the "David." The boat gradually drifted away from the "Ironsides," without being materially injured, though a bull's-eye lantern afforded a mark to the Federal cannoneers. After drifting about a quarter of a mile, Pilot C. got aboard. Seeing something in the water he hailed, and heard, to his surprise, a reply from Engineer Toombs. Toombs got aboard, caught up the fires with the light from the lantern, got up steam, and started for the city. They were fired at several times while passing the Federal monitors and picket-boats, but escaped them unhurt, and reached Atlantic wharf at 12 P. M.—Y. S.

†Pilot Cannon states, that after the war, while acting as pilot for the United States fleet, Admiral Dahlgren asserted that such was his intention, and that the attack on the *Ironsides* prevented its execution.—Y. S.

themselves for many months. The Ironsides went into dry-dock for repairs.

The attack also suggested to officers of the United States Navy that this was a game which both sides could play at, and Lieutenant Cushing bravely availed himself of it. I congratulate him for the *eclat* and promotion he obtained thereby. I do not remember the date of my exchange again as a prisoner of war, but it was only in time to witness the painful agonies and downfall of an exhausted people, and the surrender of a hopeless cause.

I was authorized to equip and command any number of torpedo boats, but it was now too late. I made efforts to do what I could at Charleston, till it became necessary to abandon that city. I then commanded the iron-clad "Fredericksburg" on James river, until ordered by Admiral Semmes to burn and blow her up when Richmond was evacuated. Leaving Richmond with the admiral, we now organized the First Naval Artillery Brigade, and I was in command of a regiment of sailors when informed that our noble old General, R. E. Lee, had capitulated. Our struggle was ended.

All that is now passed, and our duty remains to meet the necessities of the future. After the close of the war I was offered a command and high rank under a foreign flag. I declined the compliment and recommended my gallant old commander, Commodore J. R. Tucker, as one more worthy and competent than myself to fill a high position.

In conclusion let me say: I have never regretted that I acted in accordance with what appeared to be my duty. I was actuated by no motive of self-interest, and never entertained a feeling of hatred or personal enmity against those who were my honorable opponents. I have asked for no pardon, which might imply an acknowledgment that I had been either traitor or rebel. No amnesty has been extended to me.

Bear in mind, loyal reader, these facts: I had been absent nearly two years. No one could have lamented the beginning of the war more than I did. It had been in progress nearly six months when I came home from sea. I had taken no part in it, when on my arrival in Philadelphia, only because I could not truthfully swear that I felt no human sympathy for my own family and for the friends of my childhood, and that I was willing to shed their blood and desolate their homes; and because I would not take an

oath that would have been a lie, I was denounced as a traitor, thrown into prison for eight months, and then exchanged as a prisoner of war.

I may have been a fool. I supposed or believed that the people of the South would never be conquered. I hardly hoped to live through the war. Though I had no intention of throwing my life away, I was willing to sacrifice it, if necessary, for the interests of a cause I believed to be just. I was more regardless of my own interests and those of my family than I should have been. A large portion even of my paper salary was never drawn by me. Nearly every thing I had in the world was lost—even the commission I had received for gallant and meritorious conduct, and I possess not even a token of esteem from those for whom I fought to leave, when I die, to those I love.

But the time has arrived when I think it my duty to grant pardon to the government for all the injustice and injury I have received. I sincerely hope that harmony and prosperity may yet be restored to the United States of America.

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### Colonel E. P. Alexander's Report of the Battle of Gettysburg.

CAMP NEAR ORANGE C. H., *August 10th, 1863.*

Colonel G. M. SORRELL,

*Adjutant-General First Corps:*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the artillery operations on the field of Gettysburg conducted under my command:

On arriving on the field on the 2d of July, about 10 A. M., I was ordered by Lieutenant-General Longstreet to accompany the movements to the right, then being commenced by Hood's and McLaw's divisions, and to take command of the three battalions of artillery accompanying them, viz: my own battalion, of twenty-six guns (commanded in my absence by Major Frank Huger), Colonel Cabell's, of eighteen guns, and Major Henry's, of eighteen guns. About 4 P. M. the enemy's position having been defined and preparations for an assault upon him made, I placed in position against him the eighteen guns of Cabell's battalion and eigh-



teen of my own battalion, to fire upon the "Peach Orchard" position, while Henry's battalion accompanied and fought with Hood's division in its attack upon "Round-Top." The first-mentioned battalions opened fire from two pieces of wood, Cabell's on the right about six hundred yards, and my own on the left about four hundred yards from the enemy's position. At such close quarters the fight was most severe and bloody, and in some batteries the casualties were so heavy that I was compelled to get assistance from the infantry to work the guns after a half hour's fighting. The obstinacy of the enemy at last induced me to send for the remaining eight guns of my own battalion, till then held in reserve; but just as they arrived the enemy commenced to give way and the infantry charged upon them. These eight guns were immediately ordered to join in the charge, and Major James Dearing, who had come upon the field in advance of his own battalion (marching with Pickett's division and not yet arrived), was ordered to take charge of them. They advanced at a gallop to within canister distance of the retreating enemy, and did great execution upon him. The remaining guns followed as soon as the teams could be cleared of the horses killed; and our lines were formed anew upon the position from which the enemy had been driven, and whence we cannonaded him until dark. During the night ammunition was replenished, and Dearing's battalion, of eighteen guns, and the Washington Artillery, of fourteen guns, arrived and reported to me by order of General Longstreet, by whom I was directed to prepare for a general attack upon the enemy to our front and left. I accordingly placed in position the whole command of artillery, except a part of Henry's command, left to fight on the right, in one battery of seventy-five guns, extending from the Peach Orchard on the right to the point of woods on the left, where we joined with the Third corps. At 11 A. M. I reported to General Longstreet that the artillery was ready to open fire, and was directed by him to take a position whence I could observe the effect of the fire when opened, and at what I conceived to be the most favorable moment to order General Pickett to charge the enemy with his division, which was to inaugurate the general charge. I should have stated above that besides the seventy-five guns in battery, I had reserved only nine, under Major Richardson, who had been ordered to me with them

from the Third corps, which I had destined to accompany Pickett's charge, with fresh men and horses, and full ammunition chests. I considered this very important, as the guns which did the preliminary cannonading would be unable, from loss of men, horses, and ammunition to support the charge as promptly as fresh guns might, or as the occasion might demand. Had I not had these guns sent to me I would have reserved a portion of the seventy-five in battery. I placed the guns in what I supposed to be a sheltered position, where I ordered them to await my orders. Just before the general cannonading commenced, I sent for them to move up closer, where they could join the charge more promptly, but they could not be found. I dispatched several messengers, but the guns were gone, and only after our return to Virginia did I find out what became of them. General Pendleton ordered four of them to take position in the Third corps' line, and Major Richardson moved off the others without notifying me—as the position turned out to be unsheltered from the enemy's shells, though out of his sight. At 12 M., while awaiting on the flank of my line of guns for the signal to open fire, I received the following note from General Longstreet:

“HEADQUARTERS, *July 3d*, 1863.

“COLONEL: If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off the enemy, or greatly demoralize him, so as to make our effort pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise General Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal upon your good judgment to determine the matter, and shall expect you to let General Pickett know when the moment offers.

“Most respectfully, J. LONGSTREET.”

“*To Colonel E. P. ALEXANDER.*”

To this I immediately wrote a reply that when the cannonade commenced the smoke would so obscure the field that I could only judge of the effect on the enemy by his return fire, and that I considered the enemy's position so strong that an assault was most hazardous, and could only be successful (if at all) after serious loss, and recommending, if there was any alternative other than the direct attack contemplated, as his note would seem to indicate, that it should be adopted. To this I received the following reply:

“HEADQUARTERS, *July 3d, 1863.*

“COLONEL: The intention is to advance the infantry, if the artillery has the desired effect of driving off the enemy, or such other effect as to warrant us in making the attack when that moment arrives. Advise General Pickett, and of course advance such artillery as you can use in aiding the attack.

“Most respectfully, J. LONGSTREET, *Lieut. Gen.*”

“*To Colonel E. P. ALEXANDER.*”

To this I replied, that when the effect of the artillery fire was at its maximum I would direct Gen. Pickett to advance. At 1 P. M. the signal was given, and the fire opened furiously—my seventy-five guns being assisted by sixty-five in the Third corps, and Henry’s guns (ten or twelve) on the right. The enemy replied with at least an equal number—and I *believe* with a far greater—for the artillery of our Second corps took little or no part in this cannonade, while the enemy’s accounts represent that they used in reply every gun in their army. The advantage in position was decidedly on the enemy’s side, and many of their guns, and nearly all of their infantry, were protected by breastworks. For a long time neither side seemed to have any advantage over the other, and I delayed giving Gen. Pickett the order to advance until the expenditure of ammunition threatened to reduce the fire.

At length, at half-past 1 o’clock, I wrote to Gen. Pickett that unless he advanced immediately the artillery ammunition would be so nearly exhausted that it would give him but little support, although the enemy was still firing vigorously, and at least eighteen guns were firing directly from the point (the cemetery) he was to charge. Five minutes after dispatching this note these eighteen guns were entirely silenced and left the field, and the enemy’s fire generally began to slacken. On this, I wrote again to General Pickett: “The eighteen guns have been driven off. Hurry up, for God’s sake, or the artillery can’t help you”; and I also dispatched verbal messages to the same effect. At fifteen minutes to 2 o’clock General Longstreet came up to my position, and on learning the state of affairs, ordered me to stop Pickett’s advance until the guns could replenish ammunition; but on my representations that this would involve sufficient delay for the enemy to recover himself, and moreover, that the supply of ammunition in

the ordnance trains was not sufficient to support a fifteen minutes' fire, or to either renew our present effort, or attempt another, he recalled the order and allowed the division then just approaching (at ten minutes to 2) to advance, saying, however, to me, that he dreaded the result, and only ordered it in obedience to the wishes of the Commanding-General. As soon as the infantry had passed I rode down the line of guns, ordering all with less than fifteen rounds of ammunition to remain in their position, and fire over the heads of the infantry, and all with over that number to move forward and support the charge. In this way I collected eighteen guns from different commands, with which we advanced in time to assist in the repulse, with great slaughter, of a heavy attack on Pickett's right flank; but in the mean time the left of the infantry attack gave way, and the whole line from left to right rapidly followed, until the guns were left in advance, without even pickets between them and the enemy. This state of affairs was not altered until late in the afternoon, the enemy's pickets taking occasionally a mild offensive, and subsiding on receiving a few shells. About sundown most of the guns were withdrawn, and at 11 P. M. all of the remainder with the last brigade of infantry when it fell back to the new line.

On the fourth, the artillery was nearly all placed in position on the defensive line occupied that day by the army, but no action occurred, and the retreat was commenced that night. The casualties in the various battalions, and the subordinate officers mentioned for good conduct, are reported in the several battalion reports through the chief of artillery of this corps. I beg leave particularly to commend the following officers: Colonel Cabell, Major Huger, Major John Haskell, Major Eshleman, Major Dearing, and Major Henry, commanding battalion, on separate commands.

Very respectfully, colonel, your obedient servant,

E. P. ALEXANDER, *Col. Artillery.*

*To G. M. SORREL, Adjutant-General First Corps.*



## EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS.

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THAT THE SOCIETY IS NOT RESPONSIBLE for all the statements contained in the papers which we publish would seem too obvious to need repetition. We cannot hold a full meeting of the Society to discuss and endorse every paper before it is published, nor can the Executive Committee presume to decide on the accuracy of every statement made in papers sent us. Even the official reports of our most distinguished soldiers often differ in their statements, from the point of view from which each describes the events recorded, and there is scarcely any thing we can publish which would meet *universal* approval.

We have, therefore, adopted the rule of allowing those who made the history to tell it in their own way, publishing nothing without the name of the author attached, and leaving the writer himself responsible for his own statements.

But we are, of course, careful to publish only what is given by responsible men, and what seems of sufficient interest, importance, and reliability to admit of a place in our *Papers*. And where there are honest differences of opinion, we think it better to give both sides a hearing than to allow these opposing views to sleep in our Archives until those most interested have passed away.

We are glad to know that our course in this respect meets the almost universal approval of our friends; and have regretted to learn that it has met the disapprobation of any whose opinions we respect.

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RENEWALS of old subscribers, and the securing of new ones are always in order, and particularly so now, as our next number will complete our 4th volume.

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OUR DECEMBER NUMBER will contain the Annual Report of the Executive Committee and an account of our Annual Meeting.

# SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

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**Vol. IV.      Richmond, Va., Dec., 1877.      No. 6.**

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## **Leading Confederates on the Battle of Gettysburg.**

[Our series of papers on Gettysburg has naturally attracted great attention and excited general comment. It is not surprising that there should be honest differences of opinion among the gallant and accomplished soldiers who participated in the Confederate assault on that fortress; and the object of our series is to bring out a comparison of views, and thus elicit the real truth. We publish, therefore, without comment and without endorsement, the opposing views of our friends—only insisting that the discussion shall be confined to those bounds of courtesy which should always characterize gallant knights in search of the truth.]

## **A Review by General Early.**

Several of the papers recently published in relation to the battle of Gettysburg contain statements and views which in some respects are erroneous, especially in regard to the part which Ewell's corps and its commander bore in the first and second day's operations, and I therefore propose to review them, as I am the senior surviving officer of that corps, whose right to vindicate its reputation and that of its commander will hardly be disputed.

I have too much respect and regard for the officers whose statements and comments in relation to the battle I shall notice and correct, to suspect either of them of the slightest desire to misrepresent or pervert the facts, or to mislead others by their own speculations. I shall, therefore, endeavor to be entirely courteous to each one of them, and shall not attempt to controvert any fact stated on the knowledge of the writer who gives it.

Before proceeding to the execution of the main object I have in view, I must notice a slight variance between the estimate of the

strength of General Lee's army at Gettysburg made by Colonel Walter H. Taylor and that made by myself; and in doing so, I will go to some length in giving the data on which my estimate is based, as the question of numbers at that battle is one of great interest.

In his memorandum in the August number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, as well as in the paper reprinted in the September number from the *Philadelphia Times*, and understood to be an extract from the manuscript of a volume on the war now in the hands of a publisher, Colonel Taylor puts General Lee's strength at Gettysburg at 62,000 effectives, and his estimate is repeated by General Heth, whereas I put it at something under 60,000. This variance is caused by the fact that he includes in his estimate the two cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones, which had been left guarding the passes of the Blue Ridge when the last of our infantry and artillery, under Longstreet and Hill, crossed the Potomac, whilst I exclude them from mine. Those brigades had remained south of the Potomac on the duty assigned them until orders reached them to rejoin the army, which orders were sent after General Lee received information, on the night of the 28th of June, that the Federal army, then under Hooker, had crossed the Potomac. Those brigades crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, on the 2nd of July, (see Schenck's telegram, 1st vol. Congressional Report on the Conduct of the War, 2nd series, p. 489,) and arrived near Gettysburg on the 3rd of July, too late to take any part in the battle, and were posted on our right, near Fairfield, as Stuart says, (2nd vol. Society Papers, 65).

They were, therefore, of no avail to us in the invasion of Pennsylvania or in the battle of Gettysburg, but merely aided in guarding our trains to the rear and observing the enemy when we retired. There is no more reason for counting those brigades as a part of the force with which General Lee fought the battle of Gettysburg, than there is for counting as a part of Meade's force at the same battle the 10,000 or 11,000 men under French, at Frederick and Harper's Ferry, and the very considerable force under Couch, at Harrisburg, all of which were placed under Meade's orders, and were actually employed for the purpose of watching Ewell's advance to the Susquehanna and harrassing his rear on

the march to Gettysburg from Carlisle, as was the case with Couch's force, and protecting Meade's communications to the rear, as was the case with French's command. Robinson's and Jones' brigades certainly numbered over 2,000 men, and very probably over 3,000. Take them from Colonel Taylor's estimate of 62,000, and there would be left less than 60,000 as our real strength at Gettysburg. Imboden's small brigade might also be excluded from the estimate of our force at the battle, as he had been employed in destroying the bridges on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and round by the way of McConnellsburg, west of Chambersburg, and by the latter place, reaching the vicinity of Gettysburg late on the afternoon of the 3rd; but I have not made any allowance for that brigade.

As stated by Colonel Taylor, our infantry, as shown by the official returns of the 31st of May previous, then numbered 54,356, the artillery 4,460, and the cavalry 9,536, making our whole force then 68,352.

He says Pettigrew's brigade joined the army after that date; but to offset the increase by reason of that accession, one of his regiments and the whole of Corse's brigade of Pickett's division remained in Virginia, at Hanover Junction.

My division was included in the force of infantry shown by the returns of May 31st. It left the vicinity of Fredericksburg on the 4th of June, and at Culpeper Courthouse on the 10th, when its strength was somewhat less than when my return of May 31st was made, by reason of the exhaustion, foot-soreness, and stragling common to all armies; another return was made, which is now before me, and shows:

In Hays' brigade, for duty.....	137 officers.	1,495 men.
Hoke's " " .....	136	1,684
Gordon's " " .....	188	2,194
Smith's " " .....	149	1,243
	<hr/> 610	<hr/> 6,616
		610
In all, exclusive of division and brigade staff.....		<hr/> 7,226

My return for June 20th, made at Shepherdstown, two days before I crossed the Potomac, also now before me, shows:



In Hays' brigade, for duty.....	119 officers.	1,281 men.
Hoke's " " .....	96	1,225
Gordon's " " .....	175	1,860
Smith's " " .....	97	758
	<hr/> 487	<hr/> 5,124
	—	487
In all, exclusive of division and brigade staff.....		<hr/> 5,611

This shows a decrease of 1,615; but that in Hoke's and Smith's brigades was caused, mainly, by the absence of three regiments from those brigades left to occupy Winchester and guard the prisoners taken there and at Martinsburg back to Staunton. The decrease in Hays' and Gordon's brigades was 679, of which, 163 resulted from the loss in the fighting at Winchester, leaving the net loss in those two brigades, from exhaustion, foot-soreness, and straggling, 516. Their aggregate strength on the 10th of June, was 4,024; so there was a loss of a little more than 12 per cent. in those two brigades from other causes than casualties in battle, from the 10th to the 20th. They were composed of as good and well-seasoned soldiers as any in that army, and I think I can certainly assume that there was, at least, the same per centage of loss in the entire infantry of the army from the 31st of May to the time it crossed the Potomac. Twelve per cent. in 54,356, gives 6,552, which being deducted, leaves 47,834 as the strength of our infantry when it crossed the Potomac, without deducting my three regiments that were left behind, or the loss sustained in Ewell's corps in the fighting at Winchester and Martinsburg, which amounted to 269.

Add the entire artillery and cavalry without any deduction, and our whole force would be only 61,830. But the fact was, that the cavalry had had a very severe engagement with that of the enemy near Brandy Station, on the 9th of June, and several other severe engagements near the Blue Ridge before it crossed the Potomac, in which, if Hooker's telegrams are to be accepted as correct, our cavalry was very badly handled, if not almost destroyed; but I take no account of them.

It is well known how rapidly cavalry diminishes from loss of horses in action or on the march—in fact, much more than from loss of men when there are no means of replacing the horses, as

was the case with our cavalry. Stuart carried three brigades with him across the Potomac, to-wit: Fitz Lee's, Hampton's, and Wm. H. F. Lee's; Jenkins' brigade, not exceeding 1,500 or 1,600, accompanied Ewell, and one battalion of cavalry, White's, was with my division, while Imboden went along the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, then to McConnellsburg, and from thence by the way of Chambersburg to Gettysburg. This was all the cavalry that went into Pennsylvania at the time our army invaded that state, Robertson's and Jones' being left behind, as already stated. Even Hooker, who estimated our force that passed through Hagerstown at 97,000 infantry and cavalry and 280 guns, and was, by no means, disposed to underrate any part of our army, does not put the cavalry with Stuart beyond 5,000, (see Con. Rep., 173,) and Mr. J. Everett Pearson, of Westminster, Maryland, whose narrative is contained in the transactions of the Southern Historiæal Society, (Southern Magazine, for January, 1875,) says of Stuart's command, as it passed through that place on the 28th of June: "Although four thousand men comprised the whole command, each of its regiments seemed that number to a novice." General Fitz Lee, without giving any statement as to the force with Stuart, says: "The brigade of General Jenkins, Stuart estimated at 3,800 troops when leaving Virginia." Now, the fact is, that Stuart had no means of knowing Jenkins' strength, as that brigade had never served under him. Rodes, in his report, says it numbered about 1,600 men when it joined him the 12th of June, and Meade sent a dispatch to Halleck on the 28th of June, giving a statement furnished him by persons from Hagerstown, who saw with very large magnifying glasses, and placed our army at very heavy figures, which says: "Rebel cavalry came just a week ago last Monday. General Jenkins having 1,200 mounted infantry, said to be picked men from Jackson's men, and three or four hundred cavalry of his own." (Con. Rep., 479.) Jenkins had then with him all of his cavalry, but no mounted infantry—though all of his cavalry might be said to be infantry mounted, for it was armed as such only. I think it very safe to assume that the whole of our cavalry in Pennsylvania, exclusive of Robertson's and Jones' brigades, did not exceed 6,000 or 7,000, at the most. Estimating the artillery at 4,000, which makes a very small allowance for decrease, and our entire strength must have been less than 60,000 by some

2,000 or 3,000; and even including Robertson's and Jones' brigades, it could not have exceeded that number more than a few hundred, if it reached it. It must be borne in mind that our march, all the time from the start, led us from the sources from which our ranks could be refilled, and hence, our losses were permanent for the entire campaign. I have made no allowance for the decrease after we crossed the Potomac; but we had some even then.

Colonel Taylor gives our strength on the 20th of July, after we had returned to the valley, as 41,388 effective infantry and artillery, and 7,612 cavalry—in all 49,000; and, hence, he deduces our loss at about 19,000.

This mode of estimating the loss may ascertain very nearly the real loss, that is, the number of men placed *hors du combat*; but it is calculated to give rise to misapprehension. The official reports show the losses in the infantry and artillery of the several corps above, as follows:

In Longstreet's corps.....	7,659
Ewell's            " .....	6,094
Hill's             " .....	8,982
Total.....	<u>22,735</u>

This is exclusive of the loss in the cavalry, which was not inconsiderable.

Add this reported loss of 22,735 to the 49,000, and it would give 71,735 as our force in the campaign. Add the same loss to the effective infantry and artillery shown by the returns of July 20th, and it would give 64,125 as the strength of those arms; and deducting the artillery from this latter number, it would appear that we had about 60,000 infantry in the campaign, whereas the returns of May 31st show only 54,356.

Colonel Taylor omits to take into consideration the very large regiment of infantry, commanded by Colonel Wharton, the Fifty-first Virginia, which arrived at Winchester from Southwestern Virginia while we were in Pennsylvania, the convalescent wounded from the battle-fields of Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg (Second), that had, by the 20th of July reached the valley, as well as my three regiments that were left behind, and the stragglers and disabled men who had come up. This omission gives rise to a

criticism on his estimates which has already been made by a distinguished foreign writer on the war in a private letter to myself.

The discrepancy between Colonel Taylor's estimate and the official returns of the loss may be reconciled in this way: Those who lagged behind or fell out of the ranks for any cause before we crossed the Potomac could not rejoin the army after that time before our return. When we returned, we began to meet the stragglers and the convalescent wounded from the battle-fields of May and the early part of June, and perhaps some recruits. Some of them came with the supply ordnance train, which was a part of that attacked by the enemy's cavalry at Williamsport after the battle, and many more reached us in the valley by the 20th of July, having been assembled there while we were in Pennsylvania. My three regiments that had been left behind were then counted in the returns, as I suppose was the case with Wharton's regiment. By these means the ranks of the army had been increased probably to the extent of some 8,000 or 10,000 men; moreover, many of those reported wounded were very slightly wounded, as it was the custom to report as such all who were hurt, however slightly, and some very insignificant scratches sometimes were reported under the head of wounds. Many of the slightly wounded did not, in fact, properly come under the head of losses to the army, as they marched with it or with the ambulance trains, bringing off their arms and equipments, and, without being sent to hospitals, soon returned to duty. Their services were not actually lost, or were lost for so short a time as not to warrant their being counted in the real losses of the army.

Making this allowance, and Colonel Taylor's estimate of our losses in the whole campaign is not far from correct.

To illustrate this view: The official reports of Longstreet, Jackson, and D. H. Hill; in whose commands were comprised the whole of our infantry and artillery engaged in the campaign, beginning with Cedar Run in August, 1862, and ending with the minor engagements in the valley after Sharpsburg, from first to last, show for that period, a loss of 21,294 in killed and wounded alone. This of course excludes the cavalry, and yet the returns made by the Medical Director of the army, which accompany General Lee's report, show only 19,306 killed and wounded in all arms, including the cavalry, for the same period. This results from the fact



that a considerable number of those reported as wounded did not even require surgical treatment or attention.

The returns at the close of July, 1862, nine days before the battle of Cedar Run or Slaughter's Mountain, show 69,559 for duty in the Department of Northern Virginia. No new troops reached the army after those returns were made before the campaign opened; some embraced in it were left at Richmond, and did not participate in the campaign. The returns for September, made after Sharpsburg and the minor engagements following it, show for duty 52,609, while the loss in Longstreet's, Jackson's, and D. H. Hill's commands, including missing, for the period above stated, was 23,575. This again excludes the cavalry. Add the number shown by the returns at the close of September and the above loss, and there will appear a force of 76,184; yet, it is very certain that General Lee did not have, in the campaign against Pope and McClellan, including all that came up while it was progressing, that number of men by many thousands. Add the 52,609 shown by the September returns to the loss shown by the Medical Director's report in killed and wounded alone for Brownsboro', Crampton's Gap, Harper's Ferry, Sharpsburg, and Shepherdstown, which was 10,291, and we have 62,900 to begin that series of engagements with, and yet we know that we had no such force there. Without counting the loss in killed, wounded, and missing at Sharpsburg, which was 8,000 or 10,000, and the September returns would give us 52,609 to fight that battle with, and counting the losses, about 60,000, yet General Lee says he had less than 40,000 men at Sharpsburg, and I feel sure that 30,000 would cover our force of infantry and artillery on the field at that battle.

It comes within my personal knowledge, that Lawton's brigade of Ewell's division, which division I commanded during the latter part of the battle at Sharpsburg, and from that time, had on the field only 1,150 men, and its loss there was 554 in killed and wounded; and yet, before the return of September was made, it numbered nearly 2,000. This great accession of strength was caused by the return of convalescents, stragglers, and temporarily disabled men who had fallen out of ranks before we crossed the Potomac. A less time elapsed between the battle of Sharpsburg and the close of September than between the battle of Gettysburg and the 20th of July, and these illustrations will serve to confirm

my view that the force shown by the returns of July the 20th, 1863, included in it very many men who had never crossed the Potomac at all.

I think it may be assumed as very certain that we had less than 60,000 effectives of all arms at Gettysburg, and that the battle was fought with something under 50,000 infantry and about 4,000 artillerymen on our side, the cavalry merely serving to protect our flanks and guard our trains, as from the nature of the ground they could not be employed in the battle.

I will now give some consideration to the evidence in regard to the Federal strength at the battle, as that bears a very important relation to a just estimate of the battle itself. It must be borne in mind that when Hooker moved from the banks of the Rappahannock, his route led him all the time towards the sources from which his army was to be recruited; that while the route of our army was the arc of a circle, he moved on the cord of it; and that, therefore, our movements had to be rapid while his were slow.

When our army had crossed the Potomac he was enabled to recruit his strength, not only from the convalescents from the hospitals at Washington, Baltimore, and further North, time enough having elapsed to enable the wounded from the fields of Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg to begin to return to duty, but also from the troops in the defenses of Washington south of the Potomac, now rendered useless there, as well as from new recruits answering to the many earnest appeals to the "loyal North" to rally to the "Standard of the Union" and the defense of the invaded "loyal State," as well as of the National Capital. It was not probable, therefore, that his army should decrease from causes similar to those that were diminishing ours. His chief of staff, who subsequently occupied the same relation to Meade, in his testimony (Con. Rep., 428), says that on the 10th of June, when Hooker was yet on the Rappahannock, "the First corps had 11,350; Second corps, 11,361; Third corps, 11,898; Fifth corps, 10,136; Sixth corps, 15,408; Eleventh corps, 10,177; Twelfth corps, 7,925; making in all, 78,245."

This was exclusive of the cavalry, which Bates, in his history of the battle, concedes to have been 12,000, and of the reserve artillery, which General Hunt, in his testimony, says constituted one-third of the artillery of the army. Butterfield, the chief-of-

staff, in reply to the question: "Had there been any considerable change in the army between the 10th of June and the time the battle of Gettysburg was fought?" says: "A portion of the Pennsylvania Reserves, some 4,000 or 5,000, had been added to the Fifth corps; General Stannard's Vermont brigade had been added to the First corps, but were to go out of service very shortly, (it was, however, at Gettysburg); General Lockwood, with the Maryland brigade, of about 2,500 men, had joined the Twelfth corps. I have a memorandum among my papers at Lookout Valley, which will show all the additions made to Army of the Potomac. I do not remember the exact figures."

On pages 417-8, he says: "General Hooker had had in mind, as a part of his operations, to use the garrison at Harper's Ferry, which consisted of 10,000 or 11,000 men under General French. \* \* \* General Hooker's intention had been to take that garrison, with General Slocum's corps (the Twelfth), near Knoxville, the two making about 25,000 men, throw them rapidly in rear of General Lee," &c.

It does not appear whether Lockwood had then joined; but it will be seen that the Twelfth corps had been increased from 7,925 to about 12,000, even if Lockwood had then joined, without counting his brigade, which was an increase of 4,000. The other corps must also have increased, and accordingly we find Hooker telegraphing to Halleck on the 27th of June, as follows, (Con. Rep., 291): "I would respectfully state that, including the portions of General Heintzelman's command and Schenck's now with me, my whole force of enlisted men for duty will not exceed 105,000." He is then protesting that too much must not be expected of him, and of course was not disposed to overstate his force. A force of 105,000 must have had at least 5,000 officers, which would make the whole 110,000, and this was exclusive of French's command, as shown by Colonel Taylor. There is no reason to presume that this force decreased as Meade approached Gettysburg after he assumed command, for he was probably joined by other troops, and there are very cogent reasons for believing that he had between 90,000 and 100,000 men, perhaps fully the latter number, on the field of Gettysburg, exclusive of his cavalry.

The absurd estimate of Professor Bates that the 105,000 reported by Hooker had been reduced to only 72,000 between the

27th of June and the 2nd of July, if true, would furnish a curious commentary on the "loyalty" and patriotism of the North, and on the morale of the soldiers who had rallied to the "Standard of the Union" in order to "save the life of the nation." Equally as preposterous is the statement of Doubleday that there were only 14,000 men on the Federal side on the 1st of July to oppose 60,000 on our side.

We know that we got as many as 6,000 prisoners, including the wounded left on the field and in the hospitals in Gettysburg from the First and Eleventh corps, and there must have been a loss of as many more in killed and wounded; in fact, Bates puts the loss in those two corps at about 10,000. Butterfield says that on the 4th their commanders reported, respectively, in the First corps, 5,000, and in the Eleventh, 5,500 left after all the fighting of the 2nd and 3rd, which does not accord, by any means, with Doubleday's statement.

It is a little strange that Northern writers grope in the dark, and resort to conjecture to ascertain the strength of Meade's army at Gettysburg, when the official returns on file in the Adjutant-General's office should settle the question. They always persist in putting our force far beyond that shown by any official returns of ours, and the Federal force greatly under that shown by their own returns. This applies to all the battles.

The assumption that the Confederate Government, with at best only a population of 5,000,000 of whites to draw from when it was hard pressed on all sides, and a large portion of its population beyond its reach, could furnish more troops for the invasion of Pennsylvania than the Federal Government, with a population of 20,000,000 to draw from, besides its foreign recruits, could furnish to defend the soil of the "loyal North" and the national capital, and that, while the soil of Pennsylvania resounded with the tread of the "rebel horde," "the defenders of the Union" were availing themselves of the expiration of their terms of service to go home, and otherwise abandoning the standard to which they had rallied with "patriotic ardor," furnishes food for curious reflection.

I will now come to a consideration of the points, to notice which is the main object of this paper.

General Fitz. Lee, after paying a very just tribute to the memory of General Ewell, says, in reference to the first day's fight:



"I believe a little more marching, perhaps a little more fighting, would have given us the coveted position, and that in such an event the battle of Gettysburg would have had another name, and possibly another result—who knows?"

Colonel Allan says:

"The Confederates would probably have been successful—first, had Ewell and Hill pushed Howard's broken troops over the top of Cemetery Hill on the first day."

He then assigns four other conditions that would have given us success.

Colonel Taylor, in his memorandum, makes the same point as to Ewell's conduct, but it is more fully set forth in the paper from the *Philadelphia Times*, as follows:

"General Lee witnessed the flight of the Federals through Gettysburg and up the hills beyond. He then directed me to go to General Ewell and say to him that from the position he occupied he could see the enemy retreating over those hills, without organization, and in great confusion; that it was only necessary to press 'those people' in order to secure possession of the heights, and that, if possible, he wished him to do this. In obedience to these instructions, I proceeded immediately to General Ewell and delivered the order of General Lee; and after receiving from him some message for the Commanding-General in regard to the prisoners captured, returned to the latter and reported that his order had been delivered. General Ewell did not express any objection or indicate the existence of any impediment to the execution of the order conveyed to him, but left the impression upon my mind that it would be executed. In the exercise of that discretion, however, which General Lee was accustomed to accord his lieutenants, and probably because of an undue regard for his admonition, given early in the day, not to precipitate a general engagement, General Ewell deemed it unwise to make the pursuit. The troops were not moved forward, and the enemy proceeded to occupy and fortify the position which it was designed that General Ewell should seize. Major-General Edward Johnson, whose division reached the field after the engagement and formed on the left of Early, in a conversation had with me since the war about this circumstance, in which I sought an explanation of our inaction at the time, assured me that there was no hindrance to his moving forward, but that, after getting his command in line of battle, and before it became seriously engaged or had advanced any great distance, for some unexplained reason he had orders to halt. This was after General Lee's message was delivered to General Ewell."

The language quoted from all three of the officers named conveys a very serious imputation upon General Ewell—if not by

direct imputation, at least by necessary inference. It implies that he was inactive when he should have pressed on, and that he was, therefore, remiss in the discharge of his duty. Colonel Allan's language would make this implication equally applicable to Gen. Hill, and, in fact, to General Lee—for, as shown by the statements of Colonel Taylor and General Heth, he was on the field in full time to direct all the movements looking to a pursuit and the realization of the legitimate fruits of the success that had been gained. In reality there is no earthly reason why the failure to seize Cemetery Hill that afternoon should rest exclusively on Ewell's shoulders. Colonel Allan's criticism, therefore, to that extent, is more impartial and judicious than that of the others; but it is to be remarked that neither of these gentlemen give a solitary "reason for the faith that is in them" that Gen. Ewell, by going on, could have seized Cemetery Hill, or that the seizure of that hill on the afternoon of the 1st would have been of material advantage to us. All that is assumed.

Without controverting any fact stated by Colonel Taylor in his own knowledge (the other gentlemen state no facts in this connection), I propose to show that they are all under a misapprehension as to the real facts of the case, and that all of their conjectures and speculations in regard to the probable result of a further effort on our part on the afternoon of the 1st have no basis to rest on.

In order to get at what are called the "bottom facts" affecting the question in hand, I will give a detailed account of what came under my personal observation on that day, and my own part therein.

It is only necessary to refer to the well-known facts that the advance of Heth's division on the road from Cashtown, supported by Pender's, had brought on the engagement, and that Rodes, who had camped at Heidleberg the night before, and was on his way to Cashtown, came down on the road from Mummasburgh about 2 o'clock P. M., and became engaged on Heth's left. I arrived about an hour after Rodes got up. I had marched from about three miles from Heidlersburg in the direction of York, a distance of fully fourteen miles, I think, and perhaps more. Of course, as I was moving by flank, it required a little time to get my division in line, but the formation was as rapid as possible. The enemy

was then holding his line on the north of the town firmly, and his right was pressing back Rodes' left brigade. I had not seen Ewell or Rodes since the night before, and had, on my march, merely received directions from Ewell, in a note sent by courier, to move towards Gettysburg, as Hill was advancing on that place. Without waiting to communicate with Rodes or Ewell, as soon as the division was formed in line the advance was made with three brigades—Gordon's, Hays', and Hoke's—the latter commanded by Colonel Avery; Smith's brigade being posted near the York road to protect our trains and flank from some cavalry reported to be on it. Gordon first struck Barlow's division, and drove it back in great disorder. Hays and Avery then advanced beyond Gordon's left, and struck another line, retired back from the first, and routed that, driving it through the town. Hays' alone entered the town, Avery going into open ground, or rather a field, on the left of the town. Gordon's ammunition had been nearly exhausted, and he had stopped to refill his cartridge-boxes. The movements of my brigades had been very prompt and rapid, and brought them in the rear and flank of the force confronting Rodes. That force then commenced falling back, and the rout soon became general. The troops from Rodes' front moved to our right of the town, followed by his division, and I soon saw the Federal troops from Seminary Hill coming back also. I sent for Smith's brigade, and for my artillery also; but Smith did not come, and I sent a second time. Before the artillery came to me, the Federal troops passing to the right of the town towards Cemetery Hill, had got out of reach. Elated with the success, I rode into the town, past the prisoners streaming to the rear with scarcely any guard, and found Hays forming line along a street on the left of the town. The enemy had begun firing with artillery from Cemetery Hill as soon as my line was formed, and still continued it. It was very apparent that a force was there which had not participated in the fight below, and sharp-shooters were firing from the part of the town nearest the hill, and from the foot of the latter. As soon as I saw that Hays had formed his line and Avery had got his men under cover behind a low ridge in the field, I rode to find Ewell and Rodes, or either, to urge that we should advance at once upon the hill in our front, before the enemy could reform. I found some

of Rodes' brigade in the west part of the town just forming line, but did not find him.

I think all of his brigades had not come up. I rode a little out of town on that side, on the Cushtown road, to look at the position from that point of view, and see if I could find Ewell or Rodes. I met here with a staff officer of Pender's division, who had ridden to the town after the enemy had been driven from it, and requested him to go and tell General Hill that if he would send forward a division, we could take that hill. None of Hill's troops had advanced beyond Seminary Ridge. In a very short time Colonel Smead, of Ewell's staff, came to me and informed me that Ewell had sent him to tell me that Johnson was coming up, and to ask me where I thought he ought to be put. The enemy just about this time commenced a furious fire from his artillery all around. While Colonel Smead and myself were having a hurried conversation about the subject of his message, with the shells bursting around us, the aide of General Smith came to me in a gallop and under great excitement, and told me that General Smith said the enemy was advancing on the York road with infantry, artillery, and cavalry, and he could not hold him back. General Smith had not obeyed my order when I sent for him by reason of the report of an advance on that road. I had no faith in the report myself, but knowing the effect such a report must have on the men in Gettysburg and to the right and left of it, as, if true, it would bring the enemy in their rear, I immediately ordered one of my staff officers to go and tell Gordon to take his brigade out on the York road and take command of Smith's also, and stop that "stampeding."

All this had taken place in a very few moments, and in the meantime I had designated to Colonel Smead Culp's Hill, the wooded hill east of the town and adjoining Cemetery Hill, as the position Johnson should take when he got up, as it evidently commanded the enemy's position. I very quickly received another message from General Ewell, stating that he wished to see me in the town. I rode to him at once, and he again informed me that Johnson was coming on and would soon be up, and he repeated the question as to which I thought the best position for Johnson's division. I pointed out to him Culp's Hill as the proper position for Johnson, and I urged the propriety of pushing on and captur-



ing Cemetery Hill. He then asked me to ride with him up the street towards the hill to reconnoitre; but, as we were proceeding that way, we were stopped by a fire from the enemy's sharpshooters in that end of the town. General Ewell was not disposed to make the advance until Johnson arrived, because Rodes' division had sustained a very heavy loss—2,500, as Rodes states—and only two of my brigades were available. Reports were being constantly received of the enemy's advance in force on the York road, and it was necessary to keep my two brigades in that direction to prevent a panic and protect our flank and rear, if there should be any truth in the reports. That was by no means improbable, as we knew Stuart had had a fight at or near Hanover the day before, and Colonel White, who moved on the York road on the march back, had reported to me that a force of the enemy's infantry and cavalry had been on that road. Ewell, Rodes, and myself, while waiting for Johnson's arrival, rode out of the town a short distance to look out on the York road, which was visible for nearly or quite two miles, to see if we could discover any indications of the enemy's advance. I placed no confidence in the rumor, but Rodes was inclined to believe it, while Ewell seemed at a loss as to what opinion to form, as the reports came mainly from straggling cavalymen, some of whom I think were waifs from the battle-field of Hanover.

While we were discussing the matter, a line of skirmishers was seen away out on our right of the York road, as we stood, apparently advancing towards us, when Rodes exclaimed: "There they come now!" To this I replied in somewhat emphatic language, that it could not be the enemy; that Gordon was out there; and if the enemy was advancing he would certainly be firing on him. It must be recollected that it was very hard to distinguish between the blue and the gray at a distance, as both looked dark. To solve the doubt, Lieutenant T. T. Turner, of Ewell's staff, and Robert D. Early, of mine, were sent to ascertain the fact. It turned out that the skirmishers were some General Smith had sent out, which Gordon was having moved back to post differently. All this consumed time, and Johnson had not yet arrived.

When the enemy was driven through the town it was about 4 P. M., and it was now getting towards sunset. I rode to see about my two brigades confronting the enemy, as it was very apparent he

was determined to hold the position on Cemetery Hill; in fact, that purpose was manifest from the beginning. I was soon sent for by General Ewell, and on reaching him I found General Lee with him and Rodes in the back porch of a small house north of the town, near the road from Carlisle, when a conference took place, of which I will speak before I am done.

It was now after sunset, and Johnson had arrived and his division was halted near the College, in the northwest of the town, adjacent to the Mummasburgh road. It is probable that all of Johnson's brigades were not up, and that some of his men were then moving into position. Of that, however, I have no certain knowledge. In this position he was immediately in rear of Rodes' line, a half mile or more distant from it, and the town, as well as Rodes' and my lines, were between him and the enemy. He could not, therefore, have been advancing upon the enemy when halted at this point, and he did not get on my left until after dark. It is highly probable he was awaiting the result of the conference and the instructions General Lee should give us, or he may have been halted while Lieutenants Turner and Early were ascertaining if the skirmishers we had seen were the enemy's. Johnson was not present at the conference, and I know that when that took place all idea of advancing to the attack of Cemetery Hill that night had been abandoned, for it was apparent to all that the time for that had passed.

I have stated all these facts to show the doubts and difficulties we had to deal with. I was exceedingly anxious for the advance against the heights, and would have made it with my own division, immediately after the enemy was driven through the town, if Smith had come to me with his brigade when sent for, as soon as Gordon's ammunition was replenished. General Smith had been posted so as to protect our left flank, and receiving information, which he credited, that the enemy was advancing on that flank, in the exercise of a discretion necessarily entrusted to him, he did not think it prudent to withdraw, for which he was not censurable. My other two brigades were greatly encumbered with prisoners at the close of the fight, and by the loss already sustained, which was 208, their joint numbers had been reduced below 2,550. Gordon's brigade had sustained a loss of 378, and its strength, therefore, was below 1,700. I here make no allowance

for loss in marching in either brigade since we crossed the Potomac. Gordon, in his report, says he went into action with about 1,200 men—one regiment being detached to support the artillery. Subsequent developments have satisfied me that the attack, if made, though Rodes may have joined in it, would 'probably have met with a repulse.

It turns out that Steinwehr's division had been left on Cemetery Hill as a reserve, with several batteries of artillery, and Doubleday, who was not at all disposed to exaggerate the forces on his side, says that division numbered 3,000 or 4,000. We may, therefore, assume that it was fully 4,000 strong.

Bates, the State historian of Pennsylvania, says:

"When Howard came up he left one division under Gen. Alex. von Steinwehr upon this hill, with directions to have it posted most advantageously to hold the position, and to cover retiring troops. Around the base of this hill were low stone walls, tier above tier, extending from the Taneytown road around to the westerly extremity of Wolf's Hill. These afforded excellent protection to infantry, and behind which the soldiers, weary with the long march and covered with dust, threw themselves for rest. \* \* \*

Von Steinwehr was an accomplished soldier, having been thoroughly schooled in the practice of the Prussian army. His military eye was delighted with this position, and thither he drew his heavy pieces, and planted them at the utmost verge towards the town. \* \* \* \* \*

There was no time to build a fort, for which the ground was admirably adapted. He accordingly threw up lunettes around each gun. These were not mere heaps of stubble and turf, but solid works of such height and thickness as to defy the most powerful bolts which the enemy could throw against them, with smooth and perfectly level platforms, on which the guns could be worked."

This was done while the fighting was going on north and west of the town, and Steinwehr, therefore, stood firm, and furnished a rallying point for the troops driven from and across the plains below. His position faced the line occupied by Rodes and myself after we advanced into the town, and we would have had to storm it in order to carry the heights. While the enemy's troops that had been engaged were considerably demoralized, yet a number of them rallied behind Steinwehr's division. Hancock, who had been sent by Meade to take command at Gettysburg, in his testimony, says: "I found that, practically, the fight was then over. The

rear of our column, with the enemy in pursuit, was then coming through the town of Gettysburg." (Con. Rep., 406.)

He is here speaking of the time of his arrival, and at 5:25 P. M. he sent the following dispatch to Meade:

"When I arrived here an hour since, I found that our troops had given up the front of Gettysburg and the town. We have now taken up a position in the cemetery, and cannot well be taken; it is a position, however, easily turned. Slocum is now coming on the ground, and is taking a position on the right, which will protect the right. But we have as yet no troops on the left, the Third corps not having yet reported; but I suppose that it is marching up. If so, his flank will in a degree protect our left flank." (Con. Rep., 357.)

General Sickles, commanding the Third corps, in his testimony, says:

"I, therefore, moved to Gettysburg on my own responsibility. I made a forced march, and arrived there about the time General Howard had taken position on Cemetery Hill. I found his troops well posted in a secure position on the ridge." (Con. Rep., 297.)

Warren, in his testimony, speaking of his arrival a very short time after Hancock, says:

"General Howard was then on Cemetery Ridge with our division. General Buford's cavalry was all in line of battle between our position there and the enemy. Our cavalry presented a very handsome front, and, I think, probably checked the advance of the enemy. General Hancock made a great deal of personal effort to get our troops into position, and I think his personal appearance there did a great deal towards restoring order." (Con. Rep., 377.)

Buford confronted Hill's right, and had two brigades, containing seven regiments.

General Long, in his letter to me, says he was directed by Gen. Lee very soon after the close of the action to reconnoitre the position, and he adds: "I found Cemetery Hill occupied by a considerable force—a force strongly posted behind a stone fence near its crest, and the rest on the reverse slope. In my opinion, an attack at that time, with the troops then at hand, would have been hazardous and of very doubtful success."



It was not, therefore, a mere question of a little more marching, nor of a little more fighting either, which was involved. If we had made an assault on Cemetery Hill and occupied it, it would have involved a bloody struggle, and then to find Buford to check our further progress, and the Twelfth corps, under Slocum, and the Third, under Sickles, coming on the ground. What might have been the result of that conjuncture may well be imagined. Slocum and Sickles were both up before Johnson arrived, and at least one of Slocum's divisions had taken position immediately in rear of Culp's Hill, which it was designed Johnson should take. Before Johnson arrived all thought of moving on Cemetery Hill that afternoon had been abandoned, as it was then evident that the enemy had rallied from the dismay of his defeat.

The most that the capture of Cemetery Hill on that day could have accomplished would have been to throw the enemy back on the line of Pipe creek, which Meade had already selected as the position for receiving our attack, for he would not have attacked us at Cemetery Hill. Moreover, it does not appear that it possessed any peculiar strength as approached from his side, and we could not have awaited him there for any length of time, for there were no supplies for our army in that section. Hence, the position would have been of no value to us as a stronghold. There is nothing, therefore, in the idea that we lost a great opportunity by not going on on the afternoon of the 1st.

But, if we did lose such an opportunity, why is it that the entire responsibility for its loss should rest on Ewell? Anderson's division of Hill's corps came up about the close of the fight, or shortly thereafter, and the most practicable route for moving on Cemetery Hill was on our right of the town. The question of the propriety of the advance was submitted to Ewell's judgment, and he did not think it prudent to make the attempt until the arrival of Johnson; and I must confess that, though my opinion at the time was different, subsequent developments have satisfied me that his decision was right. Johnson did not arrive in time to make the assault with a prospect of success, and hence it was not made after his arrival. There is, then, no good reason for imputing to Ewell an intentional disregard of the wishes or instructions of General Lee.

Colonel Taylor has either wholly misapprehended General Johnson, or the latter was laboring under some very great mistake, when they had the conversation after the war on the subject. Johnson did not get into line of battle on my left until after dark; and if he had been in line of battle before that time, it was when he was halted near the College before moving to the left. It surely could not have been the intention for him to march from that point over Rodes and myself to attack the enemy on Cemetery Hill. If he had then, or after dark, been ordered to advance upon either hill for the purpose of attacking, Rodes and myself would have been informed of the fact, in order that we might co-operate; and I am very sure I received no such information.

But let us see what General Lee and General Ewell say on the subject of the instructions for capturing the enemy's position that afternoon.

In his report General Lee says:

"Without information as to its proximity (Meade's main force), the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops.

"General Ewell was therefore instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward. He decided to await Johnson's division, which had marched from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains, to guard the trains of his corps, and consequently did not reach Gettysburg until a late hour. In the meantime the enemy occupied the point which General Ewell designed to seize, but in what force could not be ascertained, owing to the darkness."

It is now known that that force was the Twelfth corps.

Here is General Ewell's explanation of the whole matter as given in his report:

"The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position known as Cemetery Hill, south of Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front there. On entering the town I received a message from the Commanding-General to attack the hill, if I could do so to advantage. I could not bring artillery to bear on it; all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours' marching and fighting, and I was notified that General Johnson was close to the town

with his division, the only one of my corps that had not been engaged, Anderson's division of the Third corps having been halted to let them pass. Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the town, and I determined, with Johnson's division, to take possession of a wooded hill to my left, on a line with and commanding Cemetery Hill. Before Johnson got up, the enemy was reported moving to our left flank—our extreme left, and I could see what seemed to be his skirmishers in that direction. Before this report could be investigated by Lieutenants T. T. Turner, of my staff, and Robert Early, sent to investigate it, and Johnson placed in position, the night was far advanced.

"I received orders soon after dark to draw my corps to the right in case it could not be used to advantage where it was; that the Commanding-General thought from the nature of the ground that the position for attack was a favorable one on that side. I represented to the Commanding-General that the hill above referred to was unoccupied by the enemy at dark, as reported by Lieutenants Turner and Early, who had gone upon it, and that it commanded their position and made it untenable, so far as I could judge.

"He decided to let me remain, and on my return to my headquarters, after 12 o'clock at night, I sent orders to Johnson, by Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp T. T. Turner, to take possession of this hill, if he had not already done so. General Johnson stated in reply to that order that, after forming his line of battle this side of the wooded hill in question, he had sent a reconnoitering party to the hill with orders to report as to the position of the enemy in reference to it. This party on nearing the summit was met by a superior force of the enemy, which succeeded in capturing a portion of the reconnoitering party, the rest of it making its escape. During this conversation with General Johnson a man arrived, bringing a dispatch dated at midnight, and taken from a Federal courier making his way from General Sykes to General Slocum, in which the former stated that his corps was then halted four miles from Gettysburg, and would resume its march at 4 A. M. Lieutenant Turner brought this dispatch to my headquarters, and stated that General Johnson would refrain from attacking the position until I had received notice that the enemy was in possession of the hill, and had sent him further orders.

"Day was now breaking, and it was too late for any change of place (plans?) Meantime orders had come from the General Commanding for me to delay my attack until I heard Longstreet's guns open fire on the right. Lieutenant Turner at once returned to General Johnson and delivered these instructions, directing him to be ready to attack, Early being already in line on the left and Rodes on the right of the main street of the town, Rodes' right extending out on the Fairfield road."

This is a very full and frank statement of the orders received and of the reasons that influenced General Ewell, and surely his

character and services were such as to demand for his own account, intended for the eye of the Commanding-General himself, some consideration in forming a correct estimate of the propriety of his course and the probabilities of capturing Cemetery Hill.

But the gentlemen who have undertaken to censure at least by implication what one of them styles "our inaction at that time," have entirely overlooked Ewell's statements, and have followed in the rut of other writers who have given their crude views before Ewell's report was published.

It is very possible that General Johnson may have supposed that he was advancing to the attack of the enemy when he was halted near the College; or, it may be, and probably was the fact, that Ewell had ordered him to take possession of Culp's Hill, then supposed to be unoccupied, when he ordered him to the position he reached after dark; and that, when he received the order to draw his corps to the right, he countermanded the order to take possession of the hill, until General Lee had heard the representations that induced him to change his purpose in that respect; or, it may be, that Johnson was about to attack on the morning of the 2nd, when the message was sent him that all movements were to be suspended until Longstreet's guns were heard. In some one of these ways General Johnson fell into his mistake, for he was incapable of a misrepresentation, and no one can suspect for a moment that Colonel Taylor has intentionally misstated the conversation. There was simply a misconception somewhere.

The reference of Colonel Taylor to this conversation with Gen. Johnson is unfortunate, because both Ewell and Johnson are now dead, and of course their testimony is closed. General Johnson did not expect his statement to be incorporated into the history of that great battle, and therefore was not as explicit as he would have been had he anticipated the use to be made of that statement. We all know how liable all of us are to make mistakes and oversights in speaking casually of past events. This is peculiarly the case with many in recalling the events of the late war. In response to an enquiry from myself, I have received the following note from the gallant soldier who commanded the Stonewall brigade, in Johnson's division, at Gettysburg:



NEWBERN, VA., October 13, 1877.

DEAR GENERAL:

I do not recollect where Johnson's division camped the night of 30th June, but it must have been some twelve or fifteen miles from Gettysburg. We arrived on the ground where Rodes and Gordon had fought late in the evening, after all the troops had gone. We moved to the left very late in the evening, and did not get into position until *after dark*. I recollect very distinctly that it was dark before we got to the position where we bivouacked for the night. It seems to me we reached the field sooner than sun-set, but not earlier than an hour before sun-set.

Yours very truly,

(Signed)

J. A. WALKER.

This leaves no doubt that a great mistake has been made, either by General Johnson in the conversation with Colonel Taylor, or by the latter in his recollection of it. The distance of Johnson's march was greater than the highest figure General Walker gives. General Longstreet says that his troops were greatly delayed on the 1st by Johnson's division and the trains following it, which came into the road from Shippensburg. Anderson preceded Johnson and halted, somewhere in rear of Hill's line, for him to pass. Johnson had camped the night before somewhere west of South Mountain and north of the Chambersburg road to Gettysburg.

On the morning of the 1st Ewell was moving with his troops towards Cashtown, in accordance with the orders of General Lee, when he received a note from Hill, giving the information that he was moving on Gettysburg with the expectation of encountering the enemy, and asking Ewell's co-operation. Hill was Ewell's junior, but, without hesitation, the latter promptly responded to the call, and sent information of his movement to General Lee, who in return informed him that, if the enemy's force was found to be very large, he did not wish a general engagement brought on until the rest of the army came up. Ewell found Hill already engaged, and went at once to his assistance. The arrival of Ewell's divisions was timely, and converted what threatened to be a reverse into a brilliant success; and the imputation on him, that he did not carry out the Commanding-General's instructions, when it was in his power to do so, or did not do all that it was a good soldier's duty to do to insure complete success, is most inconsiderate, if not harsh.

I trust I will not be considered discourteous to the gallant comrade and friend of Stuart, whose bright sabre ever flashed in the very front of battle by the side of his chivalrous leader, when the ringing voice of the latter summoned him to action, and as to whom there was no need of his own assertion to give assurance that he was always one "to count on," if I remind him that he is not, perhaps, the very best judge of how much marching and fighting in one day an infantry command is capable, and that his remark is a rather harsh criticism on the footmen who had preceded the cavalry to the banks of the Susquehanna.

Nor to the very accomplished and efficient chief of ordnance of the Second corps, to whose worth and services I have testified officially more than once, if I tell him that he has not shown on this occasion his usual research and discrimination, by ascertaining and weighing all the facts before pronouncing his judgment.

Nor to the very worthy and competent Adjutant-General of the Army of Northern Virginia, who justly possessed the confidence of its commander and the esteem of the whole army, if I suggest to him that it would have been more discreet for him to have confined himself in his account of the battle of Gettysburg to a narrative of the facts and events coming within his knowledge, and not essayed a criticism on the conduct of those engaged in the battle. His book will prove a most valuable contribution to the material for a correct history of the campaigns of the Army of Northern Virginia—marred, however, to the extent he has departed from the rule his position demanded of him to pursue—that is, to stand aloof from the disputed questions, and give an impartial narrative of facts and events of which necessarily he had fuller and more exact knowledge than most others, leaving the future historian to form his own opinions and conclusions from the facts given, without being forestalled by a judgment, which by some might be regarded as *ex cathedra*.

General Ewell had been the victim to some extent of a miscarriage somewhere in the sending or delivery of an important order at the first battle of Manassas, and there had been some annoying remarks in some papers in the extreme South about the matter. He was a soldier possessed of "that chastity of honor which felt a stain like a wound," and he was very keenly sensitive in regard to the imputations then cast on him. He had, as I know, the

means of vindicating himself thoroughly from the charge of either disobeying, disregarding, or neglecting any order sent him in any way on that occasion, but the unselfishness of his character induced him to trust rather to time for his vindication than to incur the risk of a discussion that might in the slightest degree injure the cause in which he was enlisted.

His subsequent career proved how ready and prompt he was to respond to all calls on his endurance or his courage. His military record for the year 1862 is so intimately identified with that of Stonewall Jackson that one cannot exist without the other.

The flight and pursuit of Banks down the Valley, Cross Keys, Port Republic, Cold Harbor, Slaughter's Mountain, and that most wonderful dash to Pope's rear in August, 1862, would all be shorn of half their proportions if Ewell's name was blotted from the record. Jackson never made a demand upon his energy, courage, or skill that was not promptly honored; and he was maimed for life in earnestly seconding his immortal leader in that most brilliant of all his achievements, the bewildering display of grand tactics, between the armies of Pope and McClellan, on the plains of Manassas in the last days of August, 1862.

The green turf now covers all that was mortal of Jackson's chief lieutenant. His voice is silent, and his pen is still. In departing he has left behind him no sentence or word to wither a solitary leaf of the laurels won by any of his comrades, or to cause a feather in the cap of one of them to moult, and I trust I will be pardoned for putting on record my protest against the injustice done the memory of as true a soldier as ever drew his sword in defence of a righteous cause.

I freely exempt the gentlemen named from all intentional injustice, and from all imputation of unkind motives in giving expression to their views. It is this very fact that renders it necessary to vindicate General Ewell against the implications and inferences to be deduced from their utterances.

I now proceed to consider the question in its general aspect. The idea upon which all the criticisms upon the failure to take Cemetery Hill on the afternoon of the 1st are based, is the assumption that the possession of that hill itself would have been of material advantage to us. We had already inflicted upon the enemy a very serious loss, and the probability is that, if we had

pursued, and his troops were so demoralized as to make no resistance at all, we would have inflicted no further damage on him, but merely have sent his flying corps further to the rear, to the cover of Meade's advancing columns.

It is not necessary for me to inform experienced soldiers that an infantry force in fighting trim cannot overtake a flying one; and it is well known that we had no cavalry up at that time, except a small regiment of Jenkins' cavalry and White's battalion which had been with me, and which I had to use in guarding the prisoners and the trains. What we wanted was not the possession of Cemetery or Culp's Hill merely, but a decisive victory and a crushing defeat of the enemy on the soil of Pennsylvania. The possession of either of those hills on that afternoon might have made that fight a complete one and a victory for us, but it would not have insured the kind of victory we wanted, for we would have had to seek the enemy elsewhere and fight him again.

If asked why it was that I was myself so anxious to go on, my reply is, that I knew nothing of the rest of Meade's army, but that it was moving north; that I took it for granted there was an object in fighting there; and that I regarded it my duty to fight the enemy when I met him, and continue to do so until the victory was complete, or the orders of my superiors arrested me. If I had known then all I know now, probably I would have had a different view.

Meade had selected Pipe Creek as the position for his army to receive our attack, and I presume it was a strong one, as it was selected by the Corps of Engineers under his Chief Engineer, Warren.

If we had seized the hills at Gettysburg, Meade would not have attacked us, but would have waited for us to attack him, as before stated; for that was his manifest policy. We would have had to reconnoitre his position before going into action, and before we could have got ready to attack him, our short stock of provisions would have been exhausted. We were compelled to get our provisions from the country we were in. Ewell's corps was pretty well supplied for a few days, my division best of all, for which the town of York is not yet done paying. We had pretty well gleaned the country through which Longstreet and Hill afterwards came, and they were not so well supplied. The country around Gettysburg



for miles furnished no supplies of consequence, and the presence of Meade's army in the vicinity, with its superior cavalry force, would have rendered it impracticable to send out foraging parties. Moreover, the country people would have been stimulated to a resistance to our demands which we had not met with at first, though many of them fled with their herds and flocks before us across the Susquehanna. The probability, therefore, is that before we got ready to fight Meade in his position when found, our army would have been without the food necessary to sustain it, and we would have been compelled to retreat without fighting another battle. To sustain the horses and mules of the army alone, a very large amount of forage was necessary, and that part of the country did not afford it.

The failure, therefore, to seize the heights on the afternoon of the 1st, whoever may have been responsible for it, cannot be legitimately assigned as one of the causes of our failure at Gettysburg. That may have prevented the battle from taking place there, but if we had been compelled to retire from want of provisions without fighting, that would have equally been a failure of the campaign as a decisive one.

I may go further and say, that even a capture of those heights on the 2nd or 3rd of July would have been of no avail to us, unless we could have inflicted on the enemy a decisive and crushing defeat.

If we had merely been able to drive the enemy from the heights and occupy them ourselves, without being able to follow him up and destroy his army or materially cripple it, we would have had but a barren victory instead of a drawn battle, as I regarded it, or a repulse, as others style it. In that event, also, we would have had to retire for want of supplies, and the enemy could soon have recovered from the blow by another levy of troops.

The concentration of Meade's army at that point, after the success on our part on the 1st, coming up as it did in detail, did give us the opportunity of striking him a decisive blow, which we would not otherwise have obtained. When he was bringing up his corps to Cemetery Ridge, one at a time, to use a war phrase very common with correspondents and editors, "we had him just where we wanted him." General Lee saw and recognized at once the great opportunity furnished him, and determined to avail him-

self of it, by striking while Meade was hurrying up his troops and before all could arrive and be put in position. I believe all now agree, that the fullest success would have attended the effort if the blow had been struck in the morning or forenoon of the 2nd, as it should have been, and as was General Lee's purpose.

If there had before remained any doubt as to who was responsible for the failure to strike the blow at the proper time, the very clear and explicit statement by General Hood, which is a most valuable contribution to the history of the battle, would settle that doubt beyond dispute, I think.

General Hood's statement furnishes information not before given, in regard to the time of the arrival on the ground of Longstreet's troops, and renders it very certain that the orders for the attack to begin were given very early in the morning, if not the night before. It is to be remarked, that no member of General Lee's staff can tell when those orders were given, and what was their precise character. It is very manifest that they were given in person, and orally, as was often General Lee's practice.

The objection which General Hood made in regard to attacking up the Emmettsburg road, would not have existed in the morning or forenoon, because the Round Tops were not then occupied, and it was the delay in the attack that produced the difficulty he mentions.

The statement of General, then Colonel, Alexander, that the duty and responsibility of ordering Pickett's division to begin the charge on the 3rd was devolved on him by the corps commander, is one calculated to excite profound if not painful attention and interest.

I may add in connection with my previous remarks in regard to the want of decisive results from a mere capture of the heights of Gettysburg, that if we had gained them, and Meade had attacked us and been repulsed, or if we had moved to our right to threaten his communications and he had attacked us, and then been repulsed, such repulse would also have been barren of beneficial results, unless it had ensured the destruction or demoralization of his army. The same considerations apply to both cases.

I have never thought that our failure at Gettysburg was due to the absence of Stuart's cavalry, though I can well understand the perplexity and annoyance it caused General Lee before the enemy.

was found. He was found, however, without the aid of cavalry, and when found, though by accident, he furnished us the opportunity to strike him a fatal blow. When Hooker was crossing the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry, it was simply impossible for Stuart to cross that stream between that point and Harper's Ferry, as Hooker was keeping up his communications with that place, and the interval was narrow. Stuart's only alternatives, therefore, were to cross west of the Blue Ridge, at Shepherdstown or Williamsport, or east of Hooker's Crossing. He selected the latter, in accordance with a discretion given him; and it is doubtful whether the former would have enabled him to fulfill General Lee's expectations, as Hooker immediately threw one corps to Knoxville, on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, a short distance below Harper's Ferry, and three to Middletown, in the Catoctin Valley, while the passes of the South Mountain were seized and guarded, and Buford's division of cavalry moved on that flank. It is difficult, therefore, to perceive of what more avail in ascertaining and reporting the movements of the Federal army Stuart's cavalry could have been if it had moved on the west of South Mountain, than individual scouts employed for that purpose, while it is very certain that his movement on the other flank greatly perplexed and bewildered the Federal commanders, and compelled them to move slower. It is not improbable, however, that it would have been better for him to hurry on, and not meddle with the wagon-train he captured—but, then the temptation was so great to a poor Confederate.

I will now notice a statement Colonel Taylor has made in reference to the conference General Lee had with Ewell, Rodes, and myself at the close of the 1st day of July. In his memorandum the Colonel says:

"Later General Lee rode over to General Ewell's front, and conferred as to the future movements. He wanted to follow up the success gained; thought that with Johnson's division, then up, General Ewell could go forward at dawn next day. Ewell, Early, and Rodes thought it best to await Longstreet's arrival, and make the main attack on the enemy's left. This was determined on. Longstreet was then about four miles off, with two of his divisions."

The statement about this conference in the paper from the *Philadelphia Times* is not entirely accurate; but I will not notice

that specially, as I propose to give a full, detailed account of the conference itself.

The statement in reference to it contained in the memorandum is susceptible of the construction that General Lee wanted to go forward at dawn the next day, though Longstreet should not be up, and that Ewell, Rodes and myself opposed the proposition, and insisted that we should await Longstreet's arrival. Yet Gen. Lee has shown, again and again, especially in the extract from his report I have already given, that his purpose was to avoid a general engagement until his army was concentrated. Col. Taylor is under a serious misapprehension as to that conference, and as I am the only surviving person who was present at it, no one else being there but Generals Lee, Ewell, Rodes, and myself, I will state what occurred. I had ridden to see about the condition of Hays' and Hoke's brigades, which were in uncomfortable proximity to the enemy's position on Cemetery Hill, and had to keep under cover from his artillery fire, as well as the fire of his sharpshooters, and maintain a constant lookout, and while there I was sent for by General Ewell. On reaching him I found General Lee, himself and Rodes in the porch, or, rather, I should say arbor, attached to the house already mentioned. No one else was there, and at that time all idea of advancing that night against the heights beyond Gettysburg for the purpose of attack had been abandoned, as it was then after sunset. I was soon given to understand that Gen. Lee's purpose was to ascertain our condition, what we knew of the enemy and his position, and what we could probably do next day. It was evident from the first that it was his purpose to attack the enemy as early as possible next day—at daylight, if practicable. This was a proposition the propriety of which was so apparent that there was not the slightest discussion or difference of opinion upon it. It was a point taken for granted. After we had given General Lee all the information we possessed, addressing us conjointly, he asked: "Can't you, with your corps, attack on this flank at daylight to-morrow?" I was the first to speak, for I had examined more thoroughly and critically than the others the enemy's position east of Gettysburg, extending along Cemetery Hill and the adjacent heights to Culp's Hill, as my two brigades immediately confronted it, and it was peculiarly my duty to do so. Moreover, I had been in Gettysburg the week before,



when there was no enemy there, and had noticed the general character of the surrounding country; and, while I was seeking that afternoon to have a further advance made, I had observed that on our right of the town (northwest of it) the ascent to the ridge was much easier and gentler than on the other side, as well as that the Round Tops commanded the whole position, though I did not then know their names.

The purport of what I said was, that the ground over which we would have to advance on our flank was very rugged and steep; that the enemy was then evidently concentrating and fortifying in our immediate front, and by morning would probably have the greater part of his force concentrated on that flank and the position strongly fortified, as ours were the only troops then confronting him in close proximity; that we could not move through the town in line of battle, and would therefore have to go on the left of the town right up against Cemetery Hill and the rugged hills on the left of it; and that the result of an attack there might be doubtful, but if successful it would inevitably be at very great loss. I then called General Lee's attention to the Round Tops, the outline of which we could see, though dusk was approaching, and suggested that those heights must evidently command the enemy's position and render it untenable; and I also called his attention to the more practicable nature of the ascents on that side of the town, adding the suggestion that the attack could be made on that side, and from our right flank, with better chances of success.

With these views both Ewell and Rodes coincided, and they submitted further considerations in the same direction. There was some conversation upon the several points suggested, when General Lee, being satisfied that it was not advisable to make the main assault from our flank, remarked, interrogatively: "Then perhaps I had better draw you around towards my right, as the line will be very long and thin if you remain here, and the enemy may come down and break through it?" This was very nearly the language he used, and I spoke at once in reply, for it was a conceded fact that the arrival of my division had decided the fortunes of the day, and I did not like the idea of giving up anything we had gained. My men, who had marched to the Susquehanna and returned without serious opposition, were very much elated with the success of the day, and I shared their feelings. I knew

what a damper it would be to their enthusiasm to be withdrawn from the position they had gained by fighting, as it might appear to them as if a reverse had occurred somewhere and we had not gained much of a victory after all. Moreover, there were some of my wounded not in a condition to be removed, and I did not like the idea of leaving those brave fellows to the mercy of the enemy; and there were a great many muskets stacked in the streets of Gettysburg which I did not want to lose. So I replied at once to General Lee, and assured him that he need not fear that the enemy would break through our line, and that we could repulse any force he could send against us. The fact was, that on that part of the line it was more difficult for the enemy to come down from the heights to attack us than for us to ascend them to attack him, as difficult as the latter would have been.

Ewell and Rodes again argued with me, and urged views of their own, the fact being that I merely spoke first. I do not recollect that during all this time Longstreet's name or corps was mentioned. If it was, it was only on the assumption that he would certainly be up during the night, of which neither of us doubted. We knew that Longstreet had been at Chambersburg when Gen. Lee had sent the order to Ewell at Carlisle for the concentration of the army, and that Ewell had then sent it to me at York, with the information that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac and was moving north. York is thirty-two miles from Gettysburg by the direct route, the McAdamized road, while I believe Chambersburg is only twenty-five, certainly not more than thirty from the same place. After getting my orders by the circuitous route mentioned, I had moved from York, by the way of Heidlersburg, several miles further than by the direct route, and Rodes had come from Carlisle, and we had both reached Gettysburg in time to participate in the first day's fight, which closed about 4 P. M. We, therefore, had no thought but that Longstreet would be up in time to begin the battle at dawn next morning; and that question did not enter at all into the considerations that governed us in our views. The first mention of Longstreet's name in connection with the attack was in this wise: When General Lee had heard our views, both in regard to attacking from our flank and our being removed towards the right, he said, in these very words, which are indelibly impressed on my memory: "Well, if I attack

from my right, Longstreet will have to make the attack;" and after a moment's pause, during which he held his head down in deep thought, he raised it and added: "Longstreet is a very good fighter when he gets in position and gets everything ready, but he is *so slow*." The emphasis was just as I have given it, and the words seemed to come from General Lee with pain. I give this expression by General Lee now with great hesitation. I have mentioned it to personal friends often, but have had very great doubts about giving publicity to it, for reasons that will readily occur. But occurrences have taken place and disclosures made which now justify, in my estimation, its publication, if they do not imperatively demand it.\* As Colonel Taylor has given a version of the conference which is not correct, and refers to Longstreet's name in a relation which it did not bear to that conference, I think the present the proper time for stating all that transpired on that occasion.

Ewell, Rodes, and myself all knew that Longstreet did not move or manœuvre with the celerity that characterized Jackson, and had been transmitted, in a great measure, to the officers and troops who had served under him, and, therefore, we were not surprised to learn that Longstreet was rather slow in his movements; but I was a little startled to hear it from General Lee, with the emphasis he gave the assertion, both in his manner and the intonation of his voice, as well as the time of making it. We knew, however, that Longstreet had a corps of very fine fighting men, equal to any in the army, and we had no doubt that he would be up in time to make the attack, and that it would certainly be made early enough to ensure the victory, for of the latter we did not permit ourselves to doubt for a moment.

The part we proposed to ourselves to perform in achieving that victory, was to follow up the success that might be gained on the right, and pursue and destroy the enemy's forces when they had been thrown in disorder by the capture of the commanding positions on their left. We did not, therefore, by any means, propose to play the part of passive spectators.

The remark of General Lee which I have given, demonstrates the strong conviction he had of the necessity of an attack at a

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\* The appearance in the Philadelphia *Weekly Times* of General Longstreet's paper on Gettysburg has removed the last scruple on this point.

very early hour in the morning, and of promptness and celerity in making it; and it has a very great significance in the light of subsequent results.

We were then given to understand that the attack should begin from our right at daylight in the morning, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and that a diversion should be made on our flank to favor it, with the direction to make that diversion a real attack on discovering any disorder or symptoms of giving way on the enemy's part—which latter is what is meant by a favorable opportunity.

This is substantially a correct narrative of what was said and concluded upon at the conference referred to, and it will be seen that Colonel Taylor is under a serious misapprehension in regard to it.

I do not wish it to be understood, by any means, that I claim for myself, or for Ewell, Rodes, and myself conjointly, the origination of the plan that was adopted for the battle, or that Gen. Lee consulted us for the purpose of being governed by our views. He did not regard his officers as mere machines to execute his will, but he treated them as thinking beings, capable of reasoning, and even aiding him by their suggestions about matters with which they were familiar, in arriving at his conclusions. He had likewise a profound knowledge of human nature, and it was his custom to talk freely to officers about movements they were to make, get their views about the proper mode of making them, in order to ascertain whether they could be relied upon for the work in hand, adopt any judicious views they might suggest, and leave them under the impression that they were carrying out plans in the formation of which they had some part; for he knew that one of the very first elements of success was a confidence on the part of an officer entrusted with a movement in its feasibility, and therefore sought to enlist all his energies in the task entrusted to him by a little humoring of his self-love.

He sought information from us on this occasion about the matters mentioned because he thought we possessed it, and he heard with attention our suggestions, because he expected us to perform an important part in the ensuing operations. From the very nature of things, he could not rely on his own observation to find out everything necessary to enable him to discharge the functions



of Commander-in-Chief, and had very often to rely on the eyes and ears of others.

When he left us on this occasion, I was so firmly impressed with the conviction that the battle was to open at daylight next morning that I rode into Gettysburg, and, as soon as it was dark enough to avoid observation, I drew Hays' brigade out of the town, to the left of it, and posted it on a line with Hoke's, under cover of the low ridge already mentioned, not far from the base of Cemetery Hill, so as to be ready at the earliest moment. The facts subsequently developed show that we were right in anticipating that the enemy would concentrate in our immediate front, and strongly fortify the position during the night. He concentrated on that flank not only the First, Eleventh, and Twelfth corps, but the Second and Fifth, as they arrived, and all of them remained there until the morning was considerably advanced. In fact, Meade says that he had contemplated making a vigorous attack from that flank on our left, until Slocum reported that the character of the ground in front was unfavorable for making the attack. Had we, therefore, attacked on that flank early in the morning, we would have been met by overwhelming numbers, and a bloody repulse must have been the consequence.

I will here remark that it appears, from Ewell's statement, that General Lee, after dark, renewed the proposition to draw our corps to the right, but, upon his representation of the feasibility of taking Culp's Hill without a fight, concluded to let us remain where we were. If I heard of that fact at the time, it had escaped my memory.

I will now notice some statements by Colonels Allan and Taylor in regard to the fighting on the 2d.

The former says :

"Longstreet's attack on the Federal left on the 2d was delayed beyond the expected time, and was not promptly seconded by Hill and Ewell when made. Ewell's divisions were not made to act in concert—Johnson, Early, Rodes attacking in succession."

His third condition for a successful result is thus stated :

"Third. Had Ewell made his attack in the afternoon of the 2d at the same time as Longstreet, instead of later, and then not 'piece-meal,' so that Early was beaten back before Rodes was ready to support him."

Colonel Allan should have been a little more circumspect in his statement and discriminating in his comments. In the paragraph of his report immediately following what I have before quoted, Ewell says:

"Early in the morning (2d) I received a communication from the General commanding, the tenor of which was that he intended the main attack to be made by the First corps, on our right, and wished me as soon as their guns opened to make a diversion in their favor, to be converted into a real attack if an opportunity offered."

This is in accord with General Lee's own statement, except that he calls it "a simultaneous demonstration." Now, Colonel Allan ought to know that neither Rodes, Johnson, nor myself, from the nature of the ground, could move from our positions to the front without making a real attack, and then the whole should have gone forward. This was not contemplated by General Lee. The only mode of making a demonstration on our flank was to open a heavy artillery fire, and hold the troops in readiness to advance when the opportunity spoken of arrived. That was done. The opportunity referred to could only be when a considerable success was achieved on our right, and the enemy in front of the left thrown into confusion, or it was discovered that he had considerably weakened his force there. The order given early in the morning was in accordance with the instructions given us at the conference of the evening before. It was expected that the attack would begin at an early hour, before all the enemy's troops were up, and when his left was weak. The procrastination that had taken place on the right was excessively wearying and annoying, and had deranged everything. The success anticipated from the attack in the early morning did not follow that made late in the afternoon. It was not a part of the programme that Ewell's real attack should be simultaneous with that of Longstreet, and therefore he is not liable to the censure of having delayed that attack too long, as would seem to be the inference from Colonel Allan's remark. My understanding at the time was that, after the partial success attending the attack on the right, General Lee directed Ewell to make an attack from his position. Ewell ordered that attack to be made by his whole corps. Rodes and myself were to be in readiness to begin the attack as soon as Johnson's muskets

should be heard on the left. The reason for this was that Johnson confronted a wooded hill, and had to feel his way through the woods with skirmishers to find the enemy, while the ground over which Rodes and myself had to move was open, and there was no need of skirmishers, but when we started we could go right on. My two brigades started promptly at the sound of Johnson's muskets, moved over the space intervening between them and the base of Cemetery Hill, fought their way up the face of that hill, over stone fences or walls held by successive lines of infantry, and got into the works on the top of the hill while Johnson was yet fighting on the slopes of Culp's Hill. There was, then, no work by "piece-meal," so far as Johnson and myself were concerned, nor is the remark that Ewell's divisions were not made to act in concert applicable to us. Colonel Allan should have recollected that he was writing for the use of one engaged in writing a history of that battle, and not made his charge of want of concert so broad. I believe that if Rodes had advanced at the time designated, especially if one of Hill's divisions on his right had co-operated, we would then have gained permanent possession of that hill; but I am not willing to submit to the imputation of a want of concert or co-operation so far as I am concerned, and I insist that the proper discrimination should be made.

The assertion that "Early was beaten back before Rodes was ready to support him" is a mode of characterizing that brilliant charge by my two brigades that does them great injustice. Prof. Bates' description of that charge contains some of the finest writing in his book, and is very graphic, as well as correct in its main features, though he over-estimates very greatly the numbers contained in my two brigades, especially Hays', as well as the loss sustained by them.

Colonel Taylor gives General Rodes' explanation of his failure to advance as follows:

"General Rodes, who was on General Early's right, states in his report that, after he had conferred with General Early on his left and General Lane on his right, and arranged to attack in concert, he proceeded at once to make the necessary preparations; but, as he had to draw his troops out of town by the flank, change the direction of the line of battle, and then traverse a distance of twelve or fourteen hundred yards, while Early had to move only half that distance, without change of front, it resulted that, be-

fore he drove in the enemy's skirmishers, General Early had attacked and been compelled to withdraw."

I am very far from intending to reflect in the slightest degree on General Rodes, of whom I had a very high appreciation as a man and a soldier, and to whose skill, gallantry and efficiency I have borne the fullest testimony when speaking of his unfortunate death in a most brilliant charge, under my command, against vastly superior numbers. He was new in his position of division commander at Gettysburg, but when killed at Winchester, on the 18th of September, 1864, he had learned to be less sensitive about his flanks, and would not at that day have given such an explanation of his failure to co-operate in an attack similar to that made by Johnson and myself at Gettysburg.

When Ewell's order was received I prepared for the attack by issuing the necessary orders to my brigades which were already in position, and I saw that they started promptly at the signal, and Professor Bates is not far wrong when he says they moved "with the steadiness and precision of parade."

He further says:

"As the rebels came within range, Howard's infantry, who had lain completely protected by the stone wall, poured in volley after volley, sweeping down the charging host. But that resolute body of men believed themselves invincible, and now, with the eyes of both armies upon them, they would not break so long as any were left to go forward. The stone walls were passed at a bound, and when once among the Union men, Stevens was obliged to cease firing for fear of killing friend and foe alike, and Weideriek was unable to withstand the shock, his supports and his own men being swept back with a whirlwind's force."

The two brigades, one of Louisianians and the other North Carolinians, continued to ascend the hill while a blaze of fire covered its face, until they reached the enemy's works and entered them. While fighting for the possession of the guns in the enemy's works, a brigade and three regiments were brought from the front, which Rodes should have assaulted, and after a sharp struggle my brigades were compelled to retire, but not in disorder. Hays' men brought off 100 prisoners and four battle-flags, captured from the enemy, and the North Carolinians brought back their gallant leader, Colonel Isaac E. Avery, in an expiring condition. There was no more dashing charge than that made during the



war by any command, and my brave Louisianians and Carolinians were the first to enter the enemy's works at Gettysburg. Now, to have their brilliant exploit characterized as part of an attack by "piecemeal," in which, "Early was beaten back before Rodes was ready to support him," is worse than being "damned with faint praise," or having one's name spelt wrong in a bulletin.

When my brigades started I sent word to Rodes that I was moving, and while they were making their way up the rugged slopes of Cemetery Hill, I sent again to urge him to go forward, the message being repeated more than once, but he did not start. I have nothing to say in regard to the causes of his delay, except that I imagine that he and the division commander on his right were discussing the question as to whether the latter should also move, while the time was passing when they could advance with chances of success. I submit that in describing this affair a discrimination should be made between Johnson's and my divisions and Rodes.' There was no attack here by "piecemeal" in any sense. Johnson and I attacked together, but Rodes did not attack at all.

Ewell gave the order for a simultaneous advance of the whole corps, and the failure of Rodes' division to go forward is the solitary instance of remissness on the part of any portion of the corps in the battle.

In regard to this, General Ewell says:

"Major-General Rodes did not advance for reasons given in his report. Before beginning my advance I had sent a staff officer to the division of the Third corps on my right, which proved to be General Pender's, to find out what they were to do. He reported the division under command of General Lane (who succeeded Pender, wounded), and who sent word back that the only order he had received from General Pender was to attack if a favorable opportunity presented. I then wrote to him that I was about attacking with my corps, and requesting that he would co-operate. To this I received no answer, nor do I believe that any advance was made. The want of co-operation on the right made it more difficult for Rodes' division to attack, though had it been otherwise I have every reason to believe, from the eminent success attending the assault of Hays and Avery, that the enemy's lines would have been carried."

Immediately following his statement of Rodes' explanation, Col Taylor says: "The whole affair was disjointed."

He should have recollected that an army in battle array is like a complicated machine, in which, when the motor that starts the whole fails to obey the control and guidance of the engineer, all the parts are powerless or are thrown out of joint.

It is a little remarkable that there is such an industrious search after causes for our failure to achieve a great victory at Gettysburg, when there is an all-sufficient cause staring us in the face, patent and palpable, which fully explains and accounts for that failure—namely, the most extraordinary procrastination and delay in carrying out the orders for the attacks on the 2d and 3d days, upon which the whole battle hinged. To be hunting for other causes in the miscarriage of dependent and minor operations, is like examining an engine to ascertain whether some of its parts are out of order, when the piston-rod fails to move on opening the valve that lets on the steam, because the fireman has omitted to kindle his fires; or looking into the delicate machinery of a watch with a microscope to discover whether some of the cogs are broken, or dust impedes their working, when the hands cease to move because the main-spring is broken.

J. A. EARLY.

NOTE.—When William the Conqueror invaded England, he was compelled to sustain his army by foraging or pillaging, which he did by spreading his army over the country adjacent to the coast. When Harold assembled his army to meet that of the invader, instead of attacking the latter, he moved near enough to William to check his ravages, and took position on the hill of Jenlac, near Hastings, and strongly entrenched his army. This covered London and compelled William to concentrate his army to insure its safety, and it has been well remarked, that “with a host subsisting by pillage, to concentrate is to starve, and no alternative was left to William but a decisive victory or ruin.” William, therefore, decided to attack at once, and after a bloody battle the victory of Hastings resulted in securing to him and his descendants the throne of England, while it placed him among the foremost captains of the world. General Lee’s army in Pennsylvania was in some respects in the same condition of William’s. It had to subsist entirely by foraging on the country, which it could do only by spreading over it, and concentration with it meant starvation. When, therefore, Meade moved his army near enough to General Lee’s to render concentration necessary, the only alternative left the latter was a battle or a retreat. He realized that fact, and after speaking in his report of the difficulty of withdrawing through the mountains, he says: “At the same time we were unable to wait an attack, as the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies in the presence of the enemy, who could restrain our foraging parties by holding the mountain passes with local and other troops.” It would have been the merest folly for Meade to attack us, whether we took position on the heights of Gettysburg or by moving around his left, at some other point. Time would have accomplished all he desired, and the idea of a campaign on “the offensive-strategical but defensive-tactical plan” of General Longstreet, for an invading army subsisting on the country, was a simple absurdity.

**Supplement to General Early's Review.—Reply to General Longstreet.**

[We had intended to have published in this No. of our PAPERS General Longstreet's letter to the *Philadelphia Times*. For while we are, of course, under no obligation to *copy what is published elsewhere*, we are desirous of getting at the whole truth, and wish to give every side a fair hearing. But the great length of General Longstreet's article compells us to postpone it for another issue. Meantime, General Longstreet's paper has been widely circulated, and it is due to fairness and a proper desire to aid the search for truth that we should give, as we do without note or comment of our own, the following rejoinder of General Early.]

After the foregoing review was in the hands of the printer, an article entitled "The campaign of Gettysburg," purporting to be by General James Longstreet, appeared in the *Philadelphia Weekly Times* of November the 3rd, which requires some notice at my hands. That article is not from General Longstreet's own pen, as is very apparent to those who are familiar with his style of writing, and of the fact I have the assurance from a quarter that leaves no doubt on the subject. The data and material for the article, however, were furnished by him and put in form by another. He is therefore responsible for its statements and utterances. The excuse for the appearance of the article is stated as follows:

After giving a letter, written on the 24th of July, 1863, to his uncle, he says:

"I sincerely regret that I cannot still rest upon that letter. But I have been so repeatedly and so rancorously assailed by those whose intimacy with the Commanding-General in that battle gives an apparent importance to their assaults, that I feel impelled by a sense of duty to give to the public a full and comprehensive narration of the campaign from its beginning to its end; especially when I reflect that the publication of the truth cannot now, as it might have done then, injure the cause for which we fought the battle."

The temper towards General Lee in which the article was written, or rather procured to be written, is shown by the following extract from an editorial notice of some additions to the article received after it was in print, contained in the same number of the *Times*:

The editor says:

"The letter from General Longstreet which accompanies these enclosures dwells particularly upon a point which he wishes to have his readers understand, as the justification of his present narrative. It is that while General Lee on the battle-field assumed all the responsibility for the result, he afterwards published a report that differs from the report he made at the time while under that generous spirit. General Longstreet and other officers made their official reports upon the battle shortly after its occurrence, and while they were impressed with General Lee's noble assumption of all the blame; but General Lee having since written a detailed and somewhat critical account of the battle—and the account from which General Longstreet's critics get all their points against him—Longstreet feels himself justified in discussing the battle upon its merits. It is in recognition of his soldiery modesty that the substance of his letter is given here; the article is its own sufficient justification."

This is a direct imputation upon the motives that governed Gen. Lee in writing his detailed report, if it does not impeach his veracity, and place him among General Longstreet's assailants.

General Longstreet ranks me among the assailants whose attacks call for this vindication of himself and criticism of General Lee, and in that connection he says:

"It was asserted by General Pendleton, with whom the carefulness of statement or deliberateness of judgment has never been a characteristic, but who has been distinguished by the unreliability of his memory, that General Lee ordered me to attack the enemy at sunrise on the 2d. General J. A. Early has, in positive terms, endorsed this charge, which I now proceed to disprove."

General Longstreet is exceedingly careless in his statements, as I have had occasion before to demonstrate, and, while to some it may be a matter of surprise when I assert that there is no foundation whatever for the statement that I endorsed either General Pendleton's or anybody else's assertion that the order was given by General Lee to General Longstreet to attack at sunrise on the morning of the 2d of July at Gettysburg, those familiar with the controversy that arose out of a bitter assault by General Longstreet on myself will not be at all astonished. In my official report, dated in the month of August, 1863, after giving an account of the operations of the 1st of July, I say: "Having been informed that the greater portion of the rest of our army would move up during the night, and that the enemy's position



would be attacked on the right and left flanks very early next morning, I gave orders to General Hays to move his brigade, under cover of the night, from the town into the field on the left of it, where it would not be exposed to the enemy's fire, and would be in position to advance on Cemetery Hill when a favorable opportunity should occur. This movement was made, and Hays formed his brigade on the right of Avery, and just behind the extension of the low ridge on which a portion of the town is located. The attack did not begin in the morning of next day, as was expected, and in the course of the morning I rode with Gen. Ewell to examine and select a position for artillery."

Here is a statement of a fact while its recollection was fresh in my memory, and it cannot surely be said that it was made for the purpose of attacking General Longstreet's war record "because of political differences," or from any other motive.

On the 19th of January, 1872, the anniversary of General Lee's birth, I delivered an address at Washington and Lee University, by invitation of the faculty, and in that address, after speaking of the fight on the 1st at Gettysburg, I said:

"General Lee had ordered the concentration of his army at Cashtown, and the battle on this day, brought on by the advance of the enemy's cavalry, was unexpected to him. When he ascertained the advantage that had been gained, he determined to press it as soon as the remainder of his army arrived. In a conference with General Ewell, General Rodes and myself, when he did reach us, after the enemy had been routed, he expressed his determination to assault the enemy's position at daylight on the next morning, and wished to know whether we could make the attack from our flank—the left—at the designated time. We informed him of the fact that the ground immediately in our front, leading to the enemy's position, furnished much greater obstacles to a successful assault than existed at any other point, and we concurred in suggesting to him that, as our corps (Ewell's) constituted the only troops then immediately confronting the enemy, he would manifestly concentrate and fortify against us during the night, as proved to be the case, according to subsequent information. He then determined to make the attack from our right on the enemy's left, and left us for the purpose of ordering up Longstreet's corps in time to begin the attack at dawn next morning. That corps was not in readiness to make the attack until 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day. By that time Meade's whole army had arrived on the field and taken its position. Had the attack been made at daylight, as contemplated, it must have resulted in a brilliant victory, as all of Meade's army had not then arrived, and a

very small portion of it was in position. A considerable portion of his army did not get up until after sunrise, one corps not arriving until 2 o'clock in the afternoon; and a prompt advance to the attack must have resulted in his defeat in detail. The position which Longstreet attacked at four was not occupied by the enemy until late in the afternoon, and Round Top Hill, which commanded the enemy's position, could have been taken in the morning without a struggle. The attack was made by two divisions, and though the usual gallantry was displayed by the troops engaged in it, no material advantage was gained."

This constituted my sole criticism on Longstreet's operations on the 2nd day. In speaking of the assault on the 3rd day, I said:

"On the next day, when the assault was made by Pickett's division in such gallant style, there was again a miscarriage in not properly supporting it according to the plan and orders of the Commanding-General. You must recollect that a Commanding-General cannot do the actual marching and fighting of his army. These must, necessarily, be entrusted to his subordinates, and any hesitation, delay, or miscarriage in the execution of his orders, may defeat the best-devised schemes. Contending against such odds as we did, it was necessary, always, that there should be the utmost dispatch, energy, and undoubting confidence in carrying out the plans of the Commanding-General. A subordinate who undertakes to doubt the wisdom of his superior's plans, and enters upon their execution with reluctance and distrust, will not be likely to ensure success. It was General Jackson's unhesitating confidence and faith in the chances of success that caused it so often to perch on his banners, and made him such an invaluable executor of General Lee's plans. If Mr. Swinton has told the truth, in repeating in his book what is alleged to have been said to him by General Longstreet, there was at least one of General Lee's corps commanders at Gettysburg who did not enter upon the execution of his plans with that confidence and faith necessary to success, and hence, perhaps, it was not achieved."

The foregoing constituted all the criticisms I had made on Gen. Longstreet's operations at Gettysburg, or on any other theatre during the war, previous to the controversy before alluded to. The views in regard to the delay in the attack on the 2nd had been repeated more succinctly in notes to my own report, which was published in the September and October numbers of the *Southern Magazine* for the year 1872. No where do I assert that General Lee had ordered General Longstreet to make the attack at sunrise, or at any other specific time. I merely state that he had announced to Generals Ewell, Rodes, and myself his purpose

to attack at dawn on the morning of the 2nd, and that he had left us for the purpose of ordering up Longstreet's troops to begin the attack at that time. I do not know what were the specific orders given to Longstreet, and in that respect I am as good a witness for him as either of those he has produced, who simply do not know what were the orders given, nor when they were given. These orders were manifestly given in person, and no living man can say precisely what they were, except General Longstreet, if he indeed recollects them.

I was prompted to make the remarks I did make in my address at the Washington and Lee University from the fact that I had read Mr. Swinton's "Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac," and discovered that his criticisms on General Lee's conduct of the battle of Gettysburg, which are amplified in those now made in General Longstreet's name with a great similarity of expression in several respects, was based on information given by the latter to Mr. Swinton after the war. I here give some extracts from Swinton's book:

On page 340 he says:

"Indeed, in entering on the campaign, General Lee expressly promised his corps commanders that he would not assume a tactical offensive, but force his antagonist to attack him. Having, however, gotten a taste of blood in the considerable success of the first day, the Confederate commander seems to have lost that equipoise in which his faculties commonly moved, and he determined to give battle."

There is a foot note to this statement as follows:

"This and subsequent revelations of the purposes and sentiments of Lee I derive from General Longstreet, who, in a full and free conversation with the writer after the close of the war, threw much light on the motives and conduct of Lee during this campaign."

On pages 340-1, he says:

"Longstreet, holding the right of the Confederate line, had one flank securely posted on the Emmetsburg road, so that he was really between the Army of the Potomac and Washington, and by marching towards Frederick could undoubtedly have manœvered Meade out of the Gettysburg position. This operation Gen. Longstreet, who foreboded the worst from an attack on the army in position, and was anxious to hold General Lee to his promise, begged in vain to be allowed to execute."



To this there is a foot note as follows:

"The officer named is my authority for this statement."

On page 358 there is this foot note:

"The absence of Pickett's division on the day before made General Longstreet very loth to make the attack; but Lee, thinking the Union force was not all up, would not wait. Longstreet urged in reply that this advantage (or *supposed* advantage, for the Union force *was* all up) was countervailed by the fact that *he* was not all up either, but the Confederate commander was not minded to delay. My authority is again General Longstreet."

These uncontradicted statements by Swinton, the genuineness of which is now verified by similar statements under General Longstreet's direct authority, not only justified me in the remarks I made, but imperatively demanded a defence of General Lee against the severe criticisms based on them, in the address delivered on the occasion referred to, which necessarily involved a review of his military career. When General Longstreet had thus thrown down the gauntlet, he had no right to complain that a friend of General Lee took it up.

After he had begun to muddy the stream at as early a period as twenty days after the battle of Gettysburg, by his letter to his uncle, and when he resumed the work then begun immediately after the war by his communications to Mr. Swinton, his complaint now of being "rancorously assailed by those whose intimacy with the Commanding-General in that battle gives an apparent importance to their assaults," brings to mind very forcibly the fable of the wolf and the lamb.

In February, 1876, he made a bitter assault on myself, among others, in a long article published in a New Orleans paper, the gravamen of his complaint against me being the remarks about Gettysburg contained in my address which I have given.

I replied to him, and I think I demonstrated beyond all question that he was responsible for the loss of the battle of Gettysburg.

I did not in either of my articles in reply to him assert that an order was given him to attack at sunrise on the 2nd. As before stated, I do not know what orders were given him, nor when they were given. I only know the declared purpose of General Lee, and I cannot believe that he did not take every step necessary to



carry that purpose into effect, as every consideration required the attack on the morning of the 2nd to be made at the very earliest hour practicable.

The testimony General Longstreet has adduced is very far from establishing the fact that General Lee did not direct the attack to be made by him at a much earlier hour than that at which it was made.

Before referring to that testimony, I desire to say that the statement contained in the article in the *Times*, that the information of the crossing of the Potomac by the Federal army was received from a scout on the night of the 29th of June is erroneous. Gen. Longstreet's own report, as well as General Lee's detailed one, show that the information was received on the night of the 28th. If it had not been received until the night of the 29th, it would have been impossible for the order to return to reach me at York by the way of Carlisle in time for me to begin my march back early enough on the 30th to reach Gettysburg in time for the fight on the 1st of July. The fact was that I received the order on the morning of the 29th at York, with the information that the enemy had crossed the Potomac and was moving north.

The statements of Colonel Taylor and Marshall, and of Gen. Long, as given by General Longstreet, that they knew nothing of an order to attack at "sunrise," amount to nothing. They had no personal knowledge of the orders that were given, or of the time when they were given. That is all their testimony amounts to. But General Longstreet omits a very important and significant part of General Long's letter. That letter, a copy of which I have, goes on to say, immediately after the part given by General Longstreet:

"As my memory now serves me, it was General Lee's intention to attack the enemy on the second of July as early as practicable; and it is my impression that he issued orders to that effect. I inferred that such was the case from the instructions that Gen. Lee gave me on the evening of the first and very early on the morning of the second of July."

See also General Long's letter to me in the August number of the Southern Historical Society Papers.

The letter of Colonel Venable is as follows:

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, *May 11, 1875.*

General JAMES LONGSTREET:

DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 25th ultimo, with regard to Gen. Lee's battle order on the 1st and 2nd of July at Gettysburg, was duly received. I did not know of any order for an attack on the enemy at sunrise on the 2nd, nor can I believe any such order was issued by General Lee. About sunrise on the 2nd of July I was sent by General Lee to General Ewell to ask him what he thought of the advantages of an attack on the enemy from his position. (Colonel Marshall had been sent with a similar order on the night of the 1st.) General Ewell made me ride with him from point to point of his lines, so as to see with him the exact position of things. Before he got through the examination of the enemy's position General Lee came himself to General Ewell's lines. In sending the message to General Ewell, General Lee was explicit in saying that the question was whether he should move all the troops around on the right and attack on that side. I do not think that the errand on which I was sent by the Commanding-General is consistent with the idea of an attack at sunrise by any portion of the army.

Yours, very truly,

CHAS. S. VENABLE.

Can Colonel Venable or any one else believe that General Lee had formed no definite opinion as to how he should attack the enemy until after his return at 9 A. M. on the 2nd from Ewell's line? That, in fact, he did not make up his mind how to begin to begin the attack until 11 A. M., when General Longstreet says the peremptory order was given to him? If that was the case, then he exhibited a remarkable degree of indecision and vacillation, and the responsibility for the procrastination and delay that occurred must rest on him, and on him alone.

That Colonel Venable is sincere in his opinions I do not doubt, but I think his reasoning is illogical and his deductions erroneous.

That General Lee made up his mind promptly to attack the enemy in his position on the Gettysburg Heights, there can be no doubt.

General Longstreet says:

"When I overtook General Lee at 5 o'clock that afternoon, he said, to my surprise, that he thought of attacking General Meade upon the heights the next day. I suggested that this course seemed to be at variance with the plan of the campaign that had been agreed upon before leaving Fredericksburg. He said: "If the enemy is there to-morrow we must attack him."

He then goes on to give a long list of the reasons he urged against the attack, and says of General Lee:

"He, however, did not seem to abandon the idea of attack on the next day. He seemed under a subdued excitement which occasionally took possession of him when "the hunt was up," and threatened his superb equipoise. The sharp battle fought by Hill and Ewell on that day had given him a taste of victory."

Is this Swinton, or Longstreet, or the writer for the *Times*?

It is very clear to my mind that when General Lee found Longstreet so averse to an attack, he rode over to see Ewell, and then ensued that conference of which I have given an account. I can now fully understand the import of his expressions in regard to Longstreet, and his anxiety for the attack to be made by Ewell's corps.

When he rode back from that conference he found Longstreet, for the latter says: "I left General Lee quite late on the night of the first." And he further says: "When I left General Lee on the night of the first, I believe that he had made up his mind to attack, but was confident that he had not yet determined as to when the attack should be made."

Now, General Lee had announced to Ewell, Rodes, and myself his purpose to attack at daylight or as soon thereafter as practicable, and asked whether we could not attack with our corps at that time. No man knew better than he the value of time, and the supreme necessity of attacking before Meade's whole army was up, and is it credible that in talking to Longstreet about the attack he did not once intimate that he desired to attack as early as practicable on the morning of the 2nd, before Meade's army should all be up? Swinton says: "The absence of Pickett's division on the day before made General Longstreet very loth to make the attack; but Lee thinking the Union force was not all up, would not wait." This information he says he got from Longstreet. Is it not very certain, then, that General Lee was determined to make the attack before Meade's army was all up, and discussed with Longstreet the necessity of making the attack before Meade had time to concentrate? Longstreet's continued reluctance to make the attack, manifested no doubt on General Lee's return from Ewell's line, must have caused the sending of Colonel Marshall to Ewell on the night of the first, after the conference I have spoken of.

Longstreet says:

"On the morning of the 2nd I went to General Lee's headquarters at daylight and renewed my views against making an attack. He seemed resolved, however, and we discussed the results."

General Lee had been firmly resolved for near twelve hours to attack the enemy, and to attack him before all of his troops had been concentrated, and is it to be credited for a moment that he had not then made up his mind when he should attack, nor where, nor how? Is it not palpable that, finding Longstreet so persistently averse to the attack, and so loth to take the steps necessary to begin it, he again sent Col. Venable to Ewell to see whether, after viewing the position by daylight, he could not make the attack from his flank. Let us see what General Hood says in his letter to Longstreet. He says:

"I arrived with my staff in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak, as I have already stated, on the morning of the 2d of July. My division soon commenced filing into an open field near me, where the troops were allowed to stack arms and rest until further orders. A short distance in advance of this point, and during the early part of that same morning, we were both engaged, in company with Generals Lee and A. P. Hill, in observing the position of the Federals. General Lee—with coat buttoned to the throat, sabre-hilt buckled around the waist, and field-glasses pending at his side—walked up and down in the shade of large trees near us, halting now and then to observe the enemy. He seemed full of hope, yet at times buried in deep thought.

"Colonel Freemantle, of England, was ensconced in the forks of a tree not far off, with glass in constant use, examining the lofty position of the Federal army.

"General Lee was seemingly anxious that you should attack that morning. He remarked to me: 'The enemy is here, and if we don't whip him he will whip us.' You thought it best to await the arrival of Pickett's division—at that time still in the rear—in order to make the attack; and you said to me subsequently, whilst we were seated together near the trunk of a tree: 'The General is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot off.'

"Thus passed the forenoon of that eventful day when in the afternoon, about 3 o'clock, it was decided to no longer await Pickett's division, but to proceed to our extreme right and attack up the Emmetsburg road."

Can there longer be any question that General Lee wanted Longstreet to begin the attack very early in the morning—as



early as possible, and that the latter threw every obstacle in the way? Doubtless, after sending Colonel Venable to Ewell, General Lee's impatience at Longstreet's opposition to the attack and the delay in the movement of his troops caused him to ride over to Ewell's line to see for himself if it was not practicable to make the attack from that flank. Upon being satisfied that it could not be made to advantage there he rode back and gave the peremptory order—which, Longstreet says, was given at 11 A. M., though he did not begin the attack until about 4 P. M. If, as Colonel Venable supposes, General Lee had been undecided or vacillating as to how, when, and by whom the attack should be made, from 5 P. M. the day before until 11 A. M. of the 2d, when Longstreet acknowledges the receipt of the order, then Longstreet's opinion that "there is no doubt that General Lee during the crisis of that campaign lost the matchless equipoise that usually characterized him, and that whatever mistakes were made were not so much matters of deliberate judgment as the impulses of a great mind disturbed by unparalleled conditions"—that is, in plain English, that General Lee had lost his senses—has some foundation to rest on.

All who know General Lee's mode of giving directions to his subordinates, can well understand how he indicated his purposes and wishes, without resorting to a technical order, and doubtless he indicated to General Longstreet in that way his desire for him to make the attack, and make it at the earliest practicable moment, and did not resort to the peremptory order until the time indicated by General Longstreet. To rely on that is standing upon a mere technicality. But when the order was given at 11 A. M., as acknowledged, why was it that it required until 4 P. M. to begin? The pretense that he made the attack with great promptness, because he attacked before any one else on that day, is simply ridiculous. Every one else was waiting for him to begin, as the orders required them to do. General Ewell, in his report, in speaking of a contemplated movement by Johnson on our extreme left, says:

"Day was now breaking, and it was too late for any change of plans. Meantime orders had come from the General Commanding for me to delay my attack until I heard General Longstreet's guns open on the right."

He is here speaking of the morning of the 2d ; and would Col. Venable have us believe that General Lee had not then made up his mind that Longstreet should open the attack, or communicated his intention to the latter?

There is one thing very certain, and that is that either General Lee or General Longstreet was responsible for the remarkable delay that took place in making the attack. I choose to believe that it was not General Lee, for if any one knew the value of promptness and eelerity in military movements he did. It is equally certain that the delay which occurred in making the attack lost us the victory.

It was very natural that Longstreet's corps should be selected to assume the initiative on the 2nd day at Gettysburg. Neither of his divisions had been at the recent battles at Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, except McLaws', and that division, with the exception of Barksdale's brigade, had not been as heavily engaged there as the other troops. Ewell's corps had captured Winchester and cleared the valley on its advance into Pennsylvania, and two of its divisions, as well as two of Hill's, had been heavily engaged on the first.

Can it be that General Longstreet apprehended that if the advantage gained on the first day was promptly and vigorously prosecuted the chief glory of the battle would devolve on the two corps which had first encountered the enemy and brought him to bay, and hence desired to change the theatre of the battle that was inevitable?

A careful study of the testimony of Meade and his officers, contained in the 1st volume, 2nd series, of the Congressional Report on the Conduct of the War, will satisfy any one that the bulk of the Federal army that was up was massed on the right, confronting Ewell's corps, all the forenoon of the 2nd, and that the Round Tops, the key to the position on the enemy's left were unoccupied until Longstreet's movement began at 4 P. M. The distance which Longstreet's corps had to march from its camp of the night of the 30th, to reach the town of Gettysburg itself, could not have exceeded 15 miles, and it had the whole day of the 1st to make it, though it was somewhat delayed by Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, which got the road first, by moving more promptly it is presumed. The Fifth corps of Meade's army was

23 miles from Gettysburg at the close of the fight on the first day, and the Sixth corps was 36 miles away, yet the former reached the field on the morning of the 2nd, and the latter at 2 P. M.

To show that a great opportunity to inflict a crushing defeat on Meade's army was lost by the failure to make the attack in the morning, I here reproduce what I said on that point in the discussion with General Longstreet which has been mentioned, as follows:

"That General Lee was correct in selecting the enemy's left for his attack, there can be no question, for that was the weakest and most assailable part of the enemy's line. That the possession of Round Top by us would have rendered the position at Gettysburg untenable by the enemy, is proved by the testimony of Meade himself, contained in the same volume of Reports on the Conduct of the War from which I have already quoted, and to which I will refer hereafter by page alone, to prevent unnecessary repetition. On page 332, in describing the attack on Sickles, Meade says: 'At the same time that they threw immense masses on Sickles' corps, a heavy column was thrown upon the Round Top Mountain, which was the key-point of my whole position. If they had succeeded in occupying that, it would have prevented me from holding any of the ground which I subsequently held to the last.' That Sickles did not occupy the position assaulted by General Longstreet until late in the afternoon, is proved by the testimony of Hancock and others. On page 406, Hancock says: 'Every thing remained quiet, except artillery firing and engagements with pickets on our front, until about four o'clock that afternoon, when General Sickles moved out to the front.' After stating that he had made a reconnoissance to ascertain whether an attack could be made on our left, Warren on page 377, says: 'Soon afterwards I rode out with General Meade to examine the left of our line, where Gen. Sickles was. His troops could hardly be said to be in position.' On page 332, Meade says he arrived on the ground where Sickles was, 'a few minutes before 4 o'clock in the afternoon.' That Round Top was unoccupied until after Longstreet's attack began, is proved by the testimony of Warren, who says, on page 377: 'I then went, by General Meade's direction, to what is called Bald Top, and from that point I could see the enemy's lines of battle. I sent word to General Meade that we would at once have to occupy that place very strongly. He sent as quickly as possible, a division of General Sykes' corps; but before they arrived the enemy's line of battle—I should think a mile and a half long—began to advance, and the battle became very heavy at once. The troops under General Sykes arrived barely in time to save Round Top Hill, and they had a very desperate fight to hold it.' During all the forenoon the bulk of Meade's troops which had arrived



were massed on the right (enemy's), as Meade contemplated an attack from that flank—Hancock's corps connected with Howard's, and Sickles was on the left of Hancock, but he did not go into position until the afternoon. On page 405, Hancock says: 'I was placed on the line connecting Cemetery Hill with Little Round Top Mountain, my line, however, not extending to Round Top, probably only about half way. General Sickles was directed to connect with my left and the Round Top Mountain, thus forming a continuous line from Cemetery Hill (which was held by Gen. Howard) to Round Top Mountain.'

"These arrangements were not made until the morning was considerably advanced.

"On page 331, Meade after stating his purpose to make an attack from his right says:

"Major-General Slocum, however, reported that the character of the ground in front was unfavorable to making an attack; and the Sixth corps having so long a distance to march, and leaving at nine o'clock at night, did not reach the scene until about two o'clock in the afternoon. Under these circumstances I abandoned my intention to make an attack from my right, and as soon as the Sixth corps arrived, I directed the Fifth corps, then in reserve on the right, to move over and be in reserve on the left.'

"It was a division of the Fifth corps (General Sykes') that rescued the Round Top from the grasp of our assaulting column. Does not this show how weak the left was in the morning, and how easy it would have then been for our troops on the right to have gotten possession of the key to the position? That General Lee's plans were thwarted by the delay on the right, can any man doubt? On the occasion of the dedication of the Cemetery for the Federal soldiers killed at Gettysburg, Edward Everett, in the presence of President Lincoln, some of his cabinet, many members of Congress and officers of the army, and an immense concourse of citizens, delivered an address, in which he thus graphically describes the effect of the delay that took place:

"And here I cannot but remark on the Providential inaction of the rebel army. Had the conflict been renewed by it at daylight on the 2nd of July, with the First and Eleventh corps exhausted by battle, the Third and Twelfth weary from their forced march, and the Second, Fifth, and Sixth not yet arrived, nothing but a miracle could have saved the army from a great disaster. Instead of this the day dawned, the sun rose, the cool hours of the morning passed, and a considerable part of the afternoon wore away without the slightest aggressive movement on the part of the enemy. Thus time was given for half of our forces to arrive and take their places in the lines, while the rest of the army enjoyed a much needed half-day's repose.'

"It is to be presumed that before preparing an address that was to assume a historical character, Mr. Everett had obtained accurate knowledge of all that transpired within the Federal lines



from the most authentic sources, and doubtless he presents a true picture of the actual condition of things."

If General Lee was responsible for the delay the effects of which were so graphically described by Mr. Everett, if, in fact, his mind was undecided and vacillating as to when, where, and how he should begin, then his conduct on that occasion was at war with his whole character and history. Who can believe it? I repeat here a remark I have made on another occasion when vindicating General Lee against a charge of want of decision and boldness in action: "There is another reason, which to me is a most potent one; and that is, because I know that the boldest man in his strategic movements and his tactics on the field of battle, in all the Army of Northern Virginia, Stonewall Jackson not excepted, was General Robert E. Lee." I cannot believe, therefore, that he omitted to do anything necessary to carry out his avowed purpose of attacking the enemy at a very early hour on the morning of the 2nd, which every consideration so imperatively demanded, except to supersede General Longstreet with another commander of the First corps; and then the question arises: Where could one of sufficient rank have been found?

General Longstreet, or his annalist, has copied from the "Military Annals of Louisiana," a book I never heard of before, an absurd story about General Hays' having sent for me at the close of the fight on the 1st and urged an immediate advance on the heights, in which it is said that, though I agreed with Hays, I refused to allow him to seize those heights, because orders had been received from General Lee through Ewell to advance no further than Gettysburg, if we succeeded in capturing that place. As I have shown in my "Review," I received no orders whatever on that day from either General Ewell or General Lee until after the whole fighting was over, except the simple order on the march to move towards Gettysburg, the previous orders being to concentrate at Cashtown. General Longstreet says, in this connection: "General Hays told me ten years after the battle that he 'could have seized the heights without the loss of ten men.'" How mistaken General Hays was in making such a remark will abundantly appear from the facts I have already given in my "Review," and the statement of Bates in regard to the precautions taken by Steinwehr, whose division, of 4,000 men, occupied the heights

immediately confronting Hays, whose brigade was considerably less than 1,400 strong at the close of the fight.

General Longstreet further says, after giving his evidence to prove that no order was given for an attack at sunrise:

"Having thus disproved the assertions of Messrs. Pendleton and Early in regard to this rumored order for a sunrise attack, it appears that they are worthy of no further recognition; but it is difficult to pass beyond without noting the manner in which, by their ignorance, they marred the plans of their chief on the field of battle."

After referring to the removal of some seven pieces of artillery from one part of the field to another, as the manner in which General Pendleton, by his "ignorance," "marred the plans" of General Lee, General Longstreet is made to say: "General Early broke up General Lee's line of battle on the 2d of July, by detaching part of his division on some uncalled-for service, in violation of General Lee's orders, and thus prevented the co-operative attack of Ewell ordered by General Lee."

This statement must have been compiled by Gen. Longstreet's annalist from the copy of his assault on me which was furnished, for General Longstreet himself would hardly have reiterated it after I had so effectually exploded it in our controversy. My official report, as well as the very full statement contained in my "Review," show that two of my brigades were placed, on the afternoon of the 1st, before General Lee came to our part of the line, on the York road, to guard against a flank movement apprehended in that direction. They never were in the line on the 2nd at all, but Gordon's brigade was sent for on the 2nd, Stuart's cavalry having arrived, and got back just as Hays' and Hoke's brigades were moving to the assault of Cemetery Hill. The repetition of this statement is simply ridiculous, and shows how hard General Longstreet and his apologists are pressed. General Longstreet has not disproved the assertion made by General Pendleton that an order was given for the attack at sunrise. That assertion made by General Pendleton, and not by myself, was contained in an address delivered by him one year after mine had been delivered. General Longstreet has merely shown that four of General Lee's staff officers knew of no such order, but neither did they know what order was given, nor when any order was given for

the attack. He omits to give a very significant part of General Long's letter, which tends to show that some order must have been given for an attack early on the morning of the 2nd. The question, therefore, rests on an issue of veracity between General Longstreet and General Pendleton. The latter was General Lee's chief of artillery, who had very important duties to perform in regard to posting the artillery for the impending battle, and it was very natural that General Lee should communicate to him the time when the battle was to open, and what orders had been given in regard thereto. It was not necessary to communicate the same facts to the staff-officers, whose statements are given. General Pendleton professes to have obtained the information as to the order from General Lee himself, and I am disposed to side with him on the question of veracity, just as I am disposed to side with Colonel Taylor on the direct issue of veracity raised by General Longstreet with him in regard to the order for the use of Hood's and McLaws' divisions in the attack made on the 3d.

General Lee's statement of his orders in regard to this latter attack would imply that the orders originally given in regard to it were to make it with Longstreet's whole corps, and is therefore corroborative of Colonel Taylor's statement.

It is to be observed here that General Longstreet has heretofore denied the authenticity of General Lee's detailed report, first published in the *Historical Magazine*, New York, then in the *Southern Magazine*, Baltimore, and lastly among the Southern Historical Society Papers from another copy, which confirms the genuineness of the first. The article now given under the sanction of his name quotes partly from the preliminary report given in the Appendix to Bates' History of the Battle of Gettysburg and partly from the detailed report; but it appears that he thinks the latter was written in a different spirit from that in which the preliminary report was written, and being a "somewhat critical account of that battle," from it his "critics get all their points against him." In speaking of "Ewell's inaction," he says:

"Having failed to move at 4 o'clock, while the enemy was in his front, it was still more surprising that he did not advance at 5 o'clock with vigor and promptness, when the trenches in front of him were vacated, or rather held by one single brigade, as General Meade's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War states."

By this statement General Longstreet or his vicarious chronicler has endeavored to show that while the fighting was progressing on the enemy's left, our right, Ewell's corps, was confronted by only one brigade. This attempt to pervert Meade's testimony shows how little credit any of the statements or arguments contained in the article are entitled to.

Here is what Meade says in his testimony, page 333:

"During these operations upon the left flank, a division and two brigades of the Twelfth corps, which held the right flank, were ordered over for the purpose reinforcing the left. Only one brigade, however, arrived in time to take any part in the action, the enemy having been repulsed before the rest of the force came up. The absence of this large proportion of the Twelfth corps caused my extreme right flank to be held by one single brigade of the Twelfth corps, commanded by General Greene. The enemy perceiving this, made a vigorous attack upon General Greene, but were held at bay by him for some time, until he was reinforced by portions of the First and Eleventh corps, which were adjacent to him, when he succeeded in repulsing them."

In his official report, Bates' Battle of Gettysburg, page 240, Meade says:

"An assault was, however, made about eight P. M. on the Eleventh corps, from the left of the town, which was repelled by the assistance of troops from the Second and First corps. During the heavy assault upon our extreme left, portions of the Twelfth corps were sent as reinforcements. During their absence the line on the extreme right was held by a very much reduced force. This was taken advantage of by the enemy, who, during the absence of Gracy's division of the Twelfth corps, advanced and occupied part of the line."\*

It was then on the extreme right from which troops were taken, so as to leave only one brigade there. This was at Culp's Hill and on the right of it (the enemy's), where the sides of the hill were wooded and exceedingly rugged. This part of the line confronted Johnson's division, while Cemetery Hill itself was held by the First and Eleventh corps, which Butterfield shows in his testimony numbered more than 10,000 men on the 4th of July, after all the fighting on the 2nd and 3rd. In addition, the Second

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\*It will be seen by this statement of General Meade's, the witness adduced by General Longstreet to show that all the troops from Ewell's front except one brigade had been allowed, by "Ewell's inaction," to be thrown against him, that only one brigade from that point arrived in time to take part in the action on the enemy's left, Meade adding: "The enemy having been repulsed before the rest of the force came up."



corps, Hancock's, was on the left of the Eleventh corps, connecting with it. That corps had three divisions, only one of which was sent to the enemy's left during Longstreet's attack. The attack mentioned by Meade as having been made on the Eleventh corps, when troops from the Second and First corps came to its assistance, was the attack made by my two brigades described in my "Review."

That attack began sooner than Meade states. It began about sunset (see Bates), and my brigades were compelled to retire probably about or a little after 8 P. M. It will be seen that there is a very gross perversion, in the article of Meade's testimony. Instead of there being only one brigade to hold the trenches in front of Ewell, there was a force fully equal to the entire strength of Ewell's corps at that time, with two divisions of Hancock's corps in easy supporting distance. This attempt of General Longstreet or his apologist to misrepresent the facts for the purpose of casting censure on General Ewell, is wholly unjustified by any criticisms of the latter on him, and demonstrates how utterly unreliable the whole article is for historical purposes.\*

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\*The following is another instance of a perversion of the testimony by General Longstreet or his compiler. In referring to Colonel Taylor's account of the delay in the attack from our right on the 2d, the article proceeds:

"He (Colonel Taylor) says: 'General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected; [it appears that he was delayed by apprehensions that his troops would be taken in reverse as they advanced]. General Ewell, who had orders to co-operate with General Longstreet, and who was, of course, not aware of any impediment to the main attack, having reinforced General Johnson during the night of the 2d, ordered him forward early the next morning. In obedience to these instructions, General Johnson became hotly engaged before General Ewell could be informed of the halt that had been called on our right.'

"Let us look at the facts of this. Instead of 'making this attack at daylight,' General Ewell says: 'Just before the time fixed for General Johnson's advance the enemy attacked him to regain the works captured by Stuart the evening before.'

This is all that is given of Ewell's statement, and then follows an extract from Meade's testimony. The part of Colonel Taylor's statement, put in brackets above, was omitted in the article. Here is Ewell's whole statement as contained in his report:

"I was ordered to renew my attack at daylight Friday morning, and as Johnson's position was the only one affording hopes of doing this to advantage, he was reinforced by Smith's brigade of Early's division, and Daniel's and Rodes' (old) brigades of Rodes' division.

"Half an hour after Johnson attacked (on Friday morning), and when too late to recall him, I received notice that General Longstreet would not attack until 10 o'clock; but, as it turned out, his attack was delayed till after 2 o'clock. Just before the time fixed for Johnson's advance the enemy attacked him to regain the works captured by Stuart the evening before. They were repulsed with very heavy loss, and he attacked in turn, pushing the enemy almost to the top of the mountain, when the precipitous nature of the hill and an abatis of logs and stones, with a very heavy work on the crest of the hill, stopped his further advance. In Johnson's attack the enemy abandoned a portion of their works in disorder, and as they ran across an open space to another work, were exposed to the fire of Daniel's brigade at sixty or seventy yards. Our men were at this time under no fire of consequence, their aim was accurate, and General Daniel thinks that he killed there, in half an hour, more than in all the rest of the fighting.

"Repeated reports from the cavalry on our left that the enemy was moving heavy columns of infantry to turn General Johnson's left, at last caused him, about 1 P. M., to evacuate the works already gained. These reports reached me, also, and I sent Captain Brown, of my

The statement by General Alexander, who was only a colonel of artillery at Gettysburg, that the responsibility of ordering Pickett when to begin the charge on the third day was devolved on him, with permission even to abstain from giving the order or "advise," as it is called, while General Longstreet himself shrank from the responsibility properly attached to him, has excited profound astonishment. That statement is now confirmed by Gen. Longstreet's own version of the matter, and it becomes abundantly apparent that the orders and plans of General Lee did not receive from him that hearty support which was absolutely necessary to success.

I desire to say in conclusion, that I do not wish to be understood as in any manner reflecting upon the conduct of that superb body of men who constituted the First corps of the Army of Northern Virginia. Their part on this occasion, so far as devolved on them, was performed in a manner becoming soldiers battling for the righteous cause in which they were enlisted.

I must add that I have never at any time entertained the feeling that would exalt the soldiers from one state at the expense of those from another. It was my fortune to command at some time or other during the war soldiers from every Confederate state, including Kentucky and Missouri, except the state of Texas, and I also commanded the Maryland troops. I could cite instances in which the troops who fought under me from each of those states, respectively, performed the most brilliant and daring feats. As the soldiers from North Carolina, especially, have taken exception to the remarks and statements of others, I will take occasion to say, that every infantry organization from that state belonging to the Army of Northern Virginia, prior to my departure from it on my Valley campaign, had at some time been under my command, and there was but a very brief interval when I did not have North Carolina soldiers under me. I can say in all sincerity, that there

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staff, with a party of cavalry to the left, to investigate them, who found them to be without foundation; and General Johnson finally took up a position about three hundred yards in rear of the works he had abandoned, which he held under a sharp fire of artillery and exposed to the enemy's sharpshooters until dark."

Meade's testimony is not at all inconsistent with this statement of facts; but by wresting our short statement of Ewell's from the context and adding Meade's, the false impression is sought to be made that Johnson did not attack at all. General Longstreet complains of "Ewell's inaction" on the 2d. What must be thought of his inaction from daylight to 2 P. M. on the 3d?

were no better troops from any state in all that grand army than the North Carolina soldiers, and of all that bright galaxy of heroes who yielded their lives for their country's cause while serving with that army, the names of Anderson, Branch, Pender, Daniel, Ramseur, and Gordon of the cavalry, will stand among the foremost.

There was enough glory won by the Army of Northern Virginia for each state to have its full share and be content with it, and there is no occasion to wrangle over the distribution of the honors.

J. A. EARLY.

**The Peace Commission—Hon. R. M. T. Hunter's reply to President Davis' letter.**

[We deeply regret that there should be serious differences of opinion among distinguished leaders in our great struggle for Southern independence, and sincerely deprecate any personal feeling which may creep into the discussion of these differences; but, on the whole, it is, perhaps, better that these things should be ventilated by living actors than left to the uncertainties of future discussion. We have published, therefore, Mr. Hunter's first paper on the Peace Commission and Mr. Davis' letter in reply, and we now publish, without note or comment of our own, Mr. Hunter's rejoinder.]

To REV. J. WILLIAM JONES, D. D.,  
*Secretary Southern Historical Society:*

DEAR SIR: In your last issue I observe a letter from the Hon. Jefferson Davis, from which it appears that he takes offence at my letter to the *Philadelphia Times*, giving an account of the conference at Hampton Roads between Messrs. Lincoln and Seward and the Confederate Commissioners. No offence was intended and no good cause of offence was given by that account when fairly construed, in my opinion. The chief point of offence seems to have been that I said, "Even President Davis and his friends began to feel that it was expedient that the Confederate Government should show some desire for peace upon fair terms." Whether it was offensive because it imputed their sudden wish to the effect of Mr. Blair's mission, or because it implied that it had not always existed, I cannot clearly discover from the letter. Surely it was no disgrace to any man to think a little more seriously of peace after Mr. Blair's representations of the dangers of a further continuance of the war than before. I was told by a senator who had conversed with Mr. Blair, (I never conversed with him upon this subject,) that he affirmed our chances for success in the war to be utterly hopeless, as he said that the Federals would man their armies from abroad and pay them with our confiscated property. Was there nothing in all this to make a Confederate a little more thoughtful of the future? An entire brigade composed almost wholly of foreigners had been slaughtered on Marye's Hill at the battle of Fredericksburg; and it was well known that acts of confiscation had actually passed the Federal Congress. Under the circumstan-



ces in which we were then placed, could it be imputed as an offence in any one at the head of our Government that he thought the necessity for peace a little more urgent than he had ever done before? He seems, too, to have taken umbrage at my describing this desire of peace as new. He says: "When Mr. Hunter penned these statements he must have known that the inaugural address of President Davis under the Provisional Government, delivered four years prior to the period of which he wrote, expressed a strong desire for peace; that a few days after his inauguration he appointed commissioners to go to Washington with full authority to negotiate for a peaceful and equitable settlement between the two governments; that in many, if not in all of his messages to Congress, there was shown the same desire to terminate the war by any settlement that would be fair and honorable to both parties; that hoping something from the relation of personal friendship formerly existing between President Lincoln and Vice-President Stephens, the latter was sent to seek an interview with Mr. Lincoln, in which, beginning with the subject of suffering prisoners, it was expected that other questions might be reached in the interests of peace." Upon declamations of vague generalities in inaugural addresses and messages to Congress I set little account. But did President Davis ever intimate the terms upon which he would accept peace? Did he ever originate any negotiation or make any overture for peace upon any terms on which it could probably be obtained? I never doubted but that he would accept peace if our independence were acknowledged. But did he ever offer peace on any conditions short of this? At the beginning I believe he did offer to make peace if our independence were acknowledged and the public property fairly divided. This was fair enough, it is true; but did any one, even President Davis, suppose that such terms would be accepted at that time? As to Vice-President Stephens' mission being an offer for settlement and peace on fair terms, I can only say he did not think so. In the 2nd vol. of his *History of the War*, p. 506, speaking of this mission, he says, "as undertaken," "it was not the one proposed by me, nor was it as undertaken in any sense an attempt to offer terms of negotiation for peace."

It seems he also objected to my stating that the insertion in our instructions that "we should treat on the basis of two coun-

tries," (an order which it was rumored that Mr. Benjamin had in vain endeavored to have stricken out,) gave great offence, and a correspondence with that gentleman is introduced to show that he did not ask to have these words stricken out, but had only failed to introduce them in a draft of instructions drawn by himself, and that he agreed to "your insertion of them as a means of protecting your character and honor."

I did not assert this as a fact in regard to Mr. Benjamin, but merely related it as a "rumor," which, if true, proved a difference of opinion between that gentleman and Mr. Davis on that subject.

I did not deal with those words critically. I did not pronounce them as right or wrong, but treated them historically, and said they made difficulties in securing an interview. Mr. Davis denies that they did so; but I doubt not but that my colleagues, Messrs. Stephens and Campbell, will confirm my statements.

Mr. Davis asserts that we were instructed to confer at Washington. Whether he means that we had no right to confer anywhere else I know not. If he considered the place as a matter of importance he should have been more specific, and doubtless he would have been obeyed. But we all supposed that the main object of the commission was the *conference*, and that the place was a matter of little or no importance. Taking the instructions and the circumstances under which they were issued together, no one, I think, would have concluded differently.

None, I think, would have inferred from that conversation that the place was a matter of importance, as the main design of the conference was not to treat of peace, but to ascertain the disposition of the enemy. I thought any limitation of the range of discussion was unwise and inexpedient, but I did not say so in the communication which seems to have given offence. Thus it seems to have been viewed by the other party as an improper limitation on the field of discussion, although I did not anticipate the objection I confess; I suppose from Mr. Benjamin's correspondence that he did also. I considered the objection when made as idle and frivolous. In a matter concerning so deeply the happiness and welfare of a great people, I regarded such small points as absurd and frivolous.

At the time when this debate occurred I considered the introduction unfortunate, but if intended as a restriction upon making

a treaty of peace on the condition of reunion I should have considered them as right at that time. I knew when we started on that mission that the Confederacy was very low in point of resources; but the extent of our destitution I did not understand, until on our way to City Point Judge Campbell gave me the substance of his recent letter to Mr. Breckenridge on that subject, stating our utter destitution. I never supposed that we were authorized to treat for peace when sent on that mission; and if we had been, none of the Confederate commissioners, in my opinion, would at that time have accepted peace on the condition of reunion. I certainly would not, nor if it had been offered on such conditions would it have been accepted then either by the President or the Confederate senate. Such at least was and is my opinion.

During our absence on this trip, Fort Fisher, the last of our forts, where blockade runners with their supplies could be received, was taken by the enemy. To the world without we were hermetically sealed by the blockade; and within the Confederacy, the letter of Judge Campbell, assistant secretary of war, represented our supplies of clothes, food, and arms as nearly, if not entirely exhausted.

But at Old Point Mr. Lincoln had declared he would not treat with us with arms in our hands; a cruel and unwise declaration, for what is that but a demand for a surrender at discretion. How can a beligerent lay down his arms before treating without submitting himself to the mercy of his adversary? Under the influence of this feeling, in which we nearly all concurred, I did declare in a speech at the African church, that my feelings were outraged by such a declaration, and urged a continued resistance sooner than submit to such terms, or if we should be forced to yield, to make that submission as dear to the enemy as possible. But a considerate friend of mine who heard me told me that he had never listened to me with so little pleasure, and thought me wrong all the while. "Knowing as I did," he said, "that our means of resistance were nearly all gone, and that our defeat was inevitable, I ought not to have endeavored to inflame the minds of the people and make any possible accommodation short of absolute submission impossible." I defended myself at the time, but have often thought since that under the circumstances I ought not to have made the speech. I

did not utterly neglect my duty to the people, but endeavored to soften their fall as much as possible.

Shortly after my return to Richmond, in an interview I had with the President in his own house, not at my instance, but at his invitation, I urged that if he thought as I did, that all chance of our success was gone and further resistance hopeless, it became him to consider whether some accommodation with the enemy might not be obtained which would be better than the terms that would be allowed us after a surrender at discretion. I urged it upon him that he owed it to his own reputation and character as well as to a gallant people to leave some evidence of his having endeavored to mitigate their sufferings and secure them some relief when further resistance had become hopeless.

I told him, further, that I knew the difficulties in the way of his making the first propositions for treating to the Senate; that many would treat it as a confession of despair, and this might only impel the enemy to greater exertions; but that I thought I could promise that the Senate would pass resolutions requesting him to negotiate for peace and ascertain the terms that could be had, if he would allow me to assure them that he could carry them out and do his utmost to settle the matter on the best terms possible. I assured him that I thought there would be no difficulty in obtaining these resolutions, by which the Senate would have assumed the responsibility and take it from his shoulders. I said that, if necessary, I would introduce the resolutions myself, and we could draw them together.

There was a senator of high character and of many noble qualities sick at a neighboring house. He had so much influence in the Confederacy that, if he had been for peace, the movement would have been irresistible in the Congress if backed by the Government. Upon the proposition of one of us—I forget which—we went to see him and discussed the matter. Unfortunately, as I thought then, and still think, he did not concur with me. When questioned during these interviews of my own opinion as to the chances of peace, I replied that I could not say, whilst remembering Mr. Lincoln's declaration that he would not treat whilst we retained arms in our hands, but said that the interests for peace were so great that I doubted if he would be allowed to retain that extreme ground; but at any rate, if we made just efforts for peace



and failed through the cruelty or vengeance of our enemy, the fact of our having made the attempt would relieve our Government, and particularly the President, from much responsibility that would otherwise attach to us. (Mr. Lincoln came to Richmond just before his death, and spoke of propositions of peace in a conversation with Judge Campbell, which indicated that we might, perhaps, have maintained our autonomy in the states, which would have been vastly better than what did occur after the surrender.) After we separated I scarcely expected to hear more from this conversation; but soon, perhaps the next day after, I heard it was bruited all over Richmond that I had been thoroughly conquered, had submitted, and was disposed to make peace on any terms, with many other disparaging remarks. Amongst others, the President's aids were said to be freely discussing these matters. How did they get hold of them? It is true there was no positive pledge of secrecy in these conversations, but, from their nature and the circumstances discussed, their confidential character was to have been implied, and ought to have been respected.

The main reasons which led me to think that the President ought to move in this matter were found in the condition of our resources, which could not be revealed to the world without doing much mischief. Indeed, it was impossible to do it: so that I was taken at a great disadvantage. How the character of the conversation got out I never did know, but always had my suspicions.

It was not very long after this before General Lee came to my room one night to talk upon this subject of peace. It was the last time I ever saw him, and our conversation ran nearly through the night. He said if I thought there was a chance for any peace which would secure better terms than were likely to be given after a surrender at discretion, he thought it my duty to make the effort. I related to him my former effort and its result. I told him it would do no sort of good, for any effort I might make would be misrepresented and laid before the public as soon as it was made, with a view to injure my influence, in which it would probably be successful. I told him I would engage in no confidential work with Mr. Davis unless the former affair were satisfactorily explained. For, although I did not know that Mr. Davis had revealed the former conversation, yet the circumstances under which it was reported and the use made of it were suspicious. He again

repeated his remark that, in his opinion, it was my duty to offer such resolutions in the Senate. He said if he were to recommend peace negotiations publicly it would be almost equivalent to surrender. I told him I was aware of this, but, if he thought the chance for success desperate, I thought he ought to say so to the President. To this he made no reply. In the whole of this conversation he never said to me he thought the chances were over; but the tone and tenor of his remarks made that impression on my mind. He spoke of a recent affair in which the Confederates had repelled very gallantly an attempt of the Federals to break his line. The next day, as he rode along the lines, one of the soldiers would thrust forth his bare foot and say, "General, I have no shoes." Another would declare, as he passed, "I am hungry; I haven't enough to eat." These and other circumstances betraying the utmost destitution he repeated with a melancholy air and tone which I shall never forget.

Gen. Breckenridge came to me not long after this and repeated Lee's advice in so nearly the same words that I began almost to suspect them of concert of action. I related to him the first transaction, as I had done to General Lee, and told him I saw no hope for peace unless the President would pledge himself to co-operate, which I hardly thought he would do. In this I may have been guilty of forgetting some high-sounding asseverations for peace in his first inaugural after the establishment of the Provisional Government, but I hardly think that my recent experience with him would have justified me in considering him as a firm and long-proclaimed advocate for peace.

But how came it that we were in the terrible state of destitution described by Judge Campbell in his letter to General Breckenridge, dated March 5th, 1865. "At present," he says, "these embarrassments have become so much accumulated that the late Commissary-General pronounces the problem of the subsistence of the army of Northern Virginia, in its present position, unsolvable; and the present Commissary-General requires the fulfilment of conditions, though not unreasonable, nearly impossible. The remarks upon the subject of subsistence are applicable to the forage, fuel, and clothing requisite for the army service, and in regard to the supply of animals for cavalry and artillery. The transportation by railroad south of this city (Richmond) is now

limited to the Danville road. The present capacity of that road is insufficient to bring supplies adequate to the support of the army of Northern Virginia, and the continuance of that road at even its existing condition cannot be relied on. It can render no assistance in facilitating the movement of troops. \* \* \* The Chief of Ordnance reports that he has a supply of 25,000 arms, He has been dependent on a foreign market for one-half of the arms used. This source is nearly cut off." It was quite cut off a few days after by the fall of Fort Fisher, the only port through which we could introduce supplies from abroad.

How came the country to be so bare of the supplies necessary for the efficient prosecution of the war. When we seceded the country had gathered in a large crop of cotton—between four and five millions of bales. That amount of cotton, in my opinion, would have exchanged for food, clothing, arms, medical stores, and all the necessary supplies in abundance for the war—enough, probably, to have enabled General Lee, with the troops which he handled with such consummate ability, to have conquered a peace upon fair terms. But those who believed "that cotton was king" had an extravagant notion of its value and a queer theory as to its use. They believed that the Government ought to acquire it, and sell it to supply its wants. An impracticable view, in my opinion. Government makes a poor trader, in peace or in war, and could not have commanded the means to utilize such a crop. But the people and the Government were in favor of prohibiting private individuals from using the article by selling it where it would bring the most, and exercised a strict surveillance over the subject. On the contrary, the only mode of effecting the exchange spoken of above was through private individuals, and if this had been allowed and encouraged early in the war, as ought to have been done, that exchange might have been made—if not wholly, to a great extent—and the horrors of the war much abated.

Whilst this state of things continued, those abroad who had accumulated cotton profited by the blockade, and had no interest to raise it. The time when the wants of the cotton market would make both Yankees and English count upon raising the blockade never came, and the cotton remained on hand, for the most part with but little benefit to any one—reminding me of an old woman I once heard of, who, coming into possession of some money unex-

pectedly by the death of a relation, was applied to by a nephew for the loan of it. No, indeed, she said; she would lock it in her trunk and live upon the interest. Upon a par with this was the Confederate policy as to cotton, which, I believe, might have saved the cause if it had been properly used. But early in the war the Government would not have allowed its use, as I would have proposed, if privileged to decide upon the matter, while the Government was very far from acting on any such policy; for Mr. Ruffin, who had much to do with the Commissary Department, assures me that after all access to foreign markets had been closed, and the only avenue of approach for supplies to the Confederacy was through Federal territory, the Commissary Department was prevented by the Government from exchanging cotton with the Federals for commissary stores. The fear of hostile criticism at home on the part of our Government was intense, I believe; but, that it could prevent the necessary action in such a case as this surprised me very much, I confess. If I did not know it before, I was destined to learn how necessary it was to have a great man at the head of a government, to serve a people in spite of themselves. The capacity to brave public opinion in the discharge of duty is rare, I know. I have no right to blame any man for wanting it, nor do I; for all men are as God and themselves have made them, and for that they are in no manner responsible to me. But when Mr. Davis knew the state of destitution into which we had fallen, if he had possessed this abiding love of peace since the adoption of the permanent government, is it not strange that he would do nothing to secure it by accommodation, except what was done in the abortive effort at Old Point? Did I give any just cause of offence in pressing on him a different view of his duties? And yet I seem to have done it, judging by his conduct towards me since.

General Wigfall, that erratic child of genius and misfortune, used sometimes to say that he almost thought at times that Mr. Barnwell and myself would be nearly as responsible for the failure which was coming on the country through the maladministration of Mr. Davis as he himself, for we sustained him in all that he did. It was true that we supported him to the best of our ability, for, placed at the head of the Government, we believed that it was of vital importance to uphold him. It seems from his conduct towards



me since my return from the conference at Old Point that he has felt no obligation for my course. "Drawing (says he) perhaps, as men frequently do, upon his own consciousness, he does injustice to the heroic mothers of the land in representing them as flinching from the prospect of having their boys of sixteen or under exposed to the horrors and hardship of military service." I confess to feeling reluctance to seeing such boys exposed to the hardships and sufferings of war, and Mr. Davis much mistakes a mother's heart if he supposes she could behold her boy of sixteen or under exposed to the hardships of war under such circumstances with indifference. Had the policy been long pursued of sending these boys to the war without clothes to cover them, without sufficient food to sustain them, without even the arms necessary to make their puny strength as efficient as it might be, and altogether in a condition in which they could neither injure their enemies nor help their friends, but must inevitably have been consigned to useless and unnecessary death, he would have heard from those mothers in a style very different from what he seems to suppose. When these involuntary Curtii had been devoted to the infernal gods and the massacre of the innocents had been accomplished, the parents of those children would not have characterized his policy as either valiant or patriotic, but would have spoken of it in terms very far from complimentary. It would have been said that, if the country required the sacrifice of a military victim, the President himself, by age and station, would have played the part of Curtius far better and should have himself become the victim, and yet in no history of his flight from Richmond to the woods in Georgia where he was captured have I seen it stated that his head was once turned towards the enemy with that purpose. Nor do I blame him. Voluntary self-sacrifice is neither called for nor proper in any case. It would then have been nearly as insensate as the wanton sacrifice of the children under circumstances when they could do no service, but must have perished either from starvation or in battle. The character for valor which is won by exposing others to unprofitable and unnecessary suffering with insensibility and indifference is not worth much, and yet how often is it sought in that very way. "The destruction of the youth of a country," said a celebrated writer and statesman of antiquity, "is like robbing the year of its spring." Rob the year of

its spring, and we may no more expect either seed-time or harvest; but the country must become utterly waste and desolate, a fit subject for such melancholy speculations as travellers some times make over a land wasted and depopulated by the ravages of war. But I will pursue this subject no further.

There is yet another fling made at me which I ought, perhaps, to notice. He says that my opposition to the conscribing of negroes was a chief obstacle to the passage of a bill for it. That my opposition to this bill was some obstacle to its passage I had supposed, but that it was a chief obstacle, I had not imagined. I say this not to avoid the responsibility of opposition to that ill-starred measure. I wish I could have defeated it altogether, for I regard its approach to a passage as a stain upon Confederate history. It afforded, I believe, plausible ground against them for the accusation of falsehood in professing to secede from the United States Government, in part, and mainly on the plea that it was, by reason of their fear that the party in power would emancipate the negroes in defiance of the constitution and in violation of their pledge, which, as we believed, was implied in their adoption of that instrument, by which they bound themselves to protect the institution. And now it would be said we had done the very thing which we professed to fear from them, and without any more constitutional right than they would have had, if they had done the same thing. I never believed that our cause had the least chance of success under the Government which proposed the absurd and mischevous law which so nearly passed the Senate. It was viewed, I think, by nearly all considerate people as a confession of despair by the Government, and I think they no longer had the least confidence in it. The effect of its passage, I believed, would be to drive the negro from us into the embraces of the Federals, from a place where he was doing us much good as a laborer, to another in which he would render the enemy some service as a soldier. Had that bill remained long on the statute book we should have had, I think, the same dispute as to negro suffrage which we have lately witnessed, with this difference: the actual dispute was between the conqueror and the conquered, in that which probably would have been produced the character would have been intercenine, and as between neighbors and friends, far more violent and bitter than between enemies; but it was an im-

practicable measure, and incapable of execution from the beginning. Judge Campbell, in the same letter to General Breckenridge from which I have been quoting, says: "I do not regard the slave population as a source from which an addition to the army can be successfully derived. If the use of slaves had been resorted to in the beginning of the war for service in the engineer corps, and as teamsters and laborers, it might have been judicious. Their employment since 1862 has been difficult, and latterly almost impracticable. The attempt to collect 20,000 has been obstructed and nearly abortive. The enemy have raised almost as many from the fugitives occasioned by the draft as ourselves from its execution. General Holmes reports 1,500 fugitives in one week from North Carolina. Colonel Blount reported a desertion of 1,210 last summer in Mobile; and Governor Clarke of Mississippi entreats the suspension of a call for them in that state. As a practicable measure I cannot see how a slave force can be collected, armed, and equipped at the present time." I find in an abstract of some remarks I made on this bill in March, 1865, reported in the *Examiner*, that I said: "The commandant of conscripts, with authority to impress twenty thousand slaves between last September and the present time, (March 7, 1865,) had been able to get but 4,000, and of these 3,500 had been obtained from Virginia and North Carolina, and five hundred from Alabama."

To the passage of such a bill as this Mr. Davis says "my opposition was a chief obstacle." That I did oppose it I neither deny nor repent. Indeed, I have been in the habit of considering the introduction of this bill in the Senate as a virtual termination of the war, though, doubtless, not so designed. But from that period I think the Government lost the confidence of the country, and all hope of success was over; for we then virtually adopted the policy which we professed to fear from our adversaries, and discredited our country for sincerity and truthful dealing. But it was introduced without much previous notice, and I hold the Government, not the country, responsible for its adoption. As a military measure it fell still-born from the Government, and did not last long enough to produce the full measure of its probable mischiefs.

"A true-hearted Confederate," says Mr. Davis, "it might have been thought reasonably, instead of seeking to put the President in the attitude of renewing efforts for conference after previous

rejections, without any intervening overtures from the other indicating a more conciliatory spirit, would rather have made prominent the fact that it was the assurance of one coming directly from President Lincoln which led to the appointment at that time of the Commission."

If I ever knew of that assurance through Mr. Blair I had forgotten it when I wrote the article for the *Philadelphia Times*, and it seems I was not so far wrong when I said Mr. Davis' desire for peace, great as it was, began about the time of Mr. Blair's visit to Richmond. I was not so far wrong, because Mr. Davis himself says that the mission was sent because of a message from Mr. Lincoln through Mr. Blair, and he thinks no true-hearted Confederate would have represented the mission as proceeding from any other cause until the demands of etiquette had been complied with as in this case. Such, at least, I understand to be his ground of offense. Now, I leave it to any impartial person to say if I did not suppose a far more creditable cause of action when I referred to the terrible condition of the country as creating in his mind a desire for peace than he did for himself in assigning this "red-tape" reason for his action? Would he have regarded more this question of etiquette than the suffering of a great and gallant people who had trusted him to lead them? In other words, would he have beheld that sad condition with insensibility and indifference and refused to treat even for relief until the demands of his dignity had been satisfied? What could have been more sacred than his duty when that people had nearly reached the point where they could no longer resist than to obtain for them some relief by treaty, if possible, from the ruin and penalties likely to befall them if forced to surrender at discretion? With my conception of a President's duty in such a case, I place him in far better position than he puts himself in regard to this conference.

In Mr. Davis' opinion, as a "true-hearted Confederate," I ought to have preferred to think that he sent the mission because of Mr. Lincoln's message rather than from a consideration of the sufferings of the country. In my opinion, I should have been no true-hearted man if I preferred that he should have been influenced by Mr. Lincoln's message more than by a desire to mitigate the miseries by a treaty, if possible, inevitably about to fall on the country unless averted in that manner. On the contrary, I should



have considered him wanting in a conception of duty and a true sense of the obligation he owed to a gallant and confiding people who had honored him and placed him in supreme command to defend and protect them.

If Mr. Davis says he had a strong desire for peace from the time of the adoption of the permanent Government I accept the fact upon his statement, and there let it stand. I cannot be pressed into service as a witness to that fact by having it said that I must have known it. I knew of no such thing, nor do I know of any occurrence in Mr. Davis' history which justifies such a belief. If he had made propositions for peace soon after the second battle of Cold Harbor, I think it probable that on the basis of reunion, to which we came at last, we might have saved everything else for which we were contending. But, unfortunately, none of us understood the true nature of the crisis—I no more than the rest. I do not, therefore, blame Mr. Davis for an omission of which I was as likely to have been guilty as he was. Indeed, I do not wish to blame him at all. Nothing is more unseemly in my eyes than disputes between those who have held prominent positions in the Confederacy during the war. Nothing but the necessity of self-defence would induce me to engage in such a dispute, and the responsibility, in my opinion, rests not upon me, but upon him who made the attack.

Very respectfully,

R. M. T. HUNTER.

NOTE.—Mr. Davis says, in his letter: "The truth is that the phraseology of the instructions constituted no embarrassment to them at all." This he asserts positively, in opposition to my statement to the contrary, about a matter of which he had no personal knowledge. Hear Mr. Stephens and Judge Campbell in corroboration of my statement. These gentlemen and myself were the only Confederates who had any personal knowledge of what happened at the Conference. A comparison of his statement with theirs, I think, will not much help his character for historical accuracy.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
WASHINGTON, D. C., 3d November, 1877.

Hon. ROBERT M. T. HUNTER, *Richmond, Va.*:

MY DEAR SIR: Your letter of a few days ago was duly received. I think you were entirely correct in saying that the expression of

"the two countries" by President Davis in his letter to Mr. Blair did throw difficulties in the way of the reception of the Peace Commissioners (*so-called*) by President Lincoln on the notable occasion to which you refer.

I do not understand you to say in your letter to the *Philadelphia Times* that these words gave rise to any obstacle in the progress of the Conference or the object for which it was sought, except in the reception of the Confederate Commissioners. It was upon this point mainly our delay at City Point hinged.

But upon all these questions and matters my views have been very fully as well as minutely given in "The War Between The States," &c., vol. 2, page 576, *et seq.*, to which I refer you for details.

Yours very truly,

ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS.

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169 ST. PAUL STREET, BALTIMORE,  
31st October, 1877.

MY DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 28th instant has been received and I proceed to comply with your request. The Commissioners appointed in 1865 to confer with the President of the United States concerning peace were furnished with a letter addressed to Mr. Francis P. Blair by President Lincoln, wherein the latter consented to receive persons coming from those in authority in the Southern States who desired to make peace on the basis "of *one common country*." This letter we were to exhibit at the lines of the Federal armies and told it would serve us as a passport to Washington City.

The letters of appointment for the Commissioners, and I believe the treasure with which our expenses was to be borne were delivered to me by Mr. Washington, of the State Department of the Confederate States, at night, after our interview with the Executive. I noticed to Mr. Washington the letter of appointment did not correspond to the letter of Mr. Lincoln to Mr. Blair, and that it might make difficulty.

I learnt from him there had been a discussion and a difference between Mr. Davis and Mr. Benjamin on the subject, and it had been so settled. We left the morning after, and I gave to Mr. Stephens and to yourself the papers on the way to Petersburg.

There was detention at Petersburg. The Federal officers did not understand our passport, if I may so call it, and had to apply to Washington City. While awaiting instructions, and within two or three days after our departure General Grant allowed us to go to City Point, his headquarters. Within two days or more Colonel Eckert, an officer of the United States, arrived at City Point from Washington City. He had a copy of the letter from President Lincoln to Mr. Blair. With General Grant he came to

us, and enquired whether we accepted the conditions of the letter he bore, and which we had been advised of and furnished with?

The only answer we could make was to submit our letter of appointment to observation. The discrepancy between obtaining a peace on the basis of "one common country", and a peace "between *two* countries" was pointed out, and we were told we could not proceed. We argued that peace was desirable and desired, and that the information sought was how peace was to be had. I remember our friend Mr. Stephens suggested that neither note was accurate, for that thirty-six countries (States) were involved. General Grant and Colonel Eckert retired and conferred, and were most emphatic in their refusal after this information. We addressed one, and perhaps more letters, to those officers, to change the resolution so that the expedition might not be wholly abortive, but without result.

During the night following General Grant visited the Commissioners, and sat with Mr. Stephens and yourself for some time. I was sick and not present.

As a consequence of his intercourse he telegraphed President Lincoln favorably in respect to the Conference, and recommended that he should see the Commissioners. The following day, perhaps, we heard that a conference would take place at Hampton Roads, and perhaps on the day after the Conference took place. The correspondence of the Commissioners, the report of General Grant, and the result of the Conference were communicated to the Congress of the United States by President Lincoln in February, 1865. By a reference to these the dates may be seen. I speak only from memory.

At Hampton Roads Mr. Stephens, with clearness and precision, stated the conditions we had been instructed to place before the President and the dispositions we had in respect to them, and which we had supposed were more or less settled upon.

President Lincoln disclaimed all knowledge of any such proposed connections, denied having given any sort of authority to any one to hold out any expectations of any arrangements of the kind being made, and declared that he would listen to no proposition which did not include an immediate recognition of the National authority in all the States and the abandonment of resistance to it.

I confess that these answers did not surprise me, and that any other would have filled me with amazement.

Very truly, your friend,

JOHN A. CAMPBELL.

*Hon. R. M. T. HUNTER, Richmond, Va.*

## EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS.

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THE ANNUAL MEETING OF OUR SOCIETY, on the 31st of October last, was a decided success. The hall of the House of Delegates, kindly tendered us by His Excellency Governor Kemper, was packed to its utmost capacity, while many turned away unable to find even standing room.

The oration of General John T. Morgan was able, eloquent, and effective, and gave universal satisfaction. We deeply regret that the pressure upon our columns compels us to postpone its publication until our next number. For the same reason we are obliged to postpone the publication of our Annual Report.

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THE REUNION OF THE VIRGINIA DIVISION OF THE ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA ASSOCIATION, on the evening of the 1st of November, was in every respect a most brilliant affair. The oration of Leigh Robinson, Esq., on "*The Battle of the Wilderness*," was ehaste, eloquent, and patriotic, and a valuable contribution to this series of historical addresses. By the way, what other army that ever existed could furnish from among its subalterns such orators as Colonel Charles Marshall, Colonel C. S. Venable, Major John W. Daniel, Captain W. Gordon McCabe, and Private Leigh Robinson? The banquet at the St. Claire hotel was presided over by the president (General W. H. F. Lee), and was a magnificent affair. We regret that we have not room for further notice of the "feast of reason and flow of soul" which made the occasion one of far more than ordinary interest.

The officers of last year (General W. H. F. Lee, president, George L. Christian and Leroy S. Edwards, secretaries, Major R. Stiles, treasurer, &c.,) were unanimously re-elected.

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RENEWALS for 1878 are now in order. With this number the subscriptions of a large number of our subscribers will expire, and we beg that they will notify us *at once* of their desire for us to continue our monthly visits by forwarding the amount of their subscription *by check, post-office money-order, or in registered letter*. We beg immediate attention to this matter, as we cannot send our January number to any who shall have failed to comply with our terms, which are \$3 *per annum, cash in advance*.

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THE FINANCES OF THE SOCIETY, our friends will be glad to learn, are in a much more satisfactory condition than they were several months ago. If our



receipts for the current year are as large as they have been the past year (and we have every reason to believe they will be much larger) we can easily *meet all of our obligations, and have money in the treasury.* But we still desire to enroll additional *life* members, and to secure a list of new subscribers in every section. We beg our friends to help us.

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WANT OF SPACE compels us to leave out of this number General Lane's report of Gettysburg, a letter from Colonel J. B. Walton, Chief of Artillery of Longstreet's Corps, and other papers which we are obliged to put off.

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### Books Received.

We acknowledge the receipt of the following books, which we propose to notice so soon as we can find room:

**THE BLOCKADE RUNNER.** By Capt. Wilkinson, Confederate States Navy. New York: Sheldon & Co. A book of deep interest and great value.

**FOUR YEARS WITH LEE.** By Colonel Walter H. Taylor, A. A. G. of the Army of Northern Virginia. New York: D. Appleton & Co. A book of rare historic value, and which *settles* the question of relative numbers engaged in all of the great battles of the two armies.

**"THIRTY-FOUR YEARS."** By John Marchmont. Spartanburg, S. C.: R. & J. H. Bryee. A new novel whose scene is laid in the South. A good plot well sustained.

From A. S. Barnes & Co., (through R. L. DeLea, agent, Richmond,) Mahan's Civil War, Barnes' Brief History of the United States, Historical School Reader, History of England.









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